



QVOD FELICITER VORTAT REIP: LITERARIÆ
V.C. FRAN: DE VERVLAMIO PHILOSOPH: LIBERTATIS
ASSERTOR AVDAX, SCIENTIARV REPARATOR FELIX
ACVNDI MENTISQ MAGNVS ARBITER INCLYTIS
MAX: TERRARVM ORBIS ACAD: OXON: CANTAB: Q. IAM
SVAM INSTAVR: VOTO SVSCEPTO VIVVS DECERNEBAT
OBIIT V NON: APRIL: II D: M: KAROLI. I.
PP AVG: clɔ lɔc XXVI.

Will: Marshall Sculpsit. 1640.



QVOD FELICITER VORTAT REIP: LITERARIÆ
V.C. FRAN: DE VERVLAMIO PHILOSOPH: LIBERTATIS
ASSERTOR AVDAX, SCIENTIARV REPARATOR FELIX
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OBIIT V NON: APRIL: II D: M: KAROLI. I.
PP AVG: clɔ lɔc XXVI.

Will: Marshall Sculpsit. 1640.


MUNDVS VISIBILIS
RATIONE ET EXPERIENTIA FOEDERANTVR
MUNDVS INTELLECTVALIS
INSTAVR·MAG·P·I·
OXONIVM
OF THE
ADVANCEMENT AND
PROFICIENCE OF LEARNING
or the
PARTITIONS OF SCIENCES
IX Bookes
Written in Latin by the Most Eminent
Illustrious & Famous LORD
FRANCIS BACON
Baron of Verulam Vicont St Alban
Counsellour of Estate and Lord
Chancellor of England.
Interpreted
by GILBERT WATS.
MONITI
I. Partit. Scientiarū
II. Novū Organum
III. Hist: Naturalis
Multi pertransibunt & augebitur Scientia.
SCIENTIÆ
HISTORIA
MEMORIA
IMAGINATIO
POESIS
RATIO
PHILOSOPHIA
NATVRALIS
HOMO
HVMANA
DEVS
DIVINA
OXFORD.
Printed by Leon: Lichfield,
Printer to the University, for
Rob: Young, & Ed: Forrest.
clɔbc XL.
W. Marshall sculpsit.

SACRATISSIMO DNO NOSTRO

CAROLO

DEI GRATIA MAG. BRITANNIÆ FRANCIÆ ET HIBERNIÆ REGI. TERRÆ MARISQ. POTENTISSIMO PRINCIPI. OCEANI BRITANNICI AD QUATUOR MUNDI PLAGAS DISPARTITI IMPERATORI. DNO VIRGINIÆ ET VASTORUM TERRITORIORUM ADJACENTIUM ET DISPERSARUM INSULARUM IN OCEANO OCCIDENTALI.

CHRISTIANÆ FIDEI DEFENSORI PACIS INSTAURATORI PUB. SECURITATIS AUCTORI PIO FEL. AUG.

NEC-NON

SUB SUI NUMINIS
INFLUENTIA AC CLIENTELA
DUOBUS MAX. MUNDI LUMINARIBUS
PERPETUIS SAPIENTIÆ FLAMMIS
CERTISS. SCIENTIARUM CYNOSURIS
UTRISQ. ANGLIÆ ACADEMIIS

INFIMUS HUMILLIMUS

VERULAMII INTERPRES
HANC PRIMAM INSTAURATIONIS
MAGNÆ PARTEM

D. N. C. Q.

TO THE

PRINCE

OF GREAT BRITAIN
FRANCE AND IRELAND
THE GROWING GLORY
of a Future Age.

THE ſacrifice of my Devotions in the Dedication of theſe Labours (*excellent* PRINCE) had gone a more humble way of Ambition, than through the hands of Kings and Princes, could I afterwards have juſtified ſuch humiliations. But the Tenure of this work is a Title-Royall, which no laps of time nor alteration of language can reverſe. In the Originall entitled to a King; ſo continued in the Tranſlation, and ſo in a direct line deſcends upon *Your Highneſſe*, as a part of a Royall Patrimony, which I durſt not alienate by a lower inſcription. The Author is Sir *Francis Bacon*, a name well known in the European world, a learned man, happily the learneſt, that ever lived, ſince the decay

of the Grecian and Romane Empires; when learning was at a high pitch; and which rise and fell with those Monarchies; for Scepters and Sciences have the same revolutions, the same periods. In the vast spaces of time between those and these last Ages, Philosophy hath bin, as it were in a slumber, for many centuries of years. For after the Christian faith grew up, the most writers betook themselves to Theology, and some mistaking the right limits of Faith and Reason, fell fowle upon Aristotle and other Philosophers, as Patriarches of Eresy, which were the Patrons of Reason. Somewhat awaked from this slumber she was, by the Arabian writers, the Schoole-Doctors and Spanish Interpreters; made more active by the Chimique Philosophers, but never perfectly recovered untill the daies of this Author, who is the first that ever joynd Rationall & Experimentall Philosophy in a regular correspondence; which before was either a subtlety of words, or a confusion of matter. He after he had survaied all the Records of Antiquity, after the volumnes of men, betook himselfe to the study of the volumne of the world, and having conquerd what ever books possest, set upon the Kingdome of Nature, and carried that victory very farre; and which was more

than

than thoſe victories, himſelfe being mortall, left ſuch lawes behind him, as may ſuffice to ſubdue the reſt, if Princes encourage men, and men be not wanting to themſelves. This attempt of his was favour'd by the ſtarres of his Nativity. For it was his felicity to live in the times of two *Great Patrons of Learning*, K. James *Your Highneſſe* Grandfather of bleſſed memory, and Your Royall Father now Raigning; and it was their glory that he lived in their times; and will be the eternall honour of this Nation, that the *Greateſt Kings* and the *Greateſt Philoſopher* met togither in one age, in one Iland. By the favour of *his Prince*, who well knew the valew of Learning and Learned men, he was raiſed to the higheſt dignities in the Civile ſtate; and by his own happie Genius, to the higheſt degree in the ſtate of learning; which was the greater wonder of the two; being ſuch incompatible perfections, and divided, enough to fill up the ſphere of the greateſt abilities alive. Yet with great applauſe he acted both theſe high parts, of the greateſt Scholler and the greateſt States-man of his time: and ſo quit himſelfe in both, as one and the ſame Perſon, in title and merit, became Lord Keeper of the Great ſeale of England, and of the Great Seale of Nature both at once, which is a

myſtery beyond the comprehenſion of his own times, and a miracle requires a great meaſure of faith in Poſterity, to believe it. This is the Author I here preſent unto *Your Highneſſe*, this his worke, which by the powerfull influence of Your favour ſhall proſper, and, it may be, be quickned to the regeneration of another Phœnix out of his aſhes, to adorne your World: for it is only the benigne aſpect & irradiation of *Princes*, that inſpires the Globe of learning, and makes Arts, and ſciences grow up and floriſh. Heaven bleſſe *Your Highneſſe* with bleſsings on the right hand and on the left, and make You Heire of all the virtues of your Royall Progenitors, that the Honour of Princes begun in them, may be continued in Your perſon, and that a future age may be ſo bleſſed in You, as the preſent is in Your Royall Father, *the Glory of Kings and their Admiration.*

YOUR HIGHNESSE

moſt Humbly devoted

GILBERT WATS.

FAVOVRABLE READER.

THE *intended* Apologetique, *for the* Inſtauration *of* Sciences, *and the juſtification of* this Author, *which ſhould have bin prefix'd this work, as a preparation thereto; is not publiſht. Motives to this reſolution, were diverſe, whereof ſome are very concerning.* Apologetiques *for ſuch Authors and ſuch enterpriſes are intertained with jealouſies, as if they threatned an innovation in the ſtate of Learning; by reverſing the judgements of* Antiquity, *and the Placits of the* Moderne; *and by bringing in, a new* Primum Mobile, *into the Intellectuall Globe of Sciences, to the ſubverſion of the Arts received. But theſe are groundleſſe fears, fancied by ſuch, who either underſtand not the intention of this attempt; or, engag'd in a* Profeſſory way, *ſuſpect their profit and reputation to be in danger, if ſuch deſignes ſhould take effect. Our Author proteſts againſt ſuch dareing vanities,* the raiſing of any new ſect, upon the ruins of Antiquity; *and every where endeavours to improve the labours of Ancient and Moderne writers,*

and

and ſo muſt he doe who defends him, if he underſtands the buſineſſe he goes about. The point is not, touching what is already done; nor of the abilities of the Agents; nor of the capacity of their inſtruments; which could not be undertake without emulous compariſons, both of Perſons, Actions, and Things: but the point is touching propagation & Advancement of Knowledges; *the improvement, and not the conſervation only, of the Patrimony of our Anceſtors: and that by opening to the* underſtanding *a different way, than hath bin known to former Ages; and clearing* that glaſſe *to the letting in of a more plentifull light. The waies and ends of theſe two knowledges (I meane of what we have, and of what we may have) thus different; and the principles upon which they proceed ſo divers; both may conſiſt without contradictions and confutations; or the invaſions upon their diſtinguiſht rights: & ſo the* propagation of Knowledge, *by the aßiſtance,* of the Father of Lights, *may be purſued, with the reſervation of the honour of Ancient and Moderne Authors, and the Arts in uſe, which reſpecting the end whereto they were inſtituted,* Diſputation, Redargution *and the like, are very conducent, and in their way of perfection highly exalted. And this is the firſt motive of deliberating the publication of my Apologetique, the difficulty of the buſineſſe.* Another is this. *The times into which we are fallen, are learned Times, as ever were ſince the Grecian Philoſophers, and, their ſeconds, the Arabian writers, which alſo through the great advantages, of the experiments of later Ages, and the directions of Antiquity, in many particulars have out-gon their predeceſſors; ſo as he that dare adventure, as ſome doe, to intrude unſtudied thoughts upon ſo learned an age as this is, neither reverences the age as he ought, nor wiſely conſults his own reputation with Poſterity. And as the Times are learned, ſo (which too frequently falls out) ſomewhat confident. Great wits, and which have fortified their conceptions by books and ſtudy, are ſtrongly prepoſſeſt with almoſt impregnable anticipations; and not ſo eaſily induced, as more inconcerned and diſengaged natures are; to know or unknow any thing, that either ſhould be farther inquired into, or ſhould be forgotten. And much within theſe two orbs our Apology moves; in diſcovery of*

igno-

Ignorance & of Error; of what we know not, and of what we should not know. For certainly much knowledge remaines yet conceal'd, and the way to this discovery is by forgoeing many unprofitable subtleties; and by a learn'd ignorance falling off from many aery speculations, to the solid simplicity of the Ancients. Were we to compose a Panegyrique in praise of the perfections of the learning of our daies, which indeed merits such a sacrifice, the labour were but halfe what it is, for laudatory hymnes seldome come out of season; they need no preparations, and what might be wanting in the waight of speech, would be supplied by an aptitude to accept and believe. But in the businesse in hand, the mind of man, *the principall subject to be wrought upon, and* her speculations, *both which we so admire, are so immur'd and blockt up with corrupt notions, either from the placits of Philosophers; the depraved lawes of Demonstration; or from inherent qualities in the generall nature of man, or individuate temperature of particulars; that nothing can be done untill these be convinced; at least, subjected to examination: which is another motive that staies me upon the Land.* Another Reason, (*which is the last I will trouble the Reader withall is this. Time the measure of all our Actions, without whose assistance our best conceptions are* Abortives, *by the intercurrence of other engagements (which I might have dispenced withall, had I rightly understood the servile tenure of secular contracts) hath surpriz'd me. I conceive, which I pronounce with some passion, that a Scholler for his studies, had bin the master of his own howres; but he that trafiques with the world shall finde it otherwise. Time which I presum'd I could command, and stay as I doe my watch, hath commanded me. And these diversions were seconded* (Humane Reader) *by a sad Accident. It pleased God in the heat of my attendance on this businesse, to take away, by one of the terrors of mortality, the* Stone, *my deare brother* Sr Richard Scot, *servant to the most Eminent* Lord *the* Lo. Deputy Generall of Ireland; *beloved of his deare* Lord *to the latest minute of life; honour'd with his presence to the farthest confines of mortality; and there, by his Noble Piety, deliver'd up, with as much solemnity, as a Kingdome could conferre, unto the im-*

mortality of another world. This deadly ſhaft paſſing through him, ſo wounded me, that I my ſelfe was arrived within few paces of the land of darkneſſe. In his ſilent *Marble, the beſt part of that ſmall portion of joy I had in the World; but* all my hopes, *are entombed. This penſive caſualty ſo took me off from books and buſineſſe, as for ſome months after, I could reliſh no thoughts but what were mingled with the contemplations of mortality.* Sic fugit interea fugit irrevocabile tempus. *Theſe were the impediments to my* Apologetique; *which (if what is done be accepted) ſhall be prefix'd the* NOV. ORG. *For of this Tranſlation this is the firſt part* (Reader) *if it pleaſe thee, if it pleaſe thee not, the laſt. But before I take my leave, here are ſome tacite objections, which I would meet halfe way, and ſo weaken their approaches, leſt they fall too heavy upon me.* The firſt is, *touching the* Diviſion of the firſt book into Chapters, *contrary to the mind of the Author, and the intention of the work. This exception may be thus ſatisfied, that profit is to be preferred before artificiall contrivance, where both cannot ſo conveniently be had, and to this end, diſcretion to be followed before rule. Were the Author now alive and his vaſt Deſignes going on, this alteration had been ſomewhat bold: but the inimitable Architect now dead, having perfected litle more then the outward Courts, as it were, of his magnificent Inſtauration; and the whole ſumme of Sciences, and the ſtock of Arts in preſent poſſeſſion, not able to defray the charges of finiſhing this Fabrique; I thought fit, by compartitions and diſtributions into ſeverall roomes, to improve what we have, to our beſt advantage, ſo it might be done without prejudice to the Authors procedure, and apt coherence, which I hope it is: Having reſpect herein rather to accommodation than decoration; for* Houſes (*as our Author ſaies*) are built to live in and not to look on, and therefore uſe to be preferred before uniformity. *Another exception may be made againſt the draught of the Platforme into* Analytique tables, *which ſeems ſomewhat pedantique and againſt that common rule* Artis eſt diſſimulare Artem. *To this I anſwer thus.* Order *and dependance is as it were, the ſoule of the World, of the Works of Nature and Art, and that which keeps*

keeps them united, without which all would fall asunder and become like the first Chaos before the production of light. And of all Methods *that ever were, at least that ever came to our hands, our Authors is the most naturall and most dependent. For* Truth, *as it reflects on us, is a congruent conformity of the Intellect to the Object; and of the different faculties thereof, to the difference of things: wherefore the truest* Partition *of humane learning, is that, which hath reference to humane faculties; when the* Intellectuall Globe, *and the* Globe of the World, *intermixe their beams and irradiations in a direct line of projection, to the Generation of Sciences. This our Author hath perform'd to admiration; and in this gone beyond all Antiquity, yet upon their grounds; wherein he can never be out-gone, unlesse followed, by Posterity. The Ancients indeed, were men of most profound speculations, but in the delivery of themselves, somewhat involv'd, as appears by* Plotinus, Proclus, Trismegistus *and others; and many of* Platoes *Schoole writ Dialogue-wise, which is no doctrinal way. As for* Aristotle, *his precepts touching* method (*if any such book was written*) *they are perisht, saving where he scatters such rules here and there, which should have been silenced, and are not so well followed by himselfe. And for the* Methods *of the Modernes*, Ramus *and others, by the improvement of* German *writers, impair'd; they knit the limmes of knowledge to soone; have bedwarfed Sciences*, and are become an Art (*as learned* Hooker *expresses it*) which teaches the way of speedy discourse, and restrains the mind of man, that it may not waxe over-wise. *The* Excellency *therefore of our Authors* Partitions, *induced me to these* delineations, *for their use only, who have not the leasure, or patience to observe it according to the merit; that by this* Anatomy, *the junctures and arteries, as it were, of this great body might more visibly appeare.* An other objection is, *touching the* Allegations in the Margin, *contrary to the solemne custome of Antiquity, and the most of graver Authors.* For this *I had these reasons. It pleased our Author, thoe he was himselfe a living fountain of knowledge, and had a wealthy stock of his own, yet to tast of other waters, and to borrow from Antiquity, and to*

acknowledge such borrowings, He thus nameing his Authors, I thought fit to note them. And as he was a man of a most elevated phansie and choice conceptions; so was he in the selection of his Authors, and the passages he pleas'd to make use of: and it is worth the labour to know with whom such great wits use to converse; to point to the Mines *where they digge their Ore; and to the shadowes where they repose at noone. And as his selection of Authors was very choice, so was his application of their sayings, very curious; and in a strain beyond the vulgar reach. Places out of* Sacred Scriptures *are so explicated, so applied, as you may search all the Commenters that are extant, and not finde the like expositions, as you shall finde in him. As for humane Authors he betters his borrowings from them; teaching the allegations out of them, a sense above the meaning of him that lent it him; and which he repaies too with double interest for what he borrowed. These considerations invited me to Marginall Citations. These Reasons set apart, I cannot approve this weake ambition; and doe, not without censure, read Moderne Authors prostitute to humane allegations; as if the* Truth *they deliver, were to be tried by voices; or having lost its primitive Innocence, must be cover'd with these fig-leaves; or as if the Authors themselves were afraid that it should make an escape out of their text, if it were not beset in the Margin with Authorities as with a watch.* The last exception is, *touching the* Prefaces, *and other* Introductions *prefix'd this worke, that make the Gates and Entries so wide, as they seem to invite the Citty to run away. This is thus answer'd. It must be remembred that this worke in the Defigne was very spacious; and is in the performance of what is done so ample, that when the second and third Parts shall be added, as added they will be, the* Porches *and* Ingresses, *in the judgement of any good Architect, are proportionable enough. And if our* Authors *rule hold, that every faire Fabrique should have three Courts; a greene Court; a second Court more garnisht; and a third to make a square with the Front; then have you here this Epistle as the mean Court; Iudgements upon this Author living and dead, as the middle Court; and the Authors own excellent Preface to confront with the work it selfe.* Now

I ſhould, *ſay ſomething touching* Tranſlation; *and as it is mine. The very Action is ſomewhat obnoxious to cenſure, being of the nature of thoſe, the failing whereof may diſgrace more, than the carrying of it through, credit the undertaker. But, beſides the conſcience of the deed done; for other ends I could not have;* (*the Author now dead, and alive* mihi nec injuriis nec beneficiis notus) *and that to be a* Tranſlator *is more than to be an* Author, *ſome ſuch as there be; and that it is no ſuch mean office, to bear a light before a* Lord Chancellor of England: *I ſhould excuſe it, were the example mine: ſo, writes learned* Savil; *ſo, eloquent* Sandys; *ſo,* Malvezzi's Noble Interpreter; *with whom conferred I am leſſe than a ſhadow: So, many able and eminent names of* France *and* Italy, *and other Nations; So the Ancients of former ages and of all Arguments. But if any be ſo ſolemne, ſo ſevere, and of ſuch primitive taſts, they can away with no waters, which come not from the ſpring-head; nor endure to drink of* Tiber, *that paſſes through* Thames; *They may give over here, if they ſo pleaſe, and proceed no farther. This interpretation was not meant for ſuch faſtidious palates, and yet, it may be, for as diſtinguiſhing as theirs are. Now if this very action be thus liable to exception, much more muſt my performance be. Certainly books by* Tranſlation *commonly take wind in the effuſion; and for ſtrength fall ſhort of their* Originals; *as reflexed beams are weaker than direct: but then it muſt be underſtood of* Originals, *truly ſo. For if a* Writer *deliver himſelfe out of his Native language, I ſee not why a* Tranſlator *rendring him in it, may not come neare him: and in this caſe, the Author himſelfe is the* Interpreter, *being he* tranſlates *his own thoughts, which originally ſpeak his mother tongue. Yet for all this, Errors I know there are, and ſome lapſes, which require a Connivence; and a Reader hath this advantage, that he may ſtay upon one period, as long as an Interpreter did on one page; beſides his peculiar Genius to ſome ſtudied paſſages. Some Errors* (*paſſing but a tranſient eye upon what is done*) *I ſee already; and could note them; but I would not willingly gratify ſome kind of Readers ſo farre. They that are Iuditious and ingenious too* (*for I would have no Readers that*

have not these two ingredients in their compositions, thoe sometimes I name but one, which I would then, should be predominant) will in their judgements find them, and in their mercy pardon them. As for *Sophists and* Satyrists, *a degenerate Race of men, that sit upon the lives and learning of all that write; who resolv'd to doe nothing themselves, may with more security censure others: and them too, who, as* Learned Don *deciphers them,* forbid not bookes, but men; damning what ever such a name, hath, or shall write: *they are* things *below the merit of my indignation; objects of Scorne; which a litle slighted, and not inflamed by oppositon, or countenanced to a reply by confutation, will within a while, of themselves, extinguish, and vanish: like some dispersed roving winds, which without encountre are dispirited and die. And it concernes me, Courteous Reader, to put on such a confidence as this; for being I am likely to appeare in mine own person, as I doe now in the Person of another; to be too tender-fronted were to invite injuries, and to prostitute such unseasonable modesty to abuse. He that will to sea, must look for some cloudy daies; and to be too* scrupulous *or* Ceremonious *touching* Times *or* Persons, *is the bane of busines and of all well-meant endeavours: according to that of* Solomon, Qui observat ventum non seminat, & qui considerat Nubes, nunquam metet.

TESTIMONIES
CONSECRATE TO THE
MERITE OF THE
INCOMPARABLE PHILOSOPHER
Sr FRANCIS BACON
BY SOME OF THE BEST-LEARN'D
OF THIS INSTANT AGE.

ALthough *severe Inquisitors of truth*, and such who, by their learned Labours, stand upon pub. Record in the approv'd Archives of Eternity, may, in an humble distance, lay claim and title to that sacred Prerogative -- *Ego autem ab homine Testimonium non Capto; ipsa enim Opera quæ facio testantur de me*,-- yet because such *Great Authors*, in their high flight, are so lessen'd in the aire of unfrequented contemplations; & take such unbeaten waies, as they become the *weak wonder* of common Capacities, accustom'd to populare opinions, and authoriz'd Errors: and in this admiring Ignorance, the *prejudicate objects* of Emulation, Envy, Jealousies, and such like impotent passions: It seems, in a sort, necessary, that the way be clear'd before such writers; and that they enter the Theatre, as well with the suffrage of *voice*, to gaine upon the *will*, as with the strength of *Reason*, to convince the *Understanding*.

Wherefore, not so much for the honor of this Author,

(though that is intended too) as for the aid of ſome anticipate Readers, not yet manu-miſſed from a ſervile beliefe, to the liberty of their own judgements, (ſuch J mean, as are yet under the minority of an implicite faith) J thought good to deliver this imperfect liſt of *Deponents*, which the precipitancy of this Edition, would not permit to fill up with ſome other *Great Names*, both of this Kingdome, and of forrain Nations. What is wanting here to the accompliſhment of this *Catalogue*, Time, *the Parent of Truth*, ſhall Conſummate.

LE SIEUR MAUGARS Counſilor and ſecretary to the K. of France, in the Epiſt. to his Tranſlation of a Part of this Work, gives our Author this Teſtimony.

Amongſt whom every one knows that S^r FRANCIS BACON, *by many degrees off, holds the firſt rank, both for the vivacity of his Spirit, eminency of his Learning, Elegancy of his ſtile. J have ſtudied with diligence all his writings; and preſume I may doe a performance of ſome merit and acceptation, in preſenting to my Countrey his Books of the* ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, *a Work hath not bin ſeen in our Language. This is the* Book *which I have cauſed to paſſe the Seas; not as the Gold of the Jndies, to cheriſh vice, and corrupt our Manners; but as a ſoveraigne Plant of ſingular virtue, to cure the wounds, which ignorance and Pedantiſme have given* humane ſciences.

M^r PEIRRE D'AMBOIS S^r DE LA MAGDELAINE In his juſt and elegant diſcourſe upon the life of our *Author*, delivers his cenſure thus.

Judgement and Memory never met in any man in that height and meaſure they met in him; ſo as in ſhort time he became Maſter *of all thoſe* Knowledges *which are learnt in Schooles.*

A page after; *But as he ever valewed himſelfe, rather borne for other men, than himſelfe; now that he could not, for want of imployment, any longer endow the publique with his* Active perfections; *he was deſirous at leaſt to become profitable*

in

in a Contemplative way, *by his writings and by his books, monuments certainly meriting, to find entertainment in all the Libraries of the world; and which deserve to be ranged with the fairest works of Antiquity.*

The same noble French-man in his Advertisement to our Auctors *Nat. History* thus expresses him.

For this Naturall History, *where the quality of Metalls, the Nature of Elements, the Causes of Generation, and Corruption, the divers actions of Bodies one upon another, and such like impressions, are discoursed with such life and light, that he may seem to have learn'd his knowledge* even in the Schoole of the First Man. *And though herein he may be thought to have pass'd upon the breaches of* Aristotle, Pliny, *and* Cardan; *yet notwithstanding he borrowes nothing from them: as if he had a designe to make it appeare, that those great men, have not so entirely possest themselves of this subject, but that there remains much to be discover'd. For my part, thoe it be farre from my intention, to raise the reputation of this* Author *upon the ruins of* Antiquity; *yet I think it may be avouched upon the grounds of reason, that in this present Argument he hath some advantage of them: being that the most of the* Ancients *which have written of* things Natural, *have satisfied themselves in reporting things, as the information of others have given them intelligence; and not considering, that oftentimes that which is deliver'd them for* History, *is farre esloign'd from all verity; they have chosen rather, by reasons to confirme the resolutions of another, than to make an exact enquiry and discovery themselves. But* Mon^r BACON *not relying upon the meer word and credit of such as went before him, will have* Experience *joyn'd with* Reason; *and examines the receiv'd principles of the Schooles, by the effects of Nature; the speculations of the* Intellectuall Globe, *by the operations of the* Corporale. *By this means he hath found out so many rare secrets, whereof he hath bequeath'd us the invention; and made many axioms acknowledged for false, which hetherto have gon current amongst Philosophers, and have bin held inviolable.*

TOB. ADAMI, In his Preface to the REALIS PHILOSOPHIA, of that excellent Philosopher CAMPANELLA (who lives to enjoy that Fame, which many eminent for their learning, rarely possesse after death) speaks his opiniō thus.

We erect no sect, establish no Placits of Eresie, but endeavour to transcribe universale and ever-veritable Philosophy out of the Ancient Originall Copy of the world: not according to variable and disputable speculations, but according to the Conducture of sense and irrefragable depositions of the Architect himselfe, whose hand in works, dissents not from his word in writing. And if the GREAT INSTAURATION *of the deep-mineing Philosopher,* FRA. BACON LO. VERULAM Chancellor of England, *a work of high expectation, and most worthy, as of Consideration, so of assistance, be brought to perfection, it will perchance appeare, that we pursue the same ends, seeing we tread the same foot-steps in traceing, and as it were, hounding nature, by* Sence *and* Experience, *&c.*

S^r TOB. MATHEWS, In his Epist. to the Duke of *Florence* prefixt his Italique Translation of my LO. BACON'S *Essaies*, amongst other Elogies deciphers him thus.

S^t AUSTEN, *said of his illegitimate sonne* Horrori mihi erat illud ingenium, *and truly I have known a great number whom I much valew, many whom I admire, but none who hath so astonisht me, and as it were, ravisht my sences, to see so many and so great parts, which in other men were wont to be incompatible, united, and that in an eminent degree in one sole Person. I know not whether this truth will find easy beliefe, that there can be found a man beyond the Alpes, of a most ready wit; most faithfull memory; most profound Iudgement; of a most rich and apt expression; universall in all kinds of knowledge, as in part may be seen by that rare incomparable piece, the* ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, *which future Ages shall render in different languages: But be the faith of other Nations what it will in this point, the matter I report is so well understood in* England, *that every man knowes & acknowledges as much, nay hath bin an eye and eare witnesse thereof; nor if I should*

ſhould expatiate upon this ſubject ſhould I be held a flatterer, but rather a ſuffragan to truth, &c.

Mr GEORGE SANDYS In his excellent Commentaries on his inimitable Tranſlation of the ſtately METAMORPHOSIS, rendred, in ah equall felicity of expreſsion, to the Eternall fires of that *ſweet tongu'd Roman*; often cites the judgement of our Author, from whoſe ſentence he never appeals, but rather adores as an Oracle; and in an ingenious acknowledgement of aſsiſtance from him, thus delivers him to poſterity.

Of Moderne writers I have receiv'd the greateſt light from Geraldus, Pontanus, Ficinus, Vives, Comes, Scaliger, Sabinus, *and the* CROWNE of the later the VICOUNT OF St ALBANS; *aſsiſted, thoe leſſe conſtantly, by other Authors, almoſt of all Ages and Arguments. Having bin true to my firſt purpoſe, in making choice, for the moſt part, of thoſe interpretations, which either beare the ſtamp of* Antiquity, *or receive eſtimation from the* honor of the Author.

MARIN MERSENNE An able man, but a declar'd adverſary to our Authors deſigne (whoſe Arguments I ſhall encountre in my Apologetique for the *Inſtaur. of Sciences*) in his Bookes of the VERITY OF SCIENCES againſt the *Sceptiques* and *Pyrrhonians Lib.* I. *Cap.* XVI. acknowledges thus much, which comming from an Adverſary is therefore more valid.

VERULAM, *ſeems to have no other intention in his* NEW METHOD; *then to eſtabliſh the* VERITY OF SCIENCES; *wherefore you muſt not anticipate, as granted, that he makes for you, or that he is of your opinion; he confeſſes we know litle, but he ſubverts not the Authority of* Senſe *and of* Reaſon; *no, he labours to find out proper and proportionable inſtruments, whereby to Conduct the underſtanding to the knowledge of Nature and her effects.*

The Authors Cenſure upon himſelfe.

For in my judgement, it is a matter which concernes not only the Benefit of others; but our own Reputation alſo; that no man imagine that we have projected in our minds ſome ſlight ſuperficiall notion of theſe Deſignes; *and that they are of the nature of thoſe things, which we could* Deſire, *and which we accept only as* good wiſhes. *For they are ſuch as without queſtion, are within the power and poßibility of men to compaſſe, unleſſe they be wanting to themſelves; and hereof, we for our parts, have certain and evident demonſtration;* for we come not hether, as Augures, to meaſure Countries in our mind, for Divination; but as Captaines, to invade them for a conqueſt.

His anſwer to ſome Tacite Objections.

I doe foreſee that many of thoſe things which I ſhall regiſter as DEFICIENTS *will incurre divers cenſures; as* that ſome parts *of this enterprize were done long agoe, and are now extant;* Others, *that they taſt of curioſity & promiſe no great fruit;* Others, *that they are impoßible to be compaſſed by humane induſtries.* For the two firſt, *let the particulars ſpeak for themſelves.* For the laſt touching impoſsibilities, *I determine thus. All thoſe things are to be held poßible and performeable which may be accompliſht by ſome perſon, thoe not by every one; and which may be done by the united labours of many, thoe not by any one apart, and which may be effected in a ſucceßion of Ages, thoe not in the ſame Age; and in briefe which may be finiſht by the care and charge of the pub., thoe not by the abilities and induſtry of private perſons. If for all this there be any, who would rather take to himſelfe that of Solomon,* Dicit Piger Leo eſt in via, *than that of Virgil* Poſſunt quia poſſe videntur --- *it is enough for me, if my labours may be eſtimed as votes yet the better ſort of wiſhes:* for as it askes ſome knowledge to demand a Queſtion not impertinent; ſo it requires ſome underſtanding, to make a wiſh not abſurd. *Proem. lib. 2.*

IN

IN HONOREM ILLVSTRISSIMI DNI FRANCISCI DE VERVLAMIO

Vice-Comitis STI ALBANI

POST EDITAM AB EO INSTAUR. MAG.

QVis iſte tandem? non enim vultu ambulat
Quotidiano. Neſcis Ignare? audies,
Dux Notionum; veritatis Pontifex;
Inductionis Dominus; & Verulamii;
Rerum Magiſter unicus, at non Artium:
Profunditatis Pinus; atq; Elegantiæ:
Naturæ Aruſpex intimus: Philoſophiæ
Ærarium. Sequeſter Experientiæ,
Speculationiſq;: Æquitatis Signifer:
Scientiarum ſub pupillari ſtatu
Degentium olim Emancipator: luminis
Promus: Fugator Idolûm, atq; Nubium:
Collega Solis: Quadra Certitudinis:
Sophiſmatum Maſtix: Brutus Literarius,
Authoritatis exuens Tyrannidem:
Rationis & ſenſus ſtupendus Arbiter;
Repumicator Mentis: Atlas Phyſicus;
Alcide ſuccumbente STAGIRITICO:
Columba Noæ, quæ in vetuſtis Artibus
Nullum locum, requiemve Cernens, præſtitit
Ad ſe ſuamq; Matris Arcam regredi.
Subtilitatis terebra; Temporis nepos
Ex veritate matre: Mellis Alveus:

Mundiq; & Animarum, ſacerdos unicus:
Securis Errorum: inq; Natalibus
Granum ſinapù, acre aliis, Creſcens ſibi.
O me prope Laſſum; Juvate Poſteri.

GEOR. HERBERT Orat. Pub.
in Academ. Cantab.



MANES

MANES VERVLAMIANI

SIVE

IN OBITVM

INCOMPARABILIS

FRANCISCI

DE VERVLAMIO, &c.

EPICEDIA.

INclyta Academia Cantabrigiensis, cujus felicitas fuit, *viro* ad salutem scientiarum *nato*, primas sapientiæ mammas prebere; ac *Philosophum*, post occasum Græciæ, *maximum*, orbi dare: super funus Alumni sui Lacrymas effudit, doctas ac duraturas mæstitias. Ex hoc integro Musarum fonte, modica hæc sed facunda fluenta, collegit *interpres*; ut quod, viventi, seculum dederat decus, gliscente adhuc invidiâ; & morienti dedisse constaret, cessante nunc adulatione Reliqua sui nominis æternitati consecranda, continuatâ seculorum serie ad ultimas usq; mundi favillas, rependet posteritas: Quis supremam suis laudibus manum imponet, novit tantum, *Fundator ille, ac simul everſor Seculorum.*

ADhuc ſuperbis inſolente purpurâ
Feretri rapinis Inclytos in tot viros
Sterile Tribunal? cilicio dicas diem,
Saccúmq; totam facito luxuriem fori.
A Themide libra *nec geratur penſilis,*
Sed urna, *prægravis urna* Verulamii.
Expendat. Ebeu! Ephorus haud lancè premit,
Sed Areopagus; nec minor tantus ſophos,
Quâ Porticus bracchata. Nam veſter, ſcholæ,
Gemiſcit axis, tanta dum moles ruit.
Orbis ſoluta cardo litterarii,
Ubi ſtudio coluit togam & trabeam pari
Qualis per umbras Ditis Euridice vagans
Palpare geſtiit Orphëum, quali Orpheus,
Saliente tandem (vix prius criſpâ) Styge,
Alite fibras lyræ titillavit manu;
Talis plicata Philologûm ænigmatis
Petiit Baconum vindicem, tali manu
Lactata criſtas extulit Philoſophia:
Humiq; ſoccis reptitantem Comicis
Non proprio Ardelionibus molimine
Sarſit, ſed Inſtauravit. *Hinc politiùs*
Surgit cothurno celſiore, & Organo
Stagirita virbius reviviſcit Novo.
Calpen ſuperbo Abylámq; vincit remige
Phœbi Columbus, artibus novis, Novum
Daturus Orbem; *promovet conamina*
Juvenilis ardor, uſq; ad invidiam trucem
Fati minacis. Quis Senex *vel* Hannibal,
Oculi ſuperſtitis timens caliginem,
Signis Suburram ventilat victricibus?
Quis Milo inultus quercubus bilem movet,
Senecta tauro gibba cùm gravior premit?
Dum noſter Heros traderet ſcientias
Æternitati, prorſus expeditior
Sui ſepulchri comperitur artifex.
Placida videtur Ecſtaſis ſpeculatio,

Quâ mens tueri volucris Idæas boni
In lacteos properat Olympi tramites.
His immoratur ſedibus Domeſtica,
Peregrina propriis. Redit. Iocularitèr
Fugax, vagatur rurſus, & rurſus redit.
Furtiva tandem ſeriò, ſe ſubtrahit
Totam, gementi, morbido cadaveri
Sic deſueſcit anima, ſic jubet mori.
Agite lugubres Muſæ, & à Libani jugis
Cumulate thura. Sydus in pyram illius
Scintillet omne, ſcelus ſit accendi rogum
Regum Prometheo culinari foco.
Et ſi quà fortè ludat in cineres ſacros
Aura petulantior, fugamq; ſuadeat,
Tunc flete; lachrymis in amplexus ruent
Globuli ſequaces. Denuò fundamine
Ergaſtuli everſo radicitùs tui
Evehere fœlix anima, Iacobum *pete,*
Oſtende, & illuc civicam fidem *ſequi.*
E Tripode juris, dictites oracula
Themidos *alumnis. Sic (Beati cœlites)*
Aſtræa *priſtino fruatur vindice,*
Vel cum Bacono rurſus Aſtræam date.

R. P.

AUdax exemplum quò Mens humana feratur,
Et Sæcli vindex ingenioſe tui;
Dum ſenio macras revocaris fœliciter artes,
Subtrahis & priſco libera colla jugo;
Quo deflenda modo veniunt tua funera? quales
Expoſcunt lacrymas, quid ſibi fata volunt?
An timuit Natura parens ne nuda jaceret,
Detraxit veſtem dum tua dextra ſacram?
Ignotiq; oculis rerum patuere Receſſus,
Fugit & aſpectum Rimula nulla tuum?

An

An verò, Antiquis olim data Sponſa Maritis,
Conjugii amplexum reſpuit illa novi?
An tandèm damnoſa piis atq; invida cœptis,
Corripuit vitæ fila (trahenda) tuæ?
Archim. *Sic ultra vitreum* Siculus *ne pergeret orbem*
Privati cecidit militis enſe Senex.
Tuq; tuos manes ideò (Franciſce) *tuliſti,*
Ne, non tentandum, perficeretur opus.

SUnt qui defuncti vivant in marmore, & ævum
Annoſis credant poſtibus omne ſuum:
Ære micant alii, aut fulvo ſpectantur in auro,
Et, dum ſe ludunt, ludere fata putant.
Altera pars hominum, numeros à prole ſuperſtes,
Cum Niobe *magnos temnit iniqua* Deos.
At tua cælatis hæret nec Fama Columnis,
Nec tumulo legitur, Siſte viator iter:
Si qua Patrem proles referat, non corporis illa eſt,
Sed quaſi de cerebro nata Minerva Jovis.
Prima tibi virtus monumenta perennia præſtat,
Altera, nec citiùs corruitura, Libri:
Tertia Nobilitas, ducant jam fata triumphos,
Quæ (Franciſce) *tui nil niſi corpus habent.*
Utraq; pars melior, Mens & bona Fama ſuperſunt,
Non tanti ut redimas vile cadaver habes.

T. Vincent. T. C.

MUſæ *fundite nunc aquas perennes*
In Threnos, Lacrymáſq;; Apollo *fundat*
Quas vel Caſtalium *tenet Fluentum:*
Nam Letho neq; convenire tanto
Poſſint næniæ parva, nec coronent
Immenſa hæc modicæ ſepulchra guttæ:
Nervus ingenii, Medulla ſuadæ
Dicendiq; Tagus, reconditarum

Et

Et gemma pretiosa Literarum,
Fatis concidit, (heu trium Sororum
Dura stamina) Nobilis Baconus.
O quam te memorem Bacone *summe*
Nostro carmine! & illa glorioſa
Cunctorum monumenta seculorum,
Excusa ingenio tuo, & Minervâ!
Quam doctis, elegantibus, profundis,
Instauratio Magna, *plena rebus!*
Quanto lumine tineas Sophorum
Dispellit veterum tenebricosas
Ex chao procreans novam ...
Sic ipse Deus inditum sepulchro
Corpus restituet manu potenti:
Ergo non moreris (Bacone) *nam te*
A morte, & tenebris, & á sepulchro,
Instauratio Magna *vindicabit.*

R. C. T. C.

PArcite: Noster amat facunda silentia luctus,
Postquam obiit solus dicere qui potuit:
Dicere, quæ stupeat Procerum generosa corona;
Nexaq; sollicitis solvere Jura reis.
Vastum opus. At nostras etiam Verulamius *artes*
INSTAURAT *veteres, condit & ille novas.*
Non qua majores: Penitos verum ille recessus
NATURÆ, *audaci provocat ingenio.*
Ast Ea, siste gradum, seriisq; nepotibus, (*inquit,*)
Linque quod inventum sæcla minora juvet.
Sit satis, his sese quod nobilitata Jnventis,
Jactent ingenio tempora nostra tuo.
Est aliquid, quo mox ventura superbiet ætas;
Est, soli notum quod decet esse mihi:
Sit tua laus, pulchros Corpus duxisse per artus,
Integra cui nemo reddere membra queat:

Sic opus artificem infectum commendat Apellem,
Cum pingit reliquam nulla manus Venerem.
Dixit, & indulgens cæco Natura *furori,*
Præsecuit vitæ Filum Operisq; simul.
At Tu, qui pendentem audes detexere telam,
Solus quem condant hæc monumenta scies.

H. T. Coll. Trin. Socius.

DUm moriens tantam nostrũ Verulamius Heros
Tristitiam Musis, *luminaq; uda facit:*
Credimus heu nullum fieri post fata beatum,
Credimus & Samium *desipuisse senem.*
Scilicet hic miseris, fœlix nequit esse, Camænis,
Nec se quàm Musas *plus amat iste suas.*
At luctantem animam Clotho *imperiosa coëgit*
Ad cœlum, invitos traxit in astra pedes.
Ergone Phœbeias *jacuisse putabimus artes?*
Atq; herbas Clarii *nil valuisse Dei?*
Phœbus *idem potuit, nec virtus abfuit herbis,*
Hunc artem atq; illas vim retinere putes:
At Phœbum (*ut metuit ne Rex foret iste* Camænis)
Rivali medicam crede negâsse manum.
Hinc dolor est; quod cum Phœbo Verulamius Heros
Major erat reliquis, hac foret arte minor.
Vos tamen ô, tantum Manes atq; Umbra, Camænæ,
Et pœnè inferni pallida turba Jovis,
Si spiratis adhuc, & non lusistis ocellos,
Sed neq; post illum vos superesse putem:
Si vos ergo aliquis de morte reduxerit Orpheus,
Jstaq; non aciem fallit imago meam:
Discite nunc gemitus, & lamentabile carmen,
Ex oculis vestris lacryma multa fluat.
En quam multa fluit? veras agnosco Camænas
Et lacrymas, Helicon *vix satis unus erit;*
Deucalionæis *& qui non mersus in undis*

Pernassus

Pernaſſus (*mirum eſt*) *hiſce latebit aquis.*
Scilicet hic periit, per quem vos vivitis, & qui
Multâ Pierias *nutriit arte* Deas.
Vidit ut hic artes nullâ radice retentas,
Languere ut ſummo ſemina ſparſa ſolo;
Creſcere Pegaſeas *docuit, velut Haſta* Quirini
Crevit, et exiguo tempore Laurus erat.
Ergo Heliconiadas *docuit cùm creſcere* divas,
Diminuent hujus ſecula nulla decus.
Nec ferre ulterius generoſi pectoris æſtus
Contemptum potuit, Diva Minerva, *tuum.*
Reſtituit calamus ſolitum divinus honorem,
Diſpulit & nubes alter Apollo *tuas.*

Diſpulit & tenebras ſed quas obfuſca vetuſtas,
Temporis & priſci lippa ſenecta tulit;
Atq; alias methodos ſacrum inſtauravit acumen,
Gnoſiaq; *eripuit, ſed ſua fila dedit.*
Scilicet antiquo ſapientum vulgus in ævo
Tam claros oculos non habuiſſe liquet;
Hi velut Eoõ *ſurgens de littore* Phœbus,
Hic velut in mediâ fulget Apollo *die:*
Hi veluti Typhis *tentârunt æquora primùm,*
At vix deſeruit littora prima ratis,
Pleiadas *hic* Hyadaſq; *atq; omnia ſydera noſcens,*
Syrtes, *atq; tuos, improba* Sylla, *canes;*
Scit quod vitandum eſt, quo dirigat æquore navem,
Certiùs & curſum nautica monſtrat acus:
Infantes illi Muſas, *hic gignit adultas;*
Mortales illi, gignit at iſte Deas.
Palmam ideo reliquis Magna Inſtauratio *libris*
Abſtulit, & cedunt ſqualida turba ſophi.
Et veſtita novo Pallas *modò prodit amictu,*
Anguis depoſitis ut nitet exuviis.
Sic Phœnix *cineres ſpectat modò nata paternos,*
Æſonis & rediit prima juventa ſenis.
Inſtaurata ſuos & ſic Verulamia *muros*

Jactat, & antiquum sperat ab inde decus.

Sed quanta effulgent plus quam mortalis ocelli
Lumina, dum regni mystica sacra canat?
Dum sic naturæ leges, arcanaq; Regum,
Tanquam à secretis esset utrisque, canat:
Dum canat Henricum, *qui Rex, idemq; Sacerdos,*
Connubio stabili junxit utramq; Rosam.

Atqui hæc sunt nostris longè majora Camænis,
Non hæc infœlix Granta, *sed* Aula *sciat:*
Sed cum Granta *labris admoverit ubera tantis*
Ius habet in laudes (maxime Alumne*) tuas.*
Ius habet, ut mœstos lacrymis extingueret ignes,
Posset ut è medio diripuisse rogo.
At nostræ tibi nulla ferant encomia Musæ,
Ipse canis, laudes & canis inde tuas.
Nos tamen & laudes, quâ possumus arte, canemus,
Si tamen ars desit, laus erit iste dolor.

Tho. Randolph. T.C.

Sic cadit Aonii *rarissima Gloria cœtûs?*
Et placet Aoniis *credere semen agris?*
Frangantur Calami, disrumpanturq; libelli,
Hoc possint tetricæ si modo jure Deæ.
Heu quæ lingua silet, quæ jam facundia cessat,
Quò fugit ingenii Nectar & Esca tui?
Quomodo Musarum nobis contingit Alumnis
Ut caderet nostri præses Apollo *chori?*
Si nil cura, fides, labor, aut vigilantia possint,
Siq; ferat rapidas, de tribu una, manus;
Cur nos multa brevi nobis proponimus ævo?
Cur putri excutimus scripta sepulta situ?
Scilicet ut dignos aliorum à Morte labores
Dum rapimus, nos Mors in sua jura trahat.

Quid

Quid tamen in caſſum nil proficientia fundo
Verba? quis optabit te reticente, loqui?
Nemo tuam ſpargat violis fragrantibus urnam,
Nec tibi Pyramidum *mole ſepulchra locet;*
Nam tua conſervant operoſa volumina famam,
Hoc ſatis, hæc prohibent te monumenta mori.

Williams.

ORdine ſequeretur deſcriptio Tumuli VERULAMIANI, monumentum Nobiliſſ. MUTISII, in honorem domini ſui conſtructum; quâ pietate, & dignitatem Patroni ſui, quem (quod rari faciunt, etiam poſt cineres Coluit) conſuluit; Patriæ ſuæ opprobrium diluit; ſibi nomen condidit. Buſta hæc nondum inviſit Interpres, ſed inviſurus: Interim Lector tua cura Commoda, & abi in rem tuam.

Creſcit occulto velut Arbor ævo
Fama BACONI. ———

FRANCISCVS
BARO DE VERVLAMIO
Vice-Comes SANCTI ALBANI.

ALMÆ MATRI *INCLITTÆ ACAD.* CANTABRIGIENSI. *S.*

DEbita Filii qualia poſſum perſolvo; quod vero facio, idem & vos hortor, ut AUGMENTIS SCIENTIARUM ſtrenuè incumbatis: & in Animi modeſtia libertatem ingenii retineatis: Neq; talentum à veteribus concreditum in ſudario reponatis. Affuerit procul dubiò

INCLYTÆ *ACADEMIÆ* OXONIENSI. *S.*

CVm ALMÆ MATRI meæ inclytæ ACADEMIÆ CANTABRIGIENSI Scripſerim, deeſſem ſanè officio, ſi ſimile Amoris pignus ſorori ejus non deferrem. Sicut autem eos hortatus ſum, ita & vos hortor ut SCIENTIARUM AUGMENTIS ſtrenuè incumbatis, & veterum

cul-dubiò & affulserit Divini Luminis Gratia, si humiliatâ & submissâ RELIGIONI PHILOSOPHIA clavibus sensûs legitimè & dextrè utamini: & amoto omni contradictionis studio, Quisq; cum alio, ac si ipse secum disputet, *Valete.*

veterum labores, neq; nihil, neq; omnia esse putetis; sed vires etiam proprias modeste perpendentes, subinde tamen experiamini, omnia cedent quam optimè; si Arma non alii in alios vertatis sed junctis copiis in Naturâ rerũ impressionẽ faciatis, sufficit quippe illa Honori & Victoriæ, *Valete.*

FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM
CONSULTED THVS,
AND THVS CONCLVDED
WITH HIMSELFE; THE PUBLICATION WHEREOF HE *CONCEIVED DID CONCERNE THE PRESENT AND FUTURE AGE.*

SEEING it was manifestly known unto HIM, that humane understanding creates it selfe much trouble; nor makes an apt and sober use of such Aides, as are within the Command of Man; from whence infinite ignorance of Things; and from the ignorance of Things, innumerous disadvantages; his opinion was, that with all our industry we should endeavour, if happily that same *COMMERCE OF THE MIND AND OF THINGS* (than which a greater blessing can hardly be found on Earth, certainly of earthly Felicities,) *might by any means be entirely restored; at least brought to termes of neerer correspondence.* But that Errors, which have prevailed, and prevaile would for ever, one after another, (if the mind were left free to it self) should rectify themselves, either by the imbred pow-

er of the underſtanding, or by the aides and aſsiſtances of Logick, there was no hope at all; becauſe that the Primitive Notions of Things, which the mind with a too facile and ſupine attractive faculty receives in; treaſures up and accumulates, from which all the reſt are derived; are unſound, confuſed, and raſhly abſtracted from things. The like luxuriant vanity and inconſtancy there is in the ſecond and ſequent Notions; whence it comes to paſſe, that all that human Reaſon which we employ, as touching the Inquiſition of Things, is not well digeſted and built; but like ſome magnificent Pile without foundation. For whileſt men admire and celebrate the counterfeit forces of the mind, hir true powers which might be raiſed (were right directions administred, and ſhe taught to become obſequious to things, and not impotently to inſult over them) they paſse by and looſe. This one way remaineth that the buſineſse be wholly reatempted with better preparations; & that there be throughout, *AN INSTAURATION OF SCIENCES AND ARTS*, and of all Human Learning rais'd from ſolid foundations. And this though it may ſeeme in a ſort an infinit enterprize, and above mortall abilities, yet the ſame will be found more ſound and adviſed, than thoſe performances which hetherto have bin atchieved: for in this there is ſome iſsue; but in the endeavours now undertaken about Sciences, a perpetuall wheeling, Agitation and Circle. Neither is he ignorant how unfrequented this *Experience*

ence is, how difficile and incredible to perſwade a beliefe, yet he thought not to deſert the deſigne, nor himſelfe, but to try and ſet upon the way, which alone is pervious and penetrable to the mind of Man. For it is better to give a beginning to a thing which may once come to an end, than with an eternall contention & ſtudie to be enwrapt in thoſe mazes which are endleſſe. And the waies of Contemplation for moſt part reſemble thoſe celebrated waies of Action; the one, at the firſt entrance hard and difficult, ends in an open plain; the other at firſt ſight ready and eaſy, leads into by-waies and downfalls: And being he was uncertain when ſuch conſiderations ſhould hereafter come into any mans mind, induced eſpecially from this argument, that there hath none hetherto appear'd, who hath applied his mind to ſuch cogitations, he reſolv'd to publiſh, ſeperatly, the *Firſt parts* as they could be perfected. Neither is this an ambitious but ſollicitous feſtination; that if in the mean ſpace he ſhould depart this mortall ſtation; there might yet remain a deſignation and deſtination of the thing he comprehended in his mind; and withall ſome Demonſtration of his ſincere and propenſe affection to promote the good of Mankind. Truly he eſtimed other ambition whatſoever, inferior to the buſineſſe he had in hand: For either the matter in conſultation, and thus farre proſequuted, is nothing; or ſo much as the conſcience of the merit it ſelfe, ought to give him contentment without ſeeking a recompence from abroad.

FRANCIS LO: VERVLAM
HIS GREAT INSTAVRATION.

THE PREFACE.

Of the STATE OF LEARNING, that it is not PROSPEROUS, nor greatly ADVANCED; and that a farre different way, than hath bin known to former Ages, must be opened, to mans understanding; and other Aides procured; that the *Mind* may practise her owne power upon the *nature of things.*

IT seemes to me, that men neither understand the Estate they possesse, nor their Abilities to purchase; but of the one to presume more; of the other, lesse, than indeed they should. So it comes to passe, that over-prizing the Arts received, they make no farther Inquiry; or undervaluing themselues, more than in equity they ought, they expend their Abilities upon matters of slight consequence, never once making experiment of those things which conduce to the summe of the businesse. Wherefore, Sciences also have, *as it were,* their Fatall Columnes; *being men are not excited*

ted, either out of Deſire, or Hope, to penetrate farther. And ſeeing the Opinion of Wealth is one of the chief cauſes of want; *and that out of a confidence of what we poſſeſſe in preſent, true aßiſtances are deſpiſed for the future, it is expedient, nay altogether neceſſary, that the exceßive Reverence and Admiration conceived of thoſe* Sciences, *which hetherto have bin found out, ſhould in the Front and Entrance of this work, (and that roundly and undiſſemblingly) by ſome wholſome premonition, be taken off, leſt their Copie and Vtility be too much Magnified and Celebrated. For he that ſurvaies with diligence all the variety of Books, wherein* Arts *and* Sciences *triumph, ſhall every where finde infinite repetitions of the ſame matter; for manner of Delivery diverſe, but for Invention ſtale and preoccupate; ſo as what at firſt view ſeem'd numerous, after examination taken, are found much abated.* § *As for Profit I may confidently avouch it, that the wiſdome we have extracted, chiefly from the Grecians, ſeems to be a Child-hood of Knowledge, and to participate that which is proper to children, namely,* that it is apt for talk; but impotent and immature for propagation: *for it is of Controverſies rank and fertile, but of works barren and fruitleſſe. So that the Fable and fiction of* Scylla, *ſeemes to be a lively Image of the* ſtate of Learning, *as now it is, which for the upper parts had the face and countenance of a comely Virgin, but was from the wombe downward circled, and enwrapt with* barking Monſters, *So the* Sciences *wherein we are trained up, contain in them certain Generalities*

ſpeci-

ſpecious and plauſible, but when you deſcend unto particulars, as to the Parts of Generation, expecting ſolid effects, and ſubſtantiall operations, then Contentions and Barking Altercations ariſe, wherein they cloſe, and which ſupply the place of a fruitfull wombe. § *Again, if theſe kinds of Sciences were not altogether a meere liveleſſe Thing, me thinkes it ſhould not have falne out, which now for many Ages hath continued, that* they *ſhould thus ſtand at a ſtay, in a manner immoveable in their firſt Footings, without any* Augmentation *worthy the Race of Mankind, in ſuch a dull Improficience, that not only Aſſertion remaines Aſſertion, but Queſtion reſts ſtill Queſtion, which by Diſputes is not determined, but fixt and cheriſht: and all Tradition and Succeſſion of Diſcipline delivered from hand to hand, preſents and exhibits the Perſons of Teacher and Schollar, not of Inventor or of one ſhould adde ſomething of note to what is invented.* § *But in Arts Mechanicall we ſee the contrary hath come to paſſe, which as if they were inſpired by the vitall breath and prolifique influence of a thriving Aire, are daily* Propagated *and* Perfected, *and which in their firſt Autors appeared, for the moſt part rude and even burthenſome and Formeleſſe, have afterward acquir'd new-refind virtues and a certain apt Propriety and uſefull Accommodation, ſo infinitely fruitfull, that ſooner may mens ſtudies and deſires languiſh, and change, than theſe* Sciences *arive at their full height and perfection.* § *Contrariwiſe* Philoſophy, *and* Sciences Intellectuall, *like* Statues *are ador'd and celebrated,*

ted, but nothing Advanc't; *nay commonly of moſt vigor in their firſt Autor, and by Time Degenerate and become embaſed. For ſince the time men became* devoted *and, as* Pedary Senators, *reſigned over to the Placits and Definitions of one, they doe not adde any* Amplitude to Sciences, *but are wholly taken up in a ſervile duty of* Poliſhing *or* Protecting *certain Autors.* § *And let no man here alleage, that* Sciences *growing up by degrees, have at length arrived to a juſt period or perfect Stature, and ſo (as having filled up the juſt ſpaces of* Augmentation) *have ſetled and fixt themſelves in the workes of ſome few Autors; and now that nothing more accompliſht can be found out, there remaines no more to doe, but that the* Sciences *already extant be improved, and adorned. Indeed it could be wiſht that the* ſtate of Learning were thus proſperous; *but the very truth is, theſe mancipations and ſervile reſignations of* Sciences, *is nothing elſe but a peccant humor, bred out of a dareing luſt and confidence in ſome few, and a languiſhing ſloth and Puſillanimity in the reſt. For when* Sciences (*for ſome parts it may be*) *have bin tilled and laboured with diligence, then perchance hath there riſen up ſome bold-undertaking wit, for Compendious brevity of Method populare, and plauſible, who in ſhew hath conſtituted a* Science, *but indeed depraved the* Labours of the Ancients: *Yet theſe Abridgements finde acceptation with Poſterity, for the expedite uſe of ſuch a work, and to avoid the trouble and impatience of a new* Inquiry. § *And if any ſtand upon* Conſent now inveterate, *as the Judgement*

ment, and teſt of Time, let him know be builds upon a very deceivable and infirme Foundation. Nor is it, for moſt part, ſo revealed unto us, what in Arts *and* Sciences *hath bin diſcovered and brought to light in diverſe ages, and different Regions of the world; much leſſe what hath bin experimented, and ſeriouſly laboured by particular Perſons in priuate;* For neither the Birthes, nor the Abortions of Time have bin Regiſtred. § *Nor is Conſent it ſelf, nor the long continuation thereof, with ſuch reverence be adored, for however there may be many kinder of* States *in* Civile Government; yet the *State of Sciences* is but one, *which alwaies was, and ſo will continue,* Populare, *and with the People the Diſciplines moſt in requeſt are either* Pugnacious *and* Polemicall; *or* Specious *and* Frivolous, *namely ſuch as either* illaqueate *or* allure *the* Aſſent. *Wherefore without queſtion, the greateſt wits in every age have bin over-borne, & in a ſort tyrannized over, whilſt men of Capacity and Comprehenſion about the vulgare, yet conſulting their own Credit and Reputation, have ſubmitted themſelves to the over-ſwaying Judgement of* Time *and* Multitude. *Therefore if in any* Time *or* Place, *more profound Contemplations have perchance emerged and revealed themſelves, they have bin forthwith toſt and extinguiſht by the Windes and Tempeſts of* Popular opinions: *ſo that* Time like a River carries down to us that which is light and blowen up, but ſinks and drownes that which is waighty and ſolid. § *Nay the very ſame Autors, who have uſurpt a kind of* Dictature in Sciences, *and with ſuch confi-*

dence paſt cenſure upon matters in doubt, have yet (the heat once over) in the lucide Intervalles, *from theſe peremptory fits of Aſſeveration, changed their note and betaken themſelves to complaints, upon the* ſubtlety of Nature; *the* ſecret Receſſes of Truth; *the* Obſcurity of Things; *the* Implication of Cauſes; *the* Infirmity of Mans Diſcerning Power: *Yet nothing the more modeſt for all this, ſeeing they chuſe rather to charge the Fault upon the* common condition of Man and Nature, *than to acknowledge any Perſonall deficience in themſelves. Yea it is a thing uſuall with them, that what they cannot compaſſe by* Art, *their way applied, to conclude the ſame impoßible to be attained by the ſame* Art: *and yet for all this,* Art *muſt not be condemned, being ſhe is to examine and judge. wherefore the aime and intention of ſuch accuſations is only this,* That Ignorance may be delivered frō Ignominy. § *So likewiſe what is already commended unto us and intertained hetherto, is for moſt part ſuch a kind of* Knowledge, *as is full of Words and Queſtions; but barren of Works and reall Improvement; for* Augmentation *backward and heartleſſe; pretending perfection in the whole, but ill-filled up in the Parts; for choice Populare, and of the Autors themſelves ſuſpected, and therefore fortified and countenanced by artificious evaſions.* § *And the Perſons who have entertained a deſigne to make triall themſelves and to give ſome* Advancement *to* Sciences, *and to* Propagate their bounds, *even theſe Autors durſt not make an open departure from the Common received opinions; nor viſite the Head-ſprings of nature,*

Nature, but take themſelves to have done a great matter, and to have gained much upon the Age, if they may but interlace, *or* annex *any thing of their own; providently conſidering with themſelves, that by theſe middle courſes, they may both conſerve the* modeſty of Aſſenting; *and the* liberty of Adding. *But whileſt they thus cautelouſly conforme themſelves to Opinions and Cuſtomes, theſe* Plauſible moderations, *redound to the great prejudice and detriment of Learning; For* at once to Admire and goe beyond Autors, are habits ſeldome compatible: but it comes to paſſe here after the manner of Waters, which will not aſcend higher than the levell of the firſt ſpring-head, from whence they deſcended; *wherefore ſuch writers amend many things, but promote litle or nothing, making a Proficience in* Melioration, *not in* Augmentation. § *Neither hath there bin wanting* undertaking Spirits, *who with a more reſolute confidence, preſuming nothing yet done, take themſelves to be the men, muſt rectify All; and imploying the ſtrength of their wits in crying down, and reverſing all former judgements, have made paſſage to themſelves and their own* Placits, *whoſe buſy Clamor, hath not much advanced* Knowledge, *ſince their aime and intention hath bin, not to enlarge the* bounds of Philoſophy *and* Arts, *by a* ſincere *and* ſolid Enquiry; *but only to change the* Placits, *and tranſlate the Empire of* Opinions, *and ſettle it upon themſelves, with litle advantage to* Learning, ſeeing amongſt oppoſite Errors, the Cauſes of Erring are commonly the ſame. § *And*

if any inconcerned natures, not mancipate to others, or their own opinions, but affecting liberty, have bin so farre animated, as to desire that others together with themselves, would make farther Inquiry; *these surely have meant well, but performed litle; for they seem to have proceeded upon probable grounds only, being wheeled about in a vertiginous maze of Arguments, and by a promiscuous* licence of Inqury, *have indeed loosened the sinewes of* severe Inquisition: *nor hath any of all these with a just patience, and sufficient expectance attended the* Operations of nature, *and the* successes of Experience. § *Some again have embarqu't themselves in the* Sea of Experiments, *and become almost Mechanicall, but in the* Experience *it selfe, they have practised a roveing manner of* Inquiry, *which they doe not in a regular course constantly pursue.* § *Nay many propound to themselves, certain petty Taskes, taking themselves to have accomplisht a great performance, if they can but extract some one Invention by a manage as poore as impertitent; for none rightly and successefully search the nature of any thing to the life in the Thing it selfe; but after a painfull and diligent variation of Experiments, not breaking off there, proceeds on, finding still emergent matter of farther* Discovery. § *And it is an Error of speciall note, that the industry bestowed in Experiments, hath presently, upon the first accesse into the Businesse, by a too forward and unseasonable Desire, seised upon some design'd operation; I mean sought after,* Fructifera non Lucifera, Experiments of use and not Experiments

riments of Light and Diſcovery: *not imitating the divine method which created the firſt day* Light *only, and allowed it one entire Day, produceing* no Materiate work the ſame day, *but deſcended to their Creation the daies following.* § *As for thoſe who have given the preeminence unto* Logique, *and are of opinion that the ſureſt Guards for* Sciences *muſt be procur'd from* thence; *they have truly and wiſely diſcerned, that the mind of man, and Intellective Faculty left unto it ſelf, may deſervedly be ſuſpected. But the remedy is too weak for the diſeaſe, and is it ſelf not exempt from Diſtemperature; for the* Logique *in force, though it may be rightly accommodated unto* matters Civile and Populare Sciences, *which conſiſt in* Diſcourſe *and* Opinion; *yet it comes farre ſhort of penetrating the* ſubtlety of Nature; *and undertaking more than it can maſter,* ſeemes rather to ſtabliſh and fixe Errors than to open a way to Truth. § *Wherefore to recollect what hath bin ſaid, it ſeemes that neither* Information from others, nor mens own Inquiries *touching* Sciences, *hath hetherto ſucceſſefully ſhined forth, eſpecially ſeeing there is ſo litle* certainty in Demonſtration *and* Infallibility *of Experiments thus farre diſcovered. And the Fabrique of the Univerſe to the contemplative eye of the Mind, for the frame thereof is like ſome Labyrinth or intricate Maze, where ſo many doubtfull paſſages, ſuch deceivable reſemblances, of Things and Signes, ſuch oblique and ſerpentine windings and implicite knots of Nature every where preſent themſelves, as confounds the un-*

derſtanding. And withall, we muſt continually make our way, through the woods of Experiences, and particular Natures, by the incertain Light of Senſe, ſometimes ſhining ſometimes ſhadowed: yea and the guides, which (as hath bin toucht) offer their aſsiſtance, they likewiſe are entangled, and help to make up the number of Errors and of thoſe that Erre. In matters of ſuch perplext difficulty, there is no relying upon the Iudgement of men from their own abilities; or upon the Caſuall Felicity of Particular events; for neither the capacity of Man, how excellent ſoever; nor the chance of Experience, never ſo often iterated and eſſayed, is of force to conquer theſe myſteries: we muſt march by line and levell, and all the way, even from the firſt perception of Senſes, muſt be ſecured, and fortified by a certain Rule, and conſtant Method of proceeding. § Yet are not theſe things ſo to be underſtood, as if, in ſo many Ages, and ſo much Induſtry, nothing at all hath bin performed to purpoſe; nor is there any cauſe why it ſhould repent us of the Diſcoveries already made; for certainly the Ancients, in thoſe ſpeculations which conſiſt in ſtrength of wit, and abſtract meditation, have approved themſelves men of admirable comprehenſions: But as in the Art of Navigation, the men of former Ages, directing their courſe by obſeruation of ſtarres only, could edge along the coaſt of the known Continent, and it may be, croſſe ſome narrow Seas or the Mediterranean; but before the Ocean could be thus commanded, and the Regions of the new world diſcovered, it was requiſite that the uſe of the Mariners needle, as a more

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ſure and certain guide ſhould be firſt found out; even ſo what diſcoveries ſoever have bin hetherto made in Arts *and* Sciences, *they are of that quality, as might have bin brought to light by Practice, Meditation, Obſervation and Diſcourſe, as things neerer the ſenſes, and for moſt part, under the command of common Notions; but before we can make our approaches, to the remote and hidden ſecrets of Nature, it is neceſſarily requiſite, that a better and more perfect uſe, and practique-operation of the Mind and underſtanding Faculty be introduct. § As for us, ſurely we, (vanquiſht with an immortall love of Truth) have expos'd our ſelves to doubtfull, difficult, and deſert Pathes; and by the protection and aſſiſtance of the Divine power, have borne up and encouraged our ſelves, againſt the violent Aſſaults and prepared Armies, as it were, of Opinions, and againſt our own private and inward heſitations and ſcruples, and againſt the cloudes and darkneſſe of Nature, and euery where flying fancies; that ſo we might procure the preſent and future Age more ſafe and ſound Indications and Impreſſions of Truth. If in this high and arduous attempt, we have made any* Proficience, *ſurely by no other means have we cleered our ſelves away, than by a ſincere and juſt* humiliation of the ſpirit of Man, to the lawes and operations of Nature. *For all they that went before us, who applied themſelves to the finding out of* Arts, *caſting a tranſient eye upon Things, examples, and experience, have preſently (as if Invention were nothing elſe but a meere Agitation of Braine) invoked*

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in a manner their own ſpirits, to divine and utter Oracles unto them: but we being chaſtly and perpetually converſant with the operations of Nature, divorce not the Intellect from the Object farther than that the Images and beams of things (as in ſenſe) may meet and concentrate; by which manner of proceeding, there is not much left to the ſtrength and excellency of wit. The ſame ſubmiſſion of ſpirit we have practiſed in diſcovery, we have followed in Delivery: Nor have we endeavour'd to ſet off our ſelves with Glory, or draw a Majeſty upon our inventions, either by Triumphs of Confutations; or Depoſitions of Antiquity; or an uſurpation of Authority; or the vaile of Obſcurity; which are Arts he may eaſily find out, whoſe ſtudy is not ſo much the Profit of others, as Applauſe to himſelfe. I ſay we neither have practiſed, nor goe we about, by force or fraud to circumvent mens Judgements, but conduct them to the things themſelves, and to the league and confederacy of Things, that they may ſee what they have, what they reprehend, what they adde and contribute to the Publique. And if we have bin too credulous, or too dormant, and not ſo intentive upon the matter, or languiſht in the way, or broken off the thread of the Inquiry, *yet notwithſtanding we preſent things after ſuch a manner open and naked, that our Errors may be detected and ſeparated before they can ſpread themſelves, or inſinuate their Contagion into the maſſe of Sciences; and after ſuch a Method as the continuation of our labours, is a matter facile and expedite. By this means we preſume we have eſtabliſht for ever,* a true and legitimate

gitimate Marriage, between the Empiricall and Rationall faculty; *whose faſtidious and unfortunate Divorce and Separation, hath troubled and diſordered the whole Race and Generation of Man-kind.* § *And ſeeing theſe performances are not within the compaſſe of our meere naturall Power and command, we doe heere, in the Acceſſe to this work*, Powre forth humbleſt and moſt ardent ſupplications to God the Father, God the Word, God the Spirit, that they being mindfulll of the Miſeries of Mankind, and of the Pilgrimage of this life, wherein we weare out few & evill daies, they would vouchſafe to endow mankind, by my hand with new Donatives. And moreover, we humbly pray, that Humane knowledges, may no way impeach, or prejudice Divine Truths; nor that from the diſcloſing of the waies of ſenſe, and the letting in of a more plentifull Naturall Light, any miſts of Incredulity or clouds of Darkneſſe ariſe in our minds, touching Divine Myſteries; but rather that from a purified Intellect, purged from Fancies and Vanity; and yet yeelded and abſolutely rendred up to Divine oracles; the tributes of Faith may be rendred to Faith. In the laſt place, that the venome of knowledge infuſed by the Serpent, whereby the mind of man is ſwelled and blown up, being voided; we may not be too aſpireingly wiſe, or above ſobriety, but that we may improve and propagate Verity in Charity. § *Now we have performed our vowes to heaven, converting our ſelves to men, we admoniſh them ſomethings that are Profitable, and*

requeſt of them ſome things that are equall. Firſt we admoniſh (which thing we have alſo prayed for,) that we keep human Reaſon within due Limits in matters Divine, and Senſe within compaſſe: For ſenſe like the
Philo. Iud. Sunne, opens and reveales the face of the Terreſtriall Globe, but ſhuts up and conceales the face of the Celeſtiall. *Again, that men beware that in flight from this error, they fall not upon a contrary extreme,* of too much abaſing Naturall Power; *which certainly will come to paſſe, if they once entertain a conceit,* that there are ſome ſecrets of nature ſeperate and exempt, as it were by iniunction, from Humane Inquiſition. *For it was not that* pure and immaculate Naturall knowledge, by the light whereof *Adam* gave names unto the Creatures, according to the propriety of their natures, which gave the firſt motion and occaſion to the Fall; but it was that proud and Imperative Appetite of Morall knowledge, defineing the lawes and limits of Good and Evill, with an intent in man to revolt from God, and to give lawes unto himſelfe, which was indeed the proiect of the Primitive Temptation. *For, of the knowledges which contemplate the works of Nature, the holy Philoſopher*
Prov. 25. *hath ſaid expreſſely;* that the glory of God is to conceale a thing, but the glory of the King is to find it out: *as if the Divine Nature, according to the innocent and ſweet play of children, which hide themſelves to the end they may be found, took delight to hide his works, to the end they might be found out; and of his indulgence and goodneſſe to man-kind, had choſen the*

ſoule

Soule of man to be his Play-fellow in this game. § *In ſumme, I would adviſe all in generall, that they would take into ſerious conſideration the true and Genuine ends of* knowledge; *that they ſeek it not either for Pleaſure, or Contention, or contempt of others, or for Profit, or Fame, or for Honor, and Promotion, or ſuch like adulterate or inferior ends: but for the merit and emolument of Life, and that they regulate and perfect the ſame in charity:* For the deſire of Power, was the Fall of Angels, the deſire of knowledge, the fall of Man; but in charity there is no exceſſe, neither men nor Angels ever incurred danger by it. § *The Requeſts we make are theſe, (To ſay nothing of our ſelves touching the matter in hand) we* Requeſt *thus much,* That men would not think of it as an opinion, but as a work, and take it for Truth, that our aime, and end is not to lay the foundation of a Sect or Placit, but of Humane Profit and Proficience. § *Again, that reſpecting their own Benefit, and putting off Partialities and Prejudices, they would all contribute in one for the publique Good: and that being freed and fortified by our Preparations and Aids, againſt the Errors and Impediments of the waies, they likewiſe may come in, and bear a part in the burden, and inherit a portion of the Labours that yet remaine behind.* § *Moreover that they cheere up themſelves, and conceive well of the enterpriſe; and not figure unto themſelves a conceit and fancy,* that this Our Inſtauration is a matter infinite, and beyond the power and compaſſe of Mortality; *ſeeing it is in truth the right and*

legitimate end and period of Infinite Errors *and not unmindfull of Mortality, and Humane Condition, being it doth not promiſe that the* Deſigne *may be accompliſht within the Revolution of an Age only, but delivers it over to Poſterity to Perfect. In a word,* it ſeeks not Sciences arrogantly in the cells of mans wit, but ſubmiſsively in the greater world: And commonly, Empty things are vaſt and boundleſſe, but Solids are contracted and determined within a narrow compaſse. § *To conclude, we thought good to make it our laſt ſuit, (leſt peradventure through the difficulty of the Attempt, any ſhould become unequall Iudges of our Labours) that men ſee to it, how they doe, from that which we muſt of neceſsity lay down as a ground (if we will be true to our own ends) aſſume a liberty to cenſure, and paſſe ſentence upon our labours; ſeeing we reject all this* premature and Anticipated humane Reaſon, *raſhly and too ſuddenly departed from* Things, (*as touching the* Inquiſition of Nature) *as a thing various, diſordered and ill-built: Neither in equity can it be required of us,* to ſtand to the Iudgement of that *Reaſon,* which ſtands it ſelfe, at the barre of Iudicature.

THE

THE DISTRIBVTION OF THE WORK INTO *SIX PARTS.*

P. I. Partitiones Scientiarvm, Or *a ſummary Survay and* partition *of* Sciences.

P. II. Novvm Organvm, Or *True Directions for the Interpretation of Nature.*

P. III. Phænomena Vniversi, Or *Hiſtory Naturall and Experimentall, for the building up Philoſophy.*

P. IV. Scala Intellectvs, Or *the Intellectuall Sphere rectified to the Globe of the World.*

P. V. Prodromi, Or *The Anticipations of* ſecond Philoſophy *emergent upon Practice.*

P. VI. Secvnda Philosophia, Or *Active Philoſophy, from intimate Converſe with Nature.*

THE ARGUMENT OF THE *SEVERALL PARTS.*

IT *is one point of the Deſigne we have in hand,* that every thing be delivered with all poſsible Plainesse and Perſpicuity: for the nakednesse of the Mind, as once of the Body, is

the companion of Innocence and Simplicity. *Firſt therefore*, the order and Diſtribution of the work, *with the reaſon thereof, muſt be made manifeſt.* The Parts of the work *are, by us, aſsigned* SIX.

P. I. ¶ The Firſt Part exhibits the ſumme or univerſall deſcription of that Learning and Knowledges in the poſſeſsion whereof, men have hetherto bin eſtated. *For we thought good to make ſome ſtay even upon* Sciences received, *and that, for this conſideration, that we might give more advantage to the* Parfection of ancient knowledges, and to the introduction of new: *For we are carried, in ſome degree, with an equall temper of Deſire,* both to improve the labours of the Ancients, and to make farther progreſse. *And this makes for the faith and ſincerity of our meaning,*
Prov. 18. *according to that of the wiſe,* The unlearned Man receives not the words of knowledge, unleſse you firſt interpret unto him the conceptions of his heart: *Wherefore we will not neglect to ſide along (as it were in paſſage) the Coaſts of* accepted Sciences and Arts; *and to import thether, ſomethings uſefull and profitable.* § *Neverthelesſe we adjoyne* ſuch Partitions of Sciences, as comprehend, not only ſuch things that are found out and obſerved already, but ſuch alſo as are thereto pertaining & have bin hetherto pretermiſs'd. *For there are found* in the Intellectuall Globe, as in the Terreſtriall, ſoyles improved and Deſerts. *Wherefore let it not ſeem ſtrange, if now and then we make a departure from the* uſuall Diviſions, *and forſake the beaten path of ſome Partitions:* for Addition

whileſt

whileſt it varies the whole, of neceſsity varies the parts and the Sections thereof: *and the* accepted Diviſions, *are accommodated only to the* accepted ſumme of Sciences, *as it is now caſt up.* § *Concerning thoſe* Parts, *which we ſhall note as* Pretermitted, *we will ſo regulate our ſelves, as to ſet down more than the naked Titles, or brief Arguments of* Deficients. *For where we deliver up any thing as a* Desiderate, *ſo it be a matter of merit; and the reaſon thereof may ſeem ſomewhat obſcure; ſo as, upon good conſideration, we may doubt, that we ſhall not be ſo eaſily conceived what we intend, or what the contemplation is we comprehend in our mind, and in our meditation: there it ſhall ever be our preciſe care, to annex either* precepts, *for the performing of ſuch a work; or a Part of the Work it ſelf, performed by us already, for* Example *to the whole; that ſo we may in every Particular, either by* Operation or Information, *promote the buſineſſe. For in my judgement, it is a matter which concernes not only the Benefit of others, but our own Reputation alſo; that no man imagine that we have projected in our minds ſome ſlight ſuperficiall notion of theſe* Deſignes; *and that they are of the nature of thoſe things, which we could* Deſire, *and which we accept only as* good wiſhes. *For they are ſuch as without queſtion, are within the power and poſsibility of men to compaſſe, unleſſe they be wanting to themſelves; and hereof, we for our parts, have certain and evident demonſtration;* for we come not hether, as Augures, to meaſure Countries in our mind, for Divination; but as Captaines, to invade them

them, for a conqueſt. And this is the Firſt part of our Works.

P. II. ¶ *Thus having paſſed over Ancient Sciences, in the next place, we enable humane Intellect to ſaile through.* Wherefore to the Second Part is deſigned the Doctrine touching a more ſound, and perfect uſe of Reaſon, in the inquiry of Things, and the true aſſiſtances of the underſtanding; *that hereby (ſo farre as the condition of humanity and mortality will ſuffer) the Intellect, may be elevated; and amplified with a faculty, capable to conquer the dark, and deeper ſecrets of Nature. And the* Art, *we here ſet downe, which we are wont to call, The* INTERPRETATION OF NATVRE, *is a kind of* Logique, *though very much, and exceeding different. That* vulgare Logique *profeſſes the Preparation and Contrivance of aides and forces for the underſtanding, herein they conſpire, but it cleerely differs from the Populare, ſpecially in three things, namely,* in the end, in the order of Demonſtrating, and, in the firſt diſcloſures to Inquiry. § *For* the End *propounded in this our Science is, that there may be found out not Arguments, but Arts; not things Conſentaneous to Principles, but even Principles themſelves; not probable reaſons, but deſignations and indications of works; wherefore from a different intention followes a different effect: for there, an Adverſary is diſtreſſed and vanquiſht by Diſputation, here by nature, the thing done.* § And with this End accords the nature and order of their Demonſtrations: *For in* vulgare Logique, *almoſt all the paines is imployed about*

bout Syllogiſme: *as for* Induction, *the* Dialectiques *ſeem ſcarce ever to have taken it into any ſerious conſideration, ſlightly paſsing it over, and haſtning to the formes of Diſputeing But we reject* Demonſtration by Syllogiſme, *for that it proceeds confuſedly; and lets nature eſcape our hands. For though no man call into doubt, but that* what are coincident in a midle terme, are in themſelves coincident, (*which is a kind of Mathematique Certitude*) *yet here lies the Fallax,* that Syllogiſme conſiſts of Propoſitions, Propoſitions of words, and words are the tokens and marks of things. *Now if theſe ſame* notions *of the the mind, (which are as it were,* the ſoule of words, *and the Baſis of this manner of ſtructure, and fabrique) be rudely and raſhly divorc'd from things, and roveing; not perfectly defin'd and limited, and alſo many other waies vitious; all falls to ruine. Wherefore we reject* Syllogiſme, *not only in regard of* Principles (*for which nor doe they make uſe of it*) *but in reſpect alſo of* Midle Propoſitions, *which indeed* Syllogiſme, *however, inferres and brings forth; but barren of operations and remote from practiſe; and in relation to the Active Part of Sciences, altogether incompetent. Although therefore we may leave to* Syllogiſme, *and ſuch celebrated and applauded* Demonſtrations, *a juriſdiction over Arts Populare and Opinable (for in this kind we move nothing) yet for the nature of Things, we every where as well in* Minor, as Maior Propoſitions, *make uſe of* Inductions: *for we take* Induction *to be that Forme of* Demonſtration, *which ſupports ſenſe, preſſes nature*

and is inſtanced in works, and in a ſort mingled therewith. Wherefore the order alſo of Demonſtration *is altogether inverted. For hetherto the buſineſſe uſed to be thus managed; from ſenſe, and ſome few Particulars, ſuddenly to fly up to the higheſt Generalls, as to fixt Poles, about which Diſputations may be turned; from which the reſt of intermediate Actioms may be derived. A courſe compendious indeed, but precipitate; and to nature impervious: but for Diſputations ready, and accommodate. But according to* our method, Actioms *are raiſed by a ſequent continuity & graduat dependancy, ſo as there is no ſeiſing upon the higheſt Generalls, but in the laſt place; and thoſe higheſt Generals in quality not notionals; but well terminated, and ſuch as nature acknowledges to be truly neere allied unto her; and which cleave to the individuall intrinſiques of things.* § But touching the forme it ſelfe of Induction and Iudgement made by it, *we undertake a mighty work. For the* Forme whereof Logicians ſpeak, which proceeds by ſimple enumeration is a childiſh thing, *and concludes upon admittance, is expoſed to perill from a contradictory inſtance; lookes only upon commune operations, and is in the iſſue endleſſe. But to the knowledges of* Induction, *ſuch a* Forme *is required, as may ſolve and ſeparate* experience, *and by due excluſion and rejection neceſſarily conclude. And if that publique and populare* Iudgement of Dialectiques, *be ſo laborious and hath exerciſed ſo many and ſo great wits; how much greater paines ought we take in this other; which not only out of the ſecret cloſets of the mind,*

mind, but out of the very entrailes of nature is extracted? Nor is this all, for we more firmely ſettle, and ſolidate the foundation of Sciences, and take the firſt riſe of our inquiry deeper than hetherto hath bin attempted; ſubmitting to examinations thoſe Principles, which vulgare Logick *takes up on the credit of another. For the* Dialectiques *borrow, as it were, from all other Sciences, the Principles of Sciences; again adore the prime Notions of the mind; laſtly reſt ſatisfied with the immediat informations of ſenſe rightly diſpoſited. But our judgement is this, that true Logique ſhould viſite every particular Province of Sciences, with greater command than their principles poſſeſſe; and that thoſe ſame* putative Principles *be enforc'd to give an account, and be liable to examination, untill ſuch time as their validity and tenure cleerely appeared. And as touching the* Prime Notions of the intellect, *there is nothing of thoſe, (the underſtanding left at liberty to it ſelfe) hath congeſted, but matter to be ſuſpected; nor any way warrantable, unleſſe it be ſummon'd, and ſubmit it ſelfe to a new Court of Judicature; and that ſentence paſſe according thereto. Moreover we many waies ſift and ſound the information of ſenſe it ſelfe; for the Sences deceive, yet withall they indicate their Errors: but Errors are at hand, Indications to be ſought for a farre off.* § The guilt of Senſe is of two ſorts; either it deſtitutes us, or elſe it deceives us. *For firſt, there are many things which eſcape the cognizance of ſenſe, even when it is well diſpoſed, and no way impedite: either by reaſon of the ſubtility of the entire body, or the minutneſſe of the*

parts thereof, or the diſtance of place, or the ſlowneſſe, and likewiſe ſwiftneſſe of motion; or the familiar converſe with the object, or ſome other cauſes. Again, nor where ſenſe truly apprehends its object, are her precepts ſo very firme: for the teſtimony and information of ſenſe, is ever from the Analogy of Man, and not from the Analogy of the World; *and it is an error of dangerous conſequence to aſſert,* that ſence is the meaſure of things. *Wee refore to encounter theſe inconveniences, we have with painfull and faithfull ſervice every where ſought out, and collected aſſiſtances,* that Supplements to Deficients; to Variations, Rectifications, may be miniſtred. *Nor doe we undertake this ſo* much by inſtruments, as by experiments; *for the ſubtlety of* Experiments, *is farre greater than of* ſenſe *it ſelfe, though aſſiſted with exact inſtruments; we mean* ſuch experiments, *which to the intention of the thing inquired, are skilfully according to Art invented and accommodated. Wherefore we doe not attribute much to the immediat and particular perception of ſenſe; but we bring the matter to this iſſue, that ſenſe may judge only of the experiment; the experiment of the thing. We conceive therefore, that of* ſenſe, *(from which all knowledge in things naturall muſt be derived, unleſſe we mean wilfully to goe a witleſſe way to worke) we are become the religious Pontifes; and the not inexpert interpreters of her Oracles; ſo as others may ſeem in outward profeſſion, but we in deed and action, to protect and honor* ſenſe. *And of this kind are they which we prepare, for the light of Nature, the accenſion, and immiſ-*

immiſsion thereof; which of themſelves were ſufficient, were humane Intellect equall, and a ſmooth inanticipated Table. But when the minds of men are after ſuch ſtrange waies beſieged, that for to admit the true beams of things, a ſincere and poliſht Area is wanting; it concernes us, of neceſsity to bethink our ſelves, of ſeeking out ſome remedy for this diſtemperature. The Idolaes, *wherewith the mind is preoccupate are either* Attracted, or Innate; *Attracted have ſlid into mens minds, either by the* Placits and Sects of Philoſophers; *or by* depraved lawes of Demonſtrations. *But the* Innate *inhere in the nature of the Intellect, which is found to be farre more liable to error, than* ſenſe. *For however men may pleaſe themſelves, and be raviſh't into admiration, and almoſt adoration of the mind of man, this is moſt certain:* as an inequall looking-glaſſe, *changes the raies of objects, according to its own figure, and cutting; even ſo the mind, when it ſuffers impreſsion from things by ſenſe, in encogitating and diſcharging her notions, doth not ſo faithfully inſinuate and incorporate her nature, with the nature of things. And thoſe two firſt kinds of* Idolaes *can very hardly; but thoſe latter, by no means be extirpate. It remains only that they be diſcloſed; and that ſame treacherous faculty of the mind be noted and convinced; leſt from the unſound complection of the mind, upon the extermination of ancient, perchance new ſhootes of Errors ſpring up in their place; and the buſineſſe be brought only to this iſſue, that errors be not extinguiſht, but changed: but that on the contrary, now at laſt, it be*

for ever decreed and ratified, that the intellect cannot make a judgement but by Induction, *and by* a legittimate forme thereof. *Wherefore* the Doctrine of purifying the understanding, *that it may become receptive of truth, is perfected by* three Reprehensions: Reprehension of Philosophy; Reprehension of Demonstrations; *and* Reprehension of Native humane Reason. *These explicated, and then the case cleered, what the nature of things, what the nature of the mind is capable off; we presume (the Divine goodnesse being President at the Rites) that we have prepared and adorned*, the Bride-chamber of the Mind and of the universe. *Now may the vote of the Marriage-song be*, that from this coniunction, Human Aides, and a Race of Inventions may be procreated, as may in some part vanquish and subdue mans miseries and necessities. *And this is the second Part of the Work.*

P. III. ¶ *But our purpose is not only to point out and munite the way; but to enterprise it:* Wherefore the third Part of the work compriseth, PHÆNOMENA VNIVERSI, *as to say*, all kind of Experience, and Naturall History, *of such kind as may be fundamentall for the building up of* Naturall Philosophy. *For neither can any exact way of* Demonstration or Forme of interpreting Nature, *both guard and support the mind from error and lapse; and withall present and minister matter for knowledge. But they who proposed to themselves not to proceed by Conjectures and Divinations, but to find out, and to know, whose end and aime*

is

is not to contrive Fictions and Fables, but to ſearch with diligence into the nature of, and, as it were, anatomize, this true world; *muſt derive all from the very things themſelves. Nor can the ſubſtitution and compenſation of wit, or meditation, or Argumentation ſuffice to this travaile, inquiſition, and mundane perambulation, no not if all the wits in the world ſhould meet together. Wherefore we muſt either take a right courſe, or deſert the buſineſſe for ever: and to this day the matter hath bin ſo managed, that it is no marvaile, if nature hath not diſcloſed her ſelfe. For firſt, defective and fallacious information of ſenſe, negligent, inequall, and as it were, caſuall obſervation vain Tradition and from idle report; Practiſe, intent on the work, and ſervile,* experimentall attempt, *ignorant, dull, wild, and broken; laſtly ſlight and porie* Naturall Hiſtory, *have towards the raiſing of Philoſophy, congeſted moſt depraved matter for the underſtanding. After this, prepoſterous ſubtlety of arguing, and ventilation, hath eſſayed a late remedy to things plainly deſperate; which doth not any way recover the buſineſſe, or ſeperate errors.* § Wherefore there is no hope of greater advancement and progreſſe, but in the Reſtauration of Sciences. *And the commencements hereto muſt by all means be derived from* Naturall Hiſtory; *and that too of a new kind and proviſion: for to no purpoſe you poliſh the Glaſſe, if images be wanting: not only faithfull guards muſt be procured, but apt matter prepared. And this our* Hiſtory, *as our* Logick, *differs from that in uſe in many particulars:* in the end or office, in the Maſſe and

and Congeries, than in the ſubtilty, alſo in choice, and in conſtitution in reference to thoſe things that follow. § For firſt we propound ſuch a Naturall Hiſtory, *as doth not ſo much either pleaſe for the variety of things, or profit for preſent improvement of Experiments, as it doth diſperſe a light to the invention of cauſes; and gives, as it were, the firſt milke to the nouriſhing up of Philoſophy. For though we principally purſue operation, and the Active part of Sciences; yet we attend the due ſeaſon of Harveſt; nor goe about to reap the green hearb or the blade. For we know well that Axioms rightly invented, draw after them the whole troupe of Operations; and not ſparſedly but plentifully exhibit works. But we utterly condemne and renounce, as* Atalantaes Apple *which retards the Race, that unſeaſonable and childiſh humor of accelerating erly pledges of new works. And this is the Duty of our* Naturall Hiſtory. § As for the Maſſe, we Compile *a Hiſtory, not only of Nature at Liberty, and in Courſe; I mean, when without compulſion ſhe glides gently along, and accompliſhes her own work: (as is the* Hiſtory of the Heavens, Meteors, Earth and Sea; of Minerals, Plants, Animals:) *but much rather of* Nature ſtraightned and vext; *when by the provocations of Art, and the miniſtry of Man, ſhe is put out of her commune road; diſtreſſed and wrought. Wherefore, all the experiments of Arts Mechanicall, all of the Operative part of Liberall, all of many Practicall, not yet conſpired into a peculiar Art (ſo farre as any diſcovery may be had, and ſo farre as is conducent to our intention) we*

will

will ſet down at large. So likewiſe (not to diſſemble the matter) nothing regarding mens pride and bravades, we beſtow more paines, and place more aſſurance in this Part than in that other; being the nature of things, more diſcloſes hirſelfe in the vexation of Art; *than when it is at its own liberty.* § *Nor doe we preſent the* Hiſtory of Subſtances only, *but alſo we have taken it as a part of our diligence, to prepare a ſeperate* hiſtory of their virtues; *we mean, ſuch as in nature may be accounted Cardinall, and wherein the Primordials of nature are expreſsely conſtituted; as matter inveſted with her Primitive qualities and appetites; as* denſe, rare, hot, cold, conſiſtent, fluid, ponderous, light, *and others not a few.* § *For indeed, to ſpeak of* ſubtility, we ſearch out with choice diligence, a kind of Experiments, farre more ſubtile and ſimple than thoſe commonly met with. *For we educe and extract many out of darkneſſe, which had never come into any mans mind to inveſtigate, ſave his who proceeds by a certain and conſtant path, to the invention of cauſes: whereas in themſelves they are of no great uſe; that it is cleerely evident, that they were not ſought after, for themſelves, but that they have directly the ſame reference to things and works, that the Letters of the Alphabet have to ſpeech and words; which, though ſingle by themſelves, they are unprofitable, yet are they the Elements of all Language.* § And in the choice of Reports and Experiments, we preſume that we have given in better ſecurity, than they who hetherto have bin converſant in Naturall Phi-

losophy: *for we admit nothing but by oculate faith, at leſt evident proofe, and that after moſt ſevere enquiry: ſo as nothing is reported hightned to the abuſive credit of a miracle; but what we relate are chaſt and immaculate from Fables and Vanity. So alſo all thoſe received and ventilated current fictions and lies, which by a ſtrange neglect, have for many ages bin countenanced and are become inveterate; we doe by name proſcribe, and preciſely note, that they may be no longer prejudiciall to Sciences.* For what one *wiſely obſerves*, that Fables, Superſtitions, and idle Stories, which nurſes inſtill into young-children, doe in good earneſt deprave their minds: *ſo the ſame reaſon moved us, to be ſo religious and carefull, leſt at the entrance, where we handle and take the charge* of the Infancy, as it were, of Philoſophy, under naturall Hiſtory, *ſhe ſhould be initiated in any vanity.* § *But* in every new and ſomewhat more ſubtile experiment, *in our opinion, certain and tryed, we yet apertly adjoyne the manner of the experiment we have practiſed, that after it is made apparent what the ſucceſſe of every particular was with us, men might ſee the error which might lurke and cleave thereto, and be awaked to prooſes, if any ſuch be, more exact and ſecure.* § In briefe, *we every where ſparſedly inſert monitions and ſcruples and conjectures, ejecting and interdicting, as it were, by a ſacred adjuration and exorciſme, all Phantaſmes.* § Laſtly being it is a thing moſt liquid unto us, *how exceedingly Experience and Hiſtory diſperſe the beams of the ſight of humane Intellect, and how hard a matter it is, ſpecially*

Plut. de Ed. P. ex Plat. de Rep.

ally to minds tender and preoccupate, at first entrance, to become familiar with nature; we therefore many times adde our own observations, as certain first conversions and inclinations, and as it were, Aspects of History to Philosophy; *to the end that they may be both pledges to men, that they shall not ever be detained in the waves of History; as also that when they are once arrived to the operation of the understanding, all may be in a more preparednesse. And by this kind of* Naturall History, *as here we describe, we suppose that there may be a secure and easy accesse unto Nature; and solid and prepared matter presented unto the Vnderstanding.*

¶ Now we have *both fortified and environed the understanding with faithfull Auxiliaries and forces, and by a strict Muster raised a compleat Army of Divine works,* there seemes nothing remaining but that we set upon Philosophy it selfe. *But in so difficile and dubious an enterprise, there are some particulars, which seem necessarily to be interposed partly for instruction, partly for present use.* § Of these the first is, that the examples of Inquisition and of Invention, *be propounded according to our rule and method represented in particular subjects; chiefly making choice of such subjects, which amongst other things to be enquired, are the most noble, and in mutuall relation, most Adverse; that there may not want an* example *in every kind. Nor doe we speak of those* examples, *which for illustration sake, are annexed to every particular precept and rule, (for we have sufficiently quit* P. IV.

our ſelves hereof in the Second Part of the Work,) *but we mean directly the Types and Platformes which may preſent as it were, to the eye, the whole Procedure of the mind, and the continued Fabrick and order of Invention, in certain ſelected ſubjects; and they various and of remarke. For it came into our mind, that in* Mathematiques, *the frame ſtanding, the Demonſtration inferred is facile and perſpicuous; on the contrary, without this accomodation and dependency, all ſeems involved, and more ſubtile than indeed they be.* Wherefore to examples of this ſort we aſsigne the Fourth Part of our work; *which indeed is nothing elſe, but a particular, and explicite application of the Second Part.*

P. V. ¶ But the fifth Part *is added only for a time, and paid as intereſt untill the Principall be raiſed. For we are not ſo precipitantly bent upon the end, as too ſlightly to paſſe over what we caſually meet with by the way. Wherefore the* Fift Part of the Work, is *compoſed of ſuch things as we have, or found out, or experimented, or ſuperadded; nor yet doe we performe this, by the* reaſons and rules of Interpretation, *but by the ſame application of the underſtanding, which others in enquiry and invention uſe to practiſe. For ſeeing from our perpetuall converſe with nature, we hope greater matters from our meditations, than we can promiſe to our ſelves from the ſtrength of our own wit; theſe obſervations may be as tents pitched in the way, into which the mind, in puſuit of more certain Collections, may turne in, and for a while repoſe hir ſelfe. Yet in the*

the mean, we promiſe not to engage our ſelves upon the credit of thoſe Obſervations; becauſe they are not found out, nor tried by the right forme of Interpretation. § *And there is no cauſe why any ſhould diſtaſt or intertain a jealouſie,* at that ſuſpenſion of Iudgement in knowledge, which aſſerts not abſolutely, that nothing can be known; but that nothing, without a certain order and a certain method, can be known; and yet withall, layes downe for uſe and eaſe, certain degrees of certitude, untill the mind be fixt upon the explication of cauſes. *For neither thoſe very Schooles of Philoſophers, who downe-right maintained* Acatalepſie *or* Incomprehenſibility, *have bin inferior to thoſe, who uſurp* a liberty of pronouncing ſentence: *but they provided not, aſſiſtances to the ſenſe, and underſtanding, as we have done; but utterly took away all* credit *and* authority, *which is a farre different caſe and almoſt oppoſite.* Academ. Vet. Nov. Dogmat.

¶ Now the ſixth Part of our Work, whereto the reſt are ſubſervient and miniſtrant, doth altogether diſcloſe, and propound that Philoſophy, which is educed, and conſtituted out of ſuch a legitimate ſincere and ſevere enquiry, as we have already taught and prepared. *But to conſummate and perfect this* laſt Part, *is a thing exalted above our ſtrength, and beyound our hopes. We have given it, as we truſt, not contemptible beginnings; the proſperous ſucceſſe of mankind ſhall give it iſſue; and peradventure ſuch, as men, in this preſent ſtate of mind and imployments, can not eaſily conceive and Comprehend. And the caſe con-* P. VI.

cernes not contemplative ſelicity alone, but indeed mens affaires and fortunes, and all the power of works: For Man, Natures miniſter and interpreter, doeth, and underſtands ſo much, as he hath by Operation or Contemplation obſerved of Natures Order; nor can know or doe any more: *For neither can any forces unlooſe and break aſunder the chain of Cauſes; nor is nature otherwiſe, than by obedience unto it, vanquiſht. Wherefore theſe two main Intentions,* Human Sciences, and Human Potencies, *are indeed in the ſame point coincident: and the fruſtration of works, for moſt part, falls out from the ignorance of Cauſes.* § *But herein the ſumme and perfection of all conſiſts, if a man, never taking off the eye of his mind from the things themſelves, throughly imprint their images to the life. For God defend, that we ſhould publiſh the ayery dreams of our own Fancy, for the reall* Ideas of the World! *But rather may he be ſo graciouſly propitious unto us, that we may write the Apocalyps, and true viſion of the impreſſions and ſignets of the Creator, upon the Creature!*

Wherefore thou, O Father, who haſt conferred viſible Light as the Primitiæ on the Creature; and breathed into the face of Man Intellectuall Light, as the accompliſhment of thy works; protect and conduct this Work, which iſſueing from thy Goodneſſe, returnes to thy Glory! Thou, after thou hadſt ſurvayed the works thy hands had wrought, ſaw that all was exceeding Good, and haſt reſted: but Man ſurvaying the works his hands had wrought

wrought, ſaw that all was vanity and vexation of Spirit, and found no Reſt: Wherefore if we labour with diligence, and vigilance in Thy works, thou wilt make us Participants of thy Viſion, and of thy Sabbath. We humbly ſupplicate, that we may be of this reſolution, and inſpired with this mind; and that thou wouldeſt be pleaſed to endow human Race, with new Donatives by our hands, and the hands of others, in whom thou ſhalt implant the ſame

Spirit.

THE



THE GENERALL ARGVMENT
OF THE IX. *BOOKS.*

LIB. I. Is Proemiall to the Instauration of Sciences. § Reports the DISCREDITS of LEARNING. § The DIGNITY of LEARNING.

LIB. II. Declares the ADVANCEMENT of LEARNING. § Instrumentall. § Essentiall, in the Partition of Sciences, into, HISTORY. § POESY. § PHILOS. § Partit. of HIST. § POESY.

LIB. III. Partitions of PHILOSOPHY, into § SUMMARY. § SPECIALL, into DIVINE. § NATURALL. § HUMANE. § Partitions of NATURALL PHILOSOPHY.

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LIB. VI. Partitions of TRADITION or ELOCUTION into the ORGAN of SPEECH. § METHOD of SPEECH. § ILLUSTRATION of *SPEECH*.

LIB. VII. Partitions of ETHICK or MORALE KNOWLEDGE, into the Doctrine of the PLATFORME of GOOD. § Of the CULTVRE of the MIND.

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LIB. IX. Partitions of THEOLOGY omitted, DEFICIENTS Three. § I. THE RIGHT USE OF HUMAN REASON in DIVINITY. § II. The DEGREES OF UNITY IN THE CITTY OF GOD § III. The EMANATIONS OF SS. SCRIPTURE.

THE

THE ARGVMENT OF THE CHAPTERS OF THE First Booke.

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the Moderne Dedication of Bookes. § Discreet Morigeration allowed.

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I. *Distempers of Learning from Learned mens studies, are of three sorts; Phantasticall Learning; Contentious Learning; Delicate Learning.* II. *Delicate Learning a curiosity in words, through profuseneſſe of ſpeech. § Decent expreſsion commended. § Affected brevity censured.* III *Contentious Learning, a curiosity in matter, through Novelty of Termes or ſtrictneſſe of Poſitions. § A vanity either in Matter; or in Method.* IV. *Phantasticall Learning hath two branches, Impoſture; Credulity. § Credulity a Belief of Hiſtory; or a Beliefe of Art; or Opinion: and that either Reall, in the Art it ſelfe. § Or Perſonall in the Author of ſuch an Art or Science.*

CAP. V.

Peccant Humors in Learning. I. *Extreme affection to two extremes; Antiquity: Novelty.* II. *A diſtruſt that any thing New, ſhould now be found out.* III. *That of all Sects and Opinions, the beſt hath ſtill prevailed.* IV. *An over-early reduction of Knowledge into Arts and Methods.* V. *A neglect of* Primitive Philosophy. VI. *A Di-*

vorce of the Intellect from the Object. VII. *A contagion of Knowledge in Generall, from Particular inclinations and tempers.* VIII. *An impatience of ſuſpenſe; haſt to poſitive aſſertion.* IX. *A Magiſtrall manner of Tradition of Knowledge.* X. *Aime of Writers, Illuſtration, not Propagation of Knowledge.* XI. *End of ſtudies, Curioſity, Pleaſure, Profit, Preferment &c.*

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The Dignity of Learning from Divine Arguments and Teſtimonies. I. *From Gods Wiſdome.* § *Angels of Illumination.* § *The firſt Light.* § *The firſt Sabbath.* § *Mans imployment in the Garden.* § *Abels contemplation.* § *The Invention of Muſique.* § *Confuſion of Tongues.* II. *The excellent Learning of Moſes.* § *Job.* § *Salomon.* § *Chriſt.* § *S^t Paul.* § *The Ancient Doctors of the Church.* § *Learning exalts the Mind to the Celebration of Gods glory; and is a preſervative againſt Error and unbeliefe.*

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pieſt times under Learned Princes and others. § Exemplified in ſix continued ſucceeding Emperors from the death of Domitian. III. *Military: The Concurrence of Armes and Learning. § Exemplified in Alexander the Great. § Julius Cæſar the Dictator. § Xenophon the Philoſopher.*

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The Merit of Learning, from the influence it hath upon Morall virtues. § Learning a Soveraign remedy for all the diſeaſes of the Mind. § The dominion thereof greater than any Temporall Power, being a Power over Reaſon and Beliefe. § Learning gives Fortunes, Honours and Delights, excelling all other as the ſoule the ſenſe. § Durable monuments of Fame. § A proſpect of the Immortality of a future world.

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THE PROEM.

THe Advancement of Learning commended to the Care of Kings. I. *The Acts thereof in generall three, Reward, Direction, Aſſiſtance.* II *In ſpeciall, about three Objects, Places, Books, Perſons. § In Places foure Circumſtances, Buildings, Revenues, Priviledges, Lawes of Diſcipline. § In Books*

Books two, Libraries, good Editions. § *In Persons two, Readers of Sciences extant, Inquiries into Parts non-extant.* III. *Deficients in the Acts of Advancement, six, want of Foundations for Arts at large.* § *Meanesse of Salary to Readers.* § *Want of allowance for experiments.* § *Preposterous Institutions: unadvised practises in Academicall studies.* § *Want of Intelligence between the Universities of Europe.* § *Want of Enquirers into the Defects of Arts.* § *The Authors particular designe.* § *Modest defence.*

CAP. I.

I. *An Universall Partition of Human Learning into,* § *History.* II. *Poesy.* III. *Philosophy.* § *This Partition is drawn from the three Intellective Faculties; Memory; Imagination; Reason.* § *The same distribution is agreeable unto Divine Learning.*

CAP. II.

I. *The Partition of History, into Naturall, and Civile. (Ecclesiasticall, and Literary comprehended under Civile.)* II. *The Partition of Naturall History, into the History of Generations.* III. *Of Preter-Generations.* IV. *Of Arts.*

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I. *A Second Partition of Naturall Hiſtory from the Uſe and End thereof, into Narrative, and Inductive. And that the moſt noble end of Naturall Hiſtory is, that it Miniſter and Conduce to the building up of Philoſophy; which end, Inductive Hiſtory reſpecteth.* II. *The Partition of the Hiſtory of Generations, into the Hiſtory of the Heavens; The Hiſtory of the Meteors; The Hiſtory of the Earth, and Sea; The Hiſtory of Maſſive Bodies, or of the greater Collegiats; The Hiſtory of Kinds, or of the Leſſer Collegiats.*

CAP. IV.

I. *The Partition of Hiſtory Civile, into Eccleſiaſticall and Literary; and (which retaines the generall name) Civile.* II. *Literary* Deficient. § *Precepts how to compile it.*

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The first Partition of Civile History, into § Memorials. § Antiquities. § Perfect History.

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The Partition of the History of Times; into universall and particular History. The advantages and disadvantages of both.

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The Appendices of Hiſtory Converſant about the words of Men, as Hiſtory it ſelfe about Mens Acts. The partition of them into Speeches; Letters; and Apophthegmes.

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III. *The Constitution of Philosophia Prima, as the Commune Parent of All.*

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Of Naturall Theology. § Of the Knowledge of Angels and Spirits, an Appendix thereof.

CAP. III.

The Partition of Naturall Philosophy into Speculative and Operative. § These two both in the Intention of the Writer, and Body of the Treatise, ought to be separate.

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I. *The Partition of speculative Science concerning Nature, into Physique speciall; and Metaphysique; whereof Physique inquires the Efficient Cause and the Matter: Metaphysique the Finall cause of the Forme.* II. *The Partition of Physique into the knowledges of the Principles of things; of the Fabrique of things or of the World; and of the variety of things.* III. *The Partition of Physique respecting the variety of Things, into the Doctrine of Concretes, and into the Doctrine of Abstracts The Partition of Concretes, is the same with the Distribution of Naturall History.* IV. *The Partition of the*

of the Doctrine of Abstracts, into the knowledge of the Schemes of Matter; and into the knowledge of Motions. V. *Two Appendices of Speculative Physique, Naturall Problems; And the Placits of Ancient Philosophers.* VI. *The Partition of Metaphysique into the Doctrine of Formes; and into the Doctrine of Finall Causes.*

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I. The partition of the knowledge respecting the Body of Man, into Art Medicinall. § Cosmetique. § Athletique. § And Voluptuary. II. The partition

on of Medicine, into three duties. § Conſervation of Health. III. Cure of Diſeaſes. IV. And Prolongation of life: and that the laſt Part, Prolongation of life, ſhould be ſeparate from the other two.

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I. *The partition of Human Philoſophy touching the ſoule, into the knowledge of the Inſpired Eſſence; and into the knowledge of the ſenſible, or traduced ſoule. § The ſecond partition of the ſame Philoſophy, into the knowledge of the Subſtance and Faculties of the Soule. And into the knowledge of the Uſe, and Objects of the Faculties. II. Two Appendices of the knowledge, concerning the Faculties of the ſoule, the knowledge of Naturall Divination. § And the knowledge of Faſcination. III. The Diſtribution of the Faculties of the ſenſible ſoule, into Motion; and Senſe.*

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I. *THE partition of the knowledge which reſpecteth the uſe and objects of the Faculties of the Mind of Man; into Logique, and Ethique. II. The Diviſion of Logique, into the Arts of Invention, of Iudgement; of Memory; and of Tradition.*

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CAP. II.

I. *The partition of the Art of Invention, into the Inventive of Arts, and of Arguments.* § *The former of these which is the more eminent, is Deficient.* II. *The partition of the Inventive Art of Arts, into Literate Experience.* § *And a New Organ.* III. *A delineation of Literate Experience.*

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I. *The partition of the Inventive Art of Arguments, into Promptuary, or Places of Preparation: And Topique, or Places of Suggestion.* II. *The partition of Topiques, into Generall,* § *And Particular Topiques.* III. *An Example of Particular Topique in the Inquiry, De* Gravi *&* Levi.

CAP. IV.

I. *The partition of the Art of Iudging, into Iudgement by Induction,* § *And by Syllogisme. Of the first a Collection is made in the* Novum Organum. § *The first partition of Iudgement by Syllogisme into Reduction, Direct, and Inverst.* § *The second partition thereof, into Analytique Art, and the knowledge of Elenches.* II. *The division of the knowledge of Elenches, into Elenches of Sophismes,* § *Into Elenches of Interpretation of Termes,* § *And into Elenches of Images or Idolaes.* III. *The division of Idolaes,* § *Into Impression from the generall*

rall nature of Man, or Idola Tribûs. § Into Impreſsions from the Jndividuall temper of Particulars, or Jdola ſpecûs. § Into Impreſsions by words and Communicative nature, or Jdola Fori IV. *An Appendix to the Art of Iudging; namely of the Analogy of Demonſtration according to the nature of the ſubject.*

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I. *The Partition of Art Retentive, or of Memory, into the knowledge of the Helps of Memory. § And the Knowledge of Memory it ſelfe.* II. *The Diviviſion of the Doctrine of Memory, into Prenotion; and Embleme.*

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CAP. I.

I. *THE Partition of the Art of Tradition, into the Doctrine of the Organ of Speech. The Doctrine of the Method of Speech, and the Doctrine of the Illuſtration of Speech. § The partition of the Doctrine of the Organ of Speech, into the knowledge of the Notes of things; of Speaking; and of Writing: Of which the two laſt conſtitute Grammer, and the Partitions thereof. § The Partition of the knowledge of the Notes of Things, into Hieroglyphiques; and into Characters Reall.* II. *A ſecond Partition of Grammer into Literary; and Philoſophicall.*

III. *The aggregation of Poesy referring to Measure, to the knowledge of Speech.* § *An aggregation of the knowledge of Ciphers to the knowledge of Scripture.*

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CAP. III.

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FRANCIS

FRANCISCI DE VERVLAMIO ARCHITECTVRA *SCIENTIARVM.*

THE GENERALE

IDEA AND PROIECT OF THE LO. VERVLAMS INSTAVRATIO MAGNA.


Represented in the

PLATFORM OF THE DESIGNE OF THE I PART *thereof,*

As it was Conceav'd in the mind of the Author and is expreſſed in the Modell *of the VVork.*

DEUS OMNIA
IN MENSVRA, ET NVMERO, ET ORDINE,
DISPOSVIT.


The Emanation of SCIENCES, from the Intellectuale Faculties of MEMORY IMAGINATION REASON.




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
THE PLATFORME
OF THE DESIGNE

LIB. I. THE DIGNITY OF LEARNING.





Personall, in Proem. lib.
Generall by the
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Wisdome of Direction.
Conjunction of Labours.
Speciall
Promoted by
Places, as
Buildings. § Revenewes.
Priviledges. § Discipline.
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Libraries.
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Vse and end Cap. 3.
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3 Philosophy, referring to Reason and the will. Lib. seqq.


LIB. III. THE PARTITION OF KNOWLEDGES IN GENERALL INTO



LIB. IV. THE PARTITION OF HUMANE KNOWLEDGE, OR THE KNOWLEDGE *OF HUMANITY.*




LIB. V. THE PARTITION OF THE VSE AND OBIECTS OF THE FACVLTIES *OF THE MIND, INTO*



LIB.

LIB. VI. THE PARTITION OF THE ART OF ELOCVTION OR OF TRADITION *INTO THE*




Lib. VII. THE PARTITION OF MORALL KNOWLEDGE, INTO THE

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  - Simple or the kinds of Good Cap. 2.
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      - Active from a desire of: Perpetuity. Certainty. Variety.
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        - Duties of: Professions, &c. Oeconomicall; Politicall duties.
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        - Comparatively between: Man and Man. Case and case. Publike and private. Time and time.
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  - CULTURE of the MIND in the Cap. 3.
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      - Impressed by Nature to: Armes. § Leters. Contemplative § Active course of life.
      - Impos'd by
        - Chance of: Sex. § Age. § Region. Health. § Beauty &c.
        - Fortune: Nobility. § Honors. Riches. § Poverty.
    - Affections or distempers, their.
      - Names: Pleasure, paine, fear, hope. Anger, Patience, Love, Hate.
      - Nature: How stirr'd. How still'd. How secreted? How disclosed? What operations they produce. What turnes they take? How envrapt? How they encountre?
    - Cures, or Remedies: Custome, Exercise, Habit, Education. Emulation, Company, Friends, Fame. Reproofe, Exhortation, Lawes, Books. Study, Briefe precepts hereof.

Append. The Congruity between the Good of: Body and Mind.

LIB. VIII. THE PARTITION OF CIVILE KNOWLEDGE INTO



Lib. IX. INSPIRED THEOLOGY.

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- I ✻ The Limits And Vse Of Hvman Reason In Matters Divine.
  - The *Vſe it ſelfe*
    - Explication of Divine Myſteries.
    - Inferences thence deduced.
  - The *Exceſſes in that Vſe*
    - Mineing into things not revealed by a too Curious inquiry.
    - Attributing equall Authority to *Dirivations*, as to *Principles* themſelves.
- II ✻ The Degrees Of Vnity In The Citty Of God
  - *In Points*
    - Fundamentall; one Lo. one Faith; &c.
    - Superſtructive or of perfection.
  - ¶ A diſſent *in Fundamentell Points*, diſcorporates men from the Church of God; not ſo *in ſuperſtructive Points*.
- III ✻ Emanations From Scripture Wherein are obſerved
  - *Errors in Interpretation*
    - In ſuppoſing that all Philoſophy is derived from Scripture, as the Schoole of *Paracelſus* did, and ſome others now doe.
    - In interpreting Scripture as one would a humane Author; whereas two things were known to God which are not known to Man
      - *Secrets of the Heart.*
      - The *Succeſſion of Times.*
  - *A Deſiderate.*
    - A Collection of Poſitive Divinity upon particular Texts in briefe obſervations. prejudiced by
      - *Dilating into common places.*
      - *Chaſing after Controverſies.*
      - *Reducing to Methods.*

FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM VICOVNT S^t ALBAN,

OF THE DIGNITT AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

THE FIRST BOOK.

CHAP. I.

The Consecration of this work unto the most learned of PRINCES, K. IAMES; *who in high, but just conceptions, is here admired.* § *The Distribution, into the* DIGNITY *and the* PROFICIENCY *of* LEARNING. I. *Discredites of* Learning, *from the objections of* Divines: That the aspiring unto knowledge was the first sinne. That Learning is a thing infinite, and full of anxiety. That knowledge inclines the Mind to Heresy and Atheisme. II. *The solution: Originall Guilt was not in the* Quantity, *but in the* Quality *of* Knowledge. § *The Corrective hereof,* Charity. III. *Against* Infinity, Anxiety, *and* seducements of Sciences; *three preservatives:* That we forget not our Mortality. § That Learning give us content. § That it soare not too high. § *And so Philosophy leads the mind, by the Links of* second Causes, *unto the* First.

THERE were under the Old Law (Excellent KING) both *Free-will Offerings*, and *Daily Sacrifices*; the one proceeding upon ordinary observance; the other upon a Devout Cheerfulnesse. Certainly, in my opinion, some such kind of Homage belongs to KINGS from their servants, namely, that every one should tender, not only Tributes of his Duty, but Presents of

Affection. In the former of theſe, I hope, I ſhall not be wanting; for the latter I was in ſuſpenſe what I ſhould moſt principally undertake, and in concluſion I thought it more reſpective to make choice of ſome oblation, which might referre, rather to the propriety and excellency of Your individuall perſon, than to the buſineſſe of Your Crowne and State.

§ Repreſenting Your Majeſty, as my duty is, many times unto my mind, (leaving aſide the other parts whether of Your Vertue, or of Your Fortune,) I have been poſſeſt with extream wonder, when I conſider the excellency of thoſe vertues and faculties in You, which the Philoſophers call intellectuall; the capacity of Your mind comprehending ſo many and ſo great Notions; the faithfulneſſe of Your memory; the ſwiftneſſe of Your apprehenſion; the penetration of Your jndgement; the order and facility of Your elocution. In truth *Plato's* opinion ſometimes comes into my mind, which maintaines, *That knowledge is nothing*
In Phædo. *elſe but remembrance; and that the mind of man by nature knowes all things, once redimed and reſtored to her own native light, which the cloudy vault, or gloomy Tabernacle of the body had ore-ſpread with darkneſſe.* For certainly the beſt and cleareſt inſtance for this aſſertion ſhines in Your Majeſty, whoſe mind is ſo ready to take flame from the leaſt occaſion preſented, or the leaſt ſpark of anothers knowledge delivered. Wherefore as the ſacred Scripture ſaith of the wiſeſt King,
1. Reg. 4. *That his heart was as the ſands of the ſea:* which though it be one of the largeſt bodies, yet it conſiſteth of the ſmalleſt portions; ſo hath God given Your Majeſty a compoſition of underſtanding exceeding admirable, being able to compaſſe and comprehend the greateſt matters, and nevertheleſſe, to apprehend the leaſt, and not to ſuffer them to eſcape Your obſervation: whereas it ſhould ſeem very difficult, or rather an impoſſibility in nature, for the ſame inſtrument to make it ſelfe fit for great and ſmall works. And for Your gift of Speech, I call to mind what *Cornelius Tacitus* ſaith of *Au-*
Annal. 13. *guſtus Cæſar, Auguſto* (ſaith he) *prompta ac profluens, quæ de-*

ceret

ceret principem, eloquentia fuit. In truth if we note it well, ſpeech that is *Elaborate*, or *Affectate*, or *Imitating*, although otherwiſe excellent, hath ſomewhat ſervile in it and holding of the ſubject; but Your Majeſties manner of ſpeech is indeed Prince-like, flowing as from a fountaine, and yet ſtreaming and branching it ſelfe into natures order, full of facility and felicity, *Imitating none, & Inimitable of any*. And as in Your Civill eſtate, reſpecting as well Your Kingdome as Your Court, there apeareth to be an Emulation and Contention of Your Majeſties Vertue with Your Fortune, namely excellent Morall endowments with a fortunate Regiment; a Pious and Patient expectation when time was, of Your greater fortune, with a proſperous and ſeaſonable poſſeſsion of what was expected; a Holy obſervation of the lawes of Marriage, with a bleſſed and happy fruit of Marriage in a moſt faire Progeny; a Godly propenſion and moſt beſeeming a Chriſtian Prince to Peace, with a fortunate concurrence of the like inclination in Your neighbour Princes: ſo likewiſe in Your intellectuall abilities, there ſeemeth to be no leſſe Contention and Emulation, if we compare Your Majeſties gifts of Nature with the rich treaſury of multiplicious Erudition and the knowledge of many Arts. Neither is it eaſy to finde any KING ſince Chriſts time, which may be compared with Your Majeſty for variety and improvement of all kind of learning Divine and Humane; let who will revolve and perule the ſucceſsion of Kings and Emperours, and he ſhall finde this judgement is truly made. For indeed it ſeemeth much in Kings, if by the compendious extraction of other mens wits and Labours, they can take hold of knowledge, or attain any ſuperficiall ornaments or ſhewes of learning; or if they countenance and preferre learned men; but for a King and a King borne to drink indeed the true fountaines of Learning, nay to be himſelfe a fountaine of Learning, is almoſt a Miracle. And this alſo is an acceſſe to Your Majeſty, that in the ſame cloſet of your Mind, there are treaſured up as well Divine and Sacred Literature, as Prophane and Humane; ſo that Your Majeſty

ſtands inveſted with that triplicity of Glory, which was aſcribed to that famous *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*, *The Power of a King*; *The Illumination of a Prieſt*; *The Learning of a Philoſopher*. Wherefore ſince in theſe glorious attributes of Learning, ſo inherent and individuall in Your Perſon, Your Majeſty ſo farre excells all other Kings, it is very meet that ſuch rare endowments of Nature and Art ſhould be celebrated, not only in the fame and admiration of the preſent time, or in the light of Hiſtory conveyed over to Poſterity, but be engraven in ſome ſolid worke, which both may expreſſe the power of a great King, and bear a Character or Signature of ſo excellent a learned King. Now (to returne to our intended purpoſe) I concluded with my ſelfe that I could not make to Your Majeſty a better oblation, then of ſome Treatiſe tending to that end.

§ The ſumme and Argument hereof, will conſiſt of *two Parts: In the Former*, which is more ſlight and popular (yet may not be paſt over) we ſhall entreat of the *excellency of Knowledge and Learning, through all the parts thereof*; and likewiſe of the *merit of thoſe who have worthily and wiſely imployed and placed their bounties and induſtries in the Augmentation, and Propagation thereof. In the latter Part* (which is the main and ſumme of this worke) *I ſhall propound and ſet down what in this kind hath bin embraced, undertaken and accompliſht hitherto, for the Advancement of Learning: and again briefly touch at ſuch particulars as ſeem Deficient in this enterprize*; to the end that though I dare not preſume poſitively to ſeparate and ſelect what I would chiefly commend unto Your Majeſty, yet by repreſenting many and different obſervations, I may excite Your Princely cogitations to viſit the peculiar treaſures of Your own mind, and thence to extract what is moſt conducent to the *amplifying and enlarging of the bounds of Arts and Knowledges*, agreeable to Your Magnanimity and Wiſdome.

I. In the entrance to the *former Part*, to cleere the way, and as it were, to make ſilence, to have the teſtimonies concerning

cerning the *Dignity* of Learning to be better heard, without the interruption of tacite objections, I think good firſt to deliver Learning from the Diſcredits and Diſgraces which Ignorance hath caſt upon it, but Ignorance ſeverally diſguiſed; appearing and diſcovering it ſelf ſometime in the *zeale of Divines*; ſometimes in the *arrogancy of Politiques*, and ſometimes *in the errors of Learned men themſelves*. I heare the former ſort ſay, *That Knowledge is of the nature and number of thoſe things, which are to be accepted with great Limitation and Caution*; *That the aſpiring to overmuch knowledge, was the originall temptation and ſinne, whereupon enſued the Fall of Man*; *And that even at this day Knowledge hath ſomewhat of the Serpent in it, and therefore where it entreth into a man, it makes him ſwell*, *Scientia inflat*; That *Solomon* gives a cenſure, *That there is no end of making Bookes, and that much reading is a wearineſſe to the fleſh*; and againe in another place, *That in ſpacious knowledge there is much contriſtation, & that he that encreaſeth knowledge, encreaſeth anxiety*; That S. *Paul* gives a caveat, *That we be not ſpoild through vain Philoſophy*; And that experience demonſtrates how the Learnedſt men have been Arch-heretiques; How Learned times have been inclined to Atheiſme; and how the Contemplation of ſecond Cauſes, doth derogate from the Authority of the firſt.

1 Cor. 8.
Eccleſ. 12.
Eccleſ. 1.
Coloſ. 2.

II To diſcover then the error and ignorance of this opinion, and the miſunderſtanding in the grounds thereof, any man may ſee plainly that theſe men doe not obſerve and conſider, That it was not that *Pure and Primitive Knowledge of Nature*, by the light whereof man did give names to other Creatures in Paradiſe, as they were brought before him, according to their Proprieties, which gave the occaſion to the Fall; but it was that proud knowledge of *Good and Evill*, with an intent to ſhake of God and to give Lavv unto himſelfe. Neither is it any *Quantity of Knowledge*, how great ſoever, that can make the mind of man to ſwel; for nothing can fill, much leſſe extend the ſoule of man

but God, and the contemplation of God: therefore *Solomon* ſpeaking of the two Principall ſenſes of Inquiſition, the
Eccleſ. 1. Eye and the Eare, affirmes *That the Eye is never ſatisfied with ſeeing, nor the Eare with hearing*; and if there be no fulneſſe, then is the Continent greater then the Content. So of Knowledge it ſelfe & the Mind of Man, whereto the Senſes are but Reporters, he defines like wiſe in the words plac't after the Calendar or Ephemerides which he makes of the diverſity of times and ſeaſons for all Actions and Pur-
Eccleſ. 3. poſes, concluding thus, *God hath made all things Beautifull and Decent in the true returne of their ſeaſons; alſo he hath placed the world in mans heart, yet cannot man finde out the worke which God worketh from the beginning unto the end:* By which wordes he declares, not obſcurely, that God hath framed the Mind of Man, as a Mirror or Glaſſe capable of the Image of the univerſall world, and as joyfull to receive the impreſsions thereof, as the eye joyeth to receave light; and not only delighted in the beholding, the variety of things and the viciſitude of times, but raiſed alſo to finde out and to diſcerne the inviolable lawes and the infallible decrees of Nature. And although he ſeem to inſinuate that the ſupreme or ſummary law of Nature, which he calleth *the worke which God worketh from the beginning to the end*, is not poſsible to be found out by man, yet that doth not derogate from the Capacity of the Mind, but may be referred to the impediments of knowledge, as the ſhortneſſe of life, the ill conjunction of labours deprav'd, and unfaithfull Tradition of knowledge over from hand to hand; and many other inconveniences wherewith the condition of man is enſnared and involv'd. For that no parcell of the world is denied to mans inquiry, or invention he cleerly declares in another place,
Prov. 20. where he ſaith, *The ſpirit of a man is as the Lamp of God wherewith he ſearcheth the inwards of all ſecrets.* ¶ If then ſuch be the capacity and receipt of the mind of man, it is manifeſt that there is no danger at all from the *Proportion* or *Quantity* of *knowledge* how large ſoever, leſt it ſhould make it ſwell or outcompaſſe it ſelfe, but meerly in the *Quality*, which being

in

in Quantity more or leſſe, if it be taken without the true Corrective thereof, hath in it ſome nature of malignity, or venome full of flatuous ſymptomes. This Antidote, or Corrective ſpice, the mixture whereof tempers knowledge and makes it ſo ſoveraigne is *Charity*, which the Apoſtle immediatly addes in the former clauſe, ſaying, *Knowledge blowes up, but Charity builds up*; Not unlike to that which he delivers in an other place, *If I ſpake* (ſaith he) *with the tongues of Men and Angels and had not Charity, it were but as à tinkling Cymball*: Not but that it is an excellent thing to ſpeak with the tongus of Men and Angels, but becauſe if it be ſever'd from *Charity*, and not refer'd to the publique good of Mankind, it rather exhibites a vaine and empty glory, then any ſubſtantiall and ſolid fruit. 1. Cor. 8. 1. Cor. 13.

III As for that Cenſure of *Salomon, concerning the exceſſe of writing and reading Bookes, and the anxiety of ſpirit which redoundeth from Knowledge*, and that admonition of S. *Paul, that we be not ſeduced by vain Philoſophy*; if thoſe places be rightly underſtood, they doe very excellently ſet forth the true bounds and limitations, whereby humane knowledge is confin'd and circumſcribed, yet ſo as without any ſuch contracting and coarctation, it may comprehend all the univerſall nature of things. Theſe limitations are three. *The firſt that we doe not ſo place our felicity in knowledge, as we forget our Mortality. The ſecond, that we make application of our knowledge, to give our ſelves repoſe and contentment and not diſtaſt or repining. The third, that we doe not preſume by the contemplations of nature, to attaine the Myſteries of God.* § For as touching *the firſt*, *Salomon* doth excellently expound himſelfe in the ſame Book, *I ſaw well*, ſaith he, *that knowledge recedes as farre from ignorance as light doth from darkneſſe, and that the wiſe mans eyes keep watch in his head, whereas the foole roundeth about in darkneſſe, but withall I learned that the ſame mortality involves them both.* Eccleſ. 2.

§ *For the ſecond*, certain it is no anxiety, or perturbation of mind reſulteth from knowledge, otherwiſe then meerely by accident: For all knowledge and wonder (which is

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the ſeed of knowledge,) is an impreſsion of pleaſure in it ſelfe; but when we fall to framing concluſions out of our knowledge which obliquely applied to our particular purpoſes, either miniſter weak feares or vaſt deſires, then there growes that vexation and trouble of Mind, whereof we ſpeake: for then knowledge is no more *Lumen ſiccum*, as *Heraclitus* the *Profound* would have it, *Lumen ſiccum optima anima*, but it becomes *Lumen madidum, or maceratum*, being ſteeped and infuſed in the humors of the affections.

§ *The third rule* deſerves a litle to be ſtood upon, and not to be lightly paſſed over: For if any man ſhall think by view and enquiry into theſe ſenſible and materiall things, to attain that light whereby he may reveale unto himſelfe the nature and will of God, then indeed, *is he ſpoil'd through vain Philoſophy*. For the contemplation of the creatures, having regard to the creatures themſelves, produceth Knowledge, but having regard to God, wonder only, which is a broken Knowledge. And therefore it was moſt aptly ſaid by one of *Plato's* ſchoole, *That the ſenſe of man carries a reſemblance with the ſunne, which opens and reveales the terreſtriall Globe, but conceales and ſeales up the ſtarres and celeſtiall Globe:* ſo doth the ſenſe diſcover naturall things, but it darkens and ſhuts up divine. And hence it hath proceeded, that ſome of the choſen ranke of the more Learned have faln into Hereſy, whilſt they have ſought to fly up to the ſecrets of the Deity, by the waxen wings of the ſenſes.

Philo. Iud. de Somniis.

§ As for the conceit of thoſe who are of opinion that *too much knowledge ſhould encline the mind to Atheiſme, and that the ignorance of the ſecond Cauſes, ſhould be, as it were, a Midwife to our Piety towards the firſt.* I would willingly charge theſe in the language of *Iob, Will you lye for God as one man doth for another to gratify him?* For certain it is that God works nothing in nature according to ordinary courſe but by ſecond cauſes, and if they would have it otherwiſe believed, it is meere impoſture, under colour of Piety to God, and nothing elſe but to offer unto the Author of Truth the unclean ſacrifice of a Lye. But farther, it is an aſſured truth

Iob. 13.

and

and a concluſion of Experience, That a litle or ſuperficiall taſt of *Philoſophy*, may perchance incline the Mind of Man to *Atheiſme*; but a full draught thereof brings the mind back againe to Religion. For in the entrance of Philoſophy, when the ſecond cauſes, which are next unto the ſenſes, doe offer themſelves to the mind of Man, and the mind it ſelfe cleaves unto them and dwells there, an oblivion of the higheſt cauſe may creep in; but when a man paſſeth on farther and beholds the dependency, continuation and confederacy of cauſes, and the workes of Providence, than according to the allegory of the Poets, he will eaſily believe that the *higheſt linke of Natures chaine muſt needs be tyed to the foot of Iupiters chaire*. To cloſe in a word, let no man upon a weak conceit of ſobriety or ill applied moderation, thinke or maintaine that a man can ſearch too farre, or be too well ſtudied *in the Booke of Gods word*, or in *the Booke of Gods workes*; *Divinity* or *Philoſophy*; but rather let men awake themſelves and cheerefully endeavour, and purſue an endleſſe progreſſe or proficiency in both: only let them beware leſt they apply Knowledge to *ſwelling*, not to *charity*; to *oſtentation* not to *uſe*: and againe, that they doe not unwiſely mingle and confound theſe diſtinct Learnings of *Theology* and *Philoſophy*, and their ſeverall waters together.

Homer. Iliad. 9.

CAP. II.

I Diſcredits of Learning from the objections of Politiques, *That Learning ſoftens mens natures, and makes men unfit for the exerciſe of Armes. That it perverts mens diſpoſitions for Matter of Government.* § *Other particular indiſpoſitions pretended.* II. The Solution. *Learning makes not men unapt for Armes.* III. *Learning enables men for Civil affaires.* IIII. Particular ſeducements imputed to Learning, As, *Curious Vncertainty,* § *Pertinacious Regularity,* § *Miſleading Preſidents,* § *Retired ſlothfulneſſe,* § *Relaxation of Diſcipline;* Are all rather Cured then Cauſed by Learning.

NOw let us deſcend to the Diſgraces whereby *Politiques* defame *Learning*; They be theſe, *That Learning doth ſoften mens manners, & makes them more unapt for the honour and exerciſe of Armes: That it doth marre and pervert mens diſpoſitions for matter of Government and Policy*; which the ſtudy of Arts makes either too *Curious by vanity of Reading*; Or *too peremptory by the ſtrict rigor of Rules*; Or *too overweening by reaſon of the greatneſſe of examples*; Or *too incompatible with the times, by reaſon of the diſſimilitude of examples*; Or *at leaſt it doth divert and alienate mens minds from buſineſſe and Action, inſtilling into them a love of leaſure and privateneſſe.*

§ *And that it doth bring into States a relaxation of Diſcipline, whileſt every man is more ready to argue then obey.* Out of this conceit *Cato* ſurnamed the *Cenſor*, one of the wiſeſt men indeed that ever liv'd, when *Carneades* the *Philoſopher* came in Embaſſage to *Rome*, and that the young men of *Rome* began to flock about him being allured with the ſweetneſſe and majeſty of his eloquence; gave counſell in open ſenate; Plato in M. Cato. *that they ſhould give him his diſpatch with all ſpeed, leſt he ſhould infect and inchant the mindes of the youth, and at unawares bring in an alteration of the manners and cuſtomes of the State.* This ſame conceit, or humor mov'd *Virgil*, preferring the honour of his country, before the reputation of his own Profeſsion, to make a kind of ſeperation

on between the *Arts of Policy*, and the *Arts of Literature*, challenging the one to the *Romanes*, yeelding the other to the *Grecians*, in the verſes ſo much renowned,

Tu regere imperio populos Romane memento, Virgil.
Hæ tibi erunt Artes---- Æn. 6.

And we ſee that *Anytus* the accuſer of *Socrates*, laid it as an article of charge and accuſation againſt him, that he did with the variety and power of his diſcourſes and diſputation, embaſe in the minds of young-men, the Auctority and Reverence of the Lawes and Cuſtomes of their countrey; and that he did profeſſe a pernitious and dangerous Science, wherein, who ever was inſtructed, might make the worſe matter ſeem the better, and to ſuppreſſe Truth by force of Eloquence. Plato. Apol. Socratis.

II But theſe and the like imputations have rather a countenance of Gravity, then any ſyncerity of truth: For experience doth witneſſe that the ſelfe-ſame perſons, and the ſelfe-ſame times, have flouriſht in the *glory of Armes and Learning*. As for men, we may inſtance in that noble paire of Emperors *Alexander the Great*, and *Iulius Cæſar the Dictator*; the one was *Ariſtotle's* ſcholler in Philoſophy; the other *Cicero's Rivall* in eloquence. But if any man had rather call for Schollers that have become great Generalls, then Generalls that were great Schollers, let him take *Epaminondas* the Theban, or *Xenophon* the Athenian; whereof, the one was the firſt that abated the power of *Sparta*, and the other was the firſt that made way to the overthrow of the *Monarchy of Perſia*. And this *conjunction of Armes and Letters*, is yet more viſible in times then in perſons, by how much an age is a greater object then a man: For the ſelfe-ſame times with the *Ægyptians*, *Aſſyrians*, *Perſians*, *Græcians*, and *Romanes*, that are moſt renowned for *Armes*, are likewiſe moſt admired for *Learning*; ſo that the graveſt Auctors and Philoſophers, the greateſt Captaines and Governors have lived in the ſame Ages. Neither indeed can it otherwiſe be, for as in man the ripeneſſe of the ſtrength of the body and the minde comes much about one age, ſave that the ſtrength

of the body comes ſomewhat the more early; So in ſtates, the glory of Armes, and *Learning* (whereof the one correſpondeth to the body, the other to the ſoule of man) have a concurrence, or a neere ſequence of Time.

III Now for *matter of Policy and Government*, that *Learning* ſhould rather be an *impediment, then an adiument* thereunto is a thing very improbable. We all confeſſe that it is an unadviſed Act to commit a naturall body, and the cure of Health, to *Emperique Phyſitians*, who commonly have a few receipts which ſeem to them to be univerſall Remedies, whereupon they are confident and adventurous, when yet they neither know the cauſes of Diſeaſes, nor the complexions of Patients, nor the perill of Symptomes, nor the Method of Cures. We ſee it a like error in thoſe, who for expedition of their cauſes, and ſuites rely upon petty Advocates and Lawyers, which are only men of Practice, and not grounded in their bookes, who are many times eaſily ſurpriz'd, when a new caſe falls out beſides the common Roade of their experience: ſo by like reaſon it cannot but be a matter of doubtfull conſequence, if ſtates be managed by Empirique States-men. On the contrary it is almoſt without inſtance, that ever any Goverment was diſaſterous, that was in the hand of Learned Governours. For howſoever it hath bin ordinary with Politique men to extenuate, and diſable Learned men by the name of Pedants, yet Hiſtory, which is the miſtreſſe of Truth makes it appeare in many particulars, that the government of Princes in minority, hath farre excelled the Government of Princes of mature age, even for that reaſon which Politiques ſeeke to traduce, which is that by that occaſion the State hath bin in the hands of Pedants. Who knowes not that for the firſt five years ſo much magnified during the minority of *Nero*, the Burden of the ſtate was in the hands of *Seneca* a *Pedanti*? So likewiſe *Gordianus* the yonger owes the ten years applauded goverment to *Miſitheus* a *Pedant*. And with the like happineſſe *Alexander Severus* govern'd the ſtate in his minority, in which ſpace women rul'd all, but by the advice and

and councell of preceptors, and teachers. Nay let a man look into the Government of the *Bishop of Rome*, as by name, into the government of *Pius Quintus*, or *Sextus Quintus* in our times, who were both at their entrance estimed but as *Pedanticall Friers*; and he shall finde, that such *Popes* doe greater things, and proceed upon truer principles, than those which have ascended to the Papacy from an education, and breeding, in affaires of estate and Courts of Princes. For though men bred in learning are perchance, not so quick, and nimble in apprehending occasions, and accommodating for the present to points of convenience, which the Italians call RAGIONI DI STATO, the very name whereof *Pius Quintus* could not heare with patience, but was wont to say, *that they were the inventions of wicked men, and repugnant to religion, and the morall virtues*; yet in this there is made ample recompence, that they are perfect and ready, in the safe and plain way of Religion, Iustice, Honesty, and the Morall virtues; which way, they that constantly keep and persue, shall no more need those other Remedies, then a sound body need Physique. And besides the space of one mans life can not furnish presidents enough to direct the event of but one mans life. For as it hapneth sometimes that the great Grand-child, Nephew, or *Pro-nephew* resembleth the Grand-father, or great Grand-father more then the Father; so many times it comes to passe, that the occurrences of present times may sort better with ancient examples, then with those of later, or immediat times. Lastly the wit of one man can no more countervaile the latitude of Learning, than one mans meanes can hold way with a common purse. Platon.

IV And were it granted that those *seducements* and *indispositions* imputed to Learning, by Politicks, were of any force and validity, yet it must be remembred with all, that *Learning* ministreth in every of them, greater strength of medicin or remedy, then it offereth cause of *indisposition* or *infirmity*. For if that *Learning* by a secret influence, and operation makes the mind *irresolute and perplext*, yet certainly by plain precept it teacheth how to unwinde

the thoughts, how farre to deliberate, when to reſolve; yea it ſhewes how to protract, and carry things in ſuſpenſe without prejudice till they reſolve

§ Be it likewiſe granted that *Learning makes the minds of men more peremptory and inflexible*, yet withall it teacheth what things are in their nature demonſtrative, and what are conjecturall; and propounds as well, the uſe of diſtinctions, and exceptions, as the ſtability of rules and principles.

§ Be it againe, *that learning miſleades and wreſteth mens mindes, whether by diſproportion, or diſsimilitude of examples*, I know not, yet I know well that it unfoldeth, and laies open as well the force of circumſtances, as the errors of compariſons, and the cautions of applications; ſo that in all theſe it doth more rectify mens mindes, then pervert them. And theſe remedies *Learning* doth every way convay and inſinuate by the quick penetration, and forcible variety of examples. Let a man look into the errors of *Clement* the VII, ſo lively deſcribed by *Guicciardine*, who ſerved under him; or into the errors and waverings of *Cicero*, painted to the life by his own penſill, in *his Epiſtles to Atticus*, and he will fly a pace from being inconſtant and irreſolute in his deſignes. Let him look into the errors of *Phocion*, and he will beware how he be obſtinate or inflexible. Let him read the fable of *Ixion*, and it will diſpell vaporous hopes and ſuch like fumes and clouds. Let him behold *Cato* the *Second*, and he will never be one of the *Antipodes*, to tread oppoſite to the preſent world.

§ Now for the conceit, *That learning ſhould be a friend to ſloth, and ſhould oreſpread the mind with a ſweet ſlumber of repoſe and retiredneſſe*; it were a ſtrange thing, if that which accuſtometh the minde to a perpetuall agitation, ſhould be the *Patroneſſe to ſlothfulneſſe*: whereas contrariwiſe it may be truly affirmed, that no kinde of men love buſineſſe for it ſelfe, but thoſe that are *Learned*; for other Perſons love affaires and buſineſſe for the *Profit*, as hirelings the worke, for the wages; others for *Honor*, for while they are in Action, they live in the eyes of men and refreſh their reputation, which otherwiſe

otherwiſe would weare; others for *Power* and the *Priviledges of Fortune*, that they may pleaſure their friends, and diſpleaſure their foes; others that they may *exerciſe ſome faculties wherein they take a pride*, and in this imagination, entertaine their thoughts in a good humor and pleaſing conceit towards themſelves; others *to advance other ends*: ſo that as it is ſaid of untrue valours, that ſome mens valours are in the eyes of thoſe that look on, ſo the induſtry and courage of theſe men ſeemes to aime at this, that others may applaud them, or they hugge themſelves in the contemplation of their own deſignements: only *Learned men* love buſineſſe and imployment, as actions agreeable to nature, and no leſſe healthfull to the mind than exerciſe is to the body; taking pleaſure in the Action it ſelfe, and not in the purchaſe: ſo that, of all men living, they are the moſt indefatigable, if it be towards any buſineſſe, which can repleniſh and detaine the mind according to the dignity thereof. And if there be found ſome laborious in reading and ſtudy, and yet idle in buſineſſe, and action, this growes not from learning, but from ſome weakneſſe or ſoftneſſe of body or minde, ſuch as *Seneca* ſpeaks of, *Quidam* (ſaith he) *tam umbratiles ſunt ut putent in turbido eſſe quicquid in luce eſt.* Well may it be, that ſuch a point of a mans nature may make him give himſelfe to learning, but it is not learning that breeds, or implants any ſuch point in his nature. But if any man notwithſtanding reſolvedly maintaineth, *that Learning takes up too much time which might otherwiſe be better imployed*; I anſwere, that no man can be ſo ſtraitned and oppreſt with buſineſſe, and an active courſe of life, but may have many vacant times of leaſure, whileſt he expects the returnes and tydes of buſineſſe, except he be either of a very dull temper and of no diſpatch, or ambitious (little to his credit and reputation) to meddle and ingage himſelfe in imployment of all natures and matters above his reach. It remaineth therefore to be enquired, in what matter, and how, thoſe ſpaces and times of Leaſure, ſhould be filled up and ſpent; whether in pleaſures or ſtudy; ſenſuality, or contemplation

Controv. lib. 4. Proe.

Plut. in Demoſt. plation, as was well anſwered by *Demoſthenes* to *Æſchines*, a man given to pleaſure, who when he told him by way of reproach, *that his orations did ſmell of the Lampe, Indeed* (ſaid *Demoſthenes*) *there is great difference between the things that You and I doe by lampe-light:* Wherefore let no man feare leſt learning ſhould *expulſe buſineſſe*; nay rather it will keepe and defend the poſſeſsions of the minde, againſt idleneſſe and pleaſure, which otherwiſe, at unawares, may enter, to the prejudice both of Buſineſſe and Learning.

§ Againe, whereas they object, *That learning ſhould undermine the reverence of Lawes and Government*, it is a meere calumny without all ſhadow of truth. For to ſay that a blind obedience ſhould be a ſurer obligation then an ocular duty, is all one as to ſay, that a blind man may tread ſurer by a guide, then a ſeeing man can with the uſe of a light and his eyes. Nay it is without all controverſie that Learning doth make the mind of man, gentle, ductile, maniable and pliant to government; whereas ignorance makes them churliſh, thwart, and mutinous; which the Records of time doe cleerely manifeſt, conſidering that the moſt unlearned, rude and barbarous times have bin moſt ſubject to ſeditions, tumults and changes. As for the judgement of *Cato* the *Cenſor*, he was well puniſht for his *blaſphemy againſt learning:* For when he was paſt threeſcore years old, he was taken with an extreme deſire to goe to the ſchoole againe, and to *learne the greek tongue;* which doth well demonſtrate that his former cenſure of the Grecian Learning was rather an affected gravity, than the inward ſenſe of his own opinion. As for *Virgil's verſes*, though it pleaſed him to brave the world in takeing to the *Romanes* the *Art of Empire*, and leaving to others all other *Arts*, as popular and ſervile; yet ſo much is manifeſt, that the Romans never aſcended to that *hight of Empire*, till the time they had aſcended to the *hight of Arts*. For in the time of the two firſt *Ceſars*, Perſons moſt perfect in the State-principles of Government, there lived contemporaries, *the beſt Poet, Virgilius Maro; The beſt Hiſtoriographer, Titus Livius; the beſt Antiquary, Marcus Varro; the beſt*

Plut. in M. Cato.

or

or ſecond Orator Marcus Cicero; without queſtion the chiefeſt, every one in their ſeverall faculty, that to the memory of man are known. Laſtly, as for the *accuſation of Socrates*, only this I ſay, The time muſt be remembred when it was proſecuted, namely under the *thirty Tyrants*, of all mortalls the bloodieſt, baſeſt and moſt unworthy of Government: which revolution of State & Time was no ſooner over, but *Socrates*, whom they had made a Perſon Criminall, was made a Perſon Heroicall, and his Memory accumulate with all honours divine and humane; and thoſe Diſcourſes of his, which were than termed Corrupting of Manners, were after celebrated by all Poſterity for moſt ſoveraigne medicines of Mind and Manners. And let this ſerve for anſwer to *Politiques*, which in their humorous ſeverity, or in their feigned gravity, have preſumed to throw imputations upon Learning; which redargution nevertheleſſe, ſave that we know not whether our labours may extend to other ages, ſeems not ſo needfull for the preſent, ſeeing the aſpect and favour of two moſt learned Princes (*Queene* ELIZABETH & *Your Majeſty*, being as *Caſtor* and *Pollux*, *Lucida Sidera*, ſtarres of a moſt benigne influence) hath wrought in us of Britaine, *ſo much love* and *reverence towards Learning*.

CAP. III.

I *Diſcredits of Learning from* Learned mens Fortunes, Manners, Nature of ſtudies. II. In their Fortunes *ſcarcity of Meanes*, § *Obſcurity of life*. § *Meaneſſe of Imployment*. III. In their Manners, *Too Regular for the times*, § *Too ſenſible of the good of others, and neglective of their own*. § *They faile in applying themſelves to Particular Perſons*. § *They faile in ſome points of Behaviour*. § *Groſſe Flattery practis'd by ſome Learned*; § *Inſtanced in the Moderne Dedication of Bookes*. § *Diſcreet Morigeration allowed*.

I NOw come we to the third ſort of Diſcredit or Diminution of Credit, that redoundes upon Learning from learned men themſelves, which commonly cleaveth faſteſt. It is derived either from *their*

Fortune, or from *their Manners*, or from *the Nature of their ſtudies*; whereof the firſt is not in their power; the ſecond is not to the point; ſo as the third alone ſeemeth properly to fall into enquiry: but becauſe we are not in hand with the true valew of things, but with popular eſtimation, it will not be amiſſe to inſinuate ſomewhat alſo of the two former.

II The Derogations therefore, or Diminutions of Credit which grow to Learning *from the fortune of Learned men*, are taken either from their *Poverty and ſcarcity of Meanes*; or from their *obſcure and private courſe of Life*; or from the *meanneſſe of imployment wherein they are converſant*.

§ As concerning *Want*, and that uſually is the caſe of Learned men, that they are *poore*, and commonly begin with litle and grow not rich ſo faſt as other men, which convert their labours chiefly to lucre and encreaſe; it were good to leave the common Place in Commendation of *Poverty* to ſome *Frier Mendicant* to handle, (if by their leaves I may be ſo bold) to whom much was attributed by *Machiavell* in this point, when he ſaid, *that the Kingdome of the clergie had bin long before at an end, if the reputation and reverence towards the Poverty of Friers and Monkes, had not borne out the ſcandalls of the ſuperfluities and exceſſes of Biſhops and Prælates:* ſo a man might ſay that the felicity and magnificence of Princes and great Perſons, had long ſince turned to Barbariſme and Rudeneſſe, if the *Poverty of Learning* had not kept up civility and honor of life. But without ſuch advantages of hunting after the praiſe thereof, it is worthy obſervation, what a ſacred and reverend thing *Poverty of Fortune* was, for ſome ages in the Roman State, which yet was a State without Paradoxes: For thus ſaith *Titus Livius* in his introduction, *Either my affection to the worke I have undertaken deceaves me, or there was never State more great, more religious, more richly furniſh't with good preſidents, nor which avarice and riot conquered ſo late, nor where ſo great reverence to Poverty and Parcimony continued ſo long*. So likewiſe after the State of *Rome* was now degenerate, we read that when *Cæſar*

Dell. Hiſt. Fior. lib. 1.

Præf. lib. 1.

Cæsar the *Dictator* took upon him a Restauration of the collapsed state, one of his *confidents* gave him this counsill, That of all Points the most summary to such a designement, as he went about, was by all meanes to take away the estimation of wealth, *For* (saith he) *these and all other evills, together with the reputation of mony shall cease, if neither publique Offices nor any other Dignity, which commonly are so coveted, were exposed to sale.* To conclude this point, as it was truly said that *Rubor est virtutis Color*, though sometimes it come from vice; so you may truly say, *Paupertas est virtutis fortuna*, though sometimes it may proceed from misgovernment and improvidence. Surely this is *Solomons* Censure, *Qui festinat ad divitias non erit insons*, and Precept, *Buy the truth and sell it not*; So wisdome and knowledge judging it right and equall that meanes should be imployed to get Learning, and not Learning be applied to gather up meanes.

Orat. ad C. Cæsar. Salust. imputata. Laert. in Diog. Cyn. Prov. 28. Prov. 23.

§ To what purpose should we speake of the *privateneſſe and obſcureneße of life*, which is objected to learned men? It is a Theme so common and so frequently handled by all, to extoll *Leasure* and *retiredneſſe*, not taxed with sensuality and sloth, before a Civile and Active life; for safety, liberty, sweetneſſe, dignity, or at least freedome from indignities, as no man handles this subject, but handles it well: such a consonancy it hath to mens conceptions in the expressing; and to mens consent in the allowing. This only I will adde, that Learned men forgotten in States, are like the Images of *Cassius* and *Brutus* in the funeralls of *Iunia*, of which, not to be represented as others were, *Tacitus* saith, *Eo ipso præfulgebant quod non visebantur.* Annal. 3.

§ For *Meanneſſe of imployment assigned to Learned men*, that which is most traduced to contempt is, That the government of childhood and youth is commonly allotted to them, the contempt of which age is transferred upon the Preceptors or Tutors. But how unjust this traducement is, if you will reduce things from popularity of opinion, to measure of reason, may appeare, in that we see men are more carefull what they put into new vessels, then into a

veſſell ſeaſon'd; and more curious what mould they lay about a young plant, then a plant corroborate: So as it is manifeſt that the weakeſt termes and times of all things, uſe to have the beſt applications and helps. Harken, if you pleaſe, to the Hebrew Rabbins, *Your young men ſhall ſee viſions, your old men ſhall dreame dreams*; from this Text they collect, that youth is the worthier age, by ſo much as Revelation is more cleare by viſions, then by dreames. And it is worth the noteing that however *Pedants* have bin the deriſion and ſcorne of *Theaters*, as the Apes of *Tyranny*, and that the moderne looſeneſſe or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of *Schoolemaſters* and *Tutors*; yet it hath bin an ancient complaint drawn down from the beſt and wiſeſt times, even to our age, that States were too buſie with their *Lawes* and too negligent in point of *Education*. Which excellent part of Ancient Diſcipline hath bin in ſome ſort revived of late times *by the Colledges of the Ieſuits*, whoſe paines and diligence when I conſider, as well in the culture of knowledge, as information of manners, the ſaying of *Ageſilaus* touching *Pharnabazus* comes into my mind, *Talis cum ſis utinam noſter eſſes*. And thus much concerning the diſcredits drawn from the *Fortunes and Condition of Learned men*.

Ioel. 2.

Plut. in Ageſil.

III As touching the *Manners of Learned men*, it is a thing belonging rather to their individuall Perſons, than their ſtudies and point of learning: No doubt there is found among them, as in all other Profeſsions, and Conditions of life, men of all temperatures, as well bad as good, but yet ſo, as it is not without truth that is ſaid, *abire ſtudia in mores*; and that Learning and Studies, unleſſe they fall upon very depraved diſpoſitions, have an influence and operation upon the manners of thoſe that are converſant in them, to reforme nature and change it to the better.

§ But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for my part, can not finde any diſgrace to learning can proceed from the *Manners of Learned men, adherent unto them as they are Learned*; unleſſe peradventure it be a fault (which was the ſuppoſed fault of *Demoſthenes, Cicero, Cato* the *ſecond, Seneca*,

neca, and many more) that becauſe the times they read of, are commonly better, than the times they live in; and the duties taught, better then the duties practiſed; they *contend too farre, to reduce the corruption of manners to the honeſty of precepts, and preſcripts, of a too great hight, and to impoſe the Lawes of ancient ſeverity upon diſſolute times:* and yet they have Caveats enow touching this auſterity out of their own ſprings: For *Solon*, when he was asked, *Whether he had given his Citizens the beſt lawes? the beſt* (ſaid he) *of ſuch as they would receive.* So *Plato*, finding that his own heart could not agree with the corrupt manners of his Country, refuſed to beare place or office, ſaying, *That a mans Country is to be uſed as his Parents were, that is, with perſwaſion and not with violence, by entreating and not by conteſting:* And *Ceſars* counſelor put in the ſame caveat, ſaying, *non ad vetera inſtituta revocans quæ jampridem corruptis moribus ludibrio ſunt:* And *Cicero* notes this error directly in *Cato* the *ſecond*, writing to his friend *Atticus*, *Cato optime ſentit ſed nocet interdum Reipub. loquitur enim tanquam in Republ. Platonis, non tanquam in fæce Romuli.* The ſame *Cicero* doth excuſe and expound the Philoſophers for going too farre, and being too exact in their Preſcripts, *Theſe ſame Præceptors and Teachers*, (ſaith he) *ſeem to have ſtretched out the line and limits of Duties ſomewhat beyond the naturall bounds, that when we had laboured to reach the higheſt point of Perfection, we might reſt where it was meet:* and yet himſelfe might ſay, *Monitis ſum minor ipſe meis*; for he ſtumbled at the ſame ſtone, though in not ſo extreme a degree.

Plut. in Solon.

In vita. in epiſt. alibi.

Orat. ad C. Cæſ. Saluſt. ad ſcripta.

Ad Attic. lib. 2. ep. 1.

Pro L. Muræna.

¶ Another fault which perchance not undeſervedly is objected againſt Learned men, is this, *that they have preferr'd the honour and profit of their Country, and Maſters before their own fortunes and ſafeties.* So *Demoſthenes* to his Athenians, *My Counſells* (ſaith he) *if you pleaſe to note it, are not ſuch whereby I ſhould grow great amongſt you, you become litle amongſt the Grecians; but they be of that nature as are ſometimes not good for me to give, but are alwaies good for you to follow.* So *Seneca* after he had conſecrated that *Quinquennium Neronis*

Oratio de Corona.

to the eternall glory of Learned Governors, held on his honeſt and loyall courſe of Good and Free Counſell, after his Maſter grew extremely corrupt to his great perill and at laſt to his ruine. Neither can it be otherwiſe conceived; for Learning endues mens minds with a true ſenſe of the frailty of their Perſons; the Caſualty of fortune; the Dignity of the ſoule; and their vocation: which when they think of, they can by no meanes perſwade themſelves that any *advancement of their own fortunes*, can be ſet down as a true and worthy end of their being and ordainement. Wherefore they ſo live, as ever ready to give their account to God, and to their Maſters under God, whether they be Kings or States they
Matt. 25. ſerve, in this ſtile of words, *Ecce tibi Lucrifeci*, and not in that *Ecce mihi Lucrifeci*. But the corrupter ſort of Politiques, that have not their mindes inſtituted and eſtabliſh't in the true apprehenſion of Duties, and the contemplation of good in the univerſality, *referre all things to themſelves*, as if they were the *worlds Center*, and that the *concurrence of all lines ſhould touch in them and their fortunes*; never careing in all tempeſts, what becomes of the Ship, ſo they may retire and ſave them ſelves in the Cock-boate of their own fortune. On the contrary, they that feele the waight of Duty, and underſtand the limits of ſelfe love; uſe to make good their places, and duties, though with perill: and if they chance to ſtand ſafe in ſeditions and alterations of times and Goverment, it is rather to be attributed to the reverence which honeſty even wreſteth from adverſaries, than any *verſatile or temporizing advantage in their own carriage*. But for this point of tender ſenſe, and faſt obligation of duty, which without doubt Learning doth implant in the minde, however it may be taxed and amerced by Fortune; and be deſpiſed by Politiques in the depth of their corrupt principles, as a weake and improvident virtue, yet it will receive an open allowance, ſo as in this matter there needs the leſſe diſproofe or excuſation.

§ Another fault there is incident to Learned men, which may ſooner be excuſed than denied, namely this; *That they*

they doe not easily apply and accommodate themselves to persons with whom they negociate and live: which want of exact application ariseth from two causes, *The first is, the largenesse and greatnesse of their minds, which can hardly stoope and be confined within the observation of the nature and custome of one person.* It is the speech of a Lover, not of a wise man, *Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus.* Nevertheless I shall yeeld that he that cannot contract the light of his mind, as he doth the eye of his body, as well as disperse and dilate it, wants a great faculty for an active course of Life. *The second cause is the honesty and integrity of their nature,* which argueth no inhability in them, but a choise upon judgement; for the true and just limits of observance towards any person, extend no farther, then so to understand his inclination and disposition, as to converse with him without offence; or to be able, if occasion be offered, to give him faithfull counsill, and yet to stand upon reasonable guard & caution, in respect of our selves: but to be speculative into others, and to feele out a mans disposition, to the end to know how to worke him, winde him and governe him at pleasure; is not the part of an ingenious nature, but rather of a heart double and cloven; which, as in friendship, it is want of integrity, so towards Princes and Superiors it is want of Duty. For the Custome of the *Levant,* whereby it was accounted a hainous offence, to gaze and fixe their eyes upon Princes, is indeed, in the outward ceremony, barbarous, but good in the morall; for it becomes not Subjects by bent and inquisitive observations, to penetrate into the *hearts of Kings,* which the Scripture hath declared to be, *inscrutable.*

Seneca.

Prov. 25.

§ There is yet another fault with which I will conclude this Part, which is often noted in Learned men; namely, *that in small and outward matters of behaviour and carriage* (as in countenance, gesture, march, ordinary discourse, and the like) *they doe many times faile to observe decency and discretion;* so as the vulgar sort of capacities make a judgement of them in greater matters, by that which they finde wanting in small and ordinary points of Action. But this

this prejudication doth oftentimes deceive them: nay let them know, they have their anſwer from *Themiſtocles*, who being invited to touch a lute, ſaid, arrogantly enough, being applied to himſelfe, but pertinently to the purpoſe in hand, *That he could not, indeed, fiddle, but he knew how to make a ſmall Towne, a great State.* And there are, no doubt, many well ſeen in the Arts of Government, and Policy, which are to ſeeke in ordinary converſation and punctuall occaſions. I referre ſuch ſcoffers to the Elogie *Alcibiades* gave of his Maſter *Socrates*, whom he compar'd to the *Gallipots of the Apothecaries, which on the outſide were drawne with Apes, Owles, and Antiques, but contained within precious liquors and ſoveraigne confections*; acknowledging that to vulgar capacity and popular report, he was not without ſome ſuperficiall levities, and deformities, but was inwardly repleniſht with excellent powers and virtues. And ſo much touching the Point *of Manners of learned men.*

Plut. in Themiſt.

Plato Conv.

§ In the mean time I thought good to advertiſe, that I have no purpoſe to give allowance to ſome *baſe and unworthy Conditions of ſome Profeſſours*, whereby they have diſcredited both Themſelves and Learning: ſuch were thoſe *trencher Philoſophers*, which in the later age of the Roman ſtate, were uſually in the howſes of Great Perſons, whom not improperly you may call *ſolemne Paraſites*: of which kinde *Lucian* makes a merry deſcription of the Philoſopher, that the great Lady took to ride with her in the Coach, and would needs have him carry her litle Dogge *Melitæus*; which he doing officiouſly and yet uncomely, the page ſcoffing ſaid, *I doubt our Philoſopher of a Stoick will turne Cynique.* But above all the reſt, the groſſe and palpable flattery whereunto many not unlearned have abaſed and abuſed their wits and pens, turning as *Du Bartus* ſaith *Hecuba* into *Helena*, and *Fauſtina* into *Lucretia*, hath diminiſht the prize and eſtimation of Learning.

De Merc. conduct.

§ Neither is the *Moderne Dedication of Bookes to Patrons to be Commended*; for that Bookes, ſuch as are worthy the name of Bookes, ought to have no *Patron* but *Truth* and *Reaſon.*

Reason. The custome of the Ancients was better, who were wont to *dedicate their writings only to private and equall friends*, or to entitle the Bookes with the names of such friends; or if they Dedicated their Books to Kings or Great Persons, it was to some such as the Argument of the Book was fit and proper for. These and the like Courses may deserve rather reprehension than defence.

5. Nor say I this, as if I condemned the *Mortification and application of Learned men, to men in fortune and place*; for the answer was good that *Aristippus* made to one that askt him in mockery, *How it came to passe that Philosophers were followers of Rich men, and not Rich men of Philosophers?* He answered soberly and yet sharpely, *That it was because Philosophers knew well what they had need of, but Rich men did not*. Of like nature was the answer which the same Philosopher made when having a Petition to *Dionysius* and no care given to him, *he fell downe at his feet in manner of a worshipper*, whereupon *Dionysius* staid and gave him the hearing, and granted it: but a little after, some person tender of the honour and credit of Philosophy, *reproved Aristippus that he would offer the Profession of Philosophy such an indignity as for a private suite to fall to a Tyrants feet?* to whom he replied, *That was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius that had his eares in his feet*. Neither was it accounted weaknesse, but a discretion in him that would not dispute his best with *Adrianus Cæsar*, excusing the fact, *That it was reason to yeeld to him that commanded thirty Legions*. These and such like *applications and stoopings of Learned men below the termes of Gravity*, as the command of necessity or the advantage of occasion, cannot be condemned; for though they may seeme, at first sight, somewhat base and servile, yet in a judgement truly made, they are to be accounted *submissions* to the *Occasion* and not to the *Person*.

Laert. in Aristip.

Ibid.

Spartian. in Hadrian.

CAP. IV.

I. *Diſtempers of Learning from* Learned mens ſtudies, *are of three ſorts.* Phantaſticall Learning, Contentious Learning, Delicate Learning. II. Delicate Learning, *a Curioſity in words through Profuſeneſſe of ſpeech.* § *Decent expreſſion commended.* § *Affected Brevity cenſured.* III. Contentious Learning, *a Curioſity in matter, through the novelty of termes, or ſtrictneſſe of Poſitions.* § *A vanity either in Matter or in Method.* IV. Phantaſticall Learning *hath two branches,* Impoſture, Credulity. § *Credulity is a beliefe of Hiſtory.* § *Or a beliefe of Art or Opinion, and that either Reall in the Art it ſelfe.* § *Or Perſonall in the Author of ſuch an Art, or Science.*

LET us now proceed to thoſe *Errors, and Vanities, which have intervened amongſt the ſtudies of Learned men, and therewith are intermingled;* which is the principall point and proper to the preſent Argument; wherein my purpoſe is not to patronize errors, but by a Cenſure and ſeparation of the errors, to ſift out that which is ſound and ſolid, and to deliver the ſame from aſperſion. For we ſee it is the manner of men, eſpecially of envious perſons, to ſcandalize, and deprave that which retaines the State and Virtue, by takeing advantage upon that which is corrupt and degenerate; as the Heathens in the Primitive Church us'd to blemiſh and taint the Chriſtians, with the faults and corruptions of Heretiques: Nevertheleſſe I have no meaning to make any exact animadverſion of the *Errors*, and *Impediments in matters of Learning*, which are more ſecret and remote from vulgar opinion, but only to ſpeak of ſuch as doe fall under a common and popular obſervation, and known, or at leaſt, which recede not farre of therefrom.

I. I finde therefore chiefly three vanities, and vacuities in Learning, which have given occaſion to the reproach and diſgrace thereof. For *thoſe things* are eſteemed *vaine* which are either *falſe*, or *frivolous*; namely, wherein there is, either no truth, or no uſe: *thoſe Perſons* we eſteeme vaine, which are either *Credulous* in things falſe, or *Curious* in things of li-

tle

tle uſe. And *Curioſity* is either in *matter* or in *words*; that is when either labour is ſpent in *vaine matters*, or time is waſted in the delicacy of *fine words*: ſo that it is agreeable as well to true reaſon as approved experience, to ſet down three diſtempers of Learning; The firſt is *Phantaſticall Learning*; The ſecond *Contentious Learning*; The third *Painted* and *Delicate Learning*: or thus, *vaine Imaginations*, *vaine Altercations*, *vaine Affectations*. And with the Laſt I will beginne.

II. This Diſtemper ſeated in the *ſuperfluity and profuſeneſſe of ſpeech* (though in times paſt by turnes, it was in ſome price) about *Luthers* time, got up mightily into credit, and eſtimation. The heat and efficacy of Preaching, to winne and draw on the people, began chiefly about that time to floriſh; and this required a popular kind of expreſſion. This was furtherd by the Enmity and Oppoſition conceaved in that ſame age againſt the *Schoolemen*; whoſe writings were altogether in a differing ſtile and forme of expreſſion; taking liberty to coine and frame new and r ue termes of Art, whithout any regard to the pureneſſe and elegancy of ſpeech, ſo they might avoid circuit of words, and deliver their ſenſe and conceptions, in a preciſe exact expreſſion: and ſo it came to paſſe a litle after, that a greater care was taken for Words, than Matter; and many affected rather Comptneſſe of ſtile; a round and clean Period; the ſweet falling of the clauſes; and illuſtrations by Tropes and Figures; than the waight of Matter, ſoundneſſe of Argument, life of Invention, or depth of Judgement. Then ſprang up the *flowing and watery veine of Oſorius*, the Portugall Biſhop, to be in price and requeſt. Then did *Sturmius* ſpend ſuch infinite and curious paines upon *Cicero* the Orator, and *Hemogines* the Rhetorician. Then did our *Carre* and *Aſcham* in their Lectures and Writings almoſt Deifie *Cicero*, and *Demoſthenes*, and allure young Students to that poliſht and floriſhing kinde of Learning. Then did *Eraſmus* take occaſion to make that ſcoffing kinde of Echo, *Decem annos conſumpſi in Legendo Cicerone*, to which the

Echo anſwered, *One, Aſine.* Than grew the Learning of the Schoolemen to be utterly deſpiſed, as rude and barbarous. In ſumme, the whole inclination and bent of thoſe times was, rather about *Copie* than *Waight.* Here we ſee the firſt *Diſtemper of Learning*, when, as we have ſaid, *men ſtudy Words and not Matter.* Whereof though J have repreſented examples of late times only, yet ſuch vanities have bin accepted, in ſome degree or other, in ancient times, and will be ſo hereafter. Now it is not poſsible but that this ſhould have an operation to diſcredit and debaſe the reputation of Learning, even with vulgar capacities; when they ſee Learned mens Workes, like the firſt letter of a Patent, which though it be limmed and ſet out with large floriſhes, yet it is but a letter. And it ſeemes to me that *Pigmalions frenzie* is a good Embleme and Portraicture of this vanity; for what are words but the Images of matter, and except they be animated with the ſpirit of reaſon, to fall in Love with them, is all one as to fall in love with a Picture.

§ But yet notwithſtanding it is a thing not haſtily to be condemned to illuſtrate and poliſh the obſcurity and roughneſſe of Philoſophy, with the *ſplendor of wordes* and *ſenſible elocution*, For hereof we have great examples in *Xenophon*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, *Plutarque*, and even in *Plato* himſelfe; and the uſe hereof is great: For though to the ſevere inquiſition of Truth, and the deep progreſſe into Philoſophy, it is ſome hinderance, becauſe it is too early ſatisfactory unto the mind, and quencheth the thirſt and deſire of farther ſearch; yet if a man be to have any uſe of ſuch knowledge in Civill occaſions (of *Conference*, *Counſill*, *Perſwaſion*, *Diſcourſe*, *and the like*) he ſhall finde all that he deſireth prepar'd and ſet out to his hand in thoſe Auctors. But the exceſſe of this is ſo juſtly contemptible, that, as *Hercules*, when he ſaw the Jmage of *Adonis*, *Venus minion*, in the Temple, ſaid, *Nil ſacri es*; ſo there is none of *Hercules* followers in Learning, I mean, the more induſtrious and ſevere inquirers into Truth, but will deſpiſe thoſe *Delicacies* and *Affectations*, as indeed capable of no Divineneſſe.

§ Litle

§ Litle better is that kind of ſtile (yet neither is that altogether exempt from vanity) which neer about the ſame time ſucceeded this *Copy* and *ſuperfluity of ſpeech*. The labour here is altogether, *That words may be aculeate, ſentences conciſe, and the whole contexture of the ſpeech and diſcourſe, rather rounding into it ſelfe, than ſpread and dilated:* So that it comes to paſſe by this Artifice, that every paſſage ſeemes more witty and waighty than indeed it is. Such a ſtile as this we finde more excesſively in *Seneca*; more moderately in *Tacitus* and *Plinius Secundus*; and of late it hath bin very pleaſing unto the eares of our time. And this kind of expreſsion hath found ſuch acceptance with meaner capacites, as to be a dignity and ornament to Learning; nevertheleſſe, by the more exact judgements, it hath bin deſervedly deſpiſed, and may be ſet down *as a diſtemper of Learning*, ſeeing it is nothing elſe but a hunting after words, and fine placing of them. And thus much of the firſt *Diſeaſe* or *Diſtemper* of Learning.

III Now followes the diſtemper *ſetled in Matter*, which we ſet down as a *ſecond diſeaſe of Learning*, & have deſigned it by the name of *Contentious ſubtletie*; and this is in nature ſomewhat worſe than that whereof we ſpake even now. For as the ſubſtance of Matter, is better than the beauty of words; ſo on the contrary, *vanity of Matter* is more odious than *vanity of words*. Wherein it ſeemeth that the reprehenſion of S. *Paul* was not only proper for thoſe times, but Propheticall for the times following; and not only reſpective to Divinity, but extenſive to all knowledge, *De vita prophanas vocum novitates:* For in theſe words he aſsignes two Markes and Badges of ſuſpected and falſified ſcience; The firſt is the *Novelty* and *Strangeneſſe of Termes*; The other, the *ſtrictneſſe of Poſitions*; which of neceſsity induce oppoſition and ſo Alterations and Queſtions. Certainly like as many ſubſtances in nature, which are ſolid and entire, doe many times putrifie and corrupt into wormes; ſo good and ſound Knowledge doth often putrifie and diſſolve into a number of ſubtle, idle, unwholſome, and (as I may 1. Tim. 6.

terme them) *vermiculate* Queſtions, which ſeem indeed to have a kind of Motion and Quickneſſe in them, and yet they are unſound and hollow, and of no ſolid uſe. This kind of *Degenerate Learning* corrupting it ſelfe, did chiefly raigne amongſt the *Schoolemen*; who having a bundance of Leiſure, ſharpe, and ſtrong wits, and ſmall variety of reading, (for their wits were ſhut up within the writing of a few Auctors, chiefly *Ariſtotle*, their Dictator, as their Perſons were ſhut up in the cells of Monaſteries and Colledges) and for moſt part ignorant of the Hiſtory either of Nature, or of Time did out of no great Quantity of Matter, but infinite agitation of their Wit and Phancy, as of the ſpindle, ſpinne out unto us thoſe laborious webbes of Learning, which are extant in their Bookes. For the Wit and Mind of Man, if it worke upon Matter, by contemplating Nature and the Works of God, worketh according to the ſtuffe, and is limited thereby; but if it worketh upon it ſelfe, as the *ſpider workes his webbe*, then it is endleſſe, and brings forth *Cobwebs of Learning*, indeed admirable for fineneſſe of thred and worke but of no Subſtance and Profit.

§ This ſame unprofitable *ſubtlety* or *Curioſity*, is of two ſorts; and it is diſcerned either in the ſubject and *Matter* it ſelfe, ſuch as is fruitleſſe *Speculation* or *Controverſy*, whereof there are no ſmall number, both in Divinity and Philoſophy; Or in the *Manner* and *Method of handling*, which amongſt Schoolemen was this; Vpon every Poſition or Aſſertion they framed objections, then ſolutions of thoſe objections, which ſolutions, for the moſt part, were only diſtinctions, whereas indeed, the ſtrength of all ſciences, *like the Old mans Fagot*, conſiſteth not in every ſtick a ſunder, but in them all together united in the bonde. For the *Harmony of ſciences*, that is when each part ſupports the other, is and ought to be the true and briefe way of confutation and ſuppreſſion of all the ſmaller ſort of objections: but on the other ſide, if you draw out every Axiome, as the ſticks of a Fagot, one by one, you may eaſily quarrell with them, and bend and break them at your pleaſure. So that as it was

Æſop. Fab
Plut. Mor.

ſaid

ſaid of *Seneca*, *verborum Minutiis rerum frangit pondera*, may truly be ſaid of the Schoolemen, *Quæſtionum Minutiis ſcientiarum frangunt pondera*. For were it not better for a man, in a faire roome to ſet up one great light, or branching candleſtick of lights, whereby all may be ſeene at once, than to goe up and downe with a ſmall watch candle into every corner? And ſuch is their *Method*, that reſteth not ſo much upon evidence of Truth proved by Arguments, Auctorities, Similitudes and Examples, as upon particular Confutations, and Solutions of every ſcruple, cavillation and objection; thus breeding queſtion upon queſtion, even as in the former reſemblance, *when you carry the light into one corner, you darken the reſt*. So that the *fable* of *Scylla* ſeemes to be a lively image of this kinde of Philoſophy or knowledge, which for the upper part had the ſhape of a comely virgin, but below, *Candida ſuccinctam latrantibus inguina monſtris*; So you ſhall finde ſome generalties of the Schoolemen, faire and well proportioned, and invented to ſome good purpoſe, but than when you deſcend to diſtinctions and deciſions, in ſteed of a fruitfull wombe for the uſe and benefite of mans life, they end in monſtrous and barking *Queſtions*. Wherefore it is no marvaile, if this quality of Knowledge fall under, even popular contempt, the people being apt to contemne Truth upon occaſion of Controverſies, and altercations; and to think they are all out of their way, which never meet and agree among themſelves, and when they ſee the digladiations of Learned men, about matters of no uſe or moment, they eaſily fall upon that judgement of *Dionyſius* of Syracuſa, *verba iſta ſunt ſenum otioſorum*. Notwithſtanding it is moſt certain, that if the Schoolemen, to their great thirſt of Truth, and unwearied travaile of wit, had joyned variety, and vniverſality of reading, and contemplation, they had certainly proved excellent lights to the great *advancement of all Arts and Sciences*. And thus much of the ſecond Diſeaſe of Learning.

Fabius Qu. Inſtit. X.

Virg. Buc. Ecl. 6.

Laertius in Plato.

IV For the third Diſeaſe of Learning which concernes *Deceit or Untruth*, it is of all the reſt the fouleſt, as that which

which doth destroy the Nature and essentiall forme of Knowledge, which is nothing but a representation of Truth. For the *Truth of Being*, and the *Truth of Knowing* are all one, differing no more than the direct beame, and the beame reflexed. This vice therefore brancheth it selfe into two sorts *Imposture* and *Credulity*, the one deceives, the other is deceived, which although they appear to be of a diverse nature, the one seeming to proceed of Cunning, and the other of Simplicity, yet for the most part they doe concurre, for as the verse noteth,

Horat. Epi. *Percontatorem fugito nam garrulus idem est.*

Intimating that an *Inquisitive man is a Prattler*, so upon the like reason, a *Credulous man is a deceaver*. As we see it in Fame & Rumors, that he that will easily believe Rumors, will as easily augment Rumors, which *Tacitus* wisely notes in these words, *Fingunt simul credunt*, such affinity there is between a propensity to *Deceive* and a facility to *Believe*.

Tacit. Hist. l. 1.

§. This *facility of Crediting* and accepting all things, though weakly authorized, is of two kindes, according to the nature of the Matter handled, for it is either *beliefe of History*, or (as the Lawyers speak) *matter of Fact*, or *matter of Opinion*. In the former kinde, we see with what losse and detriment of Credit and Reputation, this error hath distain'd and embased much of the *Ecclesiasticall History*, which hath too easily received and registred Reports and Narrations of Miracles wrought by Martyrs, Hermites, or Monkes of the Desert, Anchorites, and other holy men, and of their Reliques, Sepulchers, Chappells, Images and Shrines. So in *Naturall History*, we see many things have bin rashly, and with litle choice or judgement received and registred, as may appeare in the writings of *Plinius*, *Cardanus*, *Albertus*, and diverse of the *Arabians*, which are every where fraught with forged and fabulous Reports, and those not only uncertaine and untried, but notoriously untrue and manifestly convicted, to the great derogation of *Naturall Philosophy* with grave and sober men. Wherein in truth the wisdome and integrity of *Aristotle* doth excellently appear, that

that haveing made ſo diligent and exquiſite a *hiſtory of living Creatures*, hath mingled it ſo ſparingly with any vaine or faigned matter; but hath rather caſt all *Prodigious Reports*, which he thought worthy the recording into one *commentary*; wiſely diſcerning that matter of manifeſt Truth (which might be the experimentall groundworke whereupon Philoſophy and Sciences were to be built) ought not unadviſedly, to be mingled with matter of doubtfull faith: and yet again things rare and ſtrange, which to many ſeem incredible, are not wholly to be ſuppreſſed or denied to bee recorded to Poſterity. De Mirab. Auſcult.

§ But that other *Facility of Credit*, which is yeelded, not to *Hiſtory* and *Reports*, but to *Arts* and *Opinions*, is likewiſe of two ſorts; either when too much beliefe is attributed to *Arts* themſelves, or to certain *Auctors* in any Art. The ſciences themſelves, which hold more of the fancy and of beliefe, then of Reaſon and Demonſtration, are chiefly three *Aſtrologie*, *Naturall Magique*, and *Alchimie*; of which ſciences nevertheleſſe the end and pretences are noble. For *Aſtrologie* profeſſeth to diſcover the influence and domination of the ſuperior Globe, over the inferior. *Magique* propoſeth to it ſelfe to call and reduce Naturall Philoſophy from variety of ſpeculations, to the magnitude of workes. *Alchimie* undertakes to make a ſeparation and extraction of all hetrogeneous and unlike parts of bodies, which in mixture of Nature are Implicate and Incorporate, and to refine and depurate bodies themſelves, that are diſtained and ſoiled, to ſet at liberty ſuch as are bound and impriſoned, and to bring to perfection ſuch as are unripe. But the derivations and proſequtions, which are preſumed to conduce to theſe ends, both in the Theorie and in the Practile of *theſe Arts*, are full of *Errors* and *Vanity*. Nor is the Tradition and manner of Delivety for moſt part ingenious and without ſuſpition, but vail'd over and munited with devilles and impoſtures. Yet ſurely to *Alchimie* this right is due, that it may truely be compared to the Husbandman whereof *Æſope* makes the Fable, *that when he died, told his ſonnes he had left unto them a great*

maſſe of Gold buried under ground in his Vine-yard, but did not remember the particular place where it was hidden; who when they had with ſpades turnd up all the Vine-yard; gold indeed they found none; but by reaſon of their ſtirring and diging the Mold about the Rootes of their Vines, they had a great Vintage the year following: ſo the painfull ſearch and ſtirre of *Alchimiſts* to make Gold, hath brought to light a great number of good and fruitfull experiments, as well for the diſcloſing of nature, as the uſe of mans life.

§ As for the *overmuch Credit that hath bin given to Auctors in Sciences, whom they have inveſted with the power of Dictators, that their words ſhould ſtand, and not of Conſuls to give advice*; the dammage is infinite that Sciences have received thereby, as a Principall cauſe that hath kept them low at a ſtay, and that they have lien heartleſſe, without any notable *Growth or Advancement*. For hence it hath come to paſſe, that in *Arts Mechanicall*, the firſt deviſer commeth ſhort, & time ſupplies and perfects the reſt; but in *Sciences*, the firſt Author goeth fartheſt, and time looſeth and corrupteth. So we ſee *Artillery*, *Sailing*, *Printing*, were imperfect, formeleſſe, and groſſely managed at firſt, but in progreſſe of time accommodated and refined. But contrariwiſe the *Philoſophy* and *Sciences* of *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, *Democritus*, *Hypocrates*, *Euclide*, *Archimede*, were of moſt vigor in their Auctors, and in proceſſe of time, became rather degenerate and embaſed, and loſt much of their luſtre; whereof the reaſon is no other, but that in *Arts Mechanicall*, *many wits and induſtries have contributed in one*, *in liberall Arts and Sciences*, *many wits and induſtries have bin ſpent about*, *and yealded to the art of ſome one*; whom (notwithſtanding many times) his ſectators have rather depraved than illuſtrated. *For as water* will not aſcend higher then the levell of the firſt ſpring-head, from whence it deſcendeth; ſo knowledge derived from *Ariſtotle*, will never riſe higher than the knowledge of Ariſtotle. And therefore although the poſition be good, *Oportet diſcentem credere*, yet it muſt be coupled with this, *Oportet jam edoctum judicio ſuo uti*. For Diſciples owe unto Maſters, only a *tempo-*

Ariſt. de Rep. Soph. lib. 1.

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porary beliefe, and a ſuſpenſion of their judgement, untill they be fully inſtructed, and not an abſolute reſignation of their liberty, and a perpetuall captivity of their judgements. Therefore, to conclude this point, I will ſay no more but this, *Let great Auctors ſo have their due, as we doe not derogate from Time, which is the Auctor of Auctors and Parent of Truth.*

CAP. V.

Peccant Humors in Learning. I. *Extream affection to two extreams, Antiquity, Novelty.* II. *A diſtruſt, that any thing New, ſhould now be found out.* III. *That of all Sects and Opinions, the beſt hath ſtill prevailed.* IIII. *An over early reduction of Knowledge into Arts and Methods.* V. *A neglect of* PRIMITIVE PHILOSOPHY. VI. *A Divorce of the Intellect from the Obiect.* VII. *Infection of Knowledge in generall from individuall inclinations.* VIII. *An impatience of Doubt, haſt to Aſſertion.* IX. *A Magiſtrall manner of Tradition of Knowledge.* X. *Aime of writers, Illuſtration, not Propagation of Knowledge.* XI. *End of ſtudies, Curioſity, Pleaſures, Profit, Preferments, &c.*

THus have we at length gone over the three Diſtempers or Diſeaſes of Learning; beſides the which, there are other, rather *peccant Humors*, than *confirmed Diſeaſes*, which nevertheleſſe are not ſo ſecret and intrinſique, but that they fall under a popular ſenſe and reprehenſion, and therefore are not to be paſſed over.

I The firſt of theſe is an *extreme affection of two extremities, Antiquity and Novelty*; wherein the daughters of *Time*, doe take after the Father; for as Time devoureth his children, ſo theſe, one of them ſeeketh to depreſſe the other; while *Antiquity* envieth there ſhould be *new Additions*; and *Novelty* can not be content to adde things *recent*, but it muſt deface and reject the *old*. Surely the advice of the Prophet is the true direction in this caſe, *ſtate ſuper vias antiquas & videte quænam ſit via recta & bona & ambulate in ea*. *Antiquity* deſerveth that reverence, that men ſhould make a ſtay a while, and ſtand thereupon, and look about to diſcover which is the beſt way; but when the diſcovery is well ta- Ierem. 6.

ken, than not to reſt there, but cheerefully to make progreſſion. Indeed to ſpeak truly, *Antiquitas ſeculi, Juventus Mundi*, Certainly our times are the Ancient times, when the world is now Ancient, and not thoſe which we count Ancient, *ordine retrogrado*, by a computation backward from our own times.

II An other error induced by the former is, *a ſuſpition and diffidence, that any thing ſhould be now to be found out, which the world ſhould have miſt and paſt over ſo long time:* as if the ſame objection might be made to *Time*, wherewith *Lucian* reproacheth *Iupiter*, and other the Heathen Gods, *For he wonders that they begot ſo many children in old time, and begot none in his time?* and askes in ſcoffing manner, *whether they were now become Septuagenary, or whether the Law Papia, made againſt old mens mariages, had reſtrained them?* So it ſeemes men doubt leaſt time is become paſt children and generation. Nay rather the levity and inconſtancy of mens judgements, is hence plainly diſcovered, which untill a matter be done, wonder it can be done. So *Alexander's* expedition into *Aſia* was prejudg'd as a vaſt and impoſsible enterprize; yet afterwards it pleaſed *Livie*, ſo to ſlight it as to ſay of *Alexander*, *Nil aliud quam bene auſus eſt vana contemnere:* The ſame hapned unto *Columbus* in the weſterne Navigation. But in intellectuall matters it is much more common, as may be ſeen in many propoſitions in *Euclide*, which till they be demonſtrate, they ſeem ſtrange to our aſſent; but being Demonſtrate, our minde accepteth of them by a kind of Recogniſance or Retractation, (as the Lawyers ſpeak) as if we had underſtood and knowne them before.

Sen. ait Lact. Inſt. Lib. 1.

Hiſt. lib. 9.

III An other error which hath ſome affinity with the former is, *a conceit That all ſects and ancient opinions, after they have bin diſcuſſed and ventilated, the beſt ſtill prevail'd and ſuppreſt the reſt.* Wherefore they think that if a man ſhould begin the labour of a new ſearch and examination, he muſt needs light upon ſomewhat formerly rejected, and after reſection, loſt, and brought into oblivion: as if the *multitude*, or the wiſeſt, to gratify the *multitude*, were not more ready

to

to give paſſage to that which is populare and ſuperficiall; than to that which is ſubſtantiall and profound. *For Time* ſeemeth to be of the nature of a River, which carrieth down to us that which is light and blown up, and ſinketh and drowneth that which is waighty and ſolid.

IV Another error of divers nature from the former is, *The overearly and Peremptory reduction of Knowledge into Arts and Methods; which once done, commonly ſciences receive ſmall or no augmentation.* For as young men, when they knit and ſhape perfectly, doe ſeldome grow to a farther ſtature: ſo knowledge while it is diſperſt into *Aphoriſmes*, and *Obſervations*, may grow and ſhoot up; but once incloſed and comprehended in Methods, it may perchance be farther poliſht and illuſtrate, and accommodated for uſe and practiſe, but it increaſeth no more in bulke and ſubſtance.

V Another error which doth ſucceed that which we laſt noted, is, *That after diſtribution of Particular Arts and Sciences into their ſeverall places, many men have preſently abandoned the univerſall notion of things, or* Philoſophia Prima, *which is a deadly enemy to all Progreſſion.* Proſpects are made from Turrets and high places; and it is impoſsible to diſcover the more remote and deeper parts of any ſcience, if you ſtand but upon the flat and levell of the ſame ſcience, and aſcend not as into a watch-Tower to a higher ſcience.

VI Another error hath proceeded *from too great a reverence and a kind of Adoration of the mind and underſtanding of man, by means whereof men have withdrawn themſelves too much, from the contemplation of Nature, and the obſervations of experience; and have tumbled up and downe in their own ſpeculations and conceits;* but of theſe ſurpaſsing *Opinators*, and (if I may ſo ſpeak) *Intellectualiſts*, (which are notwithſtanding, taken for the moſt ſublime & divine Philoſophers) *Heraclitus* gave a juſt cenſure, ſaying, *Men ſeek truth in their own little world,* N. 1. *and not in the great common world,* for they diſdaine the Alphabet of nature, and *Primer-Book* of the Divine works; which if they did not, they might perchance by degrees and leaſure, after the knowledge of ſimple letters, and ſpelling

of Syllables, come at laſt, to read perfectly the Text and Volume of the Creatures. But they, contrariwiſe, by continuall meditation and agitation of wit, urge, and as it were invocate their own ſpirits to divine and give *Oracles* unto them, whereby they are deſervedly and pleaſingly deluded.

VII Another Error that hath ſome connexion with this latter, is, *That men doe oftentimes imbue and infect their meditations and doctrines with the infuſions of ſome Opinions, and conceptions of their own, which they have moſt admired; or ſome ſciences to which they have moſt applied and conſecrated themſelves, giving all things a Dye and Tincture, though very deceivable, from theſe favorite ſtudies.* So hath *Plato* intermingled his Philoſophy with Theology; *Ariſtotle* with Logique; The ſecond Schoole of *Plato*, *Proclus* and the reſt, with the Mathematiques. Theſe Arts had a kind of *Primo-geniture* with them, which they would ſtill be kiſsing and making much of, as their firſt borne ſonnes. But the *Alchimiſts* have forged a new Philoſophy out of the Fire and Furnace; and *Gilbert* our Countrey-man, hath extracted another Philoſophy out of a Load-ſtone. So *Cicero*, when reciting the ſeverall opinions of the nature of the ſoule, he found a Muſitian that held the ſoule was but a harmony, ſaith pleſantly, *Hic ab arte ſua non receſſit*: But of theſe errors *Ariſtotle* ſaith aptly and wiſely, *Qui reſpiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant.*

Tuſc. lib. 1.

De Gen. & Cor. lib. 1. & alibi.

VIII Another error is, *An impatience of Doubt, and an unadviſed haſt to Aſſertion without due and mature ſuſpenſion of the judgement:* For the two waies of contemplation are not unlike the two waies of Action, commonly ſpoken of by the Ancients; of which the one was a plaine and ſmooth way in the beginning, but in the end impaſsible; the other rough and troubleſome in the entrance, but after a while faire and even; ſo is it in contemplations, if a man will begin in certainties, he ſhall end in doubts; but if he can be content to begin with doubts, and have patience a while, he ſhall end in certainties.

IX The like error diſcovereth it ſelfe in the *manner of Tradition*

Tradition and Delivery of knowledge, which is, for the most part, imperious and magistrall, not ingenious and faithfull; so contrived, as may rather command our assent, than stand to examination. It is true that in compendious Treatises designed for Practice, that Forme of writing may be retained; but in a just and compleat handling of knowledge, both extremes are to be avoided, as well the veine of *Velleius* the Epicurean, *who feard nothing so much as to seem to doubt of any thing*; as that of *Socrates* and the Academie, leaving all things in doubt and incertainty. Rather men should affect candor and sincerity, propounding things with more or lesse asseveration, as they stand in their judgement proved, more or lesse. Cic. de Nat. Dier. lib. i.

X Other errors there are *in the scope that men propound to themselves whereunto they bend their endeavours and studies:* For whereas the most devout Leaders and noted Professors of Learning, ought chiefly to propound to themselves to make some notable addition to the science they professe, contrariwise, they convert their labours to aspire to certain second prizes, as to be a *profound interpreter*, or commentator; a sharp and strong champion or *Defendor*; a Methodicall compounder or *Abridger*: so the Revenewes and Tributes of Sciences come to be improved, but not the Patrimony and Inheritance.

XI But the greatest error of all the rest is, *the mistaking or misplacing the last and farthest end of knowledge:* For many have entred into a desire of Learning and Knowledge, some upon an imbred and restlesse *Curiosity*; others to entertaine their mindes with variety and *delight*; others for *ornament and reputation*; others for *contradiction* and victory in dispute; others for *Lucre* and living; few to improve the gift of reason given them from God, to the benefite and use of men. As if there were sought in knowledge, a *couch*, whereupon to rest a restlesse and searching spirit; or a *Tarrasse* for a wandring and variable mind to walk up and downe in at liberty unrestrained; or some high and eminent *Tower of State*, from which a proud and ambitious mind, may have a Prospect,

or

or a *Fort* and commanding ground for ſtrife and contention; or a *ſhop* for profit and ſale; and not rather a *rich ſtore-houſe and Armorie* for the glory of the Creator of all things, and the reliefe of mans eſtate. For this is that which indeed would dignify and exalt Learning; if contemplation and Action were more neerely and ſtraitly, than hitherto they have bin conjoyn'd and united together: which combination, certainly would be like unto that conjunction of the two higheſt Planets, when Saturne which hath the Dominion over reſt and contemplations, conſpires with *Iupiter* the Lord of Civill ſociety and Action. Howbeit I doe not mean when I ſpeak of uſe and Action, Profeſſory or Lucretive Learning, for I am not ignorant how much that diverts and interrupteth the *Progreßion and advancement of knowledge*; like indeed the *Golden apple*, thrown before *Atalanta*, which while ſhe goes aſide and ſtoopeth to take up, the race is hindred, *Declinat curſus aurum q; volubile tollit.*

Ovid. Met. 10.

Neither is it my meaning, as was ſpoken of *Socrates*, to call Philoſophy down from heaven, to converſe upon the earth; that is to lay *Naturall Philoſophy* aſide, and to celebrate only *Morall Philoſophy* and *Policy*. But as Heaven and Earth doe conſpire and contribute, to the uſe and benefit of the life of Man; ſo indeed this ſhould be the end of *both Philoſophies*; that vain ſpeculations, and what ever is empty and barren, being rejected; that which is ſolid and fruitfull may be preſerved and augmented; that ſo Knowledge, may not be a Courtezane for Pleaſure, or as a bond-woman for gaine; but as a ſpouſe for generation, fruit and honeſt ſolace.

§ Now me thinks I have deſcribed and opened, as by a kind of Diſſection, thoſe *Peccant Humors*; or at leaſt, the Principall of them, *which have not only given impediment to the Proficience of Learning, but have given alſo occaſion to the traducement thereof*. Wherein if I have come too neere the quick, it muſt be remembred, *Fidelia vulnera amantis, doloſa oſcula malignantis*: however this ſurely I think I have gain'd, that I ought to be the better believed, concerning the *Commendations of Learning* in that which followes, becauſe

Pſal. 141.

becauſe I have proceeded ſo freely concerning cenſure, in that which went before. And yet I have no purpoſe to enter into a *Laudative of Learning*, or to make a *Hymne to the Muſes*; though I am of opinion, that it is long ſince their Rites were duely celebrated: but my intent is, without varniſh or amplification, to take the juſt waight and to ballance the *Dignity of Knowledge* in the ſcales with other things; and to ſearch out the true valewes thereof, *from teſtimonies Divine and Humane*.

CAP. VI.

The Dignity of Learning from Divine Arguments and Teſtimonies. I. *From Gods wiſdome.* § *Angels of Illumination.* § *The firſt Light and firſt Sabbath.* § *Mans imployment in the Garden.* § *Abels contemplative life.* § *The invention of Muſique.* § *Confuſion of Tongues.* II. *The excellent Learning of* Moſes. § Iob. § Salomon. § Chriſt. §. S. Paule. § *The Ancient Doctors of the Church.* § *Learning exalts the Minde to the Celebration of Gods glory: and is a Preſervative againſt Error and Vnbelieſe.*

I. FIrſt therefore let us ſeeke the Dignity of Knowledge, in the Arch-Type or firſt Platforme, which is in the *Attributes*, and in the *Acts of God*, as farre as they are revealed to man, and may be obſerved with ſobriety. Wherein we may not ſeeke it by the name of *Learning*, for all *Learning* is Knowledge acquired, and no knowledge in God is *acquired*, but *Originall:* and therefore we muſt look for it by another name, that is *wiſdome* or *ſapience*, as the ſacred Scriptures call it. It is ſo than; In the *works* of the *Creation*, we ſee a double emanation of Divine virtue from God, whereof the one is referr'd to *Power*, the other to *Wiſdome*, that is chiefly expreſt in making the *Maſſe* and ſubſtance of the *Matter*; this in diſpoſing the beauty of the *Forme*. This being ſuppoſed it is to be obſerved, that for any thing which appeares in the Hiſtory of the *Creation*, the confuſed Maſſe and Matter of *Heaven* and *Earth* was made in a moment of Time; yet the *Order* and *Diſpoſition* Gen. 1.

of that *Chaos* or Maſſe, was the work of ſix daies: ſuch a note of difference it pleaſed God to put upon the workes of *Power*, and the works of *Wiſdome*; wherewith concurres, that in the Creation of the *Matter*, It is not recorded that God ſaid *Let there be Heaven* and *Earth*, as it is ſaid of the works following, but ſimply and actually, *God made Heaven and Earth*: ſo that the *Matter* ſeemes to be as a *Manufacture*, but the *Forme* carries the ſtile of a *Law* or *Decree*.

§ Let us proceed *from God to Angels or Spirits*, whoſe nature in order of Dignity is next Gods. We ſee, ſo farre as credit is to be given to the Celeſtiall Hierarchy, ſet forth un-
Dion. Areo. der the name of *Dionyſius Areopagita*, that in the order of Angells, the firſt place or degree is given to the *Seraphim*, that is, *Angels of Love*: the ſecond to the *Cherubim*, that is, *Angels of Illumination*: the third, and ſo following, Places to *Thrones*, *Principalities* and the reſt, which are Angels of Power and Miniſtry. So as from this order and diſtribution, it appeares, that *the Angels of Knowledge and Illumination, are placed before the Angels of Office and Domination*.

§ To deſcend from Spirits and Intellectuall Formes, to Senſible and Materiall Formes; we read *that the firſt of Crea-*
Gen. 1. *ted formes was Light*; which hath a relation and correſpondence in nature and Corporall things, to knowledge in Spirits and Incorporall things. So in the diſtribution of *Daies*, we ſee the *day* wherein God did reſt and contemplate his own workes, was bleſt above all the *daies* wherein the Fabrick of the *Univerſe* was Created and Diſpoſed.

Gen. 2. § After the Creation was finiſht, we read that *Man was plact in the Garden to worke therein*; which work ſo appointed to him, could be no other than the *work of Contemplation*, that is, the end hereof was not for neceſsity, but for delight and exerciſe without vexation or trouble: For there being than no reluctation of the Creature, no ſweat of the brow; mans imployment muſt of conſequence have bin matter of *delight* and *contemplation, not of Labour and Worke*. Againe, the firſt Acts that man perform'd in *Paradice*, comprehended the two ſummary parts of *knowledge*; thoſe were the *view of*

Creatures,

Creatures, and the impoſition of names. For the *knowledge* which introduct the Fall, it was (as we have toucht before) not the *Naturall Knowledge concerning the Creatures*, but the *Morall Knowledge of Good and Evill*, where the ſuppoſition was, *that Gods Commandements or Prohibitions were not the Originalls of Good and Evill, but that they had other beginnings*, which man aſpired to know, to the end to make a totall defection from God, and to depend wholly upon himſelfe, and his Free-will.

§ To paſſe to the firſt event or occurrence after the Fall of Man, we ſee (as the Scriptures have infinite Myſteries, not violating at all the truth of the ſtory or letter) *an image of the two States, the Contemplative and Active, figur'd in the Perſons of Abel and Cain*, and in their Profeſsions and Primitive trades of life; whereof the one was a Sheapheard, who by reaſon of his leaſure, reſt in a place, and free view of Heaven, *is a lively image of a Contemplative life*; the other a Husbandman, that is, a man toild and tired with working, and his countenance fixt upon the earth: *where we may ſee the favour and Election of God went to the Sheapheard and not to the tiller of Ground.* Gen. 4.

§ So in the age before the Flood, the holy Records (with in thoſe few Memorialls which are there entred and regiſtred, touching the occurrences of that age) have vouchſafed to mention and honor *Inventors of Muſique and works in Mettals.* Gen. 4.

§ In the next Age after the flood, the great judgements of God upon the ambition of Man was the *Confuſion of Tongues, whereby the open trade and intercourſe of Learning and Knowledge was chiefly embraced.* Gen. 11.

II. Let us deſcend to *Moſes* the Law-giver & Gods firſt Notarie, he is adorn'd in Scripture with this commendation, *That he was ſeen in all the Learning of the Ægyptians*; which Nation, we know, was one of the moſt ancient Schooles of the world; for ſo *Plato* brings in the Ægyptian Prieſt ſaying unto *Solon*, *You Greeians are ever children, you have no knowledge of Antiquity nor Antiquity of Knowledge:* Let us take Act. 7. In Timæ.

a view of the *Ceremoniall Law of Moſes*, and we ſhall finde (beſides the prefiguration of Chriſt, the Badge or Difference of the people of God, from the profane Race of the world, the exerciſe and impreſſion of obedience, and other ſacred uſes and fruits of the ſame Law) that ſome of the moſt learned Rabbins, have travelled profitably and profoundly in the ſame, intentively to obſerve and extract, ſometimes
Levit. 13. *a Naturall, ſometimes a Morall ſence of the Ceremonies and Ordinances:* For example, where it is ſaid of the Leproſy, *If the whiteneſſe have over-ſpread the fleſh, the Patient may paſſe abroad for clean; but if there be any whole fleſh remaining, he is to be ſentenced unclean, and to be ſeparated at the diſcretion of the Prieſt.* From this Law one of them collects a Principle in Nature; *That Putrifaction is more contagious before maturity then after:* Another raiſeth a Morall inſtruction; *That men ore-ſpread with vice, doe not ſo much corrupt publique Manners, as thoſe that are halfe evill and but in part only.* So that from this and other like places in that Law, there is to be found, beſides Theologicall ſence, much aſperſion of Philoſophy.

§ So likewiſe that *excellent Book of Job*, if it be revolved with diligence, it will be found full and pregnant with the
Iob. 26. ſecrets of *Naturall Philoſophy*; as for example, of *Coſmography* and the roundneſſe of the Earth in that place, *Qui extendit Aquilonem ſuper vacuum, & appendit Terram ſuper nihilum*, where the Penſileneſſe of the Earth; the Pole of the North; and the Finiteneſſe or convexity of Heaven, are manifeſtly touched. Again, *of Aſtronomy and Conſtellations*, in thoſe
Ibid. words, *Spiritus ejus ornavit Cœlos, & obſtetricante manu eius*
Iob. 38. *eductus eſt coluber tortuoſus:* And in another place, *Canſt thou bind the ſweet influences of Pleiades, or looſe the bands of Orion?* where the ſetled and immoveable configuration of the firſt ſtarres, ever ſtanding at equall diſtance, is with great elegan-
Iob. 9. cy deſcribed. So in another Place, *Which maketh Arcturus, Orion and Pleiades and the ſecret chambers of the South.* Where he again points at the depreſſion of the Southern Pole, deſigning it by the name of *the ſecrets of the South*, becauſe the Southern ſtarres are not ſeen upon our Hemiſphear. Matter

of

of Generation of living Creatures, *Haſt thou not powred me out like milke, and condenſed me like Curds?* Matter of Minerals, *Surely there is a Mine for Silver, and a place wherein Gold is fined; Iron is digged up out of compacted duſt, and Braſſe extracted from ſtone diſſolved in the furnace*, and ſo forward in the ſame chapter. Iob. 10. Iob. 28.

§ So likewiſe in the perſon of *Solomon the King, we ſee the endowments of wiſdome, both in his Petition and Gods aſſent thereunto, preferred before all terrene and temporall felicity.* By virtue of which Donative and Grant, *Solomon* being ſingularly furniſht and enabled, not only writ thoſe *excellent Parables or Aphoriſmes* concerning Divine and Morall Philoſophy; but alſo compiled a *Naturall Hiſtory* of all verdure or vegetables *From the Cedar upon the Mountain, to the Moſſe upon the Wall*; which is but the rudiment of a plant, between putrifaction and an Herbe; and *alſo of all things that breath or move.* Nay the ſame *Solomon the King*, although he excell'd in treaſure and the magnificence of Building, of Shipping, and Navigation, of Service and Attendance, of Fame & Renown, and the like train of Glory; yet of this rich harveſt and confluence of Glory, he reaps and makes claim to himſelfe of nothing, but only the Honor of the Inquiſition, and Invention of Truth; for ſo he ſaith expreſly, *The Glory of God is to conceale a thing, but the Glory of a King is to find it out.* As if according to that innocent and affectionate play of Children, the Divine Majeſty took delight to hide his works, to the end to have them found out; and as if *Kings* could not obtain a greater Honour, then to be Gods playfellowes in that game, ſpecially conſidering the great command they have of wits and means, whereby the inveſtigation of all things may be perfected. 1 Reg. 4. Prov. 25.

§ Neither did the diſpenſation of God varie in the times after our Saviour came into the world; *For our Saviour himſelfe did firſt ſhew his power to ſubdue Ignorance, by his conference with the Doctors of the Law, and the Prieſts in the Temple*, before he ſhewed his power to ſubdue Nature, by his great and ſo many Miracles. *And the comming of the Holy Ghoſt* Luc. 2. Act. Apoſt. 2.

Ghoſt, was chiefly figur'd and expreſt in the ſimilitude and guiſt of Tongues, which are the *vehicula ſcientiæ*.

§ So in the election of *thoſe inſtruments which it pleaſed God to uſe in the Plantation of the Faith*, at the firſt he imployed perſons altogether Unlearned, otherwiſe than by inſpiration from the holy Spirit; whereby more evidently he might declare his immediat and divine working, and might abaſe all humane Wiſdome and Knowledge: Yet nevertheleſſe that counſill of his in this reſpect was no ſooner perform'd, but in the next viciſsitude and ſucceſsion of time he ſent his divine Truth into the world, waited on with other Learning, as with ſervants and hand-maids; therefore we
Act. Apoſt. 12. ſee *S. Pauls pen, (who was only learned amongſt the Apoſtles)* was chiefly imployed by God, in the Scriptures of the new Teſtament.

§ So again we know, *that many of the Ancient Biſhops and Doctors of the Church were excellently read and ſtudied in all the Learning of the Heathen*; in ſo much that the Edict of the
Epiſt. ad Iambl. *Emperour Iulian, whereby it was interdicted unto Chriſtians to be admitted into Schooles, or exerciſes of Learning*, was eſtimed and accounted a more pernitious Engine and Machination againſt the Chriſtian Faith, than were all the ſanguinary
P. Diac. l. 3. Parag. 33. proſequtions of his predeceſſors. Neither could the emulation and jealouſie of *Gregory the Firſt*, (otherwiſe an excellent man) *who deſigned to extinguiſh and obliterate Heathen Auctors and Antiquity*, ever obtain the opinion of Piety and Devotion amongſt holy men. But contrariwiſe it was the Chriſtian Church, which amidſt the inundations of the Scythians from the North-weſt; and the Saracens from the Eaſt, did preſerve in the ſacred Lap and Boſome thereof the *pretious reliques of Heathen Learning*, which otherwiſe had utterly periſht and bin extinguiſht. And of late in our age we may likewiſe ſee the *Ieſuites*, who partly in themſelves, and partly by emulation and provocation of Adverſaries, *have much quickned and ſtrengthned the ſtate of Learning*; we ſee, I ſay, what notable ſervices they have done, and what helps they have brought in, to the repairing and eſtabliſhing of the Roman Sea.

§ Where-

§ Wherefore to conclude this Part, there are two principall Duties & Services besides ornament and illustration, which human Learning doth performe to Faith and Religion: *The one, because they are effectuall incitements to the exaltation and celebration of the Glory of God:* for as the Psalmes, Psal. XIX. and other Scriptures, doe often invite us to the contemplation, and publication of the magnificent and wonderfull works of God; so if we should rest only in the outward forme, as they first offer themselves unto our senses; we should doe the like injury to the Majesty of God, as if we should judge of the store and wealth of some excellent Jeweller, by that only, which is set out towards the street in his shop. *The other, because they minister a singular help and preservative against unbeliefe*, and errors: *You erre, not knowing the Scriptures nor the Power of God.* Where he layes before us, two books or volumnes to study, if we will be secur'd from errors: First the *volumne of Scriptures*, which reveale the will of God; than the *volume of Creatures*, which expresse his power; whereof the latter is as a key to the former, not only opening our understanding to conceive the true sense of Scriptures, by the generall rules of Reason and Lawes of speech; but besides, chiefly opening our beliefe, in drawing us unto a due meditation of the omnipotency of God; the characters whereof are chiefly signed and engraven upon his works. Thus much for *Divine Testimonies and Evidences*, concerning the true Dignity and value of Learning. Mat. 22.

CAP.

CAP. VII.

The Dignity of Learning from humane Arguments *and* Teſtimonies. I. Naturall *Inventours of New Arts for the Commodities of Mans life, conſecrated as Gods.* II. Politicall, *Civill Eſtates and aſfaires advanced by Learning.* § *The beſt and happieſt times under Learned Princes and others.* § *Exemplified in the immediat ſucceeding Emperors, from the death of* Domitian. III. Military, *The concurrence of Armes and Learning.* § *Exemplified in* Alexander *the* Great. § Iulius Cæſar *the Dictator.* § Xenophon *the Philoſopher.*

AS for *Humane Teſtimonies and Arguments*, it is ſo large a field, as in a diſcourſe of this compendious nature and brevity, it is fit rather to uſe choice, than to imbrace the variety of them.

I. Firſt therefore in the degrees of Honor amongſt the Heathens, it was the higheſt, to attain to a Veneration and Adoration as a God; this indeed to the Chriſtians is as the forbidden fruit; but we ſpeak now ſeparately of Humane Teſtimony. Therefore, (as we were ſaying) with the Heathens, that which the Grecians call *Apotheoſis*; and the Latines *Relatio inter Divos*; was the ſupreme Honour which man could attribute unto Man: ſpecially, when it was given, not by a formall Decree or Act of Eſtate, (as it was uſed amongſt the Roman Emperors,) but freely by the aſſent of Men and inward beliefe. Of which high Honour there was a certain degree and midle terme: For there were reckoned above *Humane Honours*, *Honours Heroicall*; and *Divine*; in the Diſtribution whereof, Antiquity obſerved this order. Founders of States; Lawgivers; Extirpers of Tyrants; Fathers of their Country, and other eminent Perſons in Civile Merit, were honour'd with the title of *Worthies* only, or *Demi-Gods*; ſuch as were *Theſeus*, *Minos*, *Romulus*, and the like. on the other ſide ſuch as were *Inventors and Authors of new Arts; and ſuch as endowed mans life with new Commodities, and acceſſions were ever conſecrated among the Greater and Entire*

Herodia. l. 4 Dio. Reliqui.

tire Gods; which hapned to *Ceres*, *Bacchus*, *Mercury*, *Apollo*, and others, which indeed was done juſtly and upon ſound judgement: For the *merits of the former*, are commonly confined within the circle of an Age, or a Nation, and are not unlike ſeaſonable and favoring ſhowers, which though they be profitable and deſirable, yet ſerve but for that ſeaſon only wherein they fall, and for a Latitude of ground which they water. *But the benefices of the latter*, like the influences of the Sunne, and the heavenly bodies, are for time, permanent, for place, univerſall: thoſe again are commonly mixt with ſtrife and perturbation; but theſe have the true character of Divine preſence, and come in *Aura leni* without noiſe or agitation.

II. Neither certainly is the *Merit of Learning in Civile affaires, and in repreſſing the inconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the other which relieve mans neceſſities, which ariſe from Nature.* And this kind of merit was lively ſet forth in that fained relation of *Orpheus Theatre*, where all beaſts and birds aſſembled, which forgetting their proper naturall appetites of Prey, of Game, of Quarrell, ſtood all ſociably and lovingly together, liſtning unto the Aires and accords of the harpe; the ſound whereof no ſooner ceaſed, or was drown'd by ſome lowder noiſe, but every beaſt returned to his own nature. In which Fable is elegantly deſcribed, the nature and condition of men, who are toſſed and diſordered with ſundry ſavage and unreclaim'd deſires, of Profit, of Luſt, of Revenge; which yet as long as they give eare to precepts, to the perſwaſion of Religion, Lawes, and Magiſtrates, eloquently and ſweetly coucht in Bookes, to Sermons and Haranges, ſo long is ſociety and peace maintaind, but if theſe inſtruments be ſilent, or that ſeditions and tumults make them not audible, all things diſſolve and fall back into Anarchy and Confuſion. Philoſt. in Orph.

§ But this appeareth more manifeſtly, *when Kings or Perſons of Authority under them, or other Governors in States, are endowed with Learning*: For although he might be thought partiall to his own profeſsion that ſaid *Than ſhould People or States* Plato de Rep. 5.

States be happy when either Kings were Philoſophers or Philoſophers Kings; yet ſo much is verified by experience, *that under wiſe and Learned Princes and Governors of State, there hath bin ever the beſt and happieſt times.* For howſoever Kings may have their errors and imperfections; that is, be liable to Paſsions and depraved cuſtomes, like other mẽ, yet if they be illuminated by Learning, they have certain anticipate notions of Religion, Policy, and Morality, which preſerve and refrain them from all ruinous and peremptory errors and exceſſes, whiſpering evermore in their eares, when Councellors, and Servants ſtand mute and ſilent. So likewiſe *Senators and Councellors which be Learned, doe proceed upon more ſafe and ſubſtantiall principles, than Councellors which are only men of experience:* Thoſe ſeeing dangers a farre off, and repulſing them betimes; whereas theſe are wiſe only neere at hand, ſeeing nothing, but what is imminent and ready to fall upon them, and than truſt to the agility of their wit, in the point of dangers, to ward and avoid them.

§ Which felicity of times under *Learned Princes* (to keep ſtill the law of brevity by uſing the moſt ſelected and eminent examples) doth beſt appear, in the Age which paſſed from the death of *Domitianus* the Emperor, untill the raigne of *Commodus, comprehending a ſucceſsion of ſixe Princes, all Learned, or ſingular favourers and advancers of Learning, and of all ages (if we regard temporall happineſſe) the moſt floriſhing that ever Rome ſaw, which was then the Modell and Epitome of the world:* A matter revealed and prefigur'd unto *Domitian* in a dream, the night before he was ſlaine, *for he ſeem'd to ſee grown behind upon his ſhoulders a neck and a head of gold*; which Divination came indeed accordingly to paſſe, in thoſe golden times which ſucceeded; of which we will make ſome particular, but brief commemoration. *Nerva* was a Learned Prince, an inward acquaintance, and even a Diſciple to *Apollonius* the Pythagorean; who alſo almoſt expired in a verſe of Homers,

Suet. in Dom parag 23.

Nerva tuis
Dion. l. 68. *Telis Phœbe tuis, lachrimas ulciſcere noſtras.*

Plin. Pan. *Trajan* was for his Perſon not Learned, but an admirer of Learn-

Learning, and a munificent benefactor to the Learned, a Founder of Libraries, and in whose Court (though a warlike Prince) as is recorded, Professors and Preceptors were of most credit and estimation. *Adrian* was the most curious man that lived, and the insatiable inquirer of all variety and secrets. *Antoninus* had the patient and subtile wit of a Schoole-man, in so much as he was called *Cymini-Sector, a Carver, or a divider of Cummin-seed:* And of the *Divi fratres*, *Lucius Commodus* was delighted with a softer kind of Learning; and *Marcus* was surnam'd the *Philosopher*. *These Princes as they excel'd the rest in Learning, so they excel'd them likewise in virtue and goodnesse.* *Nerva* was a most mild Emperour, and *who* (if he had done nothing else) *gave Trajan to the World.* *Trajan*, of all that raigned, for the Arts, both of Peace and Warre, was most famous and renowned: the same Prince enlarged the bounds of the Empire; the same, temperately confin'd the Limits and Power thereof; he was also a great Builder in so much as *Constantine* the Great, in emulation was wont to call him, *Parietaria, Wall-Flower*, because his name was carved upon so many walls. *Adrian* was Times rivall for the victory of perpetuity, for by his care and munificence in every kind, he repaired the decaies and ruines of Time. ANTONINUS, as by name, so nature, a man exceeding *Pious*; for his nature and inbred goodnesse, was beloved and most acceptable to men of all sorts and degrees; whose raigne, though it was long, yet was it peacefull and happy. *Lucius Commodus* (exceeded indeed by his brother) excel'd many of the Emperours for goodnesse. *Marcus* formed by nature to be the pattern and Platforme of virtue, against whom that *Iester* in the banquet of the Gods had nothing to object, or carpe at, *save his patience towards the humors of his wife.* So in this continued sequence of *fixe Princes, a man may see the happy fruits of Learning in Soveraignty*, Painted forth in the greatest Table of the world.

Dion. in Adriano.

Dion. in Anton. P.

Plin. Pan. Aur. vict. c. 13.

Xyphil. ex Dion. Trajan.

Capitol. In Ant. P.

In Vero.

In M. Ant.

Iuliani Cæsares.

III. Neither hath *Learning an influence or operation upon Civill merit and the Arts of Peace only*, but likewise it hath no lesse Power and Efficacy in *Martiall and Military*

virtue, as may notably be repreſented in the examples of *Alexander* the Great; and *Iulius Cæſar* the *Dictator*, mention'd, by the way before, but now in fit place to be reſumed; of whoſe *Military virtues and Acts in warre*, there needs no note or recitall, having bin the wonders of the world in that kind; but, of *their affection and propenſion towards Learning, and peculiar perfection therein*, it will not be impertinent to ſay ſome thing.

§ *Alexander* was bred and taught under *Ariſtotle*, (certainly a great Philoſopher) who dedicated diverſe of his Books of *Philoſophy* unto him: he was attended with *Caliſthenes*, and diverſe other Learned perſons that followed him in Campe, and were his perpetuall aſſociates, in all his Travailes and Conqueſts. *What Price and Eſtimation he had Learning in*, doth notably appear in many particulars; as in the envy he expreſſed towards *Achille's* great fortune, in this, *That he had ſo good a Trumpet of his Actions & proveſſe as Homers verſes.* In the judgement he gave touching the *precious Cabinet of Darius*, which was found amongſt the reſt of the ſpoiles; whereof, when queſtion was mov'd, what thing was worthy to be put into it, and one ſaid one thing, another, another, *he gave ſentence for Homers works.* His reprehenſorie letter to *Ariſtotle*, after he had ſet forth his *Book of Nature*, wherein he expoſtulates with him, for publiſhing the ſecrets or myſteries of Philoſophy, and gave him to underſtand, *That himſelfe eſtimed it more to excell others in Learning and Knowledge, than in Power and Empire.* There are many other particulars to this purpoſe. *But how excellently his mind was endowed with Learning*, doth appear, or rather ſhine in all his *Speeches* and *anſwers*, full of knowledg & wiſdome; whereof though the Remaines be ſmall, yet you ſhal find deeply impreſſed in them, the foot-ſteps of all ſciences in Moral knowledge; Let *the ſpeech of Alexander* be obſerved *touching Diogenes*, & ſee (if yee pleaſe) if it tend not to the true eſtate of one of the greateſt queſtions in morall Philoſophy? *Whether the enjoying of outward things, or the contemning of them, be the greater happineſſe.* For when he ſaw *Diogenes contented*

Plut. in Alexand.

Plut. ut ſupra.

Vt ſupra.

with,

with ſo litle, turning to thoſe that ſtood about him, that mock't at the Cyniques condition, he ſaid, *If I were not Alexander, I could wiſh to be Diogenes.* But *Seneca*, in this compariſon, preferres *Diogenes*, when he ſaith, *Plus erat quod Diogenes nollet accipere, quam quod Alexander poſſet dare, There were more things which Diogenes would have refuſed, than thoſe were which Alexander could have given.* In *Naturall knowledge*, obſerve that ſpeech that was uſuall with him, *That he felt his mortality chiefly in two things, ſleep, and Luſt:* which ſpeech, in truth, is extracted out of the depth of *Naturall Philoſophy*, taſting rather of the conception of an *Ariſtotle*, or a *Democritus*, than an *Alexander*; ſeeing as well the indigence, as redundance of nature, deſign'd by theſe two Acts, are, as it were, the inward witneſſes and the earneſt of Death. In *Poeſy*, let that ſpeech be obſerved, when upon the bleeding of his woundes, he called unto him one of his Flatterers, that was wont to aſcribe unto him divine honor; *look* (ſaith he) *this is the blood of a man, not ſuch liquor as Homer ſpeaks of, which ranne from Venus hand, when it was pierced by Diomedes:* with this ſpeech checking both the *Poets*, and his flatterers, and himſelfe. In *Logique* obſerve that reprehenſion of *Dialectique Fallacies*, in repelling and retorting Arguments, in that ſaying of his wherein he takes up *Caſſander*, confuteing the informers againſt his father *Antipater*. For when Alexander hapned to ſay, *Doe you think theſe men would come ſo farre to complain, except they had juſt cauſe?* Caſſander anſwered, *Yea, that was it that made them thus bold, becauſe they hoped the length of the way would dead the diſcovery of the aſperſion; See* (ſaith the King) *the ſubtlety of Ariſtotle wreſting the matter both waies, Pro and Contra.* Yet the ſame Art which he reprehended in another, he knew well how to uſe himſelfe, when occaſion required, to ſerve his own turne. For ſo it fell out that *Caliſthenes*, (to whom he bare a ſecret grudge, becauſe he was againſt the new ceremony of his adoration) being mov'd, at a banquet, by ſome of thoſe that ſate at table with him, that for entertainment ſake (being he was an eloquent man) he would take upon him ſome

Vt ſupra.

De Ben. 5.

Plut. in Alexand.

Vt ſupra ex Hom. Il.

Plut. in Alexand.

Theme, at his own choice, to diſcourſe upon, which *Caliſthenes* did, and chuſeing the Praiſes of the Macedonian Nation, performed the ſame with the great applauſe of all that heard him: whereupon *Alexander*, nothing pleaſed, ſaid, *That upon a good ſubject it was eaſy for any man to be eloquent*, but turne, ſaid he, your ſtile, and let us hear what you can ſay againſt us. *Caliſthenes* undertook the charge, and performed it, with that ſting & life, that *Alexander* was faine to interrupt him, ſaying; *An ill mind alſo as well as a good cauſe might infuſe eloquence.* *For Rhetorique*, whereto Tropes and Ornaments appertaine; ſee an elegant uſe of Metaphor, wherewith he taxed *Antipater*, who was an Jmperious and Tyrannous Governor. For when one of *Antipaters* friends commended him to *Alexander* for his moderation, and that he did not degenerate, as other Lief-tenants did, into the Perſian Pride, in uſeing Purple, but kept the ancient Macedon habit, *But Antipater* (ſaith *Alexander*) *is all Purple within.* So likewiſe that other Metaphor is excellent; when *Parmenio* came unto him in the plain of *Arbella*; and ſhewed him the innumerable multitude of enimies which viewed in the night, repreſented, by the infinite number of lights, a new Firmament of ſtarres; and thereupon adviſed him to aſſaile them by night, *I will not, ſaid Alexander, ſteale a victory.* *For matter of Policy*, weigh that grave and wiſe diſtinction, which all ages have imbraced, whereby he differenced his two chief friends, *Epheſtion* and *Craterus*, when he ſaid, *That the one loved Alexander, and the other loved the King*, Deſcribeing a Difference of great import, amongſt even the moſt faithfull ſervants of Kings, *that ſome in ſincere affection love their Perſons, others in duty love their Crowne.* Obſerve how excellently he could taxe an error, ordinary with Counſillors of Princes, who many times give counſill, according to the modell of their own mind and fortune, and not of their Maſters. For when *Darius* had made great offers to *Alexander*: *I, ſaid Parmenio, would accept theſe conditions, if I were as Alexander*: ſaid *Alexander, ſurely ſo would I, were I as Parmenio.* Laſtly, weigh that quick and acute reply

Plutarch. ut ſupra.

Plutarch. Dict. Not.

Plut. in Alexan.

Vt ſupra.

Plut. in Alex.

ply, which he made to his friends asking him, *what he would reſerve for himſelfe giving away ſo many and great guifts? Hope*, ſaid he; as one who well knew that when all accounts are caſt up aright, *Hope* is the true portion and inheritance of all that reſolve upon great enterprizes. This was *Iulius Cæſar's* portion when he went into *Gaull*, all his eſtate being exhauſted by profuſe Largeſſes. This was likewiſe the portion of that noble Prince, howſoever tranſported with Ambition, *Henry Duke of Guyſe*, of whom it was uſually ſaid, *That he was the greateſt uſurer in all France, becauſe that all his wealth was in names, and that he had turned his whole eſtate into obligations.* But the admiration of *this Prince* whil'ſt I repreſent him to my ſelfe, not as *Alexander the Great*, but as *Ariſtotles Scholler*, hath perchance carried me too farre.

Vt ſupra.

S. FRAN. BACON, Apol.

§ As for *Iulius Cæſar the excellency of his Learning*, needs not to be argued, either from his education, or his company, or his anſwers; For this, in a high degree, doth declare it ſelfe in his own writings, and works, whereof ſome are extant, ſome unfortunately periſh't. For firſt, there is left unto us *that excellent Hiſtory of his own warres, which he entitled only a* COMMENTARY; wherein all ſucceeding times have admired the ſolid waight of matter; and lively images of Actions and Perſons, expreſt in the greateſt propriety of words, and perſpicuity of Narration, that ever was. Which endowments, that they were not infuſed by nature, but acquired by *Precepts and inſtructions of Learning*, is well witneſſed by that work of his entitled DE ANALOGIA; which was nothing elſe but a *Grammaticall Philoſophy*, wherein he did labour, to make this, *vox ad Placitum*, to become *vox ad Licitum*, and to reduce cuſtome of ſpeech, to congruity of ſpeech; that words, which are the images of things, might accord with the things themſelves; and not ſtand to the Arbitrement of the vulgar. So likewiſe we have by his edict, *a reformed computation of the year*, correſpondent to the courſe of the Sunne; which evidently ſhewes, that he accounted it his equall glory, to finde out the lawes, of the ſtarres in heaven; as to give lawes to men on earth. So in that Book of his

Cic. de clar. Orat. Cic. de Orat. l. 3. Suet. in Iul.

Suet. in parag. 56.

Parag. 56.

Suet. in parag. 40.

his entitled ANTI-CATO; it doth easily appear, that he did aspire, as well to victory of wit, as victory of warre; undertaking therein a Conflict against the greatest Champion with the Penne, that then lived, *Cicero the Oratour*. Againe in his Book of APOPHTHEGMES, which he collected, we see he estimed it more honour, to make himselfe but a paire of Tables, or Codicills, wherein to register the wise and grave sayings of others; then if his own words were hallowed as Oracles, as many vain Princes by custome of Flattery, delight to doe. But if I should report diverse of his *Speeches*, as I did in *Alexander*, they are truly such, as Salomon notes, *Verba Sapientum sunt tanquam aculei, & tanquam clavi in altum defixi*: wherefore I will here only propound three, not so admirable for elegancy, as for vigor and efficacy: As first, it is reason he be thought *a maister of words*, that could with one word appease a mutiny in his army: the occasion was this; The *Romans*, when their Generalls did speak in their Army, did use the word, *Milites*, when the Magistrates spake to the people, they did use the word, *Quirites*: *Cæsars* souldiers were in a tumult, and seditiously prayed to be cassed, not that they so ment, but by expostulation thereof, to draw *Cæsar* to other conditions; *He*, nothing daunted and resolute, after some silence began thus, *Ego, Quirites*, which word did admit them already cassee-red; wherewith the souldiers were so surprized, and so amazed; as they would not suffer him to goe on in his speech; and relinquishing their demands of *Dismission*, made it now their earnest suit, that the name of *Milites*, might be again restored them. *The second speech* was thus; *Cæsar* did extreamly affect the name of *King*; therefore some were set on, as he passed by, in popular acclamation to salute him *King*: he finding the crie weak and poore, put off the matter with a jest, as if they had mist his sur-name, *Non Rex sum*, (saith he) *sed Cæsar*; indeed such a speech as if it be exactly searcht, the life and fulnesse of it can scarce be exprest. For first it pretended a refusall of the name, but yet not serious: again, it did carry with it an infinite confidence, and magnanimity;

Plut. in Cæsar.

Eccles. 12.

Suet. in Iul. parag. 70.

Suet. parag. 79.

nimity; as if the Appellation *Cæſar*. had bin a more eminent Title, than the name of King; which hath come to paſſe, and remaineth ſo till this day. But, that which moſt made for him, this ſpeech by an excellent contrivance, advanced his own purpoſe; for it did cloſely inſinuate, that the Senate and People of Rome, did ſtrive with him about a vaine ſhadow, a name only, (for he had the power of a King already) and for ſuch a name, whereof mean families were inveſted; for the Sur-name *Rex*, was the title of many families; as we alſo have the like in our Dialect. The laſt ſpeech, which I will mention in this place, was this; When *Cæſar*, after the warre was declared, did poſſeſſe himſelfe of the City of Rome, and had broke open the inner *Treaſury*, to take the mony there ſtored up, for the ſervice of the warre, *Metellus*, for that time Tribune, withſtood him; to whom *Cæſar*, *If thou doſt perſiſt*, (ſaith he) *thou art dead*; preſently taking himſelfe up, he added, *Young man, it is harder for me to ſpeak this, than to doe it; Adoleſcens, durius eſt mihi hoc dicere quam facere*; A ſpeech compounded of the greateſt terror, and the greateſt clemency, that could proceed out of the mouth of man. But, to purſue *Cæſars* Abilities in this kind no farther, it is evident, that he knew well *his own perfection in Learning*, as appears, when ſome ſpake, what a ſtrange reſolution it was in *Lucius Scylla* to reſigne his *Dictatiure*; he ſcoffing at him, anſwered, *That Scylla could not skill of Letters, and therefore knew not how to Dictate*. Plut. in Cæſar. Suet. in Iul. §. 77.

§ Now it were time to leave this point touching *the ſtrict concurrence of Military virtue and Learning*, (for what example in this kind, can come with any grace, after *Alexander* and *Cæſar*?) were it not that I am tranſported with the height and rareneſſe of one other particular inſtance, as that which did ſo ſuddenly paſſe from ſcorne to wonder; and it is of *Xenophon the Philoſopher*, who went from *Socrates* ſchoole into *Aſia* with *Cyrus* the younger, in his expedition againſt King *Artaxerxes*. This *Xenophon*, at that time was very young, and never had ſeen the warres before; neither had than, any command in the Army, but only followed Xen. Hiſt. de Exp. Cyri.

the warre as a voluntary, for the love and converſation of *Proxenus* his friend. He was by chance preſent when *Falinus* came in meſſage from the great King, to the Grecians, after that *Cyrus* was ſlain in the field, and the Grecians, a handfull of men, having loſt their Generall, left to themſelves in the midſt of the Provinces of Perſia, cut off from their Country by the interception of many miles, and of very great and deep rivers. The Meſſage did import that they ſhould deliver up their Armes, and ſubmit themſelves to the Kings mercy: to which meſſage before publique anſwer was made, diverſe of the Army, conferr'd familiarly with *Falinus*, amongſt whom *Xenophon* hapned to ſay thus, *why*, (ſaid he) *Falinus we have now but theſe two things left, our Armes and our Virtue, if we yeeld up our Armes, how ſhall we make uſe of our virtue?* whereto *Falinus* ſmiling ſaid, *If I be not deceived Young Gentleman you are an Athenian, and ſtudy Philoſophy, and it is pretty that you ſay, but you are much abuſed, if you think your Virtue can withſtand the Kings Power*; here was the ſcorne, the wonder followeth. This *young Scholler or Philoſopher*, after all the Captaines and Commanders were murthered by treaſon, conducted ten thouſand Foot, through the heart of all the Kings high Countreys, from Babilon to Grecia, in deſpite of all the Kings forces; to the aſtoniſhment of the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians in time ſucceeding, to make invaſion upon the *Perſian Monarchy* and to ſubvert it. Which indeed ſoone after, *Jaſon* the *Theſſalian* conceiv'd and deſign'd; *Ageſilaus* the ſpartane attempted and commenced; *Alexander* the Macedonian at laſt atchieved, all being ſtirred up, by this *brave leading Act of that young Scholler*.

Hiſt. de Cy. Ex. l. 2.

CAP.

CAP. VIII.

The Merit of Learning from the influence it hath upon Morall Virtues. § *Learning a ſoveraigne remedy for all the diſeaſes of the Mind.* § *The Dominion thereof greater than any Temporall Power, being a Power over Reaſon and Beliefe.* § *Learning gives Fortunes, Honours, Delights excelling all others, as the ſoule the ſenſe.* § *Durable Monuments of Fame.* § *A Proſpect of the immortality of a future world.*

TO proceed now, *from Imperiall and Military virtue, to Morall, and that which is the Virtue of Private men*, Firſt that of the Poet is a moſt certain truth;

Scilicet ingenuas didiciſſe fideliter Artes
Emollit mores nec ſinit eſſe feros. Ovid. de Pont.

For *Learning doth reclaime mens minds from Wildeneſſe and Barbariſme*; but inded, the accent had need be put upon *Fideliter*; for a ſuperficiall confuſed knowledge doth rather work a contrary effect. I ſay, *Learning takes away levity, temerity, and inſolency*, whileſt it ſuggeſts all dangers and doubts, together with the thing it ſelfe; ballanceth the weight of reaſons and arguments on both ſides; turnes back the firſt offers and *placits* of the mind as ſuſpect, and teacheth it to take a tried and examin'd way: The *ſame doth extirpate vain and exceſsive admiration*, which is the root of all weak adviſement. For we *admire* things, either becauſe they are *New*, or becauſe they are *Great*: As for *novelty*, no man that wades in Learning and the contemplation of things throughly, but hath this printed in his heart, *Nil novi ſub ſole*: neither can any man much marvaile at the *play of Puppets*, that thruſts but his head behind the curtain, and adviſeth well of the organs and wires that cauſeth the motion. As for *Magnitude*, as *Alexander the Great*, after he was uſed to great Battles, and conqueſts in *Aſia*; when at any time he receaved Letters out of *Greece*, of ſome fights and ſervices there, which were undertaken commonly for ſome Bridge, or a Fort, or at moſt for the beſiege of ſome City, Eccleſ. 1.

was wont to ſay, *It ſeemed to him that he was adverti ſed of the Battles of Homers Froggs and Miſe:* So certainly, if a man meditate upon the world and the Fabrick thereof; to him the Globe of the Earth, with men marching upon it, (the Divineneſſe of ſoules excepted) will not ſeem much other, than *a Hillock of Ants whereof ſome creep, and run up and down with their Corne, others with their Egges, others empty; all about a litle heap of Duſt.*

Sen. Nat. Q lib. 1. pref.

§ Againe, *Learning takes away, or, at leaſt, mitigates the fear of death, and adverſe Fortune; which is one of the greateſt impediments to Virtue or Manners.* For if a mans mind be ſeaſoned and *imbued* with the contemplation of Mortality, and the corruptible nature of things, he will, in his apprehenſion, concurre with *Epictetus*, who going forth one day ſaw a woman weeping for her Pitcher of Earth; and going forth the next day ſaw another woman weeping for her ſonne, ſaid, *Heri vidi fragilem frangi, hodie vidi mortalem mori:* Ther efore *Virgil* did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge of the cauſe and the conqueſt of Feares together, as concomitants:

Enchir. c. 33. Arr. l. 3. c. 24.

Geor. 2.

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoſcere cauſas,
Quiq; metus omnes & inexorabile fatum,
Subjecit pedibus, ſtrepitumq; Acherontis avari.

It were too long to goe over the particular Remedies, *which Learning doth miniſter to all the diſeaſes of the Mind;* ſometimes purging the ill Humors, ſometimes opening the obſtructions, ſometimes helping digeſtion, ſometimes exciting appetite, often healing the wounds and exulcerations thereof, and the like. Therefore I will conclude with that, which ſeemes to be the ſumme of all, which is, *that Learning ſo diſpoſeth and inclineth the minde, as that it is never wholly ſetled and fixt in the defects thereof, but ever awakes it ſelfe and breaths after a Growth and Perfection:* For the unlearn'd man knowes not what it is to *deſcend into himſelfe, or to call himſelfe to account, or what a ſweet life it is ſenſibly to feele that he is every day better.* If he chance to have any good parts, he will ſtill be boaſting theſe; and every where expoſe them to the full

Plat. Alcib. Porph. in Stob. Sen. Epiſt. Plut. Mor.

full view; and it may be uſe them dexterouſly to his own advantage and reputation; but not much improve or encreaſe them. Againe, what faults ſoever he hath, he wil uſe art and induſtry to hide and colour them, but not to amend them; like an ill Mower that mowes on ſtill and never whets his ſythe. Contrariwiſe, *a learned man doth not only imploy his mind and exerciſe his good parts, but continually reformes himſelfe, and makes Progreſſion in virtue.* Nay to ſay all in a word. Certaine it is, that *Veritas & Bonitas differ but as the ſeale and the Print; for goodneſſe is Truth's impreſſion*; and on the contrary the ſtormes and tempeſts of Vice and Paſſions breake from the Clouds of *error* and *falſhood*.

11 *From Morality, let us paſſe on to matter of power and commandment*, and conſider *whether there be any ſoveraignty or empirie comparable to that wherewith Learning inveſts and crownes mans nature?* We ſee the Dignity of commanding, is according to the dignity of the commanded. Commandement over Beaſts and Cattle, ſuch as Heardmen and Shepheards have, is a thing contemptible; Commandment over children, ſuch as School-maſters and Tutors have, is a matter of ſmall honour; commandment over ſlaves, is a diſparagement, rather then an honour; neither is the commandment of Tyrants much better, over a ſervile People, diſmantled of their Spirits and generoſity of mind; therefore it was ever helde that honours in free Monarchies and Commonwealths had a ſweetneſſe more than in Tyrannies; becauſe a command over the willing is more honourable than over the forced and compelled. Wherefore *Virgil*, when hee would out of the higheſt ſtraine of his Art expreſſe the beſt of Humane honours, that he could attribute to *Cæſar*, he doth it in theſe words,

——victorq; volentes
——Per Populos dat jura, viamq; affectat Olympo. Georg. 4.

But the Commandment of knowledge is farre higher than the Commandment over the will, though free, and not enſlaved and vaſſal'd: For it is a Dominion over Reaſon, Beliefe, and the Vnderſtanding, which is the higheſt part of man, and gives Law to the will it ſelfe: For without Queſtion there is no power on

earth, which advanceth and ſets up a Throne, and, as it were, *a Chaire of eſtate*, in the ſoules of men and their Cogitations, Aſſents, and Beliefe, *but Knowledge and Learning*: And therefore we ſee, the deteſtable and extreme pleaſure that *Arch-Heretiques, falſe Prophets*, and *Impoſtors* are raviſh't, and tranſported withall, when once they find that they begin to have a Dominion, and Superiority over the faith and conſciences of men; indeed ſo great, as hee that hath once taſted it, it is ſeldome ſeen that any perſecution or torture can make them relinquiſh this Soveraignty: But as this is that which the Divine Auctor of the Revelation calls, *The depth or profoundneſſe of Satan*; ſo on the contrary, the juſt and lawfull Soveraignty over mens minds, eſtabliſh't by the cleer evidence, and ſweet commendation of Truth, approacheth certainly neereſt to the ſimilitude of the Divine Rule.

Apoc. 2.

§ *As for Fortunes and Honours, the munificence of Learning doth not ſo enrich and adorne whole Kingdomes and Commonwealths, as it doth not likewiſe amplifie and advance the Fortunes and Eſtates of particular perſons:* For it is an ancient obſervation, that *Homer hath given more men their living, than either Sylla or Cæſar, or Auguſtus ever did*, notwithſtanding their great Largeſſes, ſuch infinite donatives, and diſtributions of ſo much land. No doubt, it is hard to ſay, whether Armes or Learning have advanced greater numbers: But if wee ſpeake of Soveraignty, we ſee, *that if Armes have carried away the Kingdome, yet Learning hath borne away the Prieſthood*, which ever hath bin in ſome competition with Empire.

§ Againe, *If you contemplate the Pleaſure and Delight of Knowledge and Learning, aſſuredly it farre ſurpaſſes all other pleaſure*: For what? Shall, perchance, the pleaſures of the Affections ſo farre excell the pleaſures of the ſences, as a happy obtaining of a deſire, doth a ſong or a dinner; and muſt not by the ſame degrees of conſequence, the pleaſure of the Intellect tranſcend thoſe of the Affections? In all other pleaſures there is a finite ſatiety, and after they grow a litle ſtale, their flower and verdure vades and departs; whereby we are inſtructed, that they were not indeed pure and ſincere

pleaſures

pleaſures, but ſhadowes and deceits of *Pleaſures*; and that it was the Novelty which pleas'd, and not the Quality: therefore voluptuous men often turne Friers, and the declining age of ambitious Princes is commonly more ſad and beſieged with Melancholy; *But of Knowledge there is no ſatiety*; but viciſſitude, perpetually and interchangeably, returning of fruition and appetite; ſo that the good of this delight muſt needs be ſimple, without Accident or Fallacy. Neither is that *Pleaſure* of ſmall efficacy and contentment in the mind of man, which the Poet *Lucretius* deſcribeth elegantly, *Suave, mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis, &c.* De Rer. Nat. lib. 2. *It is a view of delight* (ſaith he) *to ſtand or walke upon the ſhore, and to ſee a ſhip toſt with tempeſt upon the ſea: a pleaſure, to ſtand in the window of a Caſtle, and to ſee two Battailes joyne upon a plaine: but it is a pleaſure incomparable, for the mind of man, by Learning to be ſetled and fortified in the Tower of Truth, and from thence to behold the errors and wandrings of other men below.*

§ Laſtly leaving the vulgar arguments, *that by Learning man excels man: in that wherein man excels beaſts*; that by the help of Learning, man aſcends in his underſtanding, even to the heavens, whether in body he can not come, and the like; let us conclude this diſcourſe concerning the *dignity of knowledge and Learning*, with that good, whereunto mans nature doth moſt aſpire, *Immortality and continuance*. For to this tendeth generation, raiſing of houſes and Families, Buildings, Foundations, Monuments, Fame, and in effect the ſumme and height of humane deſires. *But we ſee how farre the monuments of wit and Learning, are more durable than the Monumeuts of materiate Memorialls and Manu-factures.* Have not the *verſes of Homer* continued XXV Centuries of years and above, without the loſſe of a ſyllable, or letter? during which time, infinite number of Places, Temples, Caſtles, Citties, have bin decayed or bin demoliſh't. The *Pictures* and *Statues* of *Cyrus*, *Alexander*, *Cæſar*, no nor of the Kings and Princes of much later years, by no means poſſible are now recoverable; for the Originals worne away with age, are periſh't, and the Copies daily looſe of the life

and

and Primitive reſemblance; *But the images of mens wits, remain unmaimed in books for ever, exempt from the injuries of time, becauſe capable of perpetuall renovation.* Neither can they properly be called Images, becauſe, in their way, they generate ſtill and caſt their ſeeds in the mindes of men; raiſeing and procreating infinite Actions and Opinions in ſucceeding ages. So that if the invention of a ſhip, was thought ſo noble and wonderfull, which tranſports Riches and Merchandice from Place to Place; and conſociats the moſt remote regions in participation of their fruits and commodities; *how much more are letters to be magnified, which as ſhips, paſſing through the vaſt ſea of time, counite the remoteſt ages of Wits and Inventions in mutuall Traſique and Correſpondency?*

§ Furthermore, we ſee ſome of the Philoſophers which were moſt immerſed in the ſenſes and leaſt divine, and which peremptorily denied the immortality of the ſoule, yet convicted by the power of truth came to this point, *That whatſoever Motions and Acts the ſpirit of man could performe without the Organ of the body, it was probable that thoſe remained after death;* ſuch as were the motions of the underſtanding, but not of the affections; *ſo immortall and incorruptible a thing did knowledge ſeem to them to be.* But we, illuminated with divine Revelation, diſclaiming theſe rudiments and deluſions of the ſenſes, know that not only the mind, but the affections purified; not only the ſoule, but the body ſhall be advanced in its time to immortality. But it muſt be remembred, both now and at other times, as the nature of the point may require, that in the proofes, of the dignity of Knowledge and Learning, I did at the beginning ſeperate Divine Teſtimonies, from Humane; which method I have conſtantly purſued and ſo handled them both apart. Although all this be true, nevertheleſſe I doe not take upon me, neither can I hope to obtaine by any Perorations, or pleadings of this caſe touching Learning, to reverſe the judgement either of *Æſops Cock, that preferred the Barly-corne before the Gemme*; or of *Midas, that being choſen Judge between Apollo, Preſident of the Muſes, and Pan Preſident of Sheep,* judg'd

Ovid. Met. XI.

judg'd for plenty; or of *Paris, that judg'd for Pleaſure* and love, againſt wiſdome and power; or of *Agrippina's* choice, *Occidat matrem modo imperet!* preferring empire with any condition never ſo deteſtable; or of *Ulyſſes, qui vetulam præ-tulit immortalitati;* being indeed figures of thoſe that preferre cuſtome before all excellency; and a number of the like popular judgements: for theſe things muſt continue as they have bin, but ſo will that alſo continue, whereupon Learning hath ever relied as on a firme foundation which can never be ſhaken: *Juſtificata eſt ſapientia à Filiis ſuis.*

Eurip. in Troad.

Tac. An. XIV.

Mat. XI.

UMI

THE SECOND BOOK OF FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM VICOUNT St ALBAN.

OF THE DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

THE PROEM.

The Advancement of Learning commended unto the care of Kings. I. The Acts thereof in generall, three, *Reward, Direction, Aſſiſtance.* II. In ſpeciall, about three objects, *Places, Bookes, Perſons.* § In places four Circumſtances; *Buildings, Revenewes, Priviledges, Lawes of Diſcipline.* § In Books two, *Libraries, good Editions.* § In Perſons two, *Readers of Sciences Extant; Inquirers into Parts non-extant.* III. Defects in theſe Acts of Advancement, ſix; *Want of Foundations for Arts at large.* § *Meanneſſe of Salary unto Profeſſors.* § *Want of Allowance for Experiments.* § *Prepoſterous inſtitutions: unadviſed practices in Academicall ſtudies.* § *Want of Intelligence between the Vniverſities of Europe.* § *Want of Inquiries into the Deficients of Arts.* § *The Authors Deſigne.* § *Ingenuous Defence.*

IT might ſeem to have more convenience, although it come often other wiſe to paſſe, (Excellent KING,) that thoſe that are fruitfull in their Generations, and have, this way, a fore-ſight of their own immortality in their Deſcendants, ſhould above all men living, be carefull of the eſtate of future times, unto which they can not but know that they muſt at laſt tranſmit their deereſt Pledges. Q. ELIZABETH was a ſojourner in the

world, in reſpect of her unmarried life, rather than an inhabitant: ſhe hath indeed adorned her own time, and many waies enricht it; but in truth, to Your Majeſty, whom God hath bleſt with ſo much Royall Iſſue worthy to perpetuate you for ever; whoſe youthfull and fruitfull Bed, doth yet promiſe more children; it is very proper, not only to irradiate, as you doe, your own times, but alſo to extend your Cares to thoſe Acts which ſucceeding Ages may cheriſh, and Eternity it ſelfe behold: Amongſt which, if my affection to Learning doe not tranſport me, there is none more worthy, or more noble, *than the endowment of the world with ſound and fruitfull Advancements of Learning*: For why ſhould we erect unto our ſelves ſome few Authors, to ſtand like *Hercules Columnes*, beyond which there ſhould be no diſcovery of knowledge; ſeeing we have *your Majeſty*, as a bright and benigne ſtarre, to conduct and proſper us in this Navigation.

I. To returne therefore unto our purpoſe, let us now waigh and conſider with our ſelves, what hitherto hath bin performed, what pretermitted by Princes and others, for the *Propagation of Learning*: And this we will purſue cloſely and diſtinctly, in an Active and Maſculine Expreſsion, no where digreſsing, nothing dilateing. Let this ground therefore be laid, which every one may grant, that the greateſt and moſt difficult works are overcome, either by the *Amplitude of Reward*, or by the *wiſdome and ſoundneſſe of Direction*, or by *conjunction of Labours*; whereof the firſt, *encourageth our endeavours*; the ſecond, *takes away Error and Confuſion*; the third, *ſupplies the frailty of Man*. But the Principall amongſt theſe three, is the *wiſdome and ſoundneſſe of Direction*, that is, a Delineation and Demonſtration of a right and eaſy way to accompliſh any enterprize: *Claudus enim*, as the ſaying is, *in via antevertit Curſorem extrà viam*; and *Solomon* aptly to the purpoſe, *If the Iron be blunt and he doe not whet the edge, then muſt he put too more ſtrength; but wiſdome is profitable to Direction*: By which words he inſinuateth, that *a wiſe election of the Mean, doth more efficaciouſly conduce to the perfecting*

Eccleſ. 10.

perfecting of any enterprize, than any enforcement or accumulation of endeavours. This I am preſſed to ſpeak, for that (not derogating from the Honor of thoſe who have any way deſerved well of Learning) I ſee and obſerve, that many of their works and Acts, are rather matter of *Magnificence* and *Memory* of their *own names*, than of *Progreſſion and Proficience of Learning*; and have rather encreaſed the *number of Learned men*, than much promoted the *Augmentation of Learning*.

II. The Works or Acts pertaining to the *Propagation of Learning*, are converſant about three objects; about the *Places of Learning*; about the *Bookes*; and about the *Perſons of Learned men*. For as *water*, whether falling from the Dew of Heaven, or riſeing from the ſprings of the earth, is eaſily ſcattered and loſt in the ground, except it be collected into ſome *receptacles*, where it may by union and Congregation into one body comfort and ſuſtain it ſelfe; for that purpoſe the induſtry of man hath invented Conduits, Ciſternes, and Pooles, and beautified them with diverſe accompliſhments, as well of Magnificence and State, as of Uſe and Neceſsity: ſo this moſt excellent *liquor of Knowledge*, whether it diſtill from a divine inſpiration, or ſpring from the *ſenſes*, would ſoone periſh and vaniſh, if it were not conſerved in *Bookes*, *Traditions*, *Conferences*, and in *Places* purpoſely deſigned to that end; as *Univerſities*, *Colledges*, *Schooles*, where it may have fixt *ſtations* and Power and Ability of uniteing and improveing it ſelfe.

§ And firſt, the workes which concerne the *Seates of the Muſes*, are foure, Foundations of *Howſes*; Endowments with *Revenewes*; Grant of *Priviledges*; *Inſtitutions, and Statutes for Government*; all which chiefly conduce to privateneſſe and quietneſſe of life, and a diſcharge from cares and troubles, much like the *ſtations Virgil* deſcribeth for the Hiveing of Bees,

Principio Sedes Apibus ſtatioq; petenda,
Quo neq; ſit ventis aditus, &c. Geor. 4.

§ But the workes touching *Bookes* are chiefly two: Firſt

Libraries, wherein, as in famous ſhrines, the Reliques of the Ancient Saints, full of virtue, are repoſed. Secondly, *new Editions of Auctors, with corrected impreßions; more faithfull Tranſlations, more profitable Gloſſes, more diligent Annotations*; with the like traine, furniſht and adorned.

§ Furthermore, the works pertaining to the *Perſons of Learned men*, beſides the *Advancing and Countenancing of them* in generall, are likewiſe two; the *Remuneration* and *Deſignation of Readers*, in *Arts and Sciences already extant* and known; and the *Remuneration and Deſignation of writers concerning thoſe parts of Knowledge, which hetherto have not bin ſufficiently till'd and labour'd.* Theſe breefely are the works and Acts, wherein the Merit of many renowned Princes and other illuſtrious Perſons, hath bin famed, *towards the ſtate of Learning.* As for particular Commemoration, of any that hath well deſerved of Learning, when I think thereof, that of *Cicero* comes into my mind, which was a motive unto him after his returne from baniſhment to give generall thanks, *Difficile non aliquem; ingratum, quenquam præterire:* Let us rather, according to the advice of Scripture, *Look unto the part of the race which is before us, then look back unto that which is already attained.*

Cic. Orat. poſt redit.

Epiſt. ad Plil. 3.

III. Firſt therefore, amongſt ſo many *Colledges* of Europe, excellently founded, I finde ſtrange, *that they are all deſtinated to certain Profeſſions and none Dedicated to Free and Univerſall ſtudies of Arts and Sciences:* For he that judgeth, that all Learning ſhould be referred to uſe and Action, judgeth well; but yet it is eaſy this way to fall into the error taxt in the Ancient Fable, in which, *the other parts of the Body entred an Action againſt the ſtomach, becauſe it neither perform'd the office of Motion, as the Limbes doe; nor of ſenſe, as the head doth;* but yet all this while it is the ſtomach, that concocteth, converteth, and diſtributeth nouriſhment into the reſt of the body: So if any man think *Philoſophy and univerſall contemplations a vaine and idle ſtudy*, he doth not conſider that all Profeſſions and Arts from thence derive their ſappe and ſtrength. And ſurely I am perſwaded that this hath bin a great

Liv. lib. 2. v. c. 260. Æſop. Fab.

great cauſe *why the happy progreſſion of Learning hitherto hath bin retarded*; becauſe theſe Fundamentalls have bin ſtudied but only in paſſage, and deeper draughts have not bin taken thereof: *For if you will have a Tree bear more fruit than it hath uſed to doe*, it is not any thing you can doe to the boughes, but it is the ſtirring of the earth about the root, and the application of new mould, or you doe nothing. Neither is it to be paſs'd over in ſilence, *that this dedicating of Colledges and Societies, only to the uſe of Profeſſory Learning, hath, not only, bin an enemy to the growth of Sciences; but hath redounded likewiſe to the prejudice of States and Governments:* For hence it commonly falls out that Princes, when they would make choice of Miniſters fit for the Affaires of State, finde about them ſuch a marveilous ſolitude of able men; becauſe there is no education Collegiate deſign'd to this end, where ſuch as are fram'd and fitted by nature thereto, might give themſelves chiefly to *Hiſtories*, Moderne *Languages*, Books and *diſcourſes of Policy*, that ſo they might come more able and better furniſht to ſervice of State.

§ And becauſe *Founders of Colledges doe Plant, and Founders of Lecturers doe water*, it followeth now in order to ſpeak of the Defects which are in publique Lectures; *the ſmallneſſe of ſtipends* (eſpecially with us) *aſſigned to Readers of Arts or of Profeſſions*: For it doth much import to the *Progreſſion and Proficiency of Sciences*, that Readers in every kinde be choſen out of the ableſt and moſt ſufficient men; as thoſe that are ordained, not for tranſitory uſe, but for to maintaine and propagate the ſeeds of Sciences for future Ages; This cannot be, except the Rewards and Conditions be appointed ſuch, as may ſufficiently content the moſt eminent man in that Art, ſo as he can be willing to ſpend his whole Age in that function and never deſire to Practiſe. Wherefore that *Sciences may flouriſh*, *Davids* Military Law ſhould be obſerved, *That thoſe that ſtaied with the Carriage* 1 Sam. 30. *ſhould have equall parts with thoſe that were in the Action*; elſe will the Carriages be ill attended. So *Readers in Sciences* are, as it were, Protectors and Guardians of the Proviſion of Learning,

Learning, whence the Action and ſervices of Sciences may be furniſh't. Wherefore it is reaſon that the *Salaryes of Speculative men, ſhould be equall to the gaines of Active men*; otherwiſe if allowances to Fathers of Sciences be not in a competent degree ample and condigne, it will come to paſſe,

Virg. Geor. 3. *Ut Patrem invalidi referent jejunia Nati.*

§ Now I will note another *Defect*, wherein ſome Alchymiſt ſhould be called unto for help; for this Sect of Men adviſe Students to ſell their Bookes and to build Fornaces; to quit *Minerva* and the Muſes, as Barren Virgins, and to apply themſelves to *Vulcane*. Yet certainly it muſt be confeſt, that unto the depth of *Contemplation*, and the fruit of *Operative ſtudies* in many Sciences, eſpecially *Naturall Philoſophy*, and *Phyſique; Bookes are not the only ſubſidiary Inſtruments*, wherein the Munificence of men, hath not bin altogether wanting; for we ſee *Spheres, Globes, Aſtrolabes, Maps*, and the like, have bin provided, and with induſtry invented, as Helps to *Aſtronomy* and *Coſmography*; as well as *Bookes*. We ſee likewiſe ſome places dedicated to the ſtudy of *Phyſique*, to have *Gardens for the inſpection and obſervation of ſimples* of all ſorts; and to be auctorized the uſe of *Dead Bodies for Anatomy-Lectures*. But thoſe doe reſpect but a few things; in the generality ſet it down for Truth, *That there can hardly be made any maine Proficience in the diſcloſing of the ſecrets of Nature, unleſſe there be liberall Allowance for Experiments; whether of* Vulcan *or of* Dædalus; *I mean of Fornace, or of Engine, or any other kind:* And therefore *as Secretaries and Spialls of State*, are allowed to bring in Bills for their diligence in the inquiry and diſcovery of New Occurrences and Secrets in Forraigne Eſtates; *ſo you muſt allow Intelligencers and Spialls of Nature their Bills of Expences*; elſe you ſhall never be advertiſed of many things moſt worthy to be known. For if *Alexander made ſuch a liberall Aſſignation of Treaſure unto Ariſtotle*, for Hunters, Fowlers, Fiſhers, and the like, that he might compile a Hiſtory of living Creatures; certainly much more is their merit, who wander not in wild forreſts of Nature, but make themſelves a way through the Labyrinths of Arts.

§ Another

§ Another Defect to be obſerved by us (indeed of great import) is, *A neglect, in thoſe which are Governours in Univerſities, of Conſultation; and in Princes and ſuperior Perſons, of viſitation; to this end, that it may with all diligence be conſidered and conſulted of, whether the Readings, Diſputations and other Scholaſticall exerciſes, anciently inſtituted, will be good to continue, or rather to antiquate and ſubſtitute others more effectuall:* For amongſt Your Majeſties moſt wiſe maxims, I find this, *That in all uſages and Præſidents, the times be conſidered wherein they firſt began; which if they were weak or ignorant, it derogateth from the Authority of the uſage and leaves it for ſuſpect.* IACOBUS R. Therefore in as much as the uſages and orders of Univerſities, were for moſt part derived from times more obſcure and unlearned than our own, it is the more reaſon that they be re-examined. In this kind I will give an inſtance or two for examples ſake, in things that ſeem moſt obvious and familiar. *It is an uſuall practice (but in my opinion ſomewhat prepoſterous) that Schollars in the Vniverſities, are two early entred in Logique and Rhetorique; Arts indeed fitter for Graduats than Children and Novices.* For theſe two (if the matter be well weighed) are in the number of the graveſt Sciences, being the *Arts of Arts, the one for Judgement, the other for Ornament.* So likewiſe they contain Rules and Directions, either for the Diſpoſition or Illuſtration of any ſubject or materiall Circumſtance thereof; and therefore for mindes empty and unfraught with matter, & which have not as yet gathered that which *Cicero* calls *Silva* and *Supellex*, that is ſtuffe and variety of things; to begin with thoſe Arts, (as if one would learn to weigh, of meaſure, or paint the wind) doth work but this effect, that the virtue and ſtrength of theſe Arts, which are great and Univerſall, are almoſt made contemptible, and have degenerated either into *Childiſh Sophiſtry or ridiculous Affectation*; or at leaſt have bin embaſed in their reputation. And farther, the untimely and unripe acceſsion to theſe Arts, hath drawn on by neceſſary conſequence; a watery and ſuperficiary delivery and handling thereof, as is fitted indeed to the capacities of Children. Another inſtance which I will ſet

downe as an Error now grown inveterate, long agoe in the Univerſities, and it is this; *That in Scholaſticall exerciſes, there uſeth to be a divorſe, very prejudicious, between Invention and Memory: for there the moſt of their ſpeeches are either, altogether premeditate, ſo as they are uttered in the very preciſe forme of words they were conceived in, and nothing left to invention; or meerely extemporall, ſo as very litle is left to Memory;* Whereas in Life and Action, there is very litle uſe of either of theſe apart, but rather of their intermixture; that is, of notes or memorialls; and of extemporall ſpeech: So as by this courſe, exerciſes are not accommodate to practice, nor the Jmage anſwereth to the Life: And it is ever a true rule in *exerciſes, that all, as neere as may be, ſhould repreſent thoſe things which in common courſe of life uſe to be practiſed*; otherwiſe they will pervert the motions and faculties of the mind, and not prepare them. The truth whereof is plainly diſcovered, when Schollars come to the Practice of their Profeſsions, or other Actions of Civile life, which when they ſet into, this defect, whereof we ſpeak, is ſoon found out by themſelves, but ſooner by others. But this part, *touching the amendment of the Jnſtitutions of the Vniverſities*, I will conclude, with the clauſe of *Cæſars* letter to *Oppius*, *Hoc quẽadmodum fieri poſsit, nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt & multa reperiri poſſunt, de iis rebus, rogo vos, ut cogitationem ſuſcipiatis.*

Cic. Epiſt. Ad Att. lib. IX.

§ Another *Defect* which I note, aſcendes a litle higher than the precedent: *For as the progreſsion of Learning conſiſteth much in the wiſe Government and Inſtitution of Univerſities in particular; ſo it would be more advanced, if the Vniverſities in generall, diſperſed through all Europe, were united in a neerer conjunction and correſpondence by mutuall Jntelligence.* For there are, as we ſee, many Orders and Societies, which, though they be divided under ſeverall Soveraignties & ſpacious Territories, yet they doe contract and maintaine a Society and a kind of *Fraternity* one with another; in ſo much that they have their *Provincialls* and *Generalls*, to whom all the reſt yeeld obedience. And ſurely as nature creates *Brother-hoods* in *Families*; and Arts Mechanicall contract *Brother-hoods*

ther-hoods in Communalties; the Anointment of God ſuper-induceth a *brother-hood in Kings and Biſhops*; Vowes and Canonicall rules unite a *Brotherhood in Orders*. in like manner there cannot but intervene *a Noble and Generous Fraternity between men by Learning and Illuminations*; reflecting upon that relation which is attributed to God, who himſelfe is called, *The Father of Illuminations or Lights*. Iac. 1.

§ Laſtly, this I find fault with, which I ſomewhat toucht upon before, *that there hath not bin, or very rarely bin, any publique deſignation of able men, who might write or make inquiry of ſuch parts of Learning as have not bin hitherto ſufficiently laboured and ſubdued*. Vnto which point it will be very available, if there were erected a kind of *viſitation of Learning*; and a Cenſe or Eſtimate taken, what parts of Learning are rich and well improved; what poore and deſtitute. For *the opinion of Plenty is amongſt the Cauſes of want*; and the multitude of Bookes makes a ſhew rather of ſuperfluity, than penury. Which ſurcharge, nevertheleſſe, if a man would make a right judgement, is not remedied by ſuppreſsing or extinguiſhing books heretofore written, but by publiſhing good new bookes, which may be of ſuch a right kind, *That, as the Serpent of Moſes may devoure the Serpents of the Enchanters*. Exod. 7.

§ The Remedies of theſe *defects* now enumerate, except the laſt, and of the laſt alſo, in reſpect of the Active part thereof, which is the *Deſignation of writers*, are *opera Baſilica*, towards which the endeavours and induſtry of a private man, are commonly but as an Image in a croſſe way, which may point at the way, but cannot goe it: But the *ſpeculative part, which pertaineth to the examination of knowledges*, namely, *what is Deficient in every particular Science*, is open to the induſtry of a private man. *Wherefore my Deſignement is to attempt a generall and faithfull perambulation and viſitation of Learning; ſpecially with a diligent and exact enquiry, what parts thereof lye freſh and waſt, and are not yet improved and converted to uſe by the induſtry of men*; to the end that ſuch a plot made, and recorded to memory, may miniſter light both to publique Deſignations, and the voluntary labours of private

endeavours. Wherein nevertheleſſe my purpoſe is, at this time, *to note only Omiſsions and Deficiencies, and not to make redargution of Errors and Overſights*: For it is one thing to ſet forth what ground lieth unmanur'd, and another thing, to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured.

§ In the undertaking and handling of which worke I am not ignorant what a buſineſſe I move, and what a difficult province I ſuſtaine, and alſo, how unequall my abilities are unto my will: yet I have a good hope, that if my extreme love to Learning carrry me too farre, I may obtaine the excuſe of affection, for that, it is *not granted to man, To love and to be wiſe*. I know well that I muſt leave the ſame liberty of judgement to others, that I uſe my ſelfe; and, in truth, I ſhall be indifferently glad, to accept from others, as to impart that duty of humanity; *Nam qui erranti comiter monſtrant viam, &c.* I doe fore-ſee likewiſe that many of thoſe things which I ſhall enter and regiſter as *Omiſsions* and *Deficients*, will incurre diverſe cenſures; *as*, that ſome parts of this enterpriſe were done long-agoe and now are extant; *others*, that they taſt of curioſity, and promiſe no great fruit; *others*, that they are too difficult and impoſsible to be compaſſed by humane induſtries. For the two firſt, let the particulars ſpeak for themſelves: For the laſt, touching *impoßibility*, I determine thus; All thoſe things are to be held poſsible and performeable, which may be accompliſht by ſome perſon though not by every one; and which may be done by the united labours of many, though not by any one apart; and which may be effected in a ſucceſsion of ages, though not in the ſame age; and in briefe, which may be finiſht by the publique care and charge, though not by the ability and induſtry of particular perſons. If, notwithſtanding, there be any man who would rather take to himſelfe that of *Solomon*, *Dicit Piger Leo eſt in via*, than that of *Virgil*

Cic. Offic. 1 ex Ennio.

Prov. 22.

Æn. 5. *Poſſunt quia poſſe videntur*: It is enough to me, if my labours may be eſtimed as votes, and the better ſort of wiſhes: for as it asketh ſome knowledge to demand a queſtion not impertinent; ſo it requireth ſome ſenſe to make a wiſh not abſurd.

CAP. I.

CAP. I.

I. *An universall Partition of Humane Learning, into,* § *History.* II. *Poetry.* III. *Philosophy.* § *This Partition is taken from the triplicity of Intellective Faculties: Memory: Imagination: Reason.* § *The same Partition is appropriate to Divine Learning.*

I. THat is the truest Partition of humane Learning, which hath reference to the *three Faculties* of Mans soule, which is the seat of Learning. *History* is referred to *Memory*, *Poesy* to the *Imagination*, *Philosophy* to *Reason*. By *Poesy*, in this place, we understand nothing else, but *feigned History*, or Fables. As for *Verse*, that is only a stile of expression, and pertaines to the *Art of Elocution*, of which in due place.

§ *History* is *properly of Individualls circumscribed within time and place:* for although *Naturall History* seeme to be conversant about *universall Natures*; yet this so falls out because of the promiscuous similitude in things Naturall comprehended under one kind; so that if you know one, you know all of that species. But if any where there be found Individualls, which in their kind are either singular, as the *Sun*, and the *Moone*; or which doe notably digresse, from their kinde, as *Monsters*; these are as aptly handled in *Naturall History*, as particular men are in *Civile History*. All these are referred unto *Memory*.

II. *Poesy*, in that sense we have expounded it, *is likewise of Individualls, fancied to the similitude of those things which in true History are recorded*, yet so as often it exceeds measure; and those things which in Nature would never meet, nor come to passe, *Poesy* composeth and introduceth at pleasure, even as *Painting* doth: which indeed is the work of the Imagination.

III. *Philosophy* dismisseth Individualls and comprehendeth, not the first Impressions, but the abstract Motions

thereof, and converſant in compounding and dividing them according to the law of Nature and of the things themſelves: And this is wholly the office and operation of *Reaſon*.

§ And that this *Diſtribution* is truely made, he ſhall eaſily conceive that hath recourſe to the Originalls of Intellectualls. Jndividualls only ſtrike the ſenſe, which is the port or entrance of the underſtanding. The Images or Impreſsions of thoſe Individualls accepted from the *ſenſe*, are fixt in the *Memory*, and at firſt enter into it entire, in the ſame manner they were met: afterwards the *underſtanding* ruminates upon them and refines them, which than it doth either meerely *review*; or in a wanton delight counterfeit and *reſemble*; or by compounding and dividing digeſt and endue them. So it is cleerely manifeſt, that from theſe three fountaines of *Memory*, of *Jmagination* and of *Reaſon*, there are theſe three Emanations, of *Hiſtory*, of *Poeſy*, and of *Philoſophy*, and that there can be no other nor no more: for *Hiſtory* and *Experience*, we take for one and the ſame, as we doe *Philoſophy* and *Sciences*.

§ Neither doe we think any other Partition than this is requiſite to *Divine Learning*. Indeed the informations of *Oracle* and of Senſe be diverſe; both in the matter and manner of Conveying, but the ſpirit of Man is the ſame, the Cells and Receptacles thereof the very ſame. For it comes to paſſe here, as if diverſe Liquors, and that by diverſe Funnells, ſhould be receiv'd into one and the ſame veſſell. Wherefore *Theology* alſo conſiſts either of *Sacred Hiſtory*; of *Parables*, which are a kind of *Divine Poeſy*; or of *Precepts* and *Doctrines*, as an *eternall Philoſophy*. As for that part which ſeemes ſupernumerary, which is *Prophecy*, that is a branch of *Hiſtory*: however *Divine Hiſtory* hath that prerogative over *Humane*, that the Narration may be before the Fact as well as after.

CAP.

CAP. II.

I. The Partition of Hiſtory into *Naturall and Civile (Eccleſiaſticall and Literary comprehended under Civill.)* II. The Partition of *Naturall Hiſtory, into the Hiſtory of Generations.* III. *Præter-Generations.* IV. *Of Arts.*

I. HIſtory is either *Naturall or Civile:* in *Naturall* the operations of Nature are recorded; in *Civill* the Actions of men. In both theſe without queſtion, the Divine workings are tranſlucent, but more conſpicuous in *Acts Civill*; in ſo much as they conſtitute a peculiar kind of Hiſtory, which we uſually ſtile *Sacred* or *Eccleſiaſticall:* And in truth to us ſuch ſeemes the Dignity of Learning and of Arts to be, that there ought to be reſerv'd a *Particular Hiſtory* for them apart from the reſt; which yet we underſtand to be comprehended, as *Eccleſiaſtique Hiſtory* alſo is, under *Hiſtory Civile.*

II. The Partition of *Naturall Hiſtory* we ſhall raiſe out of the ſtate and condition of *Nature* hirſelfe, which is found ſubject to a triple ſtate, and under a three-fold regiment: For *Nature is either Free and diſplaying her ſelfe in her ordinary courſe*; as in the Heavens, living Creatures, Plants, and the Univerſall furniture of the world; or *put out of her uſuall courſe and depos'd from her ſtate, by the pravities and inſolencies of contumacious Matter, and the violence of Impediments*, as in Monſters: or laſtly ſhe is *Compreſt and faſhioned, and as it were new caſt*, as in Artificiall Operations: Let therefore the partition of *Naturall Hiſtory*, be made into the Hiſtory of *Generations*; of *Præter-Generations*, and of *Arts*; whereof the laſt we uſe to call *Hiſtory Mechanicall*, or *Experimentall.* The firſt of theſe handles the *Liberty of Nature*; the ſecond the *Errors*; the third the *Bandes* thereof. And we are the rather induced to aſsigne the *Hiſtory of Arts*, as a branch of *Naturall Hiſtory*, becauſe an opinion hath long time

time gon currant, as if *Art* were ſome different thing from *Nature*, and *Artificiall* from *Naturall*. From this miſtake this inconvenience ariſes, that many writers of *Naturall Hiſtory* think they have quit themſelves ſufficiently, if they have compiled a Hiſtory of *Creatures*, or of *Plants*, or of *Mineralls*; the experiments of Mechanicall Arts paſt over in ſilence. But there is yet a more ſubtile deceit which ſecretly ſteales into the mindes of Men, namely, that *Art* ſhould be reputed a kind of *Additament* only to *Nature*, whoſe virtue is this, that it can indeed either perfect *Nature inchoate, or repaire it when it is decaied, or ſet it at liberty from impediments; but not quite alter, tranſmute, or ſhake it in the foundations:* which erroneous conceit hath brought in a too haſty deſpaire upon mens enterpriſes. But on the contrary, this certain truth ſhould be throughly ſetled in the minds of men, *That Artificialls differ not from Naturalls in Forme and Eſſence; but in the Efficient only;* for man hath no power over *Nature* ſave only in her *Motion*; that is, to mingle or put together Naturall bodies, and to ſeparate or put them aſunder; wherefore where there is *Appoſition and Seperation* of *Bodies*, *Naturall conjoyning* (as they terme it) *Active with Paſsive*, man may doe all things; this not done, he can doe nothing. Nor is it materiall ſo things be managed in a right order, for the production of ſuch an effect, whether this be done by the Art of Man or without the Art of Man. Gold is ſometimes diſgeſted and purged from crudities and impurities, by fire; ſometimes found pure in ſmall ſands, Nature performing her own worke. So the Raine-Bow is formed of a dewy cloude in the Aire above; form'd alſo by aſperſion of water by us below. Therefore Nature commandeth all, and theſe three are her ſubſtitute Adminiſtrators, *The courſe of Nature; the Expatiation of Nature and Art; or the Cooperation of Man with Nature in particulars.* Wherefore it is very proportionable that theſe three be comprized in Naturall Hiſtory, which C. *Pliniw* for moſt part performed, who alone comprehended *Naturall Hiſtory* according to the dignity thereof; but what he thus comprehended he hath not handled

C. Plin. Nat. Hiſt.

handled as was meet, nay rather foulely abuſed.

III. The firſt of theſe is extant in ſome good perfection: *The two latter are handled ſo weakly and ſo unprofitably, that they may be referr'd to the liſt of* DEFICIENTS. For you ſhall find no ſufficient and competent collection of thoſe works of *Nature which have a Digreſſion and Deflection from the ordinary courſe of Generations, Productions and Motions*; whether they be the ſingularities of certain Countries and Places, or the ſtrange events of times; or the wit of chance, or the effects of latent proprieties; or *Monodicalls of Nature* in their kinde. It is true, there are a number of Bookes more than enough, full fraught with fabulous Experiments, forged Secrets, and frivolous Impoſtures, for pleaſure and ſtrangeneſſe; but a ſubſtantiall and ſevere *Collection of Heteroclites*, and of the *wonders* of *Nature*, diligently examined and faithfully deſcribed, *this, I ſay, I finde not*, eſpecially with due rejection, and, as it were, publique proſcription of untruths and fables, which have got up into credit. For as the matter is now carried, if any untruths touching *Nature* be once on foot and celebrated (whether it be the Reverence of Antiquity, that can thus farre countenance them; or that it is a trouble to call them unto a re-examination; or that they are held to be rare ornaments of ſpeech, for ſimilitudes and compariſons) they are never after exterminate and called in. The uſe of this work honour'd with a Preſident in *Ariſtotle*, De Mirab. is nothing leſſe than to give contentment to curious and vaine wits, as the manner of *Mirabilaries* and the *ſpreaders of invented Prodigies* is to doe; but for two reaſons ſerious and grave; the one to correct the partiality of Axioms, which are commonly grounded upon common and popular examples; the other becauſe from the *wonders of Nature*, a faire and open paſſage is made to the *wonders of Art*. For the buſines in this matter is no more than by quick ſent to trace out the footings of nature in hir willfull wanderings; that ſo afterward you may be able at your pleaſure, to lead or force her to the ſame place and poſtures againe.

§ Neither doe I give in precept that ſuperſtitious Nar-

rations of Sorceries, Witch-crafts, Inchantments, Dreams, Divinations, and the like, where there is cleere evidence of the fact and deed done, be altogether excluded from this *Hiſtory of Marvailes*. For it is not yet known, in what caſes and how farre, effects attributed to ſuperſtition, doe participate of Naturall Cauſes; and therefore, howſoever the uſe and practice of theſe Arts, in my opinion, is juſtly to be condemned; yet from the ſpeculation and conſideration of them, (if they be cloſely purſued) we may attaine a profitable direction; not only for the right diſcerning of offences in this kind of guilty perſons; but for the farther diſcloſeing of the ſecrets of Nature. Neither ſurely ought a man to make ſcruple of entring and penetrating the vaults and receſſes of theſe Arts, that propoſeth to himſelfe only the inquiſition of *Truth*, as your Majeſty hath confirmed in your own example. For you have with the two clear and quick-ſighted eyes of *Religion and Naturall Philoſophy*, ſo wiſely and throughly enlightned theſe *ſhadowes*, that you have proved your ſelfe moſt like the *Sunne* which paſſeth through polluted places, yet is not diſtained. But this I would admoniſh, that theſe *Narrations* which have mixture with *Superſtition*, be ſorted by themſelves, and not be mingled with the *Narrations*, which are purely and ſincerely Naturall. As for the Narrations touching the *Prodigies* and *Miracles* of *Religions*, they are either not true; or no way Naturall, and therefore pertaine not to *Naturall Hiſtory*.

K. IAMES his Demonology.

* IV. For Hiſtory of Nature, wrought and ſubdued by the hand, which we are wont to call *Mechanicall*, I finde indeed ſome collections made of Agriculture, and likewiſe of many *Manuall Arts*; but commonly (which in this kind of knowledge is a great detriment) with a neglect and rejection of *Experiments familiar and vulgar*; which yet, to the *interpretation of Nature*, doe as much, if not more, conduce, than Experiments of a higher quality. But it is eſtimed a kind of diſhonour and aſperſion unto Learning, if learned men ſhould, upon occaſion perchance, deſcend to the Inquiry or Obſervation of *Matters Mechanicall*, except they be reputed

reputed for *Secrets of Art, or Rarities, or Subtleties.* Which humor of vaine and ſupercilious arrogance, *Plato* juſtly derideth, where he brings in *Hippias* a vaunting Sophiſt diſputing with *Socrates* a ſevere and ſolid inquiſitor of Truth; where the ſubject being of Beauty, *Socrates* after his wandring and looſe manner of diſputeing, brought in firſt an example of a faire Virgin, than of a faire Horſe, than of a faire Pot well glaz'd; at this laſt inſtance *Hippias* ſomewhat mov'd ſaid; *Were it not for curteſy ſake I ſhould diſdaine to diſpute with any that alleaged ſuch baſe and ſordid inſtances*; to whom *Socrates, You have reaſon and it becomes you well, being a man ſo trimme in your veſtments, and ſo neat in your ſhooes*; and ſo goes on in an Irony. And certainly this may be averr'd for truth, that they be not the higheſt inſtances, that give the beſt and ſureſt information. This is not unaptly expreſt in the Tale, ſo common, of the Philoſopher, *That while he gaz'd upward to the ſtarres fell into the water:* for if he had lookt down, he might have ſeen the ſtarres in the water; but looking up to heaven he could not ſee the water in the ſtarres. In like manner it often comes to paſſe that ſmall and mean things conduce more to the diſcovery of great matters, than great things to the diſcovery of ſmall matters; and therefore *Ariſtotle* notes well, *that the Nature of every thing is beſt ſeen in his ſmalleſt Portions.* For that cauſe he inquires the Nature of a Common-wealth, firſt in a Family and the ſimple conjugations of Society, Man and Wife; Parents and Children; Maſter and Servant, which are in every cottage. So likewiſe the Nature of this great Citty of the world, and the Policy thereof, muſt be ſought in every firſt Concordances and leaſt Portions of things. So we ſee that ſecret of Nature (eſtimed one of the great myſteries) of the turning of Iron toucht with a Loadſtone towards the Poles, was found out in needles of Iron, not in barres of Iron.

In Hipp. Major.

Laert. in Thalete.

Pol. lib. 1.

§ But if my judgement be of any waight, I am wholly of this mind, that the uſe of *Mechanicall Hiſtory*, to the raiſeing of *Naturall Philoſophy*, is of all other the moſt radicall and fundamentall; ſuch Naturall Philoſophy, I underſtand

as doth not vaniſh into the fumes of ſubtile and ſublime ſpeculations; but ſuch as ſhall be effectually operative to the ſupport and aſsiſtance of the incommodities of mans life: For it will not only help for the preſent, by connecting and transferring the obſervations of one Art, into the uſe of others, which muſt needs come to paſſe, when the experiences of diverſe Arts ſhall fall into the conſideration and obſervation of one man; but farther it will give a more clear illumination, than hetherto hath ſhined forth, for the ſearching out of the cauſes of things, and the deducing of Axioms. For *like as you can never* well know and prove the diſpoſition of another man, unleſſe you provoke him; nor *Proteus* ever changed ſhapes, untill he was ſtraitned and held faſt with cordes; ſo nature provoked and vexed by Art, doth more cleerely appear, than when ſhe is left free to hir ſelfe. But before we diſmiſſe this part of *Naturall Hiſtory*, which we call *Mechanicall* and *Experimentall*, this muſt be added; That the body of *ſuch a Hiſtory*, muſt be built not only upon *Mechanicall Arts themſelves*, but the *operative part of Liberall ſciences*, as alſo upon many practices not yet grown up into Art, that nothing profitable may be omitted, which availes to the information of the underſtanding. And ſo this is the firſt Partition of *Naturall Hiſtory*.

CAP.

CAP. III.

I. The Second Partition of *Naturall Hiſtory*, from the uſe and end thereof into *Narrative and Inductive*. And that the moſt noble end of *Naturall Hiſtory is, that it miniſter and conduce to the building up of Philoſophy: which end Inductive Hiſtory reſpecteth.* II. The partitiō of the *Hiſtory of Generations into the Hiſtory of the Heavens. The Hiſtory of the Meteors. The Hiſtory of the Earth and Sea. The Hiſtory of Maſſive Bodies, or of the greater Corporations. The Hiſtory of Kindes, or of the leſſer Corporations.*

I. NAturall Hiſtory, as in reſpect of the *ſubiect it is of three ſorts*, as we obſerved before; ſo in reſpect of the *uſe, of two:* for it is applied, either for the knowledge of things themſelves recorded in *Hiſtory*; or as the Primitive matter of *Philoſophy*. The former of theſe, which either for the pleaſure of the Narrations is delightfull; or for the practice of experiments is uſefull; and for ſuch pleaſure or profits ſake is purſued; is of farre inferior quality, compared with that which is the Materialls and Proviſion of a *true and juſt Induction*; and gives the firſt ſuck to *Philoſophy*, wherefore let us again divide *Naturall Hiſtory*, into *Hiſtory* Narrative, and INDUCTIVE; *this latter we report as* DEFICIENT. Nor doe the great names of Ancient Philoſophers, or the mighty volumes of Moderne writers ſo aſtoniſh my ſenſe; for I know very well that *Naturall Hiſtory*, is already extant, ample for the maſſe, for variety delightfull, and often curious for the diligence: but if you take from thence *Fables* and *Antiquity*, and *Allegations of Authors*, and *vain Controverſies*; *Philology* and *Ornaments*, which are accommodate to Table-talke, or the *night-diſcourſes* of Learned men; then will the ſequel, for the INSTAURATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, come to no great matter. And to ſpeak truth this is farre ſhort of the variety which we intend. For firſt thoſe two parts of *Naturall Hiſtory*, whereof we have ſpoken; The Hiſtory of *Præter-generations*, and *of Arts*; matters

of great conſequence, are there *Deficient:* than in that third generall Part mentioned before, namely of *Generations*, of five parts thereof, the *Naturall Hiſtory* extant gives ſatisfaction only to one.

II. For the *Hiſtory of Generations* hath Five ſubordinate Parts; The firſt is of *Celeſtiall Bodies* which comprehends the PHAENOMENA ſincere, and not dogmatiz'd into any peremptory aſſertions: The ſecond of *Meteors* with the *Comets*, and of the *Regions*, as they call them, of the *Aire*; neither is there extant any Hiſtory concerning *Comets*, *Fiery Meteors*, *Windes*, *Raine*, *Tempeſts* and the reſt, of any valew: The third is of the *Earth and of the Water* (as they are integrall parts of the world) of *Mountaines*, of *Rivers*, of *Tydes*, of *Sands*, of *Woods*, as alſo of the *Figure* of the continents, as they are ſtretcht forth: in all theſe particulars the Inquiries and Obſervations are *rather* Naturall, *than Coſmographicall:* Fourthly, touching the *generall Maſſes of Matter*, which we ſtile the *Greater Collegiats*, commonly called the *Elements:* Neither are there found any narrations touching *Fire*, *Aire*, *Water*, and of their Natures, Motions, Workings, Impreſsions, which make up any complete Body. The fift and the laſt Part is of *the Perfect and exact Collections*, which we entitle the *leſſer Collegiats*, commonly called *Kindes* or *Specifiques*. In this laſt part only the induſtry of writers hath appeared, yet ſo as was prodigally waſted in ſuperfluous matter, ſwelling with the outward deſcriptions of liveing Creatures, or of Plants and ſuch like; than enricht with ſolid and diligent obſervations, which in *naturall Hiſtory* ſhould every where be annext and interſerted. And to ſpeak in a word, all the *naturall Hiſtory* we have, as well in regard of the Inquiſition, as of the Collection, is no way proportionable in reference, to that end whereof we ſpeak, namely the *Raiſeing and advancing of Philoſophy:* Wherefore we pronounce *Inductive Hiſtory Deficient.* And thus farre of *naturall Hiſtory.*

CAP.

CAP. IV.

I. The Partition of *Civill Hiſtory, into Eccleſiaſticall and Literary*, and, which retaines the generall name, *Civile*. II. *Literary Deficient*. § *Precepts how to compile it.*

I. CIvile *Hiſtory*, in our Judgement, is rightly divided into three kindes; firſt into *Sacred* or *Eccleſiaſticall*; then into that which retaines the generall name *Civile*; laſtly into that of *Learning* and *Arts*. We will begin with that kinde we ſet down laſt, becauſe the other are extant, *but this I thought good to report as* DEFICIENT; it is the HISTORY OF LEARNING. And ſurely the *Hiſtory of the world* deſtitute of this, may be thought not unlike the ſtatue of *Polyphemus*, with his eye out, that part of the Image being wanting, which doth moſt ſhew the nature and ſpirit of the Perſon. And though we ſet downe this as *Deficient*, yet we are not ignorant, that in divers particular ſciences of Iuris-conſults, Mathematicians, Rhetoricians, Philoſophers, there are made ſome ſlight Memorialls and ſmall relations of Sects, Schooles, Books, Authors and ſuch like ſucceſsions of ſciences. There are likewiſe extant, ſome weak and barren diſcourſes touching the *Inventors of Arts and Vſages*; but a Iuſt and Generall HISTORY OF LEARNING, we avouch that none hetherto hath bin publiſht. Wherefore we will propound the Argument; the way how to contrive it, and the uſe thereof.

II. *The Argument is nothing elſe but a recitall from all Times, what Knowledges and Arts, in what Ages and Climates of the world have floriſht.* Let there be made a commemoration of their *Antiquities*, *Progreſſes* and *Peragrations*, through diverſe parts of the world: (for Sciences ſhift and remove, as people doe,) Againe of their *Declenſions*, *Oblivions*, and *Inſtaurations*. Let there likewiſe be obſervations taken through all *Arts*, of the *occaſion and originall of their Invention*

tion; of their *Manner of delivery*, and the diſcipline of their managings, *Courſe of ſtudy* and exerciſes. Let there alſo be added the *Sects* then on foot; and the *more famous controverſies* which buſied and exerciſed Learned men; the Scandalls and reproches to which they lay open; the Lauds and Honours wherewith they were grac't. Let there be noted the *Chiefeſt Authors*, the *beſt Bookes*, *Schooles*, *Succeſſions*, *Univerſities*, *Societies*, *Colledges*, *Orders*, and whatſoever elſe belongs to the State of Learning. But above all, let this be obſerved (which is the Grace and Spirit of *Civile Hiſtory*,) that the Cauſes and Conſultations be Connexed, with the events: namely, that *the nature of Countries and People be recorded, the diſpoſitions apt and able; or inept and inable for diverſe diſciplines; the Occurrentes of time Adverſe, or Propitious to Learning; the zeales and mixtures of Religions, the Diſcountenances, and favours of Lawes; and laſtly, the eminent virtues and ſway of Perſons of note, for the promoteing of Learning; and the like.* But our adviſe is, that all theſe points be ſo handled, that time be not waſted in praiſe and cenſure of particulars, after the manner of *Critiques*; but that things be plainly and hiſtorically related, and our own judgements very ſparingly interpoſed.

§ *As for the manner of compileing ſuch a Hiſtory*, we doe eſpecially admoniſh thus much; *that the Matter and Proviſion thereof, be drawn, not only from Hiſtories and Critiques; but alſo that through every century of years or leſſer Intervalls, by a continued ſequence of time, deduced from the higheſt antiquity; the beſt Bookes written within thoſe diſtinguiſht ſpaces of time, be conſulted with*; that from a taſt and obſervation of the argument, ſtile and method thereof, and not a through peruſall, for that *were an infinite work*, *the learned ſpirit of that age, as by a kind of charme, may be awakt and rais'd up from the dead.*

§ *As touching the uſe of this Work*, it is deſign'd to this end; not, that the Honour and State of Learning uſher'd in by ſo many Images and Ghoſts of the Learned, ſhould be celebrated; or that for the earneſt affection we bear to Learning,

ing, we desire, even to a curiosity, to enquire, and know, and to conserve whatsoever to the state of Learning may any way appertaine; but chiefly, for a more serious and grave purpose. It is, in few words this, *For that such a Narration, as we have described, in our opinion, may much conferre to the wisdome and judgement of Learned men, in the use and administration of Learning: and that the passions and perturbations; the vices and virtues; as well about Intellectuall matters, as Civile, may be observed; and the best Presidents for practise may be deduced therefrom.* For it is not Saint *Austines*, nor Saint *Ambrose* workes, (as we suppose) that will make so wise a Bishop or a Divine, as *Ecclesiasticall Story* throughly read and observed: which without question may befall Learned men from the History of Learning. For whatsoever is not munited and sustained by Examples and Records, is exposed to imprudency and ruine. Thus much of the *History of Learning.*

CAP. V.

Of the Dignity. § And Difficulty of Civile History.

Civile History properly so called comes now to be handled; The *Dignity and Authority whereof*, is very eminent among secular writings. For upon the credit of *this History*, the examples of our Ancestors, the vicissitudes of Affaires; the grounds of Civile Prudence; and the Name and Fame of men depend.

§ But the *Difficulty is as great as the Dignity*; for to draw back the mind in writing, to the contemplation of matters long agoe passed; and thus, as it were, to make it aged; to search out with diligence; and to deliver with faith and freedome; and with the life and height of expression; to represent unto the eyes, the changes of times; the characters of Persons; the incertainties of Counsils; the Conveyances of

Actions (as of waters,) the ſubtileties of Pretentions, the ſecrets of State, is a taske of great paines and judgement; eſpecially ſeeing Ancient reports, are ſubject to incertainty; Moderne liable to danger. Wherefore the errors are many which attend *Civile Hiſtory*; whileſt ſome write poore and popular Relations, the very reproach of Hiſtory; others patch up, in a raſh haſt, and unequall contexture, particular Reports, and briefe Memorialls; others ſlightly runne over the heads of actions done; others on the contrary purſue every triviall Circumſtance, nothing belonging to the ſumme and iſſue of things; ſome out of a too partiall indulgence to their own wit, take confidence to faine many things; but others adde and imprint upon affaires the Image, not ſo much of their own wit, as of their affections; mindfull rather of their own parts, than to become Religious deponents for truth; others every where interlace ſuch Politique obſervations, as they moſt fancy; and ſeeking occaſion of digreſsion for oſtentation, too ſlightly break off the contexture of the diſcourſe; others for want of moderation and judgement, over doe things, by the prolixity of their ſpeeches, Haranges or other performances; ſo as it is ſufficiently manifeſt, that in the writings of men, *there is not any kind more rare than a juſt Hiſtory, and in all points complete and perfect*. But our purpoſe at this preſent is, to ſet down a partition of knowledge, *for the obſervation of parts omitted; and not a cenſure of parts erroneous*. Now we will proceed *to the Partitions of Civile Hiſtory*, and thoſe of diverſe ſorts; for the particular kindes will be leſſe intangled, if diverſe partitions be propounded; than if one partition by diverſe members, be curiouſly drawn out.

CAP.

CAP. VI.

The first Partition of Civile History, *into* § *Memorialls.* § *Antiquities.* § *And Perfect History.*

CIvile *History is of three kinds*, not unfitly to be compared to the three sorts of Pictures or Images: for of Pictures and Images we see, some are unperfect and unfinisht; others perfect; and others decayed and defaced with Age. In like manner we will divide *Civile History, which is the Image of Actions and Times*, into three kindes, agreeable to those of Pictures; namely, *Memorials; Perfect History;* and *Antiquities. Memorials are Histories unfinisht*, or the first and rough draughts of History. *Antiquities, are Histories defaced*, or the Remaines of History, which have casually escaped the shipwrack of Time.

§ *Memorials or Preparations to History*, are of two sorts, whereof one may be termed *Commentaries*; the other *Registers*. *Commentaries* set downe a naked Continuance and Connexion of Actions and Events, without the Causes and Pre-texts of Busines; the beginings and Motives thereof; also the Counsels and Speeches, and other preparations of Actions. For this is the true nature of *Commentaries*, though *Cæsar* in modesty mixt with greatnesse, did for his pleasure apply the name of *Commentaries*, to the best History that is extant. But *Registers* are of two sorts, for either they comprehend the titles of Matter & Persons in a continuation of Times, such as are *Calendars* and *Cronologies*: or *Solennities* of *Acts*; of which kind are the Edicts of Princes; the Decrees of Counsils; the Proceedings of Iudgements; Publique Orations; Letters or Estate and the like; without the Contexture or Continued thred of the *Narration*.

§ *Antiquities*, or the *Remaines of Histories*, are as we said, *tanquam Tabula Naufragii*; when industrious and un-

derſtanding perſons (the memory of Things being decaied and almoſt overwhelmed with oblivion) by a conſtant and ſcrupulous diligence, out of Geneologies, Calendars, Inſcriptions, Monuments, Coines, Proper-names, and ſtiles; Etymologies of words, Proverbs, Traditions, Archives, and Inſtruments, as well publique as private; Fragments of ſtories, ſcattered paſſages of Books that concerne not Hiſtory; out of all theſe I ſay, or ſome of them, they recover and ſave ſomewhat from the Deluge of Time. Certainly a painefull work, but acceptable to all ſorts of Men, and attended with a kind of Reverence, and indeed worthy (all Fabulous Originals of Nations defac'd, and extinguiſht) to be ſubſtituted in the roome of ſuch counterfeit ſtuffe: but yet of the leſſe Authority, becauſe what is proſtitute to the licenſe of private deſignes, looſes the honour of publique regard. In theſe kinds of *Imperfect Hiſtoriss*, I deſigne no Deficience, ſeeing they are *tanquam imperfectè miſta*, ſo as ſuch Defects are but their nature. As for *Epitomes the corruptions, certainly, and the Moathes of Hiſtories*, we would have them baniſht (where in we concurre with many of moſt ſound judgement) as thoſe that have fretted and corroded the ſound bodies of many excellent Hiſtories; and wrought them into baſe and unprofitable dreggs.

CAP. VII.

The Partition of Perfect Hiſtory, into *Chronicles of Times; Lives of Perſons; Relations of Acts.* § The Explication *of the Hiſtory of Lives.* § *Of Relations.*

IUſt or *Perfect Hiſtory*, is of three kinds, according to the nature of the object which it propounds to repreſent; for it either repreſents a portion of Time; or ſome memorable Perſon; or ſome Famous Act. The firſt we call *Chronicles* or *Annals*; the

the ſecond *Lives*; the third *Relations*. Of theſe, *Chronicles* ſeem to excell, for Celebrity and Name; *Lives*, for profit and examples; *Relations*, for ſincerity and verity. *For Chronicles, repreſent the magnitude of publique Actions, and the externe faces of Men, as they regard the publique, and involue in ſilence ſmaller Paſſages, which pertaine either to Matter or Men.* And ſeeing it is the workmanſhip of God alone, *to hang the greateſt waight upon the ſmalleſt wyers;* it comes many times to paſſe, that ſuch a Hiſtory purſueing only the greater occurrences, rather ſets forth the Pompe and Solennity; than the true reſorts, and the intrinſeque contextures of buſineſſe. And although it doth adde and intermixe the Counſils themſelves; yet affecting greatneſſe, it doth beſprinkle mens actions with more ſolemneneſſe and wiſdome, than indeed is in them; *that a Satyre may be a truer table of a Mans life, than many ſuch Hiſtories.* Contrariwiſe; *Lives*, if they be well written with diligence and judgement (for we doe not ſpeak of *Elogies* and ſuch ſlight commemorations) although they propound unto themſelves ſome particular perſon, in whom Actions, as well commune as ſolemne; ſmall as great; private as publique, have a compoſition and commixture; yet, certainly, they exhibite more lively and faithfull Narrations of Matters; and which you may more ſafely and ſucceſſefully transferre into example. But ſpeciall *Relations of Actions*, ſuch as are the *warres of Peloponeſus*; the *Expedition of Cyrus*; the *Conſpiracy of Cataline*, and the like, ought to be attired with a more pure and ſyncere Candor of Truth than the *Perfect Hiſtories of Times*; becauſe in them may be choſen an Argument more particular and comprehenſible; and of that quality, as good notice and certitude, and full information, may be had thereof: whereas, on the contrary, the *ſtory of Time* (ſpecially more ancient than the age of the writer) doth often faile in the memory of things, and containeth blank ſpaces, which the wit and conjecture of the writer (confidently enough) uſeth to ſeize upon and fill up. Yet this which we ſay, touching the ſyncerity of *Relations*, muſt be underſtood with reſervation, for indeed

it muſt be confeſſed (ſince all mortall good laboureth of imperfection, and conveniences with diſconveniences are uſually connext) that ſuch kind of *Relations*, ſpecially if they be publiſhed about the times of things done; ſeeing very often they are written with paſsion or partiality, of all other narrations, are deſervedly moſt ſuſpected. But again; together with this inconvenience, this remedy groweth up; that theſe ſame *Relations*, being they are not ſet out by one ſide only, but through faction and partiary, affections are commonly publiſhed by ſome or other on both ſides; they doe by this means open and hedge in a midle way between extremes to truth: and after the heat of paſsions is over, they become, to a good and wiſe writer of Hiſtory, not the worſt matter and ſeedes of a perfect Hiſtory.

§ As touching thoſe points which ſeem *deficient* in theſe three kinds of Hiſtory, without doubt there are many particular Hiſtories (of ſuch I ſpeak as may be had) of ſome dignity or mediocrity, which have bin hetherto paſſed by, to the great detriment of the honor and fame of ſuch Kingdomes and States, to which they were due, which would be too tedious here to obſerve. But leaving the ſtories of forreigne Nations, to the care of Forreigne Perſons, leſt I ſhould become *Curioſus in aliena Reipub.* I cannot faile to repreſent unto Your Majeſty the indignity and unworthineſſe of the *Hiſtory* of *England*, as it now is, in the main continuation thereof, as alſo the partiality and obliquity of that of *Scotland*, in the lateſt and largeſt author thereof: ſuppoſeing that it would be honour to Your Majeſty, and a work acceptable with Poſterity, if this Iland of *Great Britany*, as it is now joyned in a Monarchy for the Ages to come, ſo were joyned in one Hiſtory for the times paſt, after the manner of the ſacred Hiſtory, which draweth down the ſtory of the Ten Tribes, and of the two Tribes as Twinnes together. And if it ſhall ſeem that the waight of the work, (which certainly is great and difficult) may make it leſſe exactly, according to the worthineſſe thereof, performed; behold an excellent period of much ſmaller compaſſe of time,

as

as to the ſtory of *England*; that is to ſay, from the uniting of the Roſes to the uniting of the Kingdomes; a ſpace of time, which in my judgment containes more variety of rare events, than in like number of ſucceſſions ever was knowne in an Hereditary Kingdome. For it begins with the mixt Title to a Crowne, partly by might partly by right: An entry by Armes; an eſtabliſhment by marriage; ſo there followed times anſwerable to theſe beginings; like waves after a great tempeſt, retaining their ſwellings and agitations, but without extremity of ſtorme; but well paſt through by the wiſdome of the Pilot, *being one of the moſt ſufficient Kings of all his Predeceſſors*. Then followed a King whoſe Actions conducted rather by raſhneſſe, than counſil, had much intermixture with the affaires of Europe; ballancing and inclining them according as they ſwayed; In whoſe time began that *great Alteration in the Eccleſiaſticall State*; ſuch as very ſildome comes upon the Stage. Then followed the Raign of a Minor; then an Offer of an Vſurpation, though it was very ſhort, *like a Feaver for a day*: Then the Raigne of a woman matcht with a Forraigner: Againe, of a woman that liv'd ſolitary and unmarried. And the cloſe of all was this happy and glorious event; that is, that this Iland divided from all the world, ſhould be united in it ſelfe; by which that ancient Oracle given to *Æneas*, which preſaged reſt unto him; *Antiquam exquirite Matrem*; ſhould be fulfill'd upon the moſt noble Nations of England & Scotland, now united in that name of *Britannia*, *their ancient Mother*; as a Pledge and Token of the Period and Concluſion, now found of all Wandrings and Peregrination. *So that as maſſive bodies* once ſhaken, feele certaine Trepidations before they fixe and ſettle; ſo it ſeemes probable, that by the Providence of God, it hath come to paſſe, *That this Monarchy, before it ſhould ſettle and be eſtabliſh't in your Maieſty and your Royal Progeny*, (in which I hope it is firme fixt for ever) *it ſhould undergoe ſo many changes, and viciſſitudes, as preluſions of future Stability*.

HEN. VII.

HEN. VIII

ED. VI.

MARIA ELISA.

Virg. Æn. 3

Iacobus R. Carolus R.

§ As *for Lives*, when I think thereon, I doe find ſtrange that theſe our Times have ſo litle knowne, and acknowledged

ledged their owne virtues; *being there is ſo ſildome any Memorials or Records of the lives af thoſe who have bin eminent in our Times*. For although Kings and ſuch as have abſolute ſoveraignty, may be few; and Princes in free Commonwealths (ſo many States being collected into Monarchies,) are not many; yet however, there hath not bin wanting excellent men (though living under Kings,) that have deſerv'd better, than an incertain and wandring Fame of their memories; or ſome barren & naked Elogie. For herein the invention of one of the late Poets, whereby he hath well enricht the ancient Fiction, is not inelegant: *Hee faines that at the end of the Thread of every mans life, there was a Medall or Tablet, whereon the name of the Dead was ſtampt;* and that time waited upon the ſheeres of the fatall Siſter, and as ſoone as the Thread was cut, caught the Medalls, and carrying them away; a litle after threw them out of his Boſome into the River Lethe. And that about the Bank there were many Birds flying up and downe, that would get the Medals; and after they had carried them in their beakes a litle while, ſoon after, through negligence ſuffered them to fall into the River. Amongſt theſe Birds there were a few *ſwannes* found, which if they got a Medall with a name, they uſed to carry it to a certaine *Temple conſecrate to Immortality*. But ſuch *ſwannes* are rare in our Age: And although many men more mortall in their vigilancies and ſtudies, than in their bodies, deſpiſe the *Memory of their Name*, as if it were fume or ayre, *Animæ nil magnæ laudis egentes:* namely whoſe Philoſophy and ſeverity ſprings from that roote, *Non prius laudes contempſimus quam laudanda facere deſcivimus*. Yet that wil not with us, prejudicate *Salomon's* Iudgment, *The memory of the Iuſt is with Benediction; but the name of the wicked ſhall putrifie:* The one perpetually floriſhes; the other either inſtantly departs into Oblivion; or diſſolves into an ill Odor. And therefore in that ſtile and forme of ſpeaking, which is very well brought in uſe, attributed to the Dead, of *Happy Memory*; of *Pious Memory*; of *Bleſſed Memory*; we ſeeme to acknowledge that which *Cicero* alleageth; borrowing it from

Plin. Iun. alicubi in Epiſt.

Prov. 10.

from *Demosthenes*, *Bonam Famam propriam esse possessionem defunctorum*; which possession I cannot but note that in our age it lies much wast and neglected.

§ *As concerning Relations* it could be in truth, wish't, that there were a greater diligence taken therein: For there is no Action more eminent, that hath not some able Pen to attend it, which may take and transcribe it. And because it is a Quality not common to all men to write a *Perfect History* to the Life and Dignity thereof; (as may well appear by the small number, even of mean Writers in that kind) yet if particular Actions were but by a tolerable Pen reported, as they passe, it might be hoped that in some after Age, Writers might arise, that might compile a *Perfect History* by the helpe an assistance of such *Notes*: For such *Collections* might be as a *Nursery Garden*, whereby to Plant a faire and stately Garden, when time should serve.

CAP. VIII

The Partition of the *History of Times, into History Universall, and Particular. The Advantages and Disadvantages of both.*

THE History of Times is either Universall, or Particular: This comprehends the affaires of some Kingdome, or State, or Nation: That the affaires of the whole world. Neither have there bin wanting those, who would seeme to have composed a *History of the world*, even from the Birth thereof; presenting a miscellany of matter and compends of *Reports* for *History*. Others have bin confident that they might comprize, as in a Perfect *History*, the Acts of their owne times, memorable throughout the world; which was certainly a generous attempt, and of singular use. For the actions, and negotiations of men, are not so divorced through the division of Kingdomes, and Countries; but that they have many coincident Connexions: wherefore it is of great import to behold the fates, and affaires destinate to one age

or time drawne, as it were and delineate in one *Table*. For it falls out that many writings not to be diſpiſed (ſuch as are they whereof we ſpake before, *Relations*) which perchance otherwiſe would periſh; nor often come to the Preſſe; or at leaſt the chiefe heads thereof might be incorporated into the body of ſuch a *Generall Hiſtory*, and by this meanes be fixed and preſerved. Yet notwithſtanding if a man well waigh the matter, he ſhall perceive that the Lawes of a *Juſt Hiſtory* are ſo ſevere and ſtrict, as they can hardly be obſerv'd in ſuch a vaſtneſſe of Argument; ſo that the Majeſty of *Hiſtory* is rather miniſht, than amplified by the greatneſſe of the Bulk. For it comes to paſſe that he, who every where purſueth ſuch variety of matter; the preciſe ſtrictneſſe of Information by degrees ſlackned; and his owne diligence diſperſed in ſo many things, weakned in all,) takes up popular Reports and Rumors; and from *Relations* not ſo authentique, or ſome other ſuch like ſlight ſtuffe, compiles a *Hiſtory*. Moreover he is forced (leſt the worke ſhould grow too voluminous) purpoſely to paſſe over many occurrences worth the relating; and many times to fall upon the way of Epitomes and abridgments. There is yet another danger of no ſmall importance which ſuch a worke is liable unto, which is directly oppoſed to the profitable uſe of *Univerſall Hiſtory*; for as Generall Hiſtory preſerves ſome *Relations* with it may be, otherwiſe would be loſt; ſo contrarywiſe many times it extinguiſhes other fruitfull *Narrations* which otherwiſe would have lived through *Breviaries*, which are ever accepted in the world.

CAP.

CAP. IX.

An other Partition *of the Hiſtory of Times into Annals and Iournals.*

THE Partition *of the Hiſtory of Time* is likewiſe well made into *Annals*; and *Iournals*. Which Diviſion though it derive the names from the *Period of Times*, yet pertaines alſo to the choice of Buſineſſe. For *Tacitus* ſaith well, when falling upon the mention of the magnificence of certaine ſtructures, preſently he addes; *Ex dignitate Populi Ro. repertum eſſe, res illuſtres, Annalibus; Talia, Diurnis urbis Actis mandare:* Applying to *Annals*, Matters of State; to *Diaries*, Acts and Accidents of a meaner nature. And in my judgment a Diſcipline of Heraldry would be to purpoſe in the diſpoſing of the merits of Books; as of the merits of Perſons. For as nothing doth more derogate from Civile Affaires, than the confuſion of Orders and Degrees; ſo it doth not a litle embaſe the authority of a grave *Hiſtory*, to intermingle matters of triviall conſequence, with matters of State; ſuch as are Triumphs, and Ceremonies; Shews, and Pageants, and the like. And ſurely it could be wiſht that this diſtinction would come into Cuſtome. In our Times *Iournals* are in uſe only in Navigations, and Expeditions of warre. Amongſt the Ancients it was a point of Honour to Princes to have the Acts of their Court referr'd to *Iournals*. Which we ſee was preſerv'd in the raign of *Ahaſuerus* King of *Perſia*, who when he could not take reſt call'd for the Chronicles; wherein hee reviewed the Treaſon of the Evnuches paſt in his owne time. But in the *Diaries* of *Alexander* the Great, ſuch ſmall Particularities were contained, that if he chanc'd but to ſleepe at the Table, it was Regiſtred. For neither have *Annals* only compriz'd grave matters, and *Iournals* only light; but all were promiſcuouſly, & curſorily taken in *Diaries*; whether of greater, or of leſſer Importance.

Annal. 13.

Lib. Eſth. Cap. 6.

Plutarch Symp. 1.

CAP. X.

A Second Partition of Hiſtory Civile, *into* Simple, *and* Mixt.
§ Coſmographie *a mixt Hiſtory.*

THE laſt Partition of *Civile Hiſtory* may be this. *Hiſtory Simple*, and *Mixt*. The Commune Mixtures are two, the one from *Civile Knowledge*; the other ſpecially from *Naturall*. For there is a kind of writing introduc'd by ſome, to ſet down their Relations, not continued according to the Series of the *Hiſtory*; but pickt out, according to the choice of the Author, which he after re-examines, and ruminates upon; and taking occaſion from thoſe ſelected pieces, diſcourſes of Civile Matters. Which kind of *Ruminated Hiſtory*, we doe exceeding well allow of; ſo ſuch a Writer doe it indeed, and profeſſe himſelfe ſo to doe. But for a man reſolvedly writeing a *Juſt Hiſtory*, every where to ingeſt *Politique inter-laceings*; and ſo to break off the thread of the *ſtory*, is unſeaſonable and tedious. For although every wiſe Hiſtory be full, and as it were impregnate with Politicall Precepts and Counſils; yet the Writer himſelfe ſhould not be his own *Mid-wife* at the delivery.

§ *Coſmography* likewiſe is a *mixt-Hiſtory*, for it hath from *Naturall Hiſtory*, the Regions themſelves, and their ſite and commodities; from *Ciuile Hiſtory*, Habitations, Regiments and Manners; from the *Mathematiques*, Climates, and the Configurations of the Heavens, under which the Coaſts and Quarters of the World doe lye. In which kind of *Hiſtory* or Knowledge, we have cauſe to Congratulate our Times; for the world in this our age, hath through-lights made in it, after a wonderfull manner. The Ancients certainly had knowledge of the *Zones*, and of the *Anti-podes*.

Virg. Geor. 1. (*Neſq; ubi Primus Equis Oriens afflavit anhelis,*
Illic ſera Rubens accendit Lumina veſper)

and

and rather by Demonſtrations than by Travels. But for ſome ſmall keele to emulate Heaven it ſelfe; and to Circle the whole Globe of the Earth, with a more oblique and winding Courſe, than the Heavens doe; this is the glory and prerogative of our Age. So that theſe Times may juſtly bear in their *word*, not only *Plus ultra*, whereas the Ancients uſed *non ultra*; and alſo *imitabile fulmen*, for the Ancients *non imitabile fulmen*.

Demens qui Nimbos & non imitabile Fulmen. Virg. Æn. 6

But likewiſe that which exceeds all admiration *imitabile Cœlum*, our voyages; to whom it hath bin often granted to wheele and role about the whole compaſſe of the Earth, after the manner of Heavenly Bodies. *And this excellent felicity in Nauticall Art, and environing the world, may plant alſo an expectation of farther*, PROFICIENCIES AND AUGMENTATIONS OF SCIENCES; ſpecially ſeeing it ſeems to be decreed by the divine Counſill, that theſe two ſhould be Coævals, for ſo the Prophet *Daniel* ſpeaking of the latter times foretells, *Plurimi pertranſibunt & augebitur Scientia*: as if Cap. 12. the through Paſſage, or Perluſtration of the World, and the various propagation of knowledge were appointed to be in the ſame Ages; as we ſee it is already performed in great part; ſeeing our times doe not much give place for Learning to the former two *Periods*, or *Returnes* of Learning; the one of the *Græcians*; the other of the *Romans*; and in ſome kinds farre exceed them.

CAP. XI.

I. The Partition of *Eccleſiaſticall Hiſtory*, into the *Generall Hiſtory of the Church.* II. *Hiſtory of Propheſy.* III. *Hiſtory of Providence.*

HIſtory *Eccleſiaſticall* falls under the ſame diviſion commonly with *Civile Hiſtory*; for there are *Eccleſiaſticall Chronicles*; there are *Lives* of *Fathers*; there are *Relations* of *Synods*, and the like, pertaining to the *Church.* In proper expreſſion this kind of Hiſtory is divided, *into the Hiſtory of the Church by a generall name*; *Hiſtory of Propheſy*; *and Hiſtory of Providence.* The firſt recordeth the times and different ſtate of the *Church Militant*; whether ſhe flote as the *Arke in the Deluge*; or ſojourne *as the Arke in the Wilderneſſe*; or be at reſt *as the Arke in the Temple*; that is, the State of the Church in *Perſecution*; in *Remove*; and in *Peace*. In this Part I find no *Deficience*; but rather more things abound therein, than are wanting; only this I could wiſh, that the virtue and ſyncerity of the Narrations were anſwerable to the greatneſſe of the Maſſe.

II The Second Part which is the *Hiſtory of Propheſie*, conſiſteth of two Relatives; the *Propheſy it ſelfe*; and the *accompliſhment thereof*. wherefore the deſigne of this worke ought to be, that every *Propheſy of Scripture* be ſorted with the truth of the event; and that throughout all the ages of the world; both for Confirmation of Faith; as alſo to plant a Diſcipline; & skill in the Interpretation of *Propheſies*, which are not yet accompliſh't. But in this work, that latitude muſt be allowed which is proper, and familiar unto *Divine Propheſies*; that their accompliſhments may be both perpetuall and punctual: For they reſemble the nature of their Auctor *to whom one day is as a thouſand yeares, and a thouſand yeares are but as one day*: And though the fulneſſe, and height of their complement be many times aſſigned to ſome certaine age, or

Pſal 90

or certaine point of time; yet they have nevertheleſſe many ſtaires and ſcales of Accompliſhment throughout diverſe Ages of the world. This worke I ſet down as DEFICIENT; * but it is of that nature as muſt be handled with great wiſdome, ſobriety, and reverence, or not at all.

III The third Part which is the *Hiſtory* of *Providence* hath fallen indeed upon the Pens of many pious Writers, but not without ſiding of Partiaries; and it is imployed *in the obſervation of that divine Correſpondence which often intervenеth betweene Gods revealed Will, and his ſecret Will*. For though the Counſils, and Iudgments of God be ſo obſcure, that they are *inſcrutable to the Naturall man*; yea many times withdraw themſelves even from *their* eyes, that look out of the Tabernacle: Yet ſometimes by turns it pleaſeth the Divine wiſdome for the Confirmation of *this*; and Confutation of thoſe which are *as without God in the world*; to propoſe them to be ſeen written in ſuch Capitall Letters, that, as the Prophet ſpeaketh, *Every one that runnes by, may read them*; that is, *that men meerly Senſuall, and Carnall; who make haſt to poſt over thoſe divine Iudgments; and never fixe their cogitations upon them; yet though they are upon the ſpeed, and intend nothing leſſe; they are urg'd to acknowledge them*. Such as are late, and unlooked for Iudgments; unhoped for Deliverances ſuddenly ſhining forth; the divine Counſils, paſſing through ſuch Serpentine windings, and wonderful mazes of things; at length manifeſtly diſintangling, and cleering themſelves. which ſerve not only for the Conſolation of the minds of the Faithfull; but for the Aſtoniſhment and Conviction of the Conſciences of the Wicked.

1 Cor. 2.

Ad Epheſ. 2.

Habac. 2.

CAP.

CAP. XII.

The Appendices *of Hiſtory Converſant about the words of Men; as Hiſtory it ſelfe about the Deeds:* The Partition thereof into, *Orations.* § *Letters.* § *And Apophthegmes.*

BVt not the *Deeds only*, *but the Words alſo of Men, ſhould be retained in Memory*. It is true that ſometimes *Words* are inſerted into the Hiſtory it ſelfe, ſo farre as they conduce to a more perſpicuous, and ſolemne Delivery of *Deeds*. But the *ſayings and words of men*, are preſerved properly in Books of, *Orations; Epiſtles;* and *Apophthegmes*. And certainly the *Orations*, of wiſe men made touching buſineſſe, and matters of grave and deepe importance, much conduce, both to the knowledge of things themſelves; and to Elocution.

§ But yet greater Inſtructions for Civile Prudence, are from the *Letters of great Perſonages*, touching the Affaires of State. And of the *words of men*, there is nothing more ſound and excellent, than are *Letters*; for they are *more naturall than Orations; more adviſed than ſodaine Conferences*. The ſame *Letters*, when they are continued according to the ſequele of times (as is obſerved in thoſe ſent by Embaſſadors, Governours of Provinces, and other Miniſters of Eſtate) are without Queſtion of all other *the moſt precious proviſion for Hiſtory*.

§ Neither are *Apophthegmes* only for delight, and ornament; but for reall Buſineſſes; and Civile Vſages, for they are, as he ſaid, *Secures aut mucrones verborum*, which by their ſharpe edge cut and penetrate the knots of Matters and Buſineſſe: And Occaſions runne round in a Ring; and what was once profitable, may againe be practis'd; and againe be effectuall; whether a man ſpeake them, as ancient; or make them his own. Neither can it be doubted but that is uſeful in Civile negotiations, which [a] *Cæſar* himſelfe hath honour'd by

[a] Cic. Epiſt. fam. L. IX.

[a] Etiam & tu Inclite Heros.

by his own example; it is pitty his book is loſt, ſeeing what we have in this kind, ſeems to be collected with litle choice. *Thus much of Hiſtory*, namely of that part of Learning, which anſwereth to one of the Cells, or Domicils of the underſtanding, which is, *Memory*.

CAP. XIII.

The Second Principall Part of Human Learning Poeſy; I. *The Partition of* Poeſy into Narrative. II. Drammaticall. III. And Parabolicall. § *Three Examples of* Parabolicall Poeſy *propounded*. IV. Naturall. V. Politicall. VI. Morall.

NOw let us proceed to *Poeſy*. *Poeſy is a kind of Learning in words reſtrained; in matter looſe and licenc'd*; ſo that it is referred, as we ſaid at firſt, to the *Imagination*; which uſeth to deviſe, and contrive, unequall and unlawfull Matches and divorces of things. And *Poeſy*, as hath bin noted, is taken in a double ſenſe; *as it reſpects Words; or as it reſpects Matter*. In the *firſt ſenſe*, it is a kind of Character of ſpeech; for *Verſe*, is a kind of Stile and Forme of Elocution, and pertaines not to *Matter*; for a *true Narration* may be compoſed in *Verſe*; and a *Faigned* in *Proſe*. In the *latter ſenſe*, we have already determined it, a *Principall member of Learning*, and have placed it next unto *Hiſtory*; ſeeing it is nothing elſe than *Imitation of Hiſtory at pleaſure*. Wherefore ſearching and purſuing in our Partition the true veines of Learning; and in many points, not giveing place to cuſtome, and the *receaved Diviſions*; we have diſmiſſed *Satyres*, and *Elegies*, and *Epigrammes*, and *Odes*, and the like, and referred them to *Philoſophy* and *Arts of Speech*. Under the name of *Poeſy*, we treat only of *Hiſtory Faigned at Pleaſure*.

I. The trueſt *Partition of Poeſy*, and moſt appropriate, beſides thoſe Diviſions common to it with Hiſtory (for

there are *fain'd Chronicles*, *fain'd Lives*, and *fain'd Relations*) is this, *that it is either Narrative; or Repreſentative, or Alluſive. Narrative is a meere imitation of Hiſtory*, that in a manner it deceives us; but that often it extolls matters above beliefe. *Drammaticall or Repreſentative, is as it were, a viſible Hiſtory*; for it ſets out the Image of things, as if they were Preſent; and *Hiſtory*, as if they were Paſt. *Parabolicall or Alluſive is Hiſtory with the Type, which brings downe the Images of the underſtanding to the Objects of Senſe.*

§ As for *Narrative Poeſy*, or if you pleaſe *Heroicall* (ſo you underſtand it of the *Matter*, not of the *Verſe*) it ſeems to be raiſed altogether from a noble foundation; which makes much for the Dignity of mans Nature. For ſeeing this ſenſible world, is in dignity inferior to the ſoule of Man; *Poeſy* ſeems to endow Humane Nature with that which *Hiſtory* denies; and to give ſatisfaction to the Mind, with, at leaſt, the ſhadow of things, where the ſubſtance cannot be had. For if the matter be throughly conſidered; a ſtrong Argument may be drawn from *Poeſy*, that a more ſtately greatneſſe of things; a more Perfect Order; and a more beautifull variety delights the ſoule of Man, than any way can be found in Nature, ſince the Fall. Wherefore ſeeing the Acts and events, which are the ſubject of true *Hiſtory*, are not of that amplitude, as to content the mind of Man; *Poeſy* is ready at hand to faine *Acts* more *Heroicall*. Becauſe *true Hiſtory* reports the ſucceſſes of buſineſſe, not proportionable to the merit of Virtues and Vices; *Poeſy* corrects it, and preſents events and Fortunes according to deſert, and according to the Law of Providence: becauſe *true Hiſtory*, through the frequent ſatiety and ſimilitude of Things, workes a diſtaſt and miſpriſion in the mind of Man; *Poeſy* cheereth and refreſhes the ſoule; chanting things rare, and various, and full of viciſſitudes. So as *Poeſy* ſerveth and conferreth to Delectation, Magnanimity, and Morality; and therefore it may ſeem deſervedly to have ſome Participation of Divineneſſe; becauſe it doth raiſe the mind, and exalt the ſpirit with high raptures, by proportioning the ſhewes of things

things to the desires of the mind; and not submitting the mind to things, as *Reason* and *History* doe. And by these allurements, and congruities, whereby it cherisheth the soule of man; joyned also with consort of Musique, whereby it may more sweetly insinuate it selfe, it hath wonne such accesse, that it hath bin in estimation even in rude times, and Barbarous Nations, when other Learning stood excluded.

II. *Drammaticall, or Representative Poesy, which brings the World upon the stage*, is of excellent use, if it were not abused. For the Instructions, and Corruptions of the *Stage*, may be great; but the corruptions in this kind abound; the Discipline is altogether neglected in our times. For although in moderne Commonwealths, *Stage-plaies* be but estimed a sport or pastime, unlesse it draw from the Satyre, and be mordant; yet the care of the Ancients was, that it should instruct the minds of men unto virtue. Nay, wise men and great Philosophers, have accounted it, as the Archet, or musicall Bow of the Mind. And certainly it is most true, and as it were, a secret of nature, *that the minds of men are more patent to affections, and impressions, Congregate, than solitary.*

III. But *Poesy Allusive, or Parabolicall, excells the rest, and seemeth to be a sacred and venerable thing; especially seeing Religion it selfe hath allowed it in a work of that nature, and by it, trasiques divine commodities with men.* But even *this* also hath bin contaminate by the levity and indulgence of mens wits about *Allegories*. And it is of ambiguous use, and applied to contrary ends. For it serves for *Obscuration*; and it serveth also for *Illustration*: in this it seems there was sought a way how to teach; in that an Art how to conceale. And this way of teaching which conduceth to *Illustration*, was much in use in the Ancient times: for when the Inventions and conclusions of human reason, (which are now common and vulgar) were in those ages strange and unusuall; the understandings of men were not so capable of that subtilty, unlesse such discourses, by resemblances and examples, were brought downe to sense. Wherefore in those first ages all

were full of *Fables*, and of *Parables*, and of *Ænigmaes*, and of *Similitudes* of all ſorts. Hence the *Symboles* of *Pythagoras*; the *Ænigmaes* of *Sphynx*; and the *Fables* of *Æſop*; and the like. So the *Apophthegmes* of the Ancient ſages, were likewiſe expreſſed by *ſimilitudes*. So *Menenius Agrippa*, amongſt the Romans, a Nation in that age not learned, repreſſed a ſedition by a Fable. *And as Hieroglyphiques were before letters; ſo Parables were before Arguments.* So even at this day, and ever, there is, and hath bin much life, and vigor in *Parables*; becaule Arguments cannot be ſo ſenſible, nor examples ſo fit. *There is another uſe of Parabolicall Poeſy, oppoſite to the former, which tendeth to the folding up of thoſe things; the dignity whereof, deſerves to be retired, and diſtinguiſht, as with a drawn Curtain: That is when the ſecrets and myſteries of Religion, Policy, and Philoſophy are vailed, and inveſted with Fables, and Parables.* But whether there be any myſticall ſenſe couched under the ancient *Fables* of the *Poets*, may admit ſome doubt: and indeed for our part we incline to this opinion, as to think, that there was an infuſed myſtery in many of the ancient *Fables* of the *Poets*. Neither doth it move us that theſe matters are left commonly to Schooleboyes, and Grammarians, and ſo are imbaſed, that we ſhould therefore make a ſlight judgement upon them: but contrariwiſe becauſe it is cleere that the *writings* which recite thoſe *Fables* of all the writings of men, next to ſacred writ, are the moſt ancient; and that the *Fables* themſelves, are farre more ancient than they (being they are alleadged by thoſe writers, not as excogitated by them, but as credited and receptod before) they ſeem to be like a thinne fine rarified Aire, which from the traditions of more Ancient Nations, fell into the Flutes of the Grecians. And becauſe that whatſoever hath hetherto bin undertaken for interpretation of theſe *Parables*, namely by unskilfull men, not learned beyond common places, give us no ſatisfaction at all; we thought good to referre Philoſophy according to *ancient Parables*, in the number of DEFICIENTS.

Liv. Hiſt. lib. 2.

* § And we will annex an example or two of this work:

not

not that the matter perhaps is of ſuch moment: but to maintaine the purpoſe of our deſigne. That is this; that if any portion of theſe works which we report as *Deficient*, chance to be more obſcure than ordinary; that we alwaiſe propoſe, either Precepts, or Examples, for the perfecting of that work; leſt perchance ſome ſhould imagine, that our conceit hath only comprehended ſome light notions of them; and that we like Augures, only meaſure Countries in our mind, but know not how to ſet one foot forward thither. As for any other part defective in *Poeſy*, we find none; nay rather, *Poeſy* being a plant coming, as it were, from the luſt of a rank ſoile, without any certain ſeed, it hath ſprung up, and ſpread abroad above all other kind of Learning. But now we will propound examples, in number only three, one from things *Naturall*; one from *Politicall*; and one from *Morall*.

The firſt example of Philoſophy, according to Ancient Parables in things Naturall. Of the Univerſe, according to the Fable of Pan.

IV. The Originall of *Pan*, the Ancients leave doubtfull; for ſome ſay that he was the *Sonne of Mercury*, others attribute unto him a farre different begining: For they affirme that all *Penelopes* ſuitors had to doe with her, and from this promiſcuous Act *Pan* deſcended, a common offſpring to them all. There is a third conceit of his birth, not to be paſſed over: for ſome report that he was the ſonne of *Iupiter* and *Hybris*, which ſignifies contumelie. But however begotten, the *Parcæ*, they ſay, were his ſiſters, who dwelt in a cave under ground; but *Pan* remained in the open Aire. The figure and forme, Antiquity repreſented him by, was this. He had on his head a paire of Hornes, riſeing in a ſharp, acuminate to heaven; his body ſhagged, and hairie; his beard very long; his ſhape biformed; above like a man, below like a beaſt; ſmiſht with the feet of a Goat. He bare theſe enſignes of Juriſdiction; in his left hand a pipe of ſeaven Reeds; in his right a ſheepe hoock or a ſtaffe, at the upper end crooked

Hom. Hym. Herod. Eut.

ked or inflexed: he was clad with a Mantle made of a Leopards skinne. *The dignities* and offices attributed unto him were these; that he was the God of Hunters, of Sheepherds, and of all Rurall Inhabitants. Lo. President of Mountaines, and next to *Mercury*, the Embassador of the Gods. *Moreover* he was accounted the leader, and commander of the Nymphs; which were alwaies wont to dance the Rounds, and frisk about him: his train were the Satyres, and the old Sileni. He had power also to strike men with terrors, and those especially vaine, and superstitious, which are termed *Panique fears*. *His Acts* recorded are not many; the chiefest was, that he challenged Cupid at wrestling, in which conflict he had the foile; caught *Typhon* the Gyant in a net, and held him fast. *Moreouer* when *Ceres* being sad and vext for the Rape of *Proserpina*, had hid her selfe, and that all the Gods took paines by dispersing themselves severall wayes to find her out; it was only *Pans* good fortune, as he was hunting, to light on her, and to give the first intelligence where she was. *He presumed* also to put it to the triall who was the better Musitian he or Apollo, and by the judgement of *Midas* was preferred; for which judgement, *Midas* had a paire of Asses eares secretly imped to his head. Of the Love-tricks of *Pan*, there is nothing reported, or at least not much; a thing to be wondred at, especially being among a troope of Gods so profusely amorous. This also is said of him, that he loved the Nymph *Eccho* whom he took to wife; and one pretty wench more called *Syrinx*, towards whom *Cupid* (in an angry revengefull humour because so audaciously he had challenged him at wrestling) inflamed his desire. *So he* is reported once to have sollicited the Moon apart into the high Woods. *Moreover* hee had no issue (which is a marvell also seeing the Gods specially those of the male-kind were very Generative) only he was the reputed Father of a litle Girle called *Iambe*, that with many pretty tales was wont to make strangers merry; and some thought that she was begotten of his wife Eccho. The *Parable* seemeth to be this.

Cic. Epist. ad Att. l. 5. 1

Claud. de R. Proser.

Ovid. Met. XI,

§ *Pan*

§ *Pan* as the very name imports represents, or layeth open the world, or the world of things. *Concerning* his Originall there are only two opinions that goe for Currant. For either he came of *Mercury*, that is the *Word of God*, which the holy Scriptures, without all Controversy, affirme; and the Philosophers such as were the more Divine law; or *else from the confused seeds of things*. For some of the Philosophers held, that the Seeds and Principles of Nature, were even in the substance infinite, hence the opinion, of *Similary Parts primordiall*, was brought in; which *Anaxagoras* either invented, or celebrated. Some more acutely, and soberly think it sufficient to salve the variety of Nature, if seeds, the same in substance, be only diversified in forme and figure; certaine and definite; and placed the rest in the inclosure, and bosome of the seeds. From this spring, the opinion of Atomes is derived, which *Democritus* maintain'd; and *Leucippus* found out. But others though they affirm only one Principle of Nature (*Thales* water; *Anaximenes* Air; *Heraclitus* Fire) yet they have defined that Principle, which is one in Act, to be various and dispensible in power; as that wherein the seeds of all naturall essences lie hidden. *They* who have introduced the first Matter every way disarayed, and unformed, and indifferent to any forme (as *Plato* and *Aristotle* did) came to a farre nearer, and naturall resemblance of the *Figure* of the *Parable*. For they conceiv'd the Matter as a common Courtezan; and the Forms as Suitors. So as all the Opinions touching the beginnings of things come to this point, and may be reduc'd to this distribution; that the world took beginning either from *Mercury*; or from *Penelope*; and all hir Suitors. *The third* conceit of *Pans* Originall is such, as it seemes that the Grecians either by intercourse with the Ægyptians; or one way or other, had heard something of the Hebrew mysteries. For it points to the state of the World not considered in the absolute production; but as it stood after the fall of *Adam*, expos'd and made subject to Death and Corruption: For in that state it was, and remaines to this day; the off-spring of God, and of Sin, or *Contumely*. For the *like*

Laert. in Anaxag.

Laerr in vitis eorũ.

Laert. in vitis.

In Timæo

phys. I.

Gen. 3.

Gen. 3. ſinne of *Adam* was a kind of Contumely, when *hee would be like God*. And therefore all theſe three Narrations concerning the manner of of *Pans* Birth, may ſeem true; if they be rightly diſtinguiſht according to things and times. For this *Pan*, as we now behold and comprehend it, took begining from the word of God, by the means of confuſed matter, which yet was the work of God, and the entrance of Prevarication, and through it of corruption.

§ The *Deſtinies* may well be thought the ſiſters of *Pan*, or *Nature:* for the beginings, and continuances, and diſſolutions; the Depreſsions alſo, and eminencies, and labours, and felicities of things; and whatſoever conditions of a particular Nature, are called *Fates* or *Deſtinies:* which yet unleſſe it be in ſome noble individuate ſubject, as a Man, a Citty, or a Nation, commonly are not acknowledged. But *Pan*, that is, the *Nature of things*, is the cauſe of theſe ſeverall ſtates, and qualities in every particular; ſo as in reſpect of Individualls, the *Chaine* of nature, and the thred of the *Deſtinies*, is the ſame. *Moreover* the Ancients fained, that *Pan* ever lived in the open Aire; but the PARCÆ, or *Deſtinies*, in a mighty ſubterraneous Cave; from whence with an infinite ſwiftneſſe they flew to men: becauſe the nature and common face of the *Univerſe* is apert, and viſible; but the individuall *Fates* of Particulars are ſecret, ſwift, and ſodain. But if *Fate* be taken in a more generall acception, as to ſignify the more notable only, and not every common event; yet in that ſenſe alſo, the ſignification is correſpondent to the univerſall ſtate of things; ſeeing from the order of *Nature*, there is nothing ſo ſmall which comes to paſſe without a Cauſe; and nothing ſo abſolutely great, as to be independent; ſo that the very Fabrique of *Nature* comprehendeth in the lappe and boſome thereof, every event, ſmall or great; and by a conſtant rule diſcloſeth them in due ſeaſon. Wherefore no marvell if the PARCÆ be brought in as the legitimate Siſters of *Pan*: For *Fortune* is the daughter of the fooliſh vulgar; and found favour only with the more unſound Philoſophers. Certainly the words of

of Epicurus ſavour leſſe of Dotage than of prophaneneſſe where he ſaith; *Præſtare credere fabulam Deorum, quam Fatum aſſerere*, As if any thing in the frame of nature could be like an Iland, which is ſeparate from the connexion of the cõtinent. But *Epicurus* (as it is evident from his own words) accommodating, and ſubjecting his *Naturall Philoſophy* to his *Morall*, would heare of no opinion which might preſſe and ſting the conſcience; or any way diſca lme, and trouble that, *Euthymia*, or *Tranquility of mind*, which hee had receiv'd from *Democritus*. Wherefore being more indulgent to the deluſions of his owne fancies, than patient of truth; he hath fairely caſt off the yoak, and abandon'd as well the *Neceſſity* of *Fate*, as the *Feare* of the *Gods*. And thus much concerning the Fraternity of *Pan* with the *Deſtinies*. Senec. in Epiſt.

§ *Hornes* are attributed unto the *World*, broad at the root, ſharpe at the top; the nature of all things being like a Pyramis leſſening upwards. For *Individuals* in which the Baſe of nature is ſpread out; being infinite, are collected into Species, which are many alſo; Species againe riſe up into Generalls; and theſe aſcending are contracted into more Univerſall Generalities; ſo that at length, nature may ſeeme to cloſe in a *unity*; which is ſignified by the Pyramidal Figure of *Pans* Hornes. Neither is it to be wonder'd at, that *Pan* toucheth heaven with his *horns*; ſeeing the tranſcendentals *of Nature*, or *Univerſall Ideas*, doe in ſome ſort reach things Divine. Wherefore *Homers famous Chaine of Naturall Cauſes, tyed to the foot of Iupiters Chaire*, was celebrated. And it is plain, that no man converſant in *Metaphyſique*; & thoſe things which in Nature are *Eternall*, and immoveable; and that hath never ſo litle withdrawn his mind from the fluid ruine of ſublunary things, which doth not at the ſame inſtant fall upon *Naturall Theologie*: ſo direct and compendious a paſſage it is, from the top of the *Pyramis*, to Matters Divine. Iliad. IX.

§ The body of *Nature* is elegantly and lively drawne *Hairy*, repreſenting the beames of things; for beames are, as it were, the haires or briſtles of nature; and every Creature is

more or leſſe Beamy; which is moſt apparant in the faculty of ſeeing; and no leſſe in every magnetique virtue, and operation upon diſtance; for whatſoever worketh upon any thing upon Diſtance, that may rightly be ſaid to dart forth rayes. Moreover *Pans beard* is ſaid to be exceeding long, becauſe the beames or influences of the Heavens; and ſpecially of the Sunne, doe operate, and pierce fartheſt of all; ſo that not only the ſurface, but the inward bowels of the earth have bin turn'd; ſubduc'd; and impregnate, with the maſculine Spirit of the heavenly influence. And the forme of *Pans beard* is the more elegant; becauſe the *Sun* when his higher part, is ſhadowed with a Cloud, his beams break out in the lower; and ſo appeares to the eye as if he were *bearded.*

§ Nature alſo is moſt expreſſively ſet forth with a *bi-formed Body*; in reference to the Differences betweene ſuperior and inferior bodies. For the one part, by reaſon of their beauty; and equability; and conſtancy of motion; and dominion over the earth; and earthly things; is aptly ſet out by the ſhape of man: And the other part in reſpect of their perturbations; and irregular motions; and that they are for moſt part cõmanded by the Celeſtiall; may be well fitted with the figure of a *bruit beaſt*. Againe this ſame *bi-formed* deſcription of his *body*, pertaines to the participation of the ſpecies or kind; for no ſpecies of Nature, ſeemes to be ſimple; but, as it were participating and compounded of two, Eſſentiall Ingredients. For Man hath ſomething of a Beaſt: a Beaſt ſomething of a Plant: a Plant ſomething of an inanimate Body: and all Natural things are indeed bi-formed; and compounded of a ſuperior and inferior kind.

§ It is a witty Allegory that ſame, of the *feet of the Goat*; by reaſon of the upward tending motions of Terreſtiall bodies towards the regions of the aire; and of the heaven; where alſo they become penſile; and from thence are rather forc'd downe, than fall downe. For the Goat is a mounting Animal, that loves to be hanging upon rocks, and precipices, & ſteep hils: And this is done alſo in a wonderfull manner, even

even by thoſe things which are deſtinated to this inferior Globe; as may manifeſtly appear, in *Cloudes* and *Meteors*. And it was not without the grounds of reaſon, that *Gilbert*, who hath written a painfull and an experimentall work, touching a *Loadſtone*, caſt in this doubt, *Whether or no ponderous bodies, after a great diſtance, and long diſcontinuance from the earth, may not put off their motion towards the inferior Globe?* De Magn.

§ The two enſignes which *Pan* bears in his hands, doe point, the one at *Harmony*, the other at *Empirie:* for the *Pipe of ſeven Reeds*, doth evidently demonſtrate the conſent and *Harmony*; or diſcordant concord of Nature, which is cauſed by the motion of the ſeaven wandring ſtarres: for there are no other Errors, or manifeſt Expatiations in heaven, ſave thoſe of the ſeaven Planets; which being intermingled, and moderated with the equality of the fixed ſtarres; and their perpetuall and invariable diſtance one from the other, may maintaine and excite both the conſtancy in ſpecificall; and the fluency of Individuall Natures. If there be any leſſer Planets which are not conſpicuous; or any greater Mutation in heaven (as in many ſuperlunary Comets) they ſeem but like Pipes, either altogether mute, or only ſtreperous for a time, becauſe their influence either doth not ſtream down ſo low as to us; or doth not long interrupt the Harmony of the *ſeaven Pipes of Pan*. And that *Staffe of Empirie*, may be excellently applied to the order of Nature, which is partly right, partly crooked. And this ſtaffe or rodde is eſpecially crooked at the upper end; becauſe all the works of Divine Providence are commonly fetcht about by circuits, and windings; ſo that one thing may ſeem to be done, and yet indeed a clean contrary brought to paſſe; as *the ſelling of Ioſeph into Ægypt*, and the like. Beſides in all wiſe humane Goverment, they that ſit at the helme, doe more happily bring their purpoſes about, and inſinuate more eaſily things fit for the people, by pretexts, and oblique courſes; than by downe-right dealing. Nay (which perchance may ſeem very ſtrange) in things meerely naturall, you may ſooner Gen. 45.

deceive nature, than force her; ſo improper, and ſelfe-impeaching are open direct proceedings; whereas on the other ſide, an oblique and an inſinuing way, gently glides along, and compaſſeth the intended effect.

§ *Pans Cloak or Mantle*, is ingeniouſly faigned to be the *Skin of a Leopard*, becauſe it is full of ſpots: ſo the Heavens are ſpotted with ſtarres; the Sea with Ilands; the Land with flowers; and every particular creature alſo, is for moſt part garniſhed with diverſe colours about the ſuperficies; which is, as it were a Mantle unto it.

§ The office of *Pan* could be by nothing ſo conceived; and expreſt to the life, as by faigning him to be the *God of Hunters*; for every naturall Action, and ſo by conſequence, motion and progreſſion, is nothing elſe but a *Hunting*. Arts and Sciences have their works; and humane Counſils their ends, which they earneſtly *hunt* after. All naturall things have either their food, as a *Prey*; or their pleaſure, as a recreation; which they ſeek for; and that in a quick-diſcurſive, and diſcerning way.

Virg.B.2. *Torva leæna Lupum ſequitur, Lupus ipſe Capellum,*
Florentem Cythiſum ſequitur laſciva Capella.

§ *Pan* is alſo ſaid to be the God of the *Country Swaines*; becauſe men of this condition lead lives more agreeable unto Nature, than thoſe that live in the Citties and Courts of Princes; where Nature by too much Art is corrupted: ſo as the ſaying of the Poet (though in the ſenſe of love) may be here verified: --- *Pars minima eſt ipſa puella ſui.* Mart. Ep.

§ *Pan* was held to be *Lo. Preſident of the Mountaines*; becauſe in high Mountaines and Hills, *Nature* laies hir ſelfe moſt open, and is moſt diſplaied to the view and contemplation of men.

§ Whereas *Pan* is ſaid to be (*next unto Mercury*) the *Meſſenger* of the Gods; there is in that a Divine Myſtery contained; becauſe, next unto the word of God, the *Image* of the world proclaimes the Divine power and wiſdome; as records the ſacred Poet, *The Heavens proclaime the Glory of God, and the vaſt Expanſion reports the works of his hands.* Pſal. 19.

§ The

§ The *Nymphs*, that is the Soules of living things, give great delight to *Pan*: for the ſoules of the living are the Minions of the World. The *Conduct* of theſe Nymphs is with great reaſon attributed to *Pan*, becauſe theſe Nymphs, or Soules of the liveing, doe follow their naturall diſpoſition, as their guides; and with infinite variety every one of them after the faſhion of his country, doth leap and dance with unceſſant motion about hir. *Wherefore one of the Moderne* N. L. very ingeniouſly hath reduced all the power of the Soule into Motion; noteing the miſpriſion, and precipitancy of ſome of the ancients; who fixing their eyes and thoughts with unadviſed haſt, upon Memory; Imagination, and Reaſon, have paſt over the *Cogitative faculty* untoucht; which hath a chiefe part in the order of conception. For he that calleth a thing into his mind, whether by impreſſion or recordation, *cogitateth* and *conſidereth*; and he that imployeth the faculty of his phanſie alſo *cogitateth*; and he that reaſoneth doth in like manner *cogitate* or adviſe: and to be briefe, the Soule of man, whether admoniſht by ſenſe, or left to her own liberty; whether in functions of the Intellect, or of the affections and of the will, dances to the muſicall aires of the *cogitations*; which is that *tripudiation* of the *Nymphs*.

§ The *Satyres*, and *Sileni*, are perpetuall followers of *Pan*, that is old age and youth: for of all naturall things, there is a lively, jocund, and (as I may ſay) a danceing age; and a dull, flegmatique age: the carriages and diſpoſitions of both which ages, may peradventure ſeeme, to a man which ſeriouſly obſerves them, as ridiculous and deformed, as thoſe of the *Satyres*, or of the *Sileni*.

§ Touching the *Terrors which Pan is ſaid to be the Author of*, there may be made a wiſe inſtruction; namely, *that Nature hath implanted in every living thing, a kind of care and feare, tending to the preſervation of its own life, and being; and to the repelling and ſhunning of all hurtfull encounters.* And yet Nature knows not how to keepe a mean, but alwaies intermixeth vaine and empty fears, with ſuch as are diſcreet and profitable; ſo that all things (if their inſides might be

ſeen) would appear full of *Panique frights*; but ſpecially Men; and above all other men, the people which are wonderfully travailed and toſſed with ſuperſtition; ſpecially in hard, and formidable, and adverſe times; which indeed is nothing elſe but a *Panique terror*. Nor doth this ſuperſtition raigne only in the vulgar; but from popular opinions, breaks out ſome times upon wiſe men; as Divinely Epicurus (if the reſt of his diſcourſes touching the Gods, had bin conformable to this rule) *Non Deos vulgi negare prophanum; ſed vulgi opiniones diis applicare prophanum.*

Laert. in Epicur.

§ Concerning *the audacity of Pan; and his combate upon challenge with Cupid; the meaning of it is, that matter wants not inclination, and deſire, to the relapſing and diſſolution of the World into the old Chaos; if hir malice and violence were not reſtrained and kept in order, by the prepotent concord of things; ſignified by Cupid, or the God of Love.* And therefore it fell out well for man, by the fatall contexture of the world; or rather the great goodneſſe of the Divine Providence, that *Pan* was found too weak, and overcome. To the ſame effect may be interpreted, *his catching of Typhon in a net.* for howſoever there may ſometimes happen vaſt, and unwonted tumors (as the name of *Typhon* imports) either in the Sea, or in the Ayre, or in the Earth; yet nature doth intangle in an intricate toile, and curbe and reſtraine as it were with a chaine of Adamant the exceſſes and inſolencies of theſe kind of Bodies.

§ As touching the *finding out of Ceres, attributed to this God, and that as he was hunting and thought little of it*, which none of the other Gods could doe, though they did nothing elſe but ſeek hir, and that with diligence; it gives us this true and grave admonition; that is, *that men doe not expect the invention of things neceſſary for life and manners, from abſtract Philoſophies, as from the greater Gods; though they ſhould apply themſelves to no other ſtudy; but only from* Pan, *that is, from diſcreet experience, and from the univerſall obſervation of the things of the World;* where oftentimes by chance (and as it were going a hunting) ſuch inventions are lighted upon.

for

For the moſt profitable inventions, are the off-ſpring of experience; and, as it were, certaine Donatives diſtributed to men by chance.

§ His conteſtation with *Apollo* about *Muſique*; and the event thereof, containes a wholſome inſtruction, which may ſerve to reſtraine mens reaſons, and judgments, with the reines of ſobriety, from boaſting and glorying in their gifts. For there ſeemes to be a two-fold *Harmony* or *Muſique*; the one of Divine Wiſdome; the other of Humane Reaſon; for, to humane judgment, and as it were, the eare of mortalls; the adminiſtration of the world; and of Creatures therein; and the more ſecret judgments of God, ſound ſomewhat hard and harſh: Which rude ignorance, albeit it be well proclaim'd by Aſſes eares; yet notwitſtanding theſe eares are ſecret, and doe not openly appeare; neither is it perceived, or noted as a Deformity by the Vulgar. Addas & in-cõpar. Sandiſij cõmẽt. ad Ovid. Mer. XI.

§ Laſtly it is not to be wondered at, that there is nothing attributed unto *Pan* concerning *Loves*, but only of the marriage with *Eccho*; for the world doth injoy it ſelfe, and in it ſelfe all things elſe. Now he that loves would enjoy ſomething, but where there is enough, there is no place left to deſire. Wherefore there can be no wanton love in *Pan*, or the *World*, nor deſire to obtaine any thing, (ſeeing it is contented with it ſelfe) but only *Speeches*; which (if plaine) are pronounced by the Nymph *Eccho*, a thing not ſubſtantiall, but only vocall; if more accurate by *Syringa*; that is, when *words* and *voices* are regulate by certaine numbers; Poeticall, or Oratoricall, as by muſicall meaſures. It is an excellent invention that amongſt *ſpeeches*, and *voices*, only *Eccho* ſhould be taken in marriage by the *World*; *for that alone is true Philoſophy, which doth faithfully render the very words of the world; and which is written, no otherwiſe, than the world doth dictate; and is nothing elſe than the image and reflection thereof*; and addeth nothing of its owne, but only iterates, and reſounds.

§ And whereas *Pan is reported to have called the Moone aſide into a high-ſhadowed wood*; ſeemes to appertaine to the convention

convention betweene ſence and heavenly, or divine things: For the caſe of *Endymion*, and *Pan* are different; the *Moone* of hir owne accord came downe to *Endymion*, as hee was aſleep: *For that Divine illuminations oftentimes gently ſlide into the underſtanding, caſt aſleepe, and retired from the ſences*; but if they be called, and ſent for by *Sence*, as by *Pan*; than they preſent no other light than that,

Quale ſub incertam lunam, ſub luce malignâ
Eſt iter in ſylvis.----

It belongs alſo to the ſufficiency, and perfection of the world, that it begets no iſſue: For the world doth generate in reſpect of its parts; but in reſpect of the whole, how can it generate, ſeeing there is no body beyond the bounds of the Vniverſe? *As for that Girle Iambe*, father'd upon *Pan*, certainly it is a wiſe adjection to the fable; for by *hir* are repreſented thoſe *vaine and idle Paradoxes concerning the nature of things*, which have been frequent in all ages, and have filled the world with novelties, for the matter, fruitles; ſpurious for the Race; by their garrulity, ſometimes pleaſant; ſometimes tedious and unſeaſonable.

An other example of Philoſophy according to Ancient Parables in Politiques, *of Warre*, according to the Fable of *Perſeus*.

Herod. Polym. Ovid. Met. 4. Paus. Strab.

V *Perſeus a Prince of the Eaſt is reported to have bin imployed by Pallas for the deſtroying of Meduſa*, who was very infeſtious to the weſterne parts of the world, about the utmoſt Coaſts of Hiberia. A *Monſter* huge and fierce, of an aſpect ſo dire and horrid, that with hir very looks ſhe turn'd men into ſtones: Of all the Gorgons this *Meduſa* alone was mortall, the reſt not ſubject to death. *Perſeus* therefore preparing himſelfe for this noble enterpriſe, had Armes, and guifts beſtowed on him by three of the Gods: *Mercury* gave him wings fitted for his feet not his armes; *Pluto* a helmet; *Pallas* a ſhield, and a Looking-Glaſſe. *Notwithſtanding* although he was thus well furniſht, he went not directly to *Meduſa*, but turned into the *Greæ*, which by the Mothers

ſide

ſide were ſiſters to the *Gorgons*. Theſe *Greæ* from their birth were hoary-headed, reſembling old women. They had but one only *eye*, and one *tooth* among them all; both which as they had occaſion to goe abroad, they were wont in courſe to take with them, and at their returne to lay them downe againe. This *Eye* and *Tooth* they lent to *Perſeus*: ſo finding himſelfe completely appointed for the Action deſigned, with winged ſpeed he marches towards *Meduſa*. *Hir he* found ſleeping; yet durſt not venture himſelfe a front to hir aſpect, if ſhe ſhould chance to awake; but turning his head aſide, beholding her by reflection in *Pallas Mirror*, and ſo directing his blow, cut of hir head; from whoſe bloud guſhing out, inſtantly there emerged *Pegaſus* the flyeing Horſe. *Hir* head thus ſmitten off, *Perſeus* transferres and inſerts into *Pallas* ſhield; which yet retained this virtue, that whoſoever lookt upon it, as one blaſted or Plannet-ſtruck, he ſhould ſodainly become ſenſeleſſe.

§ *This Fable* ſeems to be deviſed for direction to the preparation, and order that is to be obſerved in making of warre. And firſt the undertaking of any warre ought to be as a commiſsion from *Pallas*; certainly not from *Venus*, (as the Trojan warre was) or ſome ſuch ſlight motive; becauſe the Deſignes of Warre, ought to be grounded upon ſolid Counſils. Than for the choice of warre; for the nature and quality thereof; the Fable propounds three grave and wholſome Precepts. *The firſt is, that a Prince doe not much trouble himſelfe about the conqueſt of neighbour Nations: nor is the way of enlarging a Patrimony, and an Empiry, the ſame; for in the augmentation of private poſſeſsions, the vicinity of Territories is to be conſidered; but in the amplification of publique Dominions, the occaſion and facility of makeing warre, and the fruit to be expected, ought to be inſtead of propinquity.* Therefore *Perſeus*, though an Eaſterne Prince, makes the expedition of his warre a farre off, even in the remoteſt parts of the Weſterne World. *There is a notable* preſident of this Caſe, in the different manner of warring, practiſed by two Kings, the Father and the Sonne, *Philip*

Sandys Comment. in Ovid. Met. 4. Renovard.

Plut. in Alex. Id. de Fort. Alex.

lip and *Alexander*. For *Philip* warred upon Borderers only, and added to the Empire ſome few Citties, and that not without great contention and danger; who many times, but eſpecially in a Theban warre, was brought into extreme hazard: But *Alexander* carried the Actions of his warre a farre off; and with a proſperous boldneſſe undertook an expedition againſt the *Perſian*; conquered infinite Nations; tired, rather with travile, than warre. This point is farther cleered in the propagation of the *Roman Empire*, what time their conqueſts towards the Weſt ſcarce reacht beyond *Liguria*, did yet in the *Eaſt*, bring all the provinces as farre as the mountaine *Taurus*, within the compaſſe of their Armes and command. So *Charles* the eight, King of France, finding the warre of Brittaine (which afterward was compounded by marriage) not ſo feaſable, purſued his enterprile upon *Naples*, which he accompliſht with wonderfull facility and felicity. Certainly warres made upon Nations farre off, have this advantage, that they are to fight with thoſe who are not practiſed in the diſcipline and Armes of the Aggreſſor: but in a warre made upon Borderers, the caſe is otherwiſe. Beſides the preparation for ſuch an expedition is commonly better appointed; and the terror to the enemy from ſuch a bold and confident enterpriſe, the greater. Neither can there uſually be made, by the enimy to whom the warre is brought ſo farre off, any retaliation or reciprocall invaſion; which in a warre upon borderers often falls out. But the chief point is, that in ſubdueing a neighbour ſtate, the election of advantages is brought to a ſtraight; but in a forraigne expedition, a man may turne the race of the warre at pleaſure, thether, where military diſcipline is moſt weakned; or the ſtrength of the Nation much waſted and worne; or Civile diſcords are ſeaſonably on foot; or ſuch like opportunities preſent themſelves.

Hiſt. Fran. Serres alii.

§ *The ſecond precept is, that the motives of warre be juſt; and Religious; and Honourable, and Plauſible*: for that begets alacrity, as well in the Souldiers that fight, as in the people that afford pay: it drawes on and procureth aides; and hath many

Cic. 1. de Off. Bacon de jure Belli cont. Hiſp.

many other advantages beſides. Amongſt the juſt grounds of warre, that is moſt favorable, which is undertaken for the extirpation of Tyrans; under whom the people looſe their courage, and are caſt downe without heart and vigor, *as in the ſight of Meduſa:* which kind of heroick Acts, procured *Hercules* a divinity amongſt the Gods. certainly it was a point of Religion amongſt the Romans, with valour and ſpeed, to aid and ſuccour their confederates and allies, that were any way diſtreſſed. So juſt vindictive warres have for moſt part bin proſperous; ſo the warre againſt *Brutus* and *Caſſius*, for the revenge of *Cæſars* death; of *Severus* for the death of *Pertinax*; of *Junius Brutus* for the revenge of the death of *Lucretia:* and in a word, whoſoever relieve and revenge the calamities and injuries of men, beare arms under *Perſeus*.

Ovid. Met. IX. Sandiſii Comment.

Tacit.

Herodian. &c.

§ *The third precept is, that in the undertaking of any warre, a true eſtimate of the forces* be taken; and that it be rightly waighed whether the enterpriſe may be compaſt and accompliſht; leſt vaſt and endleſſe deſignes be purſued. *For amongſt the Gorgons*, by wh ich warre is repreſented, *Perſeus* wiſely undertook hir only, that was mortall; and did not ſet his mind upon impoſſibilities. Thus farre the fable inſtructs touching thoſe things that fall in deliberation, about the undertakeing of a warre; the reſt pertaine to the warre it ſelfe.

Fra. Bacon ut ſupra.

§ *In warre thoſe three guifts of the Gods doe moſt availe*, ſo as commonly they governe, and lead fortune after them: for *Perſeus received ſpeed, from Mercury*; concealing *of his Counſils, from Orcus; and* Providence *from Pallas*. Neither is it without an Allegorie, and that moſt prudent, that thoſe wings of *ſpeed* in diſpatch of affaires (for quickneſſe in warre is of ſpeciall importance) were faſtned unto his heeles, and not unto his Arme-holes; to his feet, and not to his ſhoulders; becauſe *celerity* is required, not ſo much in the firſt aggreſſions and preparations; as in the purſuit and the ſucours that ſecond the firſt aſſaults: for there is no errors in warre more frequent, *than that proſequution, and ſubſidiary forces, fiale to anſwer the alacrity of the firſt on-*

ſets. *Now the Helmet of Pluto*, which hath power to make men inviſible, is plaine in the Morall: for the *ſecreting of Counſils* next to *Celerity*, is of great moment in warre; wherof Celerity it ſelfe is a great part; for *ſpeed*, prevents the diſcloſure of Counſils. *It pertains to Pluto's Helmet*, that there be one generall of the Army in warre, inveſted with abſolute authority; for conſultations communicated with many, partake more of the *Plumes* of *Mars*, than of the *Helmet* of *Pluto*. To the ſame purpoſe are various Pretenſions, and doubtfull deſignations, and emiſſary reports; which either caſt a cloud over mens eyes, or turne them another way, and place the true aimes of Counſils in the darke: for diligent and diffident Cautions touching letters, Ambaſſadors, Rebells, and many ſuch like Proviloes, adorne and begirt the *Helmet* of *Pluto*. *But it importeth no leſſe*, to diſcover the Counſils of the enemy than to conceale their owne: wherefore to the *Helmet of Pluto*, we muſt joyne the *Looking-glaſſe* of *Pallas*, whereby the ſtrength, the weakneſſe, the ſecret abettors, the diviſions and factions, the proceedings and Counſils of the enemy may be diſcerned and diſcloſed. *And becauſe the caſualties of warre are ſuch*, as we muſt not put too much confidence, either in the concealeing our own deſignes, or the diſſecreting the deſignes of the enimy; or in celerity it ſelfe; we muſt eſpecially take the *ſhield of Pallas*, that is of *Providence*; that ſo, as litle as may be, be left to fortune. Hetherto belong the ſending out of eſpialls, the fortification of camps, (which in the Military diſcipline of this latter age, is almoſt grown out of uſe: for the camps of the Romans were ſtrengthened as if it had bin a Citty, againſt all adverſe events of warre) a ſetled and well ordered Army, not truſting too much to the light Bands, or to the troops of horſemen; and whatſoever appertaines to a ſubſtantiall and adviſed Defenſive warre: ſeeing in warres the *ſhield of Pallas* prevailes more than the *ſword of Mars*.

§ *But Perſeus* albeit he was ſufficiently furniſht with forces and courage, yet was he to doe one thing of ſpeciall importance, before he enterprized the Action; and that was

to

to have ſome *intelligence with the Greæ*. Theſe *Greæ are treaſons*, which may be termed the *ſiſters of Warre*; not deſcended of the ſame ſtock, but farre unlike in nobility of Birth: *ſo warres are Generous and Heroicall*; *but Treaſons baſe and ignoble*. Their deſcription is elegant, for they are ſaid to be gray headed, and like old women from their birth; by reaſon that Traitors are continually vext with cares and trepidations. But all their ſtrength, before the break out into open Rebellions, conſiſts either in an *Eye, or in a Tooth*, for every faction alienated from any ſtate, hath an *evill eye*; *and bites*. Beſides, this *Eye and Tooth* is, as it were, common; for whatſoever they can learne or know, runs from hand to hand amongſt them. And as concerning the *Tooth*, they doe all bite alike, and caſt the ſame ſcandals; ſo that hear one, and you hear all. *Perſeus* therefore was to deale with theſe *Greæ*, and to engage their aſſiſtance for the loan of their *Eye and Tooth*: their *Eye for Diſcoveries*; their *Tooth for the ſowing and ſpreading of Rumors*; and the ſtirring up of envy; and the troubling of the mindes of men. *After all things are well, and preparedly diſpoſed for warre*; that is firſt of all to be taken into conſideration, which *Perſeus* did, *that Meduſa may be found a ſleep*: for a wiſe Captain ever aſſaults the enimy unprepared; and when he is moſt ſecure. *Laſtly in the very action and heat of warre*, the looking into *Pallas Glaſſe*, is to be put in practiſe: for moſt men, before it come to the puſh, can with diligence and circumſpection dive into, and diſcerne the ſtate and deſignes of the enimies; but in the very point of danger, either are amazed with fear; or in a raſh mood fronting dangers too directly, precipitate themſelves into them; mindfull of victory; but forgetfull of evaſion, and retrete. Yet neither of theſe ſhould be practiſed, but they ſhould look with a reverſed countenance into *Pallas Mirror*; that ſo the ſtroak may be rightly directed, without either terror or fury.

§ After the Warre was finiſht, and the victory wonne, there followed two Effects; *The procreation and raiſing of Pegaſus*; which evidently denotes Fame, that flying through

the world proclaimes victory; and makes the remaines of that warre eaſy and feaſable. *The ſecond is the bearing of Meduſa's head in his ſhield*; becauſe there is no kind of defence for excellency comparable to this. For one famous and memorable Act proſperouſly enterpriz'd and atchieved, ſtrikes the Spirit of inſurrection in an enemy, into an amazing terror; and blaſts envy hir ſelfe into an aſtoniſhment and wonder.

The third Example of Philoſophy according to Ancient Parables in *Morality. Of Paſſion according to the Fable of Dionyſus.*

Orph. in Hym. Ov. Met. 3. Eurip in Bacc. Nonn. in Dion.

VI *They ſay that Semele Iupiters Minion*, having bound hir Paramour, by an inviolable oath, to grant hir one requeſt which ſhe would aske, deſir'd that he would accompany hir in the ſame form, wherein he came in to *Juno*: So ſhe periſht with lightning. But the *Infant* which ſhe bare in hir Wombe, *Iupiter* the Father took out, and ſowed it in his thigh till the months were accompliſht, that it ſhould be borne. *This burden* made *Iupiter* ſomewhat to limpe; wherefore the child, becauſe it vext and pinched *Iupiter*, while it was in his flank, was called *Dionyſius*. *Being borne* hee was committed to *Proſerpina* for ſome yeares to be nurſt; and being growne up, he had ſuch a maiden face, as that a man could hardly judge whether it were a boy, or a girle. *He was dead alſo*, and buried for a time, but afterwards revived. *Being but a youth* he invented the planting & dreſſing of vines; the making and uſe of wine; for which becomming famous and renowned, he ſubjugated the world even to the utmoſt bounds of *India*. *He rode in a Chariot drawne with Tygers*. There danced about him certaine deformed *Hobgoblins* called *Cobali*; *Acratus* and others; yea, even the *Muſes* alſo were ſome of his followers. *Hee took to wife Ariadne*, forſaken and left by *Theſeus*. The *tree ſacred unto him was the* Ivy. He was held the *Inventor* and *Inſtitutor* of *ſacrifices* and *Ceremonies*, but ſuch as were frantique and full of corruptions

ons and cruelties. *He had likewiſe power to ſtrike men with madneſſe:* For it is reported that at the Celebration of his *Orgyes*, two famous Worthies, *Pentheus* and *Orpheus*, were torne in pieces by certaine mad-enraged women; the one becauſe he got upon a tree, out of a curioſity to behold their Ceremonies in theſe Sacrifices; the other becauſe he plaid ſweetly and cunningly upon the harpe. *And for the Geſts* of this God, they are in a manner the ſame with *Iupiters*. Paus: in Bœot. Eurip in Bac.

§ *There is ſuch excellent Morality coucht in this fable*, as Morall Philoſophy affords not better. *For under the Perſon of Bacchus is deſcribed the nature of Paßion; or of Affections and Perturbations of the mind. Firſt therefore touching the birth* and parentage of *Paßion*; the beginning of all Paſſion, though never ſo hurtfull, is nothing elſe than *good Apparent*: For as the Mother of virtue is *good-Exiſtent*; ſo the Mother of Paſſion is *good Apparent*. The one of theſe (under which Perſon, the ſoule of man is repreſented) is *Jupiters* lawfull wife; the other his Concubine: which yet affecteth the honour of *Iuno*, as *Semele* did. *Paßion* is conceiv'd in an unlawfull deſire, raſhly granted, before rightly underſtood, and judged: And after when it begins to grow fervent, the *Mother* of it, which is the Nature and Species of *Good*, by too much inflamation is deſtroyed, and periſheth. The proceeding of *Paſſion* from the firſt conception thereof is after this manner: It is nouriſht and concealed by the mind of man (which is the Parent of *Paſſion*,) ſpecially in the inferior part of the mind, as in the thigh; and ſo vexeth, and pulleth, and depreſſeth the mind; as thoſe good determinations and actions, are much hindred and lamed thereby: but when it comes to be confirmed by conſent and habit; and breakes out into Act; that it hath now, as it were fulfill'd the months, and is brought forth and born; firſt for a while it is brought up by *Proſerpina*; that is, it ſeeks corners and ſecret places, and lurks as it were, underground, untill the rains of ſhame and fear laid aſide, and boldneſſe comming on; it either aſſumes the pretext of ſome virtue, or becomes altogether impudent and ſhameleſſe. *And it is moſt true that every vehement Paſſion is of* V. Cõment in Ovid. Met. 3. G. Sandijs. Renovard.

a doubtfull ſexe; being maſculine in the firſt motion; but feminine in proſeqution. *It is an excellent fiction, that of dead Bacchus reviving*; for *Paſſions* doe ſometimes ſeeme to be in a dead ſleepe, and extinct; but we muſt not truſt them, no though they were buried: For let there be but matter and opportunity offer'd, they riſe againe.

§ *The invention of the Vine is a wiſe Parable*; for every affection is very quick and witty in finding out that which nouriſheth, and cheriſheth it; and of all things knowne to men, *wine is moſt powerfull and efficacious to excite and inflame Paſſions; of what kind ſoever*; as being in a ſort a common incentive to them all.

§ *Againe Affection or Paſſion is elegantly ſet downe to be a ſubduer of Nations, and an undertaker of infinite expeditions:* For *deſire* never reſts content with what it poſſeſſeth; but with an infinite and unſatiable appetite ſtill covets more; & hearkens after a new purchaſe.

§ *So Tygers* STABLE *by Affections; and draw their Chariot:* For ſince the time that *Affection* began to ride in a Coach; and to goe no more a foot; and to captivate *Reaſon*; and to lead hir away in triumph; it grows cruel; unmanegeable, and fierce, againſt whatſoever withſtands or oppoſeth it.

§ *And it is a pretty deviſe, that thoſe ridiculous Demons, are brought in dancing about Bacchus Chariot:* For every vehement affection doth cauſe in the eyes; face; and geſture, undecent and ſubleeming, apeiſh, and deformed motions; ſo that they who in any kind of Paſſiion, (as in anger; arrogance; or love) ſeem glorious and brave in their owne eyes; doe appeare to others miſhapen, and ridiculous.

§ *The Muſes are ſeen in the Company of Paſſion:* and there is almoſt no affection ſo depraved and vile, which is not ſoothed by ſome kind of *Learning*: And herein the indulgence and arrogancy of Wits doth exceedingly derogate from the Majeſty of the Muſes; that whereas they ſhould be the Leaders and Ancient-bearers of life; they are become the foot-pages; and buffoones to luſts and vanity.

§ *Againe where Bacchus is ſaid to have engaged his Affe-*

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ctions on hir that was abandoned and reiected by another: it is an Allegory of ſpeciall regard; for it is moſt certain, that *Paſſion* ever ſeekes and ſues for that which experience hath relinquiſht; and they all know, who have paid deare for ſerving and obaying their *Luſts*; that whether it be honor; or riches; or delight; or glory; or knowledge; or any thing elſe, which they ſeeke after; they purſue things caſt off, and by diverſe men in all ages after experience had utterly rejected and repudiate.

§ *Neither is it without a Myſtery, that the Ivy was ſacred to Bacchus*; the application holds two waies: *Firſt*, in that the *Ivy* remaines green in Winter; *Secondly*, in that it creeps along, imbraceth, and advanceth it ſelfe over ſo many diverſe bodies, as trees, walls, and edifices. *Touching the firſt*, every *Paſsion* doth through renitence and prohibition, and as it were, by an *Anti-periſtaſis*, (like the *Ivy* through the cold of winter) grow freſh and lively. *Secondly*, every predominant affection in mans ſoule, like the *Ivy*, doth compaſſe and confine all human Actions and Conſils; neither can you finde any thing ſo immaculate and inconcern'd, which affections have not tainted and clinched as it were with their tendrells.

§ *Neither is it a wonder, that ſuperſtitious ceremonies were attributed unto Bacchus*, ſeeing every giddy-headed humor keeps, in a manner, Revell-rout in falſe Religions; ſo that the pollutions and diſtempers of heretiques, exceed the Bachanalls of the Heathens; and whoſe ſuperſtitions have bin no leſſe barbarous; than vile and loathſome. *Nor is it a wonder that Madneſſe is thought to be ſent by Bacchus*, ſeeing every affection in the Exceſſe thereof, is a kind of *ſhort fury*; and if it grow vehement and become habituall; it commonly concludes in *Madneſſe*.

§ *Concerning the rending and diſmembring of Pentheus and Orpheus, in the celebration of the Orgies of Bacchus*; the Parable is plain. For every *prevalent affection* is outragious againſt two things; *whereof the one is Curious enquiry into it; the other free and wholſome admonition.* Nor will it availe, though that

inquiry was only to contemplate and to behold, as it were going up into a tree, without any malignity of mind; nor againe, though that *admonition* was given with much arte and ſweetneſſe; but howſoever, the *Orgies* of *Bacchus*; can not endure either *Pentheus* or *Orpheus*.

§ *Laſtly that confuſion of the Perſons of Iupiter and Bacchus*, may be well transferred to a Parable; ſeeing noble and famous Acts, and remarkable and glorious merits, doe ſometimes proceed from virtue and well ordered reaſon, and magnanimity; and ſometimes from a ſecret affection, and a hidden paſsion; howſoever both the one and the other, ſo affect the renowne of Fame, and Glory; that a man can hardly diſtinguiſh between the Acts of *Bacchus*; and the Geſts of *Jupiter*.

But we ſtay too long in the *Theatre*; let us now paſſe on to the *Pallace* of *the Mind*; the *entrance* whereof we are to approach with more veneration, and attention.

THE

THE THIRD BOOK OF
FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM
VICOUNT. S: ALBAN.

OF THE
DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT
OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

I. *The Partition of Sciences*, into Theology and Philoſophy. II. *Partition of* Philoſophy *into three Knowledges.* Of God; of Nature; of Man. III. *The Conſtitution of* Philoſophia Prima, or Summary Philoſophy; *as the Commune Parent of all.*

ALL *Hiſtory* (Excellent KING) treads upon the Earth, and performes the office of a Guide, rather than of a light; and *Poeſy* is, as it were the Dream of Knowledge; a ſweet pleaſing thing, full of variations; & would be thought to be ſomewhat inſpired with Divine Rapture; which Dreams likewiſe pretend: but now it is time for me to awake, and to raiſe my ſelfe from the Earth, cutting the liquid Aire of *Philoſophy*, and *Sciences*.

I *Knowledge is like waters; ſome waters deſcend from the Heavens, ſome ſpring from the Earth*, ſo the Primary *Partition* of Sciences, is to be derived from their fountains; ſome are ſeated above; ſome are here beneath. For all knowledge

proceeds from a twofold information; *either from divine inſpiration, or from externall Sence*; As for that knowledge which infuſed by inſtruction; that is Cumulative, not Originall; as it is in waters, which beſides the Head-ſprings, are encreaſed by the reception of other Rivers that fall into them. *Wherefore we will divide Sciences, into Theology; and Philoſophy*; by *Theology* we underſtand *Inſpired or Sacred Divinity*, not Naturall, of which we are to ſpeak anon. But this *Inſpired Theology*, we reſerve for the laſt place, that we may cloſe up this worke with it; ſeeing it is the Port and Saboath of all Humane Contemplations.

II. *The Object of Philoſophy is of three ſorts*; GOD; NATURE; MAN: ſo likewiſe there is a Triple *Beam* of Things; *for Nature darts upon the underſtanding with a direct* Beame; *God becauſe of the inequality of the medium, which is the Creature, with a refract beam; and man repreſented and exhibited to himſelfe, with a beame reflext*. Wherefore Philoſophy may fitly be divided into three knowledges; the *knowledge of God*; the *knowledge of Nature*; and the *knowledge of Man*.

III. And becauſe the Partition of Sciences are not like ſeverall lines that meet in one angle; but rather like branches of trees that meet in one ſtemme, which ſtemme for ſome dimenſion and ſpace is entire and continued, before it break, and part it ſelfe into armes and boughes; therefore the nature of the ſubject requires, before we purſue the parts of the former diſtribution, to erect and conſtitute *one univerſall Science*, which may be the mother of the reſt; and that in the progreſſe of Sciences, a Portion, as it were, of the common high-way may be kept, before we come where the waies part and divide themſelves. *This Science we ſtile Primitive Philoſophy or Sapience*, which by the Ancients was defin'd to be, *The Science of things divine and humane*. To this *Science* none of the reſt is oppoſed, being it is differenced from other Knowledges, rather in the limits of latitude, than in the things and ſubject; that is, handling only the tops of things. Whether I ſhould report this as DEFICIENT, I ſtand doubtfull, yet I think I very well may. For I find a cer-

certain kind of Rhapſody, and confuſed maſſe of knowledge, namely of *Naturall Theology*; of *Logique*: of particular parts of *Naturall Philoſophy* (as of the Principles of Nature, and of the ſoule) compoſited and compiled: and by the height of termes) from men who love to admire themſelves advanced, and exalted, as it were, to the verticall point of Sciences. But we, without any ſuch ſtately loftineſſe, would only have thus much, *That there might be deſign'd a certain Science that ſhould be the receptacle of all ſuch Axioms, as fall not within the compaſſe of any ſpeciall part of Philoſophy; but are more common to them all, or moſt of them.*

§ That there are many of this kind needs not to be doubted. For example, *Si inæqualibus æqualia addat; omnia erunt inæqualia*, is a rule in the Mathematiques: and the ſame holds in the Ethiques concerning *Attribute Iuſtice*; for in *Iuſtice Expletive*, the reaſon of equity requires, *That equall Portion be given to unequall Perſons; but in Attributive, unleſſe unequall be diſtributed unto unequall, it is a great injuſtice.* *Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt, & inter ſe conveniunt*; is likewiſe a rule taken from the Mathematiques; but ſo potent in *Logique* alſo, as all Syllogiſmes are built upon it. *Natura ſe potiſſimum prodit in minimis*, is a rule in Naturall Philoſophy ſo prevalent, that it hath produced Democritus Atomes; yet hath *Ariſtotle* made good uſe of it in his *Politiques*, where he raiſeth his contemplations of a City or State, from the Principles of a Family. *Omnia mutantur nil interit*; is alſo a maxime in Naturall Philoſophy thus expreſſed, that the *Quantum* of Nature is neither diminiſht nor augmented. The ſame is applied to Naturall Theology thus varied; *That they are the works of the ſame Omnipotence, to make nothing ſomewhat; and to make ſomewhat nothing*; which the Scriptures likewiſe teſtify: *I have found by experience that all the works of God doe perſevere for ever: nothing can be put unto them, nor any thing taken from them. Interitus rei arcetur per reductionem ejus ad Principia*, is a rule in Naturall Philoſophy; the ſame holds alſo in the Politiques (as *Machiavell* hath wiſely obſerved) becauſe the means which muſt ſpecially preſerve

Euclid. El. lib. 1.

Eclid. El. Ariſt.

Ariſt. de Part. Animal. 1.

Polit. 1.

Eccleſ. 3.

Diſc. ſopra la. 1. Dec. di liu. lib. 3.

States from ruine, are commonly nothing else than reformation, & a reduction of them to their Ancient customes. *Putredo serpens magis contagiosa est quam matura*, is a ground in Naturall Philosophy; the same is an excellent Maxime in Morall Philosophy; because professedly wicked, and desperatly impious persons, doe not corrupt publique manners so much, as they doe, who seem to have some soundnesse and goodnesse in them, and are diseased but in part. *Quod conservativum est formæ majoris, id activitate potentius*, is a ground in naturall Philosophy: for it makes for the conservation of the fabrique of the universe; that the chaine and contexture of nature, be not cut asunder or broken; and that there be not *vacuum*, as they call it, or *empty discontinuity* in the world; and that heavy bodies should be congregate and assembled to the massy pile of the earth, makes for the conservation of the Region of grosse and compacted natures: wherefore the first and universall motion commands, and subdues, the latter and more particular. *The same rule* holds in the *Politiques*, for those things which conduce to the conservation of the whole *Body Politique* in its entire nature and absence, are more potent, than those things are, which make only for the well-fare and existence of particular members, in a State or Civile Goverment. *So the same rule* takes place in Theologie; for amongst Theologicall virtues, *Charity*, a virtue most communicative excells all the rest. *Augetur vis agentis per anti-peristasin contrarij*: is a rule in Naturall Philosophy; the same works wonders in Civile states, for all faction is vehemently moved, and incensed at the rising of a contrary faction. *Tonus discors in concordem actutum definens, concentum commendat: To fall suddenly from a Discord upon a Concord commends the Ayre*: it is a rule in Musique: the like effect it worketh in Morality, & the Affections. That *Trope of Musique*, to fall or slide softly, from the close or cadence (as they call it) when it seemed even to touch it, is common with the Trope of Rhetorique, *of deceiving expectation*. The Quavering upon a stop in Musique, gives the same delight to the eare; that the playing of light upon

Avicenna Hippoc. Epid.

Arist. alicubi.

Arist. Meteor. 1. Problem. §. 11.

V. Boet. de Musica. &c.

upon the water, or the ſparkling of a Diamond gives to the eye. ----*Splendet tremulo ſub lumine Pontus.* Virg. Æn. 7

Organa ſenſuum cum Organis reflectionum conveniunt: This hath place in *Perſpective Art*; for the eye is like to a Glaſſe, or to waters: and in *Acouſtique Art*; for the Inſtrument of hearing is like to the ſtraits and winding within a Cave. Theſe few inſtances may ſuffice for examples. And indeed the Perſian Magique, ſo much celebrated, conſiſts chiefly in this; *to obſerve the reſpondency in the Architectures, and Fabriques of things Natural, & of things Civile.* Neither are all theſe whereof we have ſpoken, and others of like nature *meere Similitudes* only, as men of narrow obſervation perchance may conceive; but one and the very ſame footſteps, and ſeales of Nature, printed upon ſeverall ſubjects or matters. *This kind of Science*, hath not bin hither too ſeriouſly handled: You may peradventure find in the Writings comming from the pens of the profounder ſort of wits, Axiomes of this kind, thinly and ſparſedly inſerted, for the uſe and explication of the Argument which they have in hand; but a compl ete body *of ſuch Maximes, which have a Primitive and Summary force and efficacy in all Sciences, none yet have compoſed*; being notwithſtanding a matter of ſuch conſequence, as doth notably conduce to the unity of Nature; which we conceive to be the office and uſe of *Philoſophia Prima.* Alhaz. Opt. 4. Vitello Paſſim.

§ There is alſo an other Part of this, *Primitive Ppiloſophy*, which, if you reſpect *termes*, is Ancient; but, if the *matter* which we deſigne, is new, and of an other kind; and it is an Inquiry concerning the *Acceſſory Conditions* of *Entities*, which we may call *Tranſcendents*; as *Multitude, Paucity; Similitude; Diverſity; Poßible*, and *Impoßible; Entity; Non-Entity*; and the like. For being *Tranſcendents* doe not properly fall within the compaſſe of *Naturall Philoſophy*; and that Dialecticall diſſertation about them is rather accommodated to the Formes of Argumentation, than the Nature of things; it is very convenient that this Contemplation, wherein there is ſo much dignity and profit, ſhould not be altogither deſerted; but find at leaſt ſome roome in the *Partitions of Sciences:*

ces: but this we underſtand to be perform'd farre after an other manner, than uſually it hath bin handled. *For example* no man who hath treated of *Paucity* or *Multitude*, hath endevour'd to give a reaſon, *Why ſome things in Nature are and may be ſo numerous and large; others ſo few and litle!* For certainly it cannot be, that there ſhould be in nature as great ſtore of Gold, as of Iron; as great plenty of Roſes, as of Graſſe; as great variety of determin'd and ſpecifique Natures, as of imperfects, and non-ſpecificates. *So* none in handling *Similitude* and *Diverſity*, hath ſufficiently diſcovered the Cauſe, why betwixt diverſe ſpecies there ſhould, as it were perpetually, be interpoſed, *Participle of Nature*, which are of a doubtfull kind and referrence; *as Moſſe* betwixt Putrefaction, and a Plant: *Fiſhes* which adhere and move not, betwixt a Plant and a living Creature: *Rats*, and Miſe, and other vermine between living Creatures generated of Putrefaction, and of ſeed: *Bats* or Flitter-miſe between Birds and Beaſts; *Flying Fiſhes*, now commonly knowne, between Fowles and Fiſh: Sea-Calfes between Fiſhes and four-footed Beaſts; and the like. Neither hath any made diligent inquiry of the Reaſon how it ſhould come to paſſe, *being like delights to unite to like*, that Iron drawes not Iron, as the Loadſtone doth; nor Gold allures and attracts unto it Gold, as it doth Quick-ſilver. Concerning theſe and the like adjuncts of things, there is, in the common Diſceptation about *Tranſcendents* a deepe ſilence: *For men have purſued Niceties of Termes, and not ſubtleties of things*. Wherefore we would have this *Primitive Philoſophy* to containe a ſubſtantiall and ſolid inquiry of theſe *Tranſcendents, or Adventitious Conditions of Entities*, according to the Lawes of *Nature*, and not according to the Laws of *Words*. So much touching *Primitive Philoſophy*, or *Sapience*, which we have juſtly referr'd to the Catalogue
* of DEFICIENTS.

CAP.

CAP. II.

1 Of *Naturall Theologie.* § *Of the Knowledge of Angels, and of Spirits; which are an Appendix thereof.*

THE *Commune Parent* of Sciences being first placed in its proper throne like unto *Berecynthia* which had so much heavenly Issue.

Omnes Cœlicolæ, omnes supera alta tenentes. Virg. Æn. 6

We may returne to the former Division of the three Philosophies, *Divine, Naturall, and Humane.*

1 *For Naturall Theology*, is truly called *Divine Philosophy.* And this is defined to be a Knowledge, or rather a spark and rudiment of that Knowledge concerning God, such as may be had by the light of Nature; and the Contemplation of the Creature: which Knowledge may be truly termed *Divine* in respect of the Object; and *Naturall* in respect of the Light. The Bounds of this Knowledge are truly set forth, that they may extend to the Confutation and Conviction of Atheisme; the Information of the Law of Nature; but may not be drawne out to the Confirmation of Religion. *Therefore there was never Miracle wrought by God to convert an Atheist, because the light of Nature might have led him to confesse a God; but Miracles are designed to convert Idolaters, and the Superstitious, who have acknowledged a Deity, but erred in his Adoration; because no light of Nature extends to declare the will and true Worship of God.* For as workes doe shew forth the power and skill of the workman; but not his Image: So the workes of God, doe shew the Omnipotency and Wisdome of the Maker; but no way expresse his Image. And in this the Heathen opinion differs from the sacred Truth: For they defined the world to be the Image of God; man the Image of the World; but Sacred Scriptures never vouchsafed the world that honour, as any where to be stiled the Image of God, but only, *the workes of his hands*: but they substitute man, *the immediate I-* Psal. 8. Gen. 1.

mage of God. Wherefore, that there is a God; that hee raines and rules the world; that he is moſt potent, wiſe, and provident: that he is a Rewarder, a Revenger; that he is to be adored; may be demonſtrated and evinced even from his workes: and many wonderfull ſecrets touching his attributes, and much more touching his Regiment and diſpenſation over the world, may likewiſe with ſobriety be extracted, and manifeſted out of the ſame workes; and is an Argument hath bin profitably handled by diverſe. *But out of* the contemplation of Nature, and out of the Principles of Human Reaſon, to diſcourſe, or earneſtly to urge a point touching the Myſteries of faith; and againe, to be curiouſly ſpeculative into thoſe ſecrets, to ventilate them; and to be inquiſitive into the manner of the Myſtery, is, in my judgement not ſafe: *Da Fidei quæ Fidei ſunt.* For the Heathens themſelves conclude as much, in that excellent and divine Fable of the golden Chaine, *That Men and Gods were not able to draw Iupiter down to the Earth; but contrariwiſe Iupiter was able to draw them up to Heaven.* Wherefore he laboureth in vaine, who ſhall attempt to draw downe heavenly Myſteries to our reaſon; it rather becomes us to raiſe and advance our reaſon to the adored Throne of Divine Truth. *And in this part of Naturall Theology*, I am ſo farre from noteing any deficience, as I rather finde an exceſſe; which to obſerve I have ſomewhat digreſſed, becauſe of the extreme prejudice, which both Religion and Philoſophy have received thereby; as that which will faſhion and forge a hereticall Religion, and an imaginary and fabulous Philoſophy.

Homer Iliad. 9.

§ *But as concerning the nature of Angels and Spirits*, the matter is otherwiſe to be conceived; which neither is inſcrutable, nor interdicted; to which knowledge, from the affinity it hath with mans ſoule, there is a paſſage opened. The Scripture indeed commands, *let no man deceive you with ſublime diſcourſe touching the worſhip of Angels, preſsing into that he knowes not*; yet notwithſtanding if you obſerve well that precept, you ſhall finde there only two things forbidden; namely *Adorotion of Angels*, ſuch as is due to God; and

Coloſſ. 2.

Phantaſti-

Phantaſticall Opinions of them, either by extolling them above the degree of a creature; or to extoll a mans knowledge of them farther than he hath warrantable ground. But the ſober enquiry touching them, which by the gradations of things corporall, may aſcend to the nature of them; or which may be ſeen in the Soule of Man, as in a Looking-glaſſe, is in no wiſe reſtrained. *The ſame may be concluded of impure and revolted ſpirits*; the converſing with them, and the imployment of them, is prohibited; much more any veneration towards them; but the Contemplation or Science of their Nature; their Power; their Illuſions; not only from places of ſacred Scripture, but from reaſon or experience; is a principall part of Spirituall wiſdome. For ſo the Apoſtle ſaith, *we are not ignorant of his ſtratagems*. And it is no more unlawfull to enquire, in naturall Theology, the nature of *evill Spirits*; than to enquire the nature of Poyſons in Phyſique, or of vices in the Ethiques. But this part of Science touching *Angels* and degenerate ſpirits, I cannot note as *Deficient*; for many have imployed their pens in it: Rather moſt of the writers in this kind may be argued either of vanity, or ſuperſtition, or of unprofitable ſubtlety. 2. Cor. 2.

CAP. III.

The Partition of Naturall Philoſophy into Speculative, and Operative. ¶ *And that theſe two, both in the intention of the writer; and in the body of the Treatiſe, ſhould be ſeparated.*

LEaving therefore *Naturall Theology* (to which we have attributed the enquiry of *Spirits*, as an Appendix) we may proceed to the ſecond Part, namely that of *Nature, or Naturall Philoſophy*. Democritus ſaith excellently, *That the knowledge concerning Nature, lies hid in certain deep Mines and Caves*. And it is ſomewhat to the purpoſe Laert. Senec.

Paracel. de Philoſ. ſagaci.

poſe, that the Alchimiſts doe ſo much inculcate, *That vulcan is a ſecond Nature, and perfects that compendiouſly which Nature uſeth to effect by ambages and length of time:* why then may we not divide Philoſophy into two parts; the *Mine, and the Fornace*; and make two profeſsions, or occupations of *Naturall Philoſophers*; *Pyoners* or workers in the mine; and *Smythes*, or refiners? Certainly however we may ſeem to be conceited, and to ſpeak in jeſt; yet we doe beſt allow of a diviſion in that kind, if it be propoſed in more familiar and Scholaſticall termes; namely, that the *knowledge of Nature*, be divided into *the Inquiſition of Cauſes*; and the *Production of Effects*; Speculative, and Operative; the one ſearcheth the bowels of Nature, the other faſhions Nature, as it were, upon the Anvile.

§ Now although I know very well with what a ſtrict band, cauſes and effects are united; ſo as the explication of them, muſt in a ſort be coupled and conjoyned: yet becauſe all ſolid and fruitfull Naturall knowledge hath a double, and that diſtinct, ſcale or ladder; *Aſcendent and Deſcendent*; From *Experiments to Axioms*, and from *Axioms to new Experiments*. I judge it moſt requiſite, that theſe two parts, *Speculative* and *Operative*, be ſeparate, both in the intention of the writer, and the Body of the Treatiſe.

CAP.

CAP. IV.

I. *The Partition of the* Speculative knowledge *of Nature into* Phyſique ſpeciall, and Metaphyſique: *Whereof* Phyſique *enquires the Efficient Cauſe, and the Matter:* Metaphyſique *the finall Cauſe and the Forme.* II. *The Partition of* Phyſique, into the knowledges of the Principles of Things; of the Fabrique of Things, or of the World; And of the variety of Things. III. *The Partition, of* Phyſique, *touching the variety of things*, into the Doctrine of Concretes; and into the Doctrine of Abſtracts. *The Partition of the* knowledge of Concretes, *is referred over to the ſame Partition which Naturall Hiſtory Comprehends.* IV. *The Partition of the* knowledge of Abſtracts, into the knowledge of the Schemes of Matter; and into the knowledge of Motions. V. *Two Appendices of* Speculative Phyſique; Naturall Problems: *And the* Placits of Ancient Philoſophers. VI. *The Partition of* Metaphyſique, *into the* Doctrine of Formes; *And into the* Doctrine of Finall Cauſes.

I. THat part of *Naturall Philoſophy* which is *Speculative and Theoricall*, we think convenient to divide into *Phyſique ſpeciall; and Metaphyſique.* And in this Partition I deſire it may be conceiv'd, that we uſe the word *Metaphyſique* in a differing ſenſe from that, that is received. And here it ſeemes to fall out not unfitly to advertiſe in generall of our purpoſe and meaning touching the uſe of words, and Termes of Art. *And it is this*, that as well in this word *Metaphyſique* now delivered, as in other termes of Art, whereſoever our conceptions and notions are new, and differ from the received; yet with much reverence, we retaine the *Ancient termes*. For being we hope, that the method it ſelfe, and a perſpicuous explication of the Matter which we labour to annexe, may redime us from an incongruous conception of the words we uſe, we are otherwiſe zealous (ſo farre as we can without prejudice of Truth and Sciences) to depart as litle as may be, from the opinions and expreſsions of Antiquity. And herein I cannot but marvaile at the confidence of *Ariſtotle*, who poſſeſt with a

ſpirit of contradiction; and denouncing warre againſt all Antiquity, not only uſurpt a licence to coine new termes of Arts at pleaſure; but hath endeavoured to deface and extinguiſh all ancient wiſdome. In ſo much as he never names any ancient Auctors; or makes any mention of their opinions, but to reprehend their Perſons; or to redargue their Placits, and opinions. Certainly if he affected glory, and drawing diſciples after him, he took the right courſe: For the ſame comes to paſſe in the aſſerting and receiving a Philoſophicall Truth, that doth in a Divine Truth; *veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis me; ſi quis venerit in nomine ſuo eum recipietis.* But from this divine Aphoriſme, if we conſider whom ſpecially it hath deſigned (namely Antichriſt the greateſt Impoſtor of all times) we may collect, *that the comming in a mans own name*, without any regard of *Antiquity*, or (if I may ſo ſpeak) of *Paternity*, is no good Augurie of Truth, however it be joyned with the fortune and ſucceſſe of an *eum recipietis. But for Ariſtotle, certainly an excellent man, and of an admirable profound wit, I ſhould eaſily be induced to believe; that he learned this ambition of his Scholler, whom perhaps he did æmulate: that if one conquered all Nations; the other would conquer all Opinions, and raiſe to himſelfe a kind of Monarchy in contemplations.* Although it may ſo fall out, that he may at ſome mens hands that are of a bitter diſpoſition, and biteing language, get a like title, as his Scholler did;

Ioan. 5.

Lucan l. 10. *Fœlix terrarum Prædo, non utile Mundo*
Editus exemplum. ----- So

Fœlix Doctrinæ Prædo &c. But to us on the other ſide that doe deſire ſo much as lies in the power of our penne, to contract a league and commerce between Ancient & Moderne knowledges; our judgement ſtands firme, *to keep way with Antiquity, uſq; ad Aras*; and to retaine the Ancient termes, though ſometimes we alter their Sence, and Definitions: according to the moderate and approved manner of Innovation, in Civile Goverment; where the ſtate of things being changed, yet the ſolennity of words, and ſtiles is obſerved which *Tacitus* notes; *Eadem Magiſtratuum vocabula.*

Annal. 1.

§ To

§ To returne therefore to the acception of the word *Metaphyſique*, in our ſence. It appears by that which hath bin already ſaid, that we diſtinguiſh *Primitive Philoſophy*, from *Metaphyſique*, which heretofore hath bin confounded and taken for the ſame thing. The one we have ſet downe as a *commune Parent of all Sciences*; the other, as a portion of *Naturall Philoſophy*. We have aſsign'd Common and Promiſcuous *Axioms* of Sciences, to *Primitive Philoſophy*. Likewiſe all *Relative and Adventive condicions and Characters of Eſſences*, which we have named *Tranſcendents*; as *Multitude*, *Paucity*, *Identity*, *Diverſity*, *Poßible Impoßible*, and ſuch like; we have attributed to the ſame, only with this Proviſo, that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not Logically. *But we have referred* the inquiry concerning *God*, *Unity*, *Bonity*, *Angels*, *Spirits*, to *Naturall Theology*. Wherefore now it may rightly be demanded, what after all this is remaining to *Metaphyſique!* certainly beyond nature, nothing; but of nature it ſelfe the moſt excellent part. And indeed without prejudice to Truth, we may thus farre concurre with the opinion and conceipt of Antiquity; that *Phyſique* only handleth that which is inherent in matter, and is moveable; *Metaphyſique* things more abſtracted and fixt. *Againe that Phyſique* ſuppoſeth exiſtence only and Motion, and naturall Neceſsity: but *Metaphyſique* the Mind alſo; the Idea or platforme. For to this point perchance the matter comes, whereof we ſhall diſcourſe. But we will propound this difference, (leaving aſide the ſublimity of ſpeech) perſpicuouſly and familiarly. We have divided *Naturall Philoſophy* into the Inquiſition of cauſes, and the production of effects. The inquiry of cauſes we have referred to the Theoricall part of *Philoſophy*; which we have divided into *Phyſique and Metaphyſique*: wherefore by neceſſary conſequence the true difference of theſe two Theoryes, muſt be taken from the nature of the Cauſes which they enquire; ſo without all obſcurity or circuit, *Phyſique* is that which enquires of the *efficient cauſe*; and of the *Matter*; *Metaphyſique*, that which enquires of the *Forme and end*.

Phyſique

II *Physique* therefore comprehends Causes variable and incertaine, and according to the nature of the subject moveable and changing, and attaines not a fixt constancy of Causes.

Virg. Æn. 8 *Limus ut hic durescit, & hæc ut cæra liquescit*
Vno eodemque igni-----

Fire is cause of induration, but respective to clay; Fire is cause of colliquation, but respective to waxe. We will divide *Phisique* into three Knowledges: For Nature is either united and collected into one, or diffused and distributed: Nature is collected into one either in respect of the *common Seeds and Principles of all things*; or in respect of the *entire, totall Fabrique of the universe*. This union of Nature hath brought forth two Parts of *Physique*, one of the *Principles of Things*; the other of the *Fabrique of the Universe*, or of the World; which we use to call the Doctrines of *Summes* or *Totalls*. The third *Knowledge* which handles Nature *diffused*, or *scattered*, exhibites *all the variety of things*, & the lesser *Summes* or *Totalls*. Wherefore from these contemplations it is plainly manifest, that there are three Knowledges touching *Naturall Philosophy*, *of the Principles of things; of the world; or of the Fabrique of thing*. Of Nature *multiplicious or sparsed*; which last Part, (as we have said) containes all the variety of things; and is, as it were, the first Glosse, or Paraphase touching the INTERPRETATION OF NATVRE Of these three Parts, none is wholly DEFICIENT; but in what truth and Perfection they are handled, I make not now my judgment.

III But we will again divide *Physique distinctively sorted*, or of the *variety of things*, into two Parts; *into Physique of concrets; and into Physique of Abstracts: or into Physique of Creatures*; and into Physique of *Natures*. The one (to use the termes of Logique) inquires of *Substances* with all the variety of their Adjuncts; the other of *Accidents*, or Adjuncts through all the variety of substances. *For example*, if the inquiry be of a *Lion*, or of an *Oak*, these are supported by many and diverse Accidents: Contrariwise if the inquiry be made of *Heate*, or *Heavinesse*, these are in many distinct substances.

And

And seeing all *Physique or Naturall Philosophy* is situate in a midle terme, betweene *Naturall History and Metaphysique*; the first part (if you observe it well) comes neerer to *Naturall History*; the later part neerer to *Metaphysique*; *Concret Physique* hath the same division which *Naturall History* hath; so that it is a knowledge either concerning the *Heavens*; or concerning *Meteors*; or concerning the *Globe of the earth and Sea*; or concerning the *greater Collegiates*, which they call the *Elements*; or concerning the *lesser Collegiates, or natures specifique*; so likewise concerning *Pretergenerations*; and concerning *Mechaniques*. For in all these *Naturall History* inquires and reports the fact it selfe; but *Physique*, the Causes likewise; but you must conceive this of fluid, not fixt Causes, that is, of matter and of the efficient.

§ Amongst these Portions of *Physique, that Part is altogether maimed and imperfect which enquires of Cœlestiall bodies*; which notwithstanding, for the excellency of the Subject, ought to be taken into speciall consideration. For *Astronomy* it is indeed not without some probability and use grounded upon the *Phœnomena*, but it is vulgar, base, and no way solid: But *Astrology* in many Circumstances hath no ground at all. *In truth Astronomy* presents such a sacrifice to Mans understanding, as once *Prometheus* did, when he went about to cozen *Jupiter*; for instead of a true, substantiall *Oxe*, he presented the *hide* of a great and faire *Oxe* stuft, and set out with straw, leaves, and Osier twigs; so in like manner *Astronomy* exhibiteth the extrinsique Parts of Celestiall Bodies, (namely the Number, Situation, Motion, and Periods of the starres) as the *Hide of Heaven*; faire and artificially contrived into Systemes, and Schemes: but the Entrals are wanting, that is, *Physicall reasons*, out of which (adjoyning Astronomicall Hypotheses) the Theory should be extracted, not such grounds and suppositions as should only save the *Phœnomena* (of which kind a number may be wittily devised) but such as propound the substance, motion and influxe of the Heavens, as they they truly are in nature. For those Dogmaes and Paradoxes are almost vanisht, & long agoe explo-

Raptus 1. mobilis. Soliditas cæli. Motus remitentiæ. Poli adverſi. Epycli. Excent. Motus Terræ diurn: &c.

Hypotheſes imaginariæ.

vide digreſſ.

ded, namely, the *Rapture of the Firſt Mover*: and the *Solidity of Heaven* (*ſtarres being there fixt as nailes in the Arched Roofe of a Parlour*). And other opinions, not much better, as, *that there are diverſe Poles of the Zodiack, and of the world; that there is a ſecond moveable of Renitency, contrary to the rapture of the firſt Moveable; that all parts of the firmament are turned about by perfect circles; that there are Eccentriques and Epicycles, to ſave the conſtancy of Motion by perfect circles; that the Moone hath no forte or influence upon a body ſuperior to it*, and the like. And the abſurdity of theſe ſuppoſitions hath caſt men upon that opinions *of the Diurnall Motion of the Earth; an opinion which we can demonſtrate to be moſt falſe*. But ſcarce any man can be found, who hath made enquiry *of the Naturall Cauſes of the ſubſtance of the heavens, as well Stellare, as Inter-ſtellare*; ſo of the *ſwiftneſſe and ſlowneſſe of heavenly bodies, refer'd one to another*; alſo *of the various incitation of Motion in the ſame Planet*; likewiſe *of the perpetuated courſe of Motion from Eaſt to Weſt, and the contrary*: Laſtly *of Progreſſions, ſtations and Retrogradations, of the Elevation and Declination of Motions, by the Apogée, or middle point; and Perigée or loweſt point of heauen*; ſo *of the obliquewindings of Motions, either by flexuous Spires, weaving and unweaving themſelves, as they make their approach or receſſe from the Tropiques; or by ſerpentine ſinuations, which they call Dragons; ſo of the fixt Poles of Rotations or wheeling motions, why they ſhould be placed in ſuch a point of the heavens, rather than in any other*; ſo *of the alligation of ſome Planets at a certain diſtance from the Sunne*: I ſay an inquiry of this kind, hath ſcarce bin attempted, ſave that ſome labour hath bin taken therein, only in Mathematicall obſervations and Demonſtrations. But theſe obſervations only ſhew how wittily all theſe motions may be contrived, and cleered from oppoſition; not how they may truly ſubſiſt in Nature; and repreſent only ſeeming Motions, and their fictitious Fabrique, and framed at pleaſure, not their cauſes, and the reall truth of Things. wherefore *Aſtronomie*, ſuch as now it is made, may well be counted in the number of *Mathematicall Arts*, not without great diminution of the Dignity thereof; ſeeing it

ought

ought rather (if it would maintaine its own right) be conſtitute a branch, & that moſt principall of Naturall Philoſophy. For who ever ſhall reject *the fained Divorces of ſuperlunary and ſublunary bodies; and ſhall intentively obſerve the appetencies of Matter, and the moſt univerſall Paſſions, (which in either Globe are exceeding Potent, and tranſverberate the univerſall nature of things) he ſhall receeive cleere information concerning celeſtiall matters from the things ſeen here with us: and contrariwiſe from thoſe motions which are practiſed in heaven; he ſhall learne many obſervations which now are latent, touching the motions of bodies here below: not only ſo farre as theſe inferiour motions are moderated by ſuperiour, but in regard they have a mutuall intercourſe by paſſions common to them both.* Wherefore this part of *Aſtronomie* which is *naturall* we ſet downe as DEFICIENT. And this we will call *Liveing Aſtronomy*, to diſtinguiſh it from *Prometheus Oxe* ſtuft with ſtraw, which was an Oxe in outward ſhape only. ✱

§ But *Aſtrologie* is corrupted with much ſuperſtition, ſo as there is hardly to be found any ſound part therein. Yet in our judgement it ſhould rather be purged, than clean caſt away. But if any contend that this ſcience is not grounded upon reaſon, and Phyſicall contemplations, but in blind experience, and the obſervation of many Ages; and therefore reject a triall by naturall Arguments (which the Chaldee Aſtrologers boaſted) he may by the ſame reaſon revoke Auguries, Divination, and Predictions from beaſts entralls, and ſwallow downe all kind of Fables, for all theſe ſuperſtitious vanities were avoucht, as the Dictates of long experience, and of Diſcipline delivered over by tradition. But we doe both accept *Aſtrologie*, as a Portion of Naturall Philoſophy; and yet attribute unto it no more credit, than reaſon and the evidence of Particulars doe evince; ſetting aſide ſuperſtitions and fictions. And that we may a litle more ſeriouſly conſider the matter.

§ *Firſt what a vaine fancy is this, that every Planet ſhould raigne for certain houres by turne, ſo as in the ſpace of twenty foure howers, they ſhould reſume their Dominions thrice over, three ſu-*

pernumerary howers reſerved? Yet this conceit brought forth unto us the Diviſion of the week, a computation very ancient, and generally received, as from the interchangeable courſe of daies moſt manifeſtly it appears; when in the begining of the day immediatly ſucceeding, the fourth Planet from the Planet of the firſt day, enters upon his Goverment; by reaſon of the three ſupernumerary howres, whereof we have ſpoken.

§ *Again we are confident to reject, as an idle fiction, the doctrine of Genethliacall Poſitures of the heavens, to preciſe points of time; with the Diſtribution of the Howſes;* thoſe ſame darlings in Aſtrologie, which have made ſuch madde work in the Heavens; nor can I ſufficiently wonder that many excellent men, and for Aſtrology of Principall note, ſhould ground themſelves upon ſo ſlight reaſons, to avouch ſuch opinions. For they ſay, ſeeing that experience it ſelfe diſcovers as much, that *Solſtices, Æquinoctialls, new Moons, full Moones,* and the like *greater revolutions* of ſtarres, doe manifeſtly and notably work upon naturall Bodies; it muſt needs be, that the more exact, and ſubtile aſpect and poſture of the ſtarres, ſhould produce effects more exquiſite and occult. But they ſhould firſt except the Sunnes operations by manifeſt heat; and likewiſe, the magnetique influence of the Moone, upon the *increaſe of Tides every halfe Moone* (for the daily Fluxe and Refluxe of the Sea, is another thing:) But theſe ſet aſide; the other powers of the Planets upon naturall bodies (ſo farre as they are confirmed by experience) is ſlender and weak; and, which they ſhall finde, latent in the *greater Revolutions.* Wherefore they ſhould rather argue the other way, namely, that ſeeing thoſe *greater Revolutions,* have ſo ſmall influence, *thoſe exact and minute differences of Poſitures* have no force at all.

§ *Thirdly, Thoſe Fatalities, that the hower of Nativity or conception governs the Birth; The hower of inception, the fortune of the thing begunne; the hower of Queſtion, the fortune of the thing enquired; and, in a word, the ſcience of Nativities, Elections, Queſtions, and ſuch like levities; in our judgement, have no certainty*

certainty or ſolidity in them; and may by naturall reaſons be plainly redargued and evinced. The point to be ſpoken of rather, is, what that is which we retaine and allow of in Aſtrologie; and in that which we doe allow, what is deficient? for, for this end, that is, for the obſervation of *Deficients*, we undertook this work; not intending (as we have often ſaid) matter of cenſure. And indeed amongſt the receiv'd parts of *Aſtrologie*, the Doctrines of *Revolutions* wee judge to have more ſoundneſſe in them, than the reſt. But it may be to good purpoſe, to ſet downe and preſcribe certain Rules, by the ſcale and ſquare whereof, *Aſtrologicall* Obſervations may be examined; that what is fruitfull may be retain'd; what is frivolous rejected.

§ *The firſt Precept* may be that whereof we have admoniſht already; *let the greater Revolutions be retained; the leſſer Horoſcopes and Howſes caſſeer'd.* Thoſe like Great Ordinance may diſcharge their influences, at a ſpacious remoteneſſe; theſe like ſmall Bowes, are for a ſhort diſtance, and carry not their forces farre. *The ſecond rule is, That the operation of the Heavens workes not on all bodies) but only upon the more tender and penetrable;* ſuch as are Humors, Aer, Spirits: but here we except the Operations *of the heate of the Sun, and of the* Heavens, which without queſtion pierce even to Mettals, and many ſubterraneous Bodies. *The third rule is, that the Operation of the Heavens extends rather to the Maſſe of things and Nature in groſſe; than unto individuall eſſences, and particularities;* yet obliquely it reacheth to many Individualls, namely, thoſe Individuates which of the ſame ſpecies are moſt *Paſſible*, and are like ſoft waxe: even as when a Peſtilentiall aire ſeizeth on bodies more open and leſſe reſiſtent; and paſſeth by Bodies more compact and ſtrong. *The fourth rule is*, ſomewhat like the precedent; *That the Operation of the Heavens hath its influxe and dominion not in points and narrow minutes of times, but in greater ſpaces.* Therefore *Prognoſtications* of the temperatures of the yeare may be true; but upon particular daies, are worthily accounted vaine and idle. *The laſt rule*, (which by the more wiſe Aſtrologers hath

bin ever imbraced) is, *That there is no fatall neceſſity in the ſtarres, but that they doe incline rather, than enforce*. Wee adde this moreover (wherein we plainly take part with *Aſtrology*, if it were rectified) and which we know to be moſt certaine: *That Celeſtiall bodies have other influences beſides heate and light*: which influences are of force according to the Rules we have preſcribed, and no otherwiſe: But theſe lie hidde in the profound Parts of Naturall Philoſophy, and require a larger diſſertation. Wherefore we think good (that which we have ſaid being rightly conceived) to ſet downe,
✲ *Aſtrologie* agreeable to our Principles, amongſt DEFICIENTS, and as we have named *Aſtronomie* grounded upon naturall reaſons, *Living Aſtronomie*, ſo we think fit to call *Aſtrologie* aſcertain'd upon the ſame reaſons, *Sound Aſtrologie*. As for the right way how to frame and make this Art, although what we have ſaid, doth not a litle conduce thereto, yet according to our manner, we will adde a few more obſervations which ſhall cleerly propouud, out of what materialls it ſhould be collected, and to what end it ſhould be referred.

§ *Firſt, let the knowledge touching the Commixtures of Beames be receiv'd into ſound Aſtrologie*, that is of Conjunctions, and of Oppoſitions, and the reſt of the conſtellations, or Aſpects of Planets, one on an other. *Alſo we aſſigne* to this part concerning the Commixtures of Beams, the paſſing of the Planets through the ſignes of the Zodiaque, and Poſition under the ſame ſignes: For the location of a Planet under any ſigne, is a kind of Conjunction of the ſame Planet with the Starres of the ſignes: Moreover as Conjunctions, ſo likewiſe Oppoſitions and other Conſtellations of Planets towards the Starres of the ſignes, are to be noted, which hitherto hath not perfectly bin accompliſht. *But the interchangeable Commixtures* of the Rayes of the fixt ſtarres, are indeed profitable to the Contemplation of the Fabrique of the world; and of the Nature of the *Regions* lying under them; but not unto *Predictions*, becauſe theſe Aſpects are ever the ſame.

Secondly

§ *Secondly, let there be taken into Astrologie the accessions of every particular Planet neerer to the Perpendicular, and Recessions from it according to the Climates of Regions.* For all the Planets as well as the Sun, have their summers, their winters, wherein they dart downe more forcible, or more feeble rayes, according to their posture in respect of the *Perpendicular*. For without question, *the Moone in Leo* works more forcibly upon naturall bodies here below, than when she is in *Pisces*: Not because the *Moone* placed in *Leo*, hath reference to the Heart, and under *Pisces* respects the Feet, (as the vulgar Fable goes), for their Elevation towards the Perpendicular and Approximation towards the greater starres, just after the same manner as the *Sun*.

§ *Thirdly, let the Apogæa, and Perigæa of the Planets be received with due inquiry, to what the vigor of a Planet appertaines in respect of himselfe, and to what in his vicinity to us.* For a Planet in his *Apogæa*, or exaltation is more cheerfull, and active; but in his *Perigæa* or declension more comunicative. 'So *the Sun* in his Elevation when hee enters the Tropick 'of Cancer is in heate more recollected and vigorous; but 'when he falls off from the Meridian, as in Capricorne, hee 'is more faint, yet more dispersed in his influence. For in his 'Ascension, he is not only neerer to the fixed starres; but his 'beams then falling at more equall and right angles, become 'more united; and by a direct resultance from the earth in-'termixe, and so reduplicate their force; whereas in his de-'clension, they are oblique, & therefore feeble and errant in 'reflection. Wherefore with the Inhabitants under the Equa-'tor, the heat is more intense, than it is with Northern Con-'finers, where the Sun daily keeps his circuit neer about the 'Horizon. But yet in this Perigean motion, the Suns beams 'are more communicative, though lesse active; because de-'parting from the point of their incidence in the rebound, 'their reflection is oblique and dispersed. This enquiry tou-'ching the projection of beames in a right or oblique line, 'would be made with diligence, for it concernes all the in-'fluences of the heavens upon terrene bodies; the generall con-

Interpret. additam.

'conſtitution of the yeare; the diverſe temperatures of the 'aire in the five Zones; the complexion of different Climates 'and the like.

§ Fourthly to be briefe, *let there be taken in all the remaining Accidents of the motion of Planets; as what are the Accelerations, Retardations, Progreſſes, Stations, Retrogradations*, of every one of them in their courſe, what their diſtance from the *Sunne*, their *Combuſtions*, *Encreaſe*, and *Diminutions of Light*, *Eccliſpes*, and whatſoever elſe of this nature? For all theſe cauſe, that the *Beames* of the *Planets* doe work more ſtrongly, or more weakly, and after diverſe waies and diſtinct virtues. And theſe foure obſervations, belong to the Radiations of ſtarres.

§ Fiftly, let there be received in, whatſoever may any way, open and diſcloſe the natures of ſtarres *Errant* or *Fixt*, in their proper eſſence and activity; as what is their *Magnitude*; of what *collour* and *aſpect*; what *Scintillation* and *Vibration* of light; what *Situation* towards the *Poles* or *Æquinoctiall*; what *Aſteriſmes*; which are more *mingled* with other ſtarres; which are more *ſolitarie*; which are *ſuperior*, which *inferior*; which of the fixt ſtarres are within the lines and courſe of the Sunne and Planets (namely within the Zodiaque) which without; which of the Planets is *more ſwift*; which *more ſlow*; which may *move in the Eccliptique line*; which may *expatiate in latitude* from it; what Planet may be *retrograde*, *which not*; what Planet may be at any diſtance from the Sunne, which is tied to attend the Sunne; which moves ſwifter in *Apogéo*, which in *Perigéo*; to conclude the Irregularities of *Mars*; the expatiations of *Venus*; the wonderfull Labours or Paſsions, which are often found in the *Sunne*, and in *Venus*, and the like?

§ Laſt of all, let there be taken into *Aſtrologie*, even from tradition the Particular Natures, and Inclination of Planets, as alſo of fixt ſtarres; which ſeeing they are delivered over with ſuch an univerſall conſent; they are not lightly to be rejected; but where they croſſe the grounds and reaſons of naturall Principles. And of ſuch obſervations as

theſe

theſe, *ſound Aſtrologie* is compiled; and according to theſe only, ſhould the Schemes and configurations of Heaven, be compoſed and interpreted. *Sound Aſtrologie* is likewiſe applied and referred with more confidence to *Predictions*; to *Elections*, with more *Caution*, within due limits to both. *Predictions* may be made of future *Comets*, which as we conjecture may be foretold; and of all ſorts of Meteors; of Deluges, Draughts; Heates; Conglaciations; Earth-quakes; ore flowing of waters; breaking out of Fires; Windes; great Raines; divers Tempeſts; and ſtrange ſeaſons of the Yeare; Peſtilences, Epidemicall diſeaſes; Plenty, and dearth of Graine; Warres, Seditions, Sects, Plantations of new Colonies; laſtly of all commotions and greater Innovations, either in *Nature*, or in *State-Goverment*: ſo theſe predictions may be drawn downe (though not with like certainty) to more *ſpeciall occurrences*, and perchance to *ſingularities*; if the generall inclinations of ſuch times and ſeaſons, being firſt diſcovered and found out, theſe be applied by a ſharpe piercing judgement Philoſophicall or Politicall, to ſpeciall or more particular events, which may be moſt ſubject to ſuch *Accidents*. As for example, a man ſhall find out from a foreſight of the ſeaſons of the yeare, ſuch temperatures of weather, as are propitious or pernitious rather to Olives, than to Vines; rather to *Phthiſiques*, and ulcerations of the Longues, than to *Hepatiques* and obſtructions of the liver; more to the inhabitants of high and montainous; than low and champane Countries; more to Monkes, than Courtiers, by reaſon of their different kind of diet. Or if one from the knowledge he hath of the influence, the Heavens have over the ſpirits of men, ſhould find out a man to be of ſuch a complexion and diſpoſition; to affect or diſtaſt rather the people then Princes; rather learned and curious, than couragious and warlike diſpoſitions; rather ſenſuall and voluptuous, than active and politique natures. Such inſtances as theſe are infinite, but (as we have ſaid) they require not only that generall knowledge, taken from the ſtarres, which are Active; but alſo a particular knowledge of Subjects which

are Paſsive. Nor are *Elections* altogether to be rejected but more ſparingly to be credited, than *Predictions*. For we ſee in Planting and in Sowing and in Grafting, that the obſervation of the *age* of the *Moone* is a matter, not altogether vaine and frivolous. But theſe *Elections*, are by our rules more reſtrained than *Predictions:* and this muſt ever be obſerved, that *Elections* are of force, in ſuch caſes alone, where both the *Influxe* of the Heavens is ſuch, as doth not ſodainly paſſe over; and likewiſe the *Action* of *Inferiour Bodies* ſuch, as is not preſently perfected: for neither the *Encreaſes* of the *Moone*, nor of the Planets are accompliſht in an inſtant: but *Punctuality* of time, is by all means to be rejected. There are found many of the like preciſe obſervations (which a man would hardly believe) in *Elections* about Civile affaires. But if any man in this caſe ſhall except againſt us, ſaying, that we have indeed made ſome remonſtrance out of what this *reformed Aſtrologie* ſhould be deduced; and likewiſe to what it may with profit be referred: but the manner how it is to be deduced, we have given no precept at all; he ſhould not deale equally with us, to exact at our hands the Art it ſelfe, which we never promiſed, nor purpoſed to handle. Yet notwithſtanding touching ſuch a point of Demand, thus much we will admoniſh; that there are only foure means, which may prepare the way to this knowledge. *Firſt by Experiments future; then by Experiments paſt*; againe *by Tradition*; laſt of all *by naturall Reaſons*. *Now for future Experiments*, to what end ſhould we ſpeak much of them? ſeeing to make up a competent number of Inſtances, ſo many ages are requiſite, as it were, but loſt labour, to think to comprehend it? *As for Experiments paſt*, they indeed are within the compaſſe and reach of men, although it is a matter will require much labour, and much leaſure to accompliſh. For *Aſtrologians* (if they be not wanting to their Profeſsion) may make a collection from the faithfull reports of Hiſtory, of all greater contingences; as *Inundations*, *Peſtilences*, *Warres*; *Seditions*; and (if the ſtate ſo require) *the deaths of Kings:* and may contemplate the *ſituation of the Heavens*,

Heavens, not according to the ſubtletie of *Figures*; but according to thoſe generall rules which we have already ſet downe; to know in what poſtures the Heavens were, at thoſe times, when ſuch effects came to paſſe; that ſo were there is a cleere, and evident conſent, and concurrence of events; there a probable rule of *Prediction* may be inferred. *As for Traditions*, they ought to be ſo examined and ſifted, that ſuch as manifeſtly oppugne *Phyſicall Reaſons*, ſhould be diſcarded; but ſuch as well conſent, ſhould be valide even of their own authority. *Laſtly, as for Phyſicall or Naturall reaſons*, they are the apteſt for this inquiry; which make inquiry of the Catholique and more univerſall inclinations and Paſsions of Matter; and of the ſimple and genuine motions of Bodies; for by theſe wings we ſafely ſoare and mount up to thoſe celeſtiall materiate ſubſtances. Thus much concerning *Aſtrologia ſana*.

§ *There is another Portion of Aſtrologicall Frenzie* (beſides thoſe figmẽts which we have noted at the begining) which is wont to be ſeperate from *Aſtrologie*, and to be transferred into *Celeſtiall Magique*, as they call it. This hath purchaſed a ſtrange Gloſſe, from the working fanſie of mans wit; namely *That a benevolent ſituation or Aſpect of ſtarres, may be taken in ſeales and ſignet-rings (be it of Mettalls or of any Gemme, capable of ſuch impreſsion) which may arreſt the felicity of that hower, which otherwiſe would ſwiftly paſſe away, and as it were, fixe it, being volatilous.* As the Poet paſsionately complaines of this ſo noble Art, among the Ancients, now long agoe buried in oblivion. C. Agrip. de Occult. Ph. 1.

Annulus infuſo non vivit mirus Olympo, N. L.
Non magis ingentes humili ſub lumine Phœbos
Fert Gemma, aut Celſo divulſas cardine lunas.

Indeed the Church of Rome hath imbraced the *Reliques of Saints*, and their virtues, (for in Divine and immateriate things, the fluxe of time hath no power to abate the force and efficacy,) but that the *Reliques of Heaven* ſhould be ſo lodged, as that the hower which is paſt, and, as it were, dead, ſhould revive and be continued; is a meere ſuperſtiti-

on, and inposture. Wherefore let us let goe these idle fancies unlesse the Muses be grown doting old wives.

IV. *Abstract Physique in our judgement, may very well be divided into two Parts, into the Doctrine of the Schemes of Matter; and into the doctrine of Appetites or Motions.* We will runne them both over briefly, from whence the delineations of the true Physique of Abstracts may be drawen. The *Schemes of Matter* are; *Dense, Rare; Grave, Light; Hot, Cold; Tangible, Pneumatique; Volatile, Fixt; Determinate, Fluid; Humid, Drie; Fat, Crude; Hard, Soft; Fragile, Tensile; Porous, United; Spirituous, Languid; Simple, Composite; Absolute, imperfectly Mixt; Fibrous and full of veines, of a simple Posture or equall; Similare Dissimilare; Specificate Non-specificate; Organicall Inorganicall; Animate Inanimate.* Neither doe we extend the figurations of Matter any farther, for *Sensible and Insensible; Rationall and Irrationall,* we referre to the knowledge of Man.

§ *Appetites and Motions*, are of two sorts; either *motions simple*, which containe in them the Roots of all naturall Actions; but yet according to the *Schemes and habitudes of Matter:* or *Motions composited and Producted*; from which last, the received Philosophy of the Times (which comprehends litle of the body of Nature) takes its begining. But such *Compound Motions* (as *Generation Corruption*, and the rest) should be taken for the *Summes* and *Products* of simple Motions; rather than for *Primitive Motions*. *Motions simple*, are motions of *Antitypie*, commonly called *Motion opposing Penetration* of Dimensions; *Motion of Connexion, or Continuity*, which they call, Motion to avoid vacuity; *Motion* of *Liberty*, least there should be any compression or extension preternaturall; *Motion into a new spheare*, or to Rarefaction and Condensation; *Motion of a second connexion*, or a motion least there should be a solution of continuity; *Motion of greater Congregation*, or to the Masse of their connaturalls, which is commonly called Naturall Motion; *Motion of lesser Congregation*, usually stiled, Motion of Sympathy and of Antipathy; *Motion Disponent*, or that parts may be rightly placed in

in the whole, *Motion of Aſſimilation*, or of Multiplication of its Nature upon an other; *Motion of Excitation*, where the more noble and vigorous agent awaketh, and ſtirres up Motion latent and dormant in an other; *Motion of the Seale or of Impreſſion*, that is, Operation without Communication of Subſtance; *Motion Regall*, or a Cohibition of other Motitions from a Motion Predominant; *Motion without Termination*, or Spontaneous Rotation; *Motion of Trepidation*, or of Contraction & Dilatation of Bodies placed betwixt things good for them, and obnoxious to them; *laſtly Motion of Reſt or abhorrency of Motion*, which is the Cauſe of many things. Of this kind are *ſimple Motions* which truly iſſue forth out of the inward bowels of Nature; which complicate, continuate, interchang'd repreſs'd, repeated, and many waies aggregated, doe conſtitute thoſe *Compoſite Motions* or *Summes* of Motions, which are receiv'd, and ſuch other of the ſame kind. *The Summes of Motions* are thoſe Celebrated Motions, *Generation; Corruption; Augmentation; Diminution; Alteration, and Lation; ſo Mixtion; Separation; Verſion.*

§ *There remaines only as Appendices of Phyſique, the Meaſures of Motions*; of what efficacy the *Quantity*, or Doſe of Nature is? *What diſtance* can doe, which is called, not unproperly, the orbe of Virtue or Activity? *What incitation, or Tardity*, can effect? *What a long or ſhort delay? what the force or rebatement* of a thing? *What the inſtigation of Periſtaſie* or circummambient incloſure? And theſe are the naturall and genuine Parts of true naturall Philoſophy, touching *Abſtracts For in the figurations, or Schemes of Matter; in Motions ſimple; In ſummes or Agregations of Motions; and in Meaſures of Motions, the Phyſique of Abſtracts is accompliſht.* As for voluntary Motion in Animals; Motion in the Actions of Senſes; *Motion of the Imagination; of the* Appetite, and of *the will*; *Motion of the mind; of the diſcerning facultie*, or Practique Iudgment; and of the *Intellectuals*, we referre over to their proper Knowledges. *Yet thus much againe* we adverti ſe, that all theſe Particulars we have delivered, are no farther to be handled in *Phyſique*, than the enquiry of their *Matter* and *Efficient*; for

according to their Formes and Ends they are reviſed and re-examined in *Metaphyſique.*

V *We will here annexe two notable Appendices*, which have reference not ſo much to the Matter, as to the Manner of Inquiry; *Naturall Problemes; and Placits of Ancient Philoſophers*. The firſt is the *Appendix of multiplied or ſparſed Nature*; the ſecond *of Nature united or of ſummes*. Both theſe belong to a grave and circumſpect *moving of doubts*, which is no meane Part of Knowledge: For *Problemes* comprehend *Particular Dubitations*; *Placits*, generall; about *Principles* and the *Fabrique*. *Of Problemes there* is an excellent example in the writing of *Ariſtotle*; which kind of worke certainly deſerv'd not only to have bin celebrated by Poſterity, but by their labours to have bin continued; ſeeing new *doubts* ariſe daily. But in this point Caution is to be taken, and that of great Importance. The recording and propoſing of *Doubts* hath in it a two-fold uſe: *One*, that it munites and fortifies Philoſophy againſt errors; when that which is not altogether ſo cleere and evident is not defin'd and avouched, (leſt error ſhould beget error) but a judgment upon it is ſuſpended, and is not definitive. *The other* that the entrie of *Doubts*, and recording of them, are ſo many Sponges which continually ſuck and draw in unto them an increaſe and improvement of Knowledge; whereby it comes to paſſe that thoſe things, which without the ſuggeſtion of Doubts had bin ſlightly, and without obſervation paſſed over, are by occaſion of ſuch *Dubitations*, more ſeriouſly and attentively conſidered But theſe two utilities ſcarce recompence one diſcommodity, which unleſſe it be carefully lookt unto, inſinuateth it ſelfe; namely, *That a Doubt once acknowledged as juſtly made, and become, as it were authentique; preſently ſtirres up defendants both waies; who in like manner commend over the ſame liberty of doubting to Poſteritie; ſo that men bend and apply their wits, rather to keepe a doubt ſtill on foot, than to determine and ſolve it.* Inſtances of this caſe we have every where, both in Iuriſconſults; and in Students in the Univerſities; who if they have once entertain'd a *Doubt*, it goes

Ariſtot. Probl.

goes ever after authoriz'd for a *Doubt*, aſſuming unto themſelves a Priviledge as well of *Dubitation*, as of *Aſſertion: Whereas the right uſe of Reaſon is, to make things doubtfull certaine; and not to call things certaine, into doubt. Wherefore I report as Deficient a Calendar of Dubitations*, or *Problemes* in Nature, and approve the undertaking of ſuch a worke, as a profitable paines; ſo care be had, that as knowledge daily grows up, (which certainly will come to paſſe if men hearken unto us) ſuch *Doubts* as be cleerly diſcuſt, and brought to reſolution, be raced out of the *Catalogue of Problemes*. To this *Calendar*, I would have another annext no leſſe uſefull: *For ſeeing that in all Enquiries, there be found theſe three ſorts of things; things manifeſtly true; Doubtfull; manifeſtly falſe*; It would be a very profitable courſe to adjoyne to the *Calendar of Doubts*, and *Non-liquets*; a *Calendar of Falſhoods*, and of *popular Errors*, now paſſing unargued in Naturall Hiſtory, and in Opinions; that Sciences be no longer diſtemper'd and embaſed by them.

§ *As for the Placits of Ancient Philoſophers*, as were thoſe of *Pythagoras, Philolaus, Xenophon, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Leucippus, Democritus*, & others, (which men uſe diſdainfully to runne over) it will not be amiſſe to caſt our eyes with more reverence upon them. *For although Ariſtotle after the manner of the race of the Ottomans, thought he could not ſafely raigne, unleſſe he made away all his Brethren*; yet to thoſe who ſeriouſly propound to themſelves the inquiſition and illuſtration of *Truth*, and not *Dominion* or *Magiſtrality*, it can not but ſeeme a matter of great profit, to ſee at once before them, the ſeverall opinions of ſeverall Auctors touching the Natures of things. Neither is this for any great hope conceiv'd that a more exact truth can any waybe expected from theſe or from the like Theories. For as the ſame *Phœnomena*; the ſame *Calculations* are ſatisfied upon the Aſtronomicall Principles both of *Ptolomy* and *Copernicus*: So the popular experience we imbrace; and the ordinary view and face of things, may apply it ſelfe to many ſeverall Theories; whereas a right inveſtigation of truth requires another manner

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Ariſtot.

of

of ſeverity and ſpeculation. For as *Ariſtotle* ſaith elegantly, *That Children at firſt indeed call all men Fathers, and women Mothers, but afterwards they diſtinguiſh them both*: So certainly experience in Childhood, will call every *Philoſophy, Mother*; but when it comes to ripeneſſe, it will diſcerne the true Mother. In the meane time it is good to read over diverſe *Philoſophies*, as diverſe Gloſſes upon Nature; whereof it may be one in one place; another in another; is more corrected. Therefore I could wiſh a collection made, but with diligence and judgment, *De Antiquis Philoſophiis*, out of the lives of Ancient Philoſophers; out of the Parcels of *Plutarch* of their *Placits*; out of the Citations of *Plato*; out of the Confutations of *Ariſtotle*; out of a ſparſed mention found in other Bookes as well of Chriſtians, as of Heathens, (as out of *Lactantius, Philo, Philoſtratus*, and the reſt): *For I doe not yet ſee extant a worke of this Nature*. But here I muſt give warning that this be done diſtinctly, ſo as the *Philoſophies*, every one ſeverly, be compoſed and continued, and not collected by titles and handfulls, as hath bin done by *Plutarch*. *For every Philoſophy while it is entire in the whole peece, ſupports it ſelfe; and the opinions maintained therein, give light, ſtrength, and credence mutually yone to the other; whereas if they be ſimple and broken, it will ſound more ſtrange and diſſonant.* In truth wheu I read in *Tacitus* the Actions of *Nero*, or of *Claudius* inveſted with Circumſtances of Times, Perſons, and Inducements: I find them not ſo ſtrange, but that they may be true: but when I read the ſame Actions in *Suetonius Tranquillus*, repreſented by titles and common places, and not in order of Time, they ſeeme monſtrous and altogether incredible. *So is Philoſophy when it is propounded entire; & when it is ſliced and articled into fragments*. Neither doe I exclude out of this *Calendar of the Placits, or Sects of Philoſophy*, the Theories and opinions of later times, as that of *Theophraſtus Paracelſus* eloquently reduced into a body & Harmony of Philoſophy by *Severinus* the Dane, or of *Teleſius of Coſenze*, who reviving the Philoſophy of *Parmenides* hath turn'd the weapons of the Peripatetiques upon themſelves, or

De Antiquis Philoſophiis.

Phyſ. 1.

Tacit.

Sueton.

of

of *Patricius* the *Venecian*, who hath ſublimated the fumes of the *Platoniſts*; or of *Gilbert* our Countryman, who hath reſtored to light the opinions of *Philolaus*; or of any other whatſoever, if he be of merit. And becauſe the volumes of theſe Auctors are wholly extant, there may be abridgements made only of them, and ſo annext, by way of reference to the reſt. And thus much of *Naturall Philoſophy*, and the *Appendices* thereof.

VI. *As for Metaphyſique, we have aſſigned unto it, the inquiry of* Formall *and* Finall *cauſes; which application, as to Formes, may ſeeme to be nugatory and void.* For an opinion hath prevailed, and is grown inveterate, that the *eſſentiall Formes* and *true Differences* of things, can by no diligence of Man be found out. Which opinion in the mean, gives and grants us thus much; that the *Invention of Formes*, is of all other parts of knowledge the worthieſt to be ſought; if it be poſſible they may be found. And as for Poſſibibility of Invention, there are ſome faint-hearted diſcoverers, who when they ſee nothing but Aire & Water, think there is no farther Land. But it is manifeſt that *Plato*, a man of an elevated wit, and who beheld all things as from a high cliffe, in his doctrine of Ideas, did deſcry, *that formes were the true object of knowledge, however he loſt the reall fruit of this moſt true opinion, by contemplating and apprehending* Formes, *as abſolutely abſtract from matters, and not confined and determined by matter: whereupon it came to paſſe that he turned himſelfe to Theologicall ſpeculations, which infected and diſtained all his Naturall Philoſophy.* But if we keep a watchfull, and a ſevere eye upon Action and Uſe, it will not be difficult, to trace and find out what are the *Formes*; the diſcloſure whereof would wonderfully enrich & make happy the eſtate of man. *For the Formes of ſubſtances*, (man only except of whom it is ſaid, *Formavit hominem de limo terræ, & ſpiravit in faciem ejus ſpiraculum vitæ*, not as of all other kinds, *Producat aqua, producat terra*) I ſay the ſpecies of creatures, as they are now multiplied by compounding and tranſplanting, are ſo perplext and complicate, as it is either alto-

2. FORMÆ RERVM.

In Timæo alibi.

Gen. 2.

Gen. 1.

gether loſt labour to make enquiry of them, or the inquiſition thereof, ſuch as may be had, ſhould be ſuſpended for a time, and when the *Formes* of nature, in her more ſimple exiſtence are rightly ſought and found out, then to be determin'd and ſet down. For as it were not a thing eaſie, nor any way uſefull, *to ſeeke the Forme of that ſound, which makes a word*; being that words through compoſition, and tranſpoſition of letters are infinite: *but to enquire the Forme of ſound, which expreſſeth ſome ſimple letter* (namely with what colliſion, with what application of the inſtruments of voice it is made) is a thing comprehenſible and eaſie; *which forme of letters once known, preſently leads us to the forme of words*. In the ſame manner to enquire the form of a Lyon, of an Oake, of Gold, nay of water, of Ayre is a vain purſuit; but to enquire the *Formes* of *Denſe, Rare; Hot, Cold; Heavy, Light; Tangible Pneumatique; Volatile, Fixt*; & the like, both of *Figurations* and of *Motions*; whereof the moſt of them we have enumerated when we handled *Phyſique*, and are wont to call them, *Formes of the firſt ranke or order*; and which (as the letters of the Alphabet) are not ſo many in number, & yet build up and ſupport the *Eſſences and Forms* of all ſubſtances. and this is that very point which we aime at, and endeavour to compaſſe; and which conſtitutes and defines that part of *Metaphiſique*, whereof we now enquire. Nor doth this ſo prejudicate or hinder, but that *Phyſique* may conſider the ſame Natures alſo (as hath bin ſaid) but only according to the fluid and mutable cauſes. *For example*, if the cauſe of *whiteneſſe in Snow or in Froth* be inquired, it is well rendred, *that it is the ſubtile intermixture of Aire with water*. But this is farre from being the *Forme of whiteneſſe*; being that aire intermixt with the duſt, or powder of Glaſſe, or Chryſtall, doth likewiſe produce *whiteneſſe*, as well as if it were mingled with water; but this is the efficient cauſe only, which is no other than *vehiculum Formæ*. But if the inquiry be made in *Metaphyſique*, you ſhall finde ſome ſuch rule as this, *That two diaphanous bodies being intermixt, their optique Portions in a ſimple order, or equally placed, do determine*

termine and constitute whiteneſſe. This part of *Metaphyſique* I *finde deficient:* and no marvaile becauſe by the courſe of inquiring, which hitherto hath bin practiſed, the *Formes of things*, will never appeare while the world endures. *The root of this error, as of all other, is this; that men in their contemplations of nature are accuſtomed to make too timely a departure, and too remote a receſſe from experience and particulars; and have yeelded and reſigned themſelves wholly over to the fumes of their own fancies, and populare Argumentations.* But the uſe of this part of *Metaphyſique, which I report as deficient*, is of the reſt the moſt excellent in two reſpects.

§ *Firſt*, becauſe it is the duty and peculiar virtue of all Sciences, to abridge (as much as the conception of truth will permit) the ambages and long circuits of Experience, and ſo to apply a remedy to the ancient complaint of *vita brevis, ars longa.* And this is excellently performed, *by collecting and uniting the Axioms of Sciences, into more generall heads and conceptions*; which may be agreeable to all Individualls. *For Sciences, are the Pyramides ſupported by Hiſtory; and experience, as their only and true Baſis; and ſo the Baſis of Naturall Philoſophy is Naturall Hiſtory; the ſtage next the Baſis is Phyſique; the ſtage next the verticall point is Metaphyſique:* as for the *Cone* and *verticall point* it ſelfe (*opus quod operatur Deus à principio uſq; ad finem*, the *ſummary law of Nature*) we doe juſtly doubt whether mans inquiry can attaine unto it. But theſe three be the true *ſtages of Sciences*, and are, to men ſwelled up with their own knowledge, and a dareing inſolence, to invade Heaven, like the three hills of the *Giants*,

Hipp. Aphor.

Eccleſ. 3.

Ter ſunt Conati imponere Pelio Oſſam,
Scilicet atq; Oſſæ frondoſum involvere Olympum.

Virg. Geor. 1.

But to thoſe that diſabling themſelves, and diſcharging their pride, referre all to the glory of God, they are the three acclamations *Sanctè, Sanctè, Sanctè: for God is holy in the multitude of his works, Holy in the order of them, Holy in the union.* And therefore the ſpeculation was excellent in *Parmenides* and *Plato*; although but a ſpeculation in them, *That all things by ſcales did aſcend to unity.* So then, that ſcience is the worthi-

Apoc. 4.

In Parm.

eſt, which leaſt chargeth mans underſtanding with multiplicity; and it is evident, that that is *Metaphyſique*, as that which principally ſpeculates *thoſe ſimple Formes of things*; (which we have ſtiled *Formes of the firſt degree* or order) which though they be few in number, yet in their commenſurations and Co-ordinations, they make all kindes of variety.

§ *The Second* reſpect which innobles this part of *Metaphyſique* touching *Formes*, is, that of all other ſciences, it doth moſt enfranchiſe, and ſet at liberty the Power of Man; and brings it forth into a moſt ample and open field to exerciſe in. For *Phyſique* directs mans labour and diligence through narrow and reſtrained wayes, imitating the flexious courſes of ordinary Nature; But *latæ undiq; ſapientibus viæ*, to *ſapience* (which was anciently defined to be, *Rerum divinarum & humanarum ſcientia*) there is ever copie and variety of means. For Phyſicall cauſes give light and occaſion to new inventions in *ſimili materia*; but whoſoever knowes any *Forme*, knows alſo the *utmoſt poſſibility of ſuperinducing that nature upon any variety of matter*; and ſo is leſſe reſtrained and tied in operation, either to the Baſis of the *matter*, or to the condition of the *Efficient*; which kinde of knowledge, though in a more divine ſence, *Solomon* elegantly deſcribes, *Non arctabuntur greſſus tui, & Currens non habebis offendiculum*; his meaning is, that the waies of *ſapience*, are not liable to ſtreights, nor perplexities.

Plat. in Phæd. Cic. de Fin. 2. Tuſc. 4.

Prov. 4.

§ *The ſecond part of Metaphyſique*, is the inquiry of *Finall cauſes*; which we note not as omitted, but as miſplaced: for the inquiry of them uſually is made amongſt the *Phyſiques*, and not in the *Metaphyſiques*. And yet if this were a fault in *order* only, I ſhould not much ſtand upon it; for *order* is a matter of Illuſtration, and pertaines not to the ſubſtance of *Sciences*: but this inverſion of *order*, hath cauſed a notable *deficience*, and brought a great decay upon Philoſophy. For the handling of *Finall Cauſes* in the *Phyſiques*, hath intercepted and baniſht the inquiry of *Phyſicall Cauſes*; and hath given men occaſion to reſt ſatisfied in ſuch ſpecious,

and

and umbratilous Cauſes; and not thorowly to urge and preſſe the inquiry of *Reall and truly Phyſicall Cauſes*. For this I find done not only by *Plato*, who ever Ancreth upon that Shoare; but alſo by *Ariſtotle*; *Galen*, and others, who uſually likewiſe fal upon theſe Flats. For to ſay, *That the eye-lids furniſht with hairs are for a quick-ſet & fence to fortifie the ſight: or that the firmneſſe of skinnes, and hides of living Creatures, is to repell the extremities of heate and cold: or that Bones are ordained by Nature for Columes and Beames whereupon the frame of the Body is to be built: or that Trees ſhoot forth leaves to ſhadow and protect the fruit from the Sunne and the wind: or that the Clouds are ingendred above, to water the earth below: or that the earth is cloſe-compact and ſolid, that it may be a Station and Manſion for living Creatures*, is properly inquired in *Metaphyſique*; but in *Phyſique* they are impertinent. Nay, (to purſue this point) *ſuch diſcourſing Cauſes as theſe, like the Remoraes (as the fiction goes) adhering to ſhippes, ſtay and ſlugge the ſayling, and the Progreſſe of Sciences, that they could not hold on their Courſe, and advance forward to further Diſcoveries: And now long agoe it is ſo brought to paſſe that the ſearch of Phyſicall Cauſes, thus neglected, are decaied and paſſed over in ſilence*. And therefore the *Naturall Philoſophy* of *Democritus*, and ſome others, who removed God and a Mind from the frame of things; and attributed the ſtructure of the world to infinite Preludiums, and Eſſayes (which by one name they term'd *Fate* or *Fortune*; and have aſſigned the Cauſes of Particulars to the neceſſity of Matter, without intermixture of *Finall Cauſes*) ſeemeth to us (ſo farre as we can conjecture from the Fragments and Remaines of their Philoſophy) in reſpect of *Phyſicall Cauſes*, to have bin farre more ſolid, and to have penetrated more profoundly into Nature, than that of *Ariſtotle* and *Plato: for this reaſon alone that thoſe Ancient Philoſophers never waſted time in finall Cauſes; but theſe perpetually preſſe and inculcate them*. And in this point *Ariſtotle* is more to blame than *Plato*, ſeeing he hath omitted the fountaine of all finall Cauſes, *God*; and in the place of *God* ſubſtituted Nature; and hath imbraced *finall Cauſes* rather as a lover of

Ariſtot. Probl.

Logique, than an adorer of Divinity. Nor doe we therefore ſpeake thus much, becauſe thoſe *finall Cauſes* are not true and very worthy the enquiry in *Metaphyſique Speculations*; but becauſe while they ſallie out, and breake in upon the Poſſeſſions of *Phyſicall Cauſes*, they doe unhappily depopulate and waſt that Province: For otherwiſe if they keepe themſelves within their precincts and borders, they are extremely deceiv'd who ever think that there is an enmitie or repugnancy between *them* and *Phyſicall Cauſes*. For the cauſe render'd, *That the hairs about the eye-lids are for the ſafegard of the ſight*, doth not indeed impugne that other Cauſe; *That piloſitie is incident to Orifices of Moiſture*,

Virg. Buc. *Muſcoſi Fontes &c.*------

Nor the Cauſe render'd, *that the firmneſſe of Hides in Beaſts is for armor againſt the injuries of extreme weather*, doth impugn that other Cauſe; *That that firmneſſe is cauſed by the contraction of Pores in the outward parts of the body through cold, and depredation of Ayre*; and ſo of the reſt: both cauſes excellently conſpiring, ſave that, the one declares an intention, the other a conſequence only. Neither doth this call in queſtion, or derogate from divine *Providence*; but rather wonderfully confirmes and exalts it. *For as in* Civile Actions that Politique wiſdome will be more deep, and admired, if a man can uſe the ſervice of other men to his owne ends and deſires; and yet never acquaint them with his purpoſe (ſo as they ſhall doe what he would they ſhould doe, and yet not underſtand what they doe); then if he ſhould impart his Counſils to thoſe he imployes: So the wiſdome of God ſhines more wonderfully, when Nature intends one thing, and *Providence* draws forth another; then if the Characters of *Divine Providence* were impreſt upon every particular habitude and motion of Nature. Surely *Ariſtotle* after he had ſwelled up Nature with *Finall Cauſes*; *Naturam nihil*

De Cœlo. lib. 1 & lib. de part. animal. *fruſtra facere*; *ſuique voti ſemper eſſe compotem (ſi impedimenta abeſſent)*; and had ſet downe many ſuch tending to that purpoſe, *had no further need of God:* but *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, when they publiſht and celebrated their *Atomes*; were thus farre

farre by the more ſubtile witts liſtned unto with Patience: but when they would avouch that the Fabrique and Contexture of all things in Nature, knit & united it ſelfe without a *Mind*, from a fortuitous Concourſe of thoſe *Atomes*, they were entertain'd with Laughter by all. So that *Phyſicall Cauſes* are ſo farre from withdrawing mens minds from *God* and *Providence*; as rather contrariwiſe thoſe Philoſophers which were moſt exerciſed in contriving thoſe Atomes, found no end and iſſue of their travaile, untill they had reſolved all at laſt into *God* and *Providence*. Thus much of *Metaphyſique*, a part whereof touching *Finall Cauſes* I deny not to have bin handled both in the Phyſiques, and Metaphyſiques; in theſe truly, in thoſe improperly; for the inconvenience hath enſued thereupon.

CAP. V.

I The Partition of the Operative Knowledge of Nature into *Mechanique and Magique*: Reſpondent to the Parts of Speculative Knowledge; *Mechanique to Phyſique*; *Magique to Metaphyſique*. § A purging of the word *Magia*. II. Two Appendices to Operative Knowledge, *An Inventary of the Eſtate of man*. § *A Catalogue of Polychreſts, or things of multifarious uſe*.

I THE *Operative knowledge of Nature* wee will likewiſe divide into two Parts, and that from a kind of Neceſsity. For this *Diviſion* is ſubordinate to the former *Diviſion* of *Speculative Knowledge; for Phyſique, and the Enquiry of Efficient and Materiall Cauſes, produces Mechanique: but Metaphyſique, and the enquiry of Formes produces Magique: As for Finall cauſes the enquiry is barren, and as a Virgin conſecrate to God brings forth nothing.* Nor are we ignorant that there is a *Mechanicall Knowledge*, which is meerely *empericall*, and *operary*, not depending on *Phyſique*; but this we have referr'd to *Naturall Hiſtory*, and ſeparate it from *Naturall Philoſophy*: Speaking here only of

of that *Mechanicall* Knowledge which is connext with *Causes Physicall*. But yet there falls out a certaine *Mechanicall*, or Experimentall Knowledge which neither is altogether *Operative*, nor yet properly teaches so high as speculative *Philosophy*: For all the Inventions of Operations which have come to mens Knowledge, either have fallen out by casuall Infidence; and afterwards deliver'd from hand to hand; or were sought out by a purposed experiment. Those which have bin found out by intentionall experiment, they have bin disclosed either by the light of *Causes*, and *Axiomes*; or found out by extending, or transferring, or compounding former inventions; which is a matter more sagacious and witty, than Philosophicall. And this part which by no means we despise, we shall briefly touch hereafter, when we shall treat of *Literate experience* amongst the Parts of *Logique*. As for the *Mechanique* now in hand, *Aristotle* hath handled it promiscuously; *Hero in spiritalibus*; as likewise *Georgius Agricola* a modern Writer very diligently in his *Mineralls*; and many others in particular Treatises on that subject; so as I have nothing to say of *Deficients* in this kind; but that the *Promiscuous Mechanicalls of Aristotle*, ought to have bin with more diligence continued, by the pens of recent Writers; especially with choice of such experimentals, of which either the Causes are more obscure, or the Effects more noble. But they who insist upon these, doe as it were only coast along the shoare, *Premendo littus iniquum*. For in my judgment there can hardly be any radicall alteration, or novation in Nature; either by any fortuitous adventures, or by essayes of Experiments; or from the light of Physicall Causes; but only through the invention of *Formes*. Therefore if we have set down that part of *Metaphysique* as *Deficient*, which entreateth of *Forms*; it follows that *Natural Magique* also, which is a Relative unto it, is likewise *Defective*.

* § But it seems requisite in this place that the word *Magia*, accepted for a long time in the worse part, be restored to the ancient and honourable sence. *Magia amongst the Persians*, was taken for a sublime sapience, and a Science of the

the Harmony & contents of universalls in Nature; so those three *Eastern Kings* which came to adore *Christ*, are stiled by the name of *Magi*: and we understand it in that sense, as to be, *a Science which deduceth the knowledge of hidden forms to strange & wonderfull effects & operations; & as it is commonly said, by joyning Actives with Passives, which discloseth the great wonders of Nature*. As for the *Naturall Magique*, (which flies abroad in many mens books) containing certain credulous and superstitious traditions, and observations of *Sympathies, and Antipathies*, and of hidden and specifique proprieties, with some experiments commonly frivolous, strange, rather for the art of convayance and disguisement, than the thing it selfe; surely he shall not much erre who shall say, that this kind of Magique, is as farre differing in truth of Nature, from such a knowledge as we require, as the Books of the Gests of *Arthur* of Brittaine, or of *Hugh* of Burdeaux, differs from *Cæsars* Commentaries, in truth of story. For it is manifest, that *Cæsar* did greater things *de vero*, then they durst faine of their *Heroes*, but he did them not in that fabulous manner. *Of this kind of Learning, the Fable of* Ixion *was a figure*; who projecting with himselfe to enjoy *Iuno* the Goddesse of Power, had copulation with a *cloude*, of which he begot *Centaures* and *Chimeraes*. So whoever are carried away with a frantique and impotent passion, and vaporous conceit to those things which only, through the fames and clouds of Imagination, they fancy to themselves to see, in stead of substantiall operations; they are delivered of nothing but ayrie hopes, and certain deformed and monstrous apparitions. The operation and effect of this superficiary, and degenerous *Naturall Magique* upon Men, is like some soporiferous drugges, which procure sleep; and withall exhale into the fancy, merry, & pleasant dreams in sleep. *First* it casts mans understanding into a sleep, still chanting and suggesting specifique proprieties, and secret virtues, and set downe, as it were, from heaven, to be delivered, and to be learned only by auricular traditions; whence it comes to passe, that men are no more

ſtirred up and awaked to ſearch with diligence, & to force out the true cauſes; but ſit down ſatisfied with theſe frivolous and credulous opinions: and then it inſtilles an infinite number of pleaſing fictions, in the manner of dreams, and ſuch as one would moſt wiſh to be true. And it is worth the pains to note, that in theſe ſciences which hold ſo much of *imagination* (as are that *adulterate Magique*, whereof we now ſpeak, *Alchymie*, *Aſtronomie* and the like) the means and Theorie are ever more monſtrous, then the end & pretences. *The turning of ſilver* or *Quick-ſilver* or any other mettall into Gold, as a hard thing to believe: yet it is a thing farr more probable, to a man well skilled, and experimented in the natures of waight, yellow colour, malleable and extenſible; as alſo fixt and volatile: and likewiſe to one who hath exactly ſearcht into the firſt ſeeds and menſtruous Purgings of Mineralls; that Gold by an induſtrious and curious wit, may, at laſt, be produced; then that a few graines of *Elixir*, or of the powder of Production, ſhould be of force, in a few Minutes, to turne Mettalls into Gold, by the activity of the ſame *Elixir*; which is able to perfect nature, and to deliver it from all impediments. *So the retarding of Age*, or the reſtoreing of ſome degree of youth, doth not eaſily purchaſe a beliefe: yet it is farre more likely to a man that knowes perfectly the nature of *Arefaction*, and the depredations of the ſpirits, upon the ſolide parts of the body, and hath throughly obſerved the nature of aſſimulation, & of Alimentation; either more perfect or more peccant; alſo the nature of the ſpirits and of the Flame (as it were) of the body, aſſigned ſometimes to conſume, ſometimes to repaire; may by diets, Bathings, Anointings, proper Medicines, and accommodate motions, and the like, *prolong life*, or renew ſome degrees of youth, or vivacity: then that this ſhould be effected, by a few drops or ſcruples of *ſome precious Liquor* or Quinteſcence. *Againe that Fates may be drawne from the ſtarres*, men will not ſodainly, and eaſily aſſent unto; but theſe, that the houre of Nativity (which oftentimes through many naturall accidents, is either accelerated or differed) ſhould go-

verne

verne the fortune of the whole life, or that the houre of Queſtiō is co-fatall with the thing it ſelfe which is ſought, you will ſay are meere impoſtures. But ſuch a raſh impotency and intemperance, doth poſſeſſe and infatuate the whole race of man; that they doe not only preſume upon, & promiſe to themſelves what is repugnant in nature to be performed; but alſo, are confident that they are able to conquer even at their pleaſure, and that by way of recreation, the moſt difficult paſſages of nature, without trouble or travaile. *And of Magiqne* thus much; the name whereof we have vindicated from reproach, and ſeparated the true and noble kind from the baſe and counterfeit.

II *Of this operative part of Nature there are two Appendices*, both of much importance. *The firſt is, that there be made an Inventary of the eſtate of Man*, in which there ſhould be taken and compendiouſly caſt up, the ſumme of all the wealth and fortunes of men (whether they ariſe from the fruits & revenewes of nature, or of Art) which are now extant, and whereof men are already poſſeſt, adding ſuch inventions, as is manifeſt have bin in times paſt celebrated, but are now periſht. To this end and purpoſe, that he who addreſſeth himſelfe to the ſearch of new Inventions, may not be arreſted in his inqueſt, nor waſt time and ſtudy in thoſe things which are already invented, and are now extant. *And this Inventary* will be more artificiall, and more ſerviceable, if you adde thoſe things which in populare conceit are reputed *impoßible*; and together with them couple ſuch inventions, as are neereſt in degree to *impoßibles*, and yet are extant; that the one may ſet an edge on mans enquiry, the other may in a ſort direct it: and that from theſe *Optatives*, and *Potentials*, mans *Actives* may be more readily conducted. * INVENTARIVM OPVM HVMANARVM.

§ *The ſecond is, that there be made a Calendare of thoſe experimēts*, which are *Polychreſts*, things of a multifarious uſe; & moſt univerſall conſequence; & which conduce and direct to the *Invention* of other *experiments*. For example, the artificiall experiment of *conglaciation of water by Ice with black ſalt*, pertaines * CATALOGVS POLYCHRESTORVM.

pertaines to infinite purpoſes and eſſaies; for this diſcloſeth the ſecret & abſtruſe manner of condenſation, than which nothing is more commodious for man. *As for fire*, that is a ready and known Agent for *Rarefaction*, but the myſtery of *Condenſation*, is not yet fully diſcovered: and it makes much for the abridgement of inventiõ, if *Polychreſts* of this nature were collected into a particular Catalogue.

CAP. VI.

Of the great Appendix of Naturall Philoſophy, Speculative, as Operative, Mathematique knowledge, *and that it ought rather to be Placed amongſt Appendices, than amongſt ſubſtantiall Sciences.* § *The Partition* of Mathematiques into Pure and Mixt.

Metaph. 1. & 1x.

ARiſtotle ſaith well, *Phyſique and Mathematique, ingender Practicall or Mechanicall knowledge:* Wherefore now we have handled, both the *ſpeculative* and *operative* part of the *knowledge of Nature*; order requires that we ſpeak of *Mathematique*, which is an auxiliary ſcience to them both. *For* in the received Philoſophy, *Mathematique is annext, as a third part to Phyſique & Metaphyſique*; but it ſeems to us, who have undertaken to reexamine, and Till over againe theſe things, (if we had deſigned this as a ſubſtantive and principall ſcience) more agreeable both in reſpect of the nature of the thing, and the light of order, to place it as a branch of *Metaphyſique*. For *Quantity*, which is the ſubject of *Mathematique Science*, applied to Matter, is the Doſe, as it were, of Nature, and productive of a number of effects in things Naturall; & therefore is to be reckoned in the number of *eſſentiall formes*. For the Power of *Figure*, *& Number*, ſeemed to be of ſuch force amongſt the Ancient Philoſophers, that *Democritus* placed the ſeeds of the variety of things, principallly, in the *Figures of Atomes*; & *Pythagoras* aſſerted, the Natures of things, to be conſtituted of

Laert. in Dem.

Iambl. de vita Pyth. l. 1.

Numbers

Numbers. In the mean, this is true, that of Naturall *Formes*, (as we underſtand formes) *Quantity* is of all moſt abſtracted and ſeparable from Matter: which was the reaſon why it hath bin more painfully laboured, and more exactly inquired by men, than any other *Forme* whatſoever, which are all more immerſed in Matter. For being it is the nature of Man (certainly to the great prejudice of knowledge) to delight *in the open Fields of Generalls*; rather than in the *Woods* & *Incloſures* of *Particulars*; there was nothing found more acceptable and delightfull, than the *Mathematiques*; wherein that appetite of expatiating & meditateing might be ſatisfied. *And* though all this be true, yet to us, who provide not only for truth and order, but likewiſe for the uſe and profit of men; it ſeemed at laſt better, to deſigne *Mathematiques*; being they are of ſuch efficacy, both in *Phyſiques* and in *Metaphyſiques*, and in *Mechaniques*, and in *Magique*, as the *Appendices* and auxiliary forces of them all; which in a ſort we are compelled to doe, for the wantonneſſe and arrogancy of *Mathematicians*, who could be content that *this ſcience*, might even command and over-rule *Phyſique*. *For* it is come to paſſe, by what fate I know not, that *Mathematique* and *Logique*, which ſhould carry themſelves as hand-maides to *Phyſique*, boaſting their certainty above it, take upon them a command and Dominion. But we doe not ſo much ſtand upon the rank, & dignity of this ſcience, let us conſider the thing it ſelfe.

§ *Mathematiques are either Pure, or Mixt; to Pure Mathematiques*, thoſe ſciences are referred, which handle *Quantity* altogether abſtracted from Matter, & Phyſicall Axioms. *They are* two, *Geometry*, and *Arithmetique*; *the one handling Quantity continued, the other diſſevered*. Which two Arts have indeed bin inquired into, with ſubtilty and induſtry, but neither to the labours of *Euclide* in *Geometry*, hath there bin any thing of any worth added by poſterity, in ſo many centuries of years ſince he floriſht; nor hath the Doctrine of *Solides*, for the uſe and excellency of the knowledge, bin la-

boured and advanced by writers Ancient or Moderne. And in *Arithmetique* there hath not bin found out apt and ſufficient variety of compendious waies for *ſupputations*; eſpecially about *Progreſſions*; whereof there is great uſe in the Phyſiques. Nor is the *Algebra*, or *Art of Equation* well perfected; but that *Pythagoricall* & *Myſticall Arithmetique*, which is begun to be revived out of *Proclus*, and ſome Remaines of *Euclide*, is a ſpacious field of ſpeculation: *For ſuch is the nature of Man, that if it be not able to comprehend ſolids, it waſts it ſelfe in unprofitable niceties.*

§ *Mixt Mathematique*, hath for ſubject *Axioms*, and *Portions of Phyſique*; and conſiders *Quantity*, as it is auxiliary to enlighten, demonſtrate, and actuate them. For many Parts of Nature can never be with ſufficient ſubtlety comprehended, nor demonſtrated with ſufficient perſpicuity, nor accommodated to uſe with ſufficient dexterity and certainty, without the Aide, and intervening of the *Mathematiques*. Of which ſort are *Perſpective*, *Muſique*, *Aſtronomie*, *Coſmographie*, *Architecture*, *Ingenarie*, and divers others. But in *Mixt Mathematiques*, I can now report no entire portions *Deficient*; I rather make this prediction, that there will be more kinds of them invented by poſterity, if men be not wanting to themſelves. For as Phyſicall knowledge daily growes up, and new Axioms of nature are diſcloſed, there will be a neceſſity of new Mathematique inventions, and ſo at laſt more *Mixt Mathematiques* will be contrived. *And now we have paſſed through the knowledge of Nature, and have noted the Deficients therein.* Wherein if we have departed from the Ancient and received opinions, and thereby have moved contradiction; *for our part, as we affect not to diſſent, ſo we purpoſe not to contend.* If it be *truth*,

Non Canimus ſurdis, reſpondent omnia ſylvæ;

Virg. Bucol. The voice of nature will cry it up, though the voice of man ſhould cry it downe. And as *Alexander Borgia* was wont to ſay, of the Expedition of the *French* for *Naples*, *that they came with chaulke in their hands to marke up their Lodgings, and*

Vid. Hiſt. Gal. *not*

not with weapons to fight; ſo we like better, that entry of truth, which comes peaceably, where the *Minds* of men, capable to lodge ſo great a gueſt, are ſigned, as it were, with *chalke*; *than that which comes with Pugnacity, and forceth it ſelfe away by contentions and controverſies*. Wherefore having finiſht two parts of Philoſophy, *concerning God, and concerning Nature*; the third remaines *concerning* Man.

THE

THE FOVRTH BOOK OF

FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM

VICOUNT St ALBAN.

OF THE

DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

Ī The Partition *of the Knowledge of Man into the Philoſophy of Humanitie, and Civile.* § The Partition of the Knowledge of *Humanitie into the Knowledge touching the Body of Man; and into the Knowledge touching the Soule of Man.* II. The Conſtitution *of a generall Knowledge of the Nature or of the State of man.* § The Diviſion *of the Knowledge of the State of Man into the Knowledge of the Perſon of Man; and of the League of the Mind, and the Body.* § The Diviſion *of the Knowledge of Mans Perſon, into the Knowledge of Mans Miſeries.* § *And of his Prerogatives.* III The Diviſion *of the Knowledge of the League, into the Knowledge of Indications.* § *And of Impreßions.* § The Aſſignment *of Phyſiognomy.* § *And of the Interpretation of Naturall Dreams, to the Knowledges of Indications.*

IF any Man (*Excellent King*) ſhall aſſault, or wound me for any of thoſe *Precepts* I have delivered, or ſhall hereafter deliver (beſides that I ſhould be ſafe being under the Protection of *Your Majeſtie*) let him know, that he doth that which is againſt the Cuſtome and Law of Armes: For I am a Trumpeter only,

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only, I doe not begin the *fight*; perchance one of those of whom *Homer* saith.

Hom. Il. 4. Καίρετε χήρυκες, διὸς ἄγγελοι, ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.

For these even between Mortall and enraged enemies past to and fro ever inviolated. Nor doth our Trumpet summon, and incourage men to teare and rend one another with contradictions; and in a Civile rage to beare armes, and wage warre against themselves; but rather, a peace concluded between them, they may with joynt forces direct their strength against *Nature hir selfe*; and take hir high Towers, and dismantle hir fortified Holds; and thus enlarge the Borders of mans Dominion, so farre as Almighty God of his goodnesse shall permit.

Plat. in Alcib. 1. I Now let us come to that Knowledge, whereunto the Ancient Oracle directeth us, which is *the knowledge of our selves:* which deserves the more accurate handling by how much it toucheth us more neerly. *This knowledge is to man the end and terme of Knowledges; but of Nature hir selfe, a portion only.* And generally let this be a rule, that all Divisions of Knowledges be so accepted and applied, *As may rather designe forth and distinguish Sciences into Parts; than cut and pull them asunder into pieces; that so the continuance and entirenesse of Knowledges may ever be preserved.* For the contrary Practice hath made particular Sciences to become barren, shallow, and erroneous; while they have not bin nourisht, maintain'd and rectified from the common Fountaine, and Nurcery. So we see *Cicero* the Oratour complained of *Socrates*, and his Schoole; *That he was the first that separated Philosophy and Rhetorique*; whereupon Rhetorique became a verball, and an empty Art. And it is also evident, that the opinion of *Copernicus*, touching *the Rotation of the Earth* (which now is maintain'd) because it is not repugnant to the *Phænomena*, cannot be revinced by Astronomicall Principles; yet by the Principles of Naturall Philosophy, truly applied, it may. So we see also that the *Science of Medicine*, if it be destituted and forsaken of *Naturall Philosophy*, it is not much better than *Empiricall Practice*.

Cic. de LL. lib. 1.

Sen. Epist. § 89.

Cicero de Orat.

§ *This*

§ *This being laid as a ground, let us proceed to the Knowledge of man*. This hath two parts: *For it either considereth man segregate, or distributively; or congregate, and in societie: the one we call Philosophy of Humanity; the other Philosophy Civile.* The *Philosophy of Humanity, or Humane*, consisteth of the same Parts, whereof man himselfe consisteth; that is of knowledges which respect the *Body*; and of knowledges which respect the *Mind*.

¶ *But before* we pursue particular Distributions, let us constitute; *One generall Knowledge of the Nature and state of man*: For indeed it is very fit that this *Knowledge* be emancipate, and made a knowledge by it selfe. It is compos'd of those *Sympathies* and *Concordances* commune betweene the *Body* and the *Mind*.

§ *Againe, this Knowledge of the Nature and State of man* may be distributed into two Parts; attributing to the one *the undivided Nature of man*; to the other *the Combination between the Mind and the Body*: The first of these we will call *the knowledge of the Person of man*; the second *the knowledge of the League*. And it is plaine that all these severall Branches of Knowledge, being they are common and commixt, could not be assigned to that first Division, of Knowledges, conversant about the *Body*; and of Knowledges conversant about the *Mind*.

§ *The Knowledge concerning the Person of man*, comprehends specially two things; namely the Contemplations of the *Miseries of Mankind*; and of the *Prerogatives, or Excellencies of the same*. But the *bewailing of mans miseries* hath bin elegantly and copiously set forth by many in the writings, as well of Philosophers, as Divines. And it is both a pleasant and a profitable Contemplation.

§ As for that other touching *Mans Prerogatives*, it is a point may well be set downe among DEFICIENTS. *Pindar* when he would extoll *Hiero*, speakes (as usually he doth) most elegantly, *That he cropt off the tops, or summities of all vertues*. For I suppose it would much conduce to the Magnanimity, and Honour of Man; if a Collection were made

* TRIVMPHI HOMINIS, SIVE DE SVMMITATIBVS NATVRÆ HVMANÆ. In Olymp.

of the *Vltimities* (as the Schooles ſpeake) or *Summities* (as Pindar) *of Humane Nature*, principally out of the faithfull reports of Hiſtory: That as; *What is the laſt and higheſt pitch, to which mans Nature of it ſelfe hath ever reach't in all the Perfections both of Body and Mind*. What a ſtrange ability was that which is reported of *Cæſar, that he could dictate at once to five Secretaries?* So the Exercitations of the Ancient Rhetoricians, *Protagoras*; *Gorgias*; likewiſe of Philoſophers; *Caliſthenes*; *Poßidonius*; *Carneades*; who were able to diſcourſe *extempore* upon any Subject *Pro* and *Con*, with fluency and elegancy of expreſſion, doe much enoble the Powers of mans wit and naturall endowments. And that which *Cicero* reports of his Maſter *Archias* is litle for uſe, but perchance great for Oſtentation and Faculties; that he was able upon the ſudden to alleadge a great number of excellent verſes pertinent to the purpoſe of ſuch Diſcourſes as were then in hand. It is a ſingular commendation to that faculty of the Mind, the *Memory*; that *Cyrus* or *Scipio* could call ſo many thouſands of men by their Particular Names. But the Trophies of Morall virtues, are no leſſe famous than thoſe of intellectuall virtues. What a great example of patience doth that cõmon ſtory of *Anaxarchus* preſent unto our thoughts, who put to the Rack and Torture, bit out his own tongue, the hoped Inſtrument of ſome Diſcovery, and ſpit it in the Tyran's face? Nor is that inferior for tolerance though much for the merit & dignity, (which fell out in our time) of a certaine Burgundian, who had committed a Murder upon the Perſon of the Prince of Orange) this ſlave being ſcourged with iron whips; and his fleſh torn with burning Pincers gave not ſo much as a groane; howbeit when a broken piece of the Scaffold fell by chance upon the head of one that ſtood by the ſcorcht-ſtigmatiz'd varlet, laught; even in the midſt of his torments, who a litle before wept at the cutting off of his curled haire. In like manner the ſerenity and ſecurity of Mind hath appeared wonderfull in many even at the inſtant approaches of Death; as that of a Centurion recorded by *Tacitus*; who being commanded by the executioner

Suet. in Iul.

Plat. in Hip in Ariſt.

Quin. Inſt. 3

Laert in vit.

Philoſtr. in Ep. alii.

Pro Archia Poeta.

Xenop. Cyrop. 5.

Quintil. Inſt. xi.

Laert.

Meteran. Hiſt. bel. l. xi.

Annal. 15.

executioner to ſtretch forth his neck valiantly. *I would* (ſaith he) *thou wouldſt ſtrike as valiantly.* But *John Duke* of Saxonie when the cõmiſſion was brought him, as he was playing at chefts, wherein his death was commanded the next day, call'd to one that ſtood by, and ſmiling, ſaid; *See, whether I have not the better hand of this game; He* (pointing towards him with whom he plaid) *will boaſt when I am dead, that he was the fairer of ſet.* And our *More*, Chancellour of England, when the day before he was to die, a Barber came unto him (ſent for this end, leſt perchance the grave and reverend ſight of his long haire might move compaſſion in the People, and asked him whether it was his pleaſure to have his haire cut) he refuſed, and turning to the Barber; *The King* (ſaid he) *is at ſuit with me for my head, and untill that Controverſie be ended I meane to beſtow no coſt upon it.* And the ſame Perſon at the very point of Death, after he had laid his head upon the fatall Block raiſeth up himſelfe a litle agen; and having a faire large Beard gently removed it, ſaying, *Yet I hope this hath not offended the King.* But not to inſiſt too long upon this point, it is evident what we meane, namely, that *the wonders of Humane Nature, and the ultimate Powers, and virtues as well of Mind as of Body, ſhould be collected into a Volume, which might ſerve as a Kalendar of Humane Triumphs.* For a worke of this Nature we approve the purpoſe, and Deſigne of *Valerius Maximus*, and C. *Plinius*; but it could be wiſht they had us'd more choice and Diligence.

Hiſt. Germ.

Vita. Mor.

III *As touching the knowledge of the league, or mutuall Alliance between the body and the Mind;* that may be diſtributed into two Parts. For as all *leagues and Amities* conſiſt of mutuall intelligence, and mutuall offices; ſo this *league* of *Mind* and *Body*, is in like manner compriſed in theſe two circumſtances, that is, to deſcribe *How theſe two, namely, the Mind and the body, diſcloſe one the other; and how one worketh upon the other, by diſcovery or Indication*, and by *Impreſſion.* The former of theſe (namely a deſcription what diſcovery may be made of the Mind, from the habit of the Body, or of the Body from the Accidents of the Mind) hath begotten unto us

two Arts, both of prediction; whereof the one is honoured
Arist. Hipp. with the Inquiry of *Aristotle*; and the other of *Hippocrates*. And although the moderne times, have polluted these Arts with superstitious and Phantasticall mixtures, yet being purged and restored to their true state, they have both a solid ground in nature, and a profitable use in life.

§ *The first is Physiognomy, which discovers the dispositions of the mind, by the lineaments of the Body. The second is the exposition of Naturall dreams, which discovereth the State and Disposition of the Body, from the Passions and Motions of the mind.*

* PHYSIOGNOMIA CORPORIS IN MOTV. In the *Former* of these, I note a DEFICIENCE: *for Aristotle hath very ingeniously and diligently handled the Postures of the Body, while it is at Rest; but not the Gestures of the Body when it is in Motion; which are no lesse comprehensible by Art, and of Greater use.* For the lineaments of the Body, doe disclose the Inclinations and Proclivities of the Mind in generall; but the Motions and Gestures of the face and Parts, doe not only so, but further declare the Accesses, and Seasons, and Prognostiques of the present disposition, and of the will. For, to use your Majesties most apt and elegant expression,
IACOBUS R. *The tongue speaks to the eare, but the gesture speaks to the eye.* And therefore a number of old subtile and craftie Persons, whose eyes doe dwell upon the faces and fashions of Men, doe well know this observation; and can turne it to their owne advantage, as being a great part of their ability and wisdome. Neither indeed can it be denied, but that this is a great discovery of dissimulation in an other, and a great direction, for the election of seasons, and opportunities of approaching to persons; which is not the meanest part of Civile Prudence. And let no man think that such a dexterity, may somewhat availe, in respect of some Particular persons, but cannot be comprehended under rule: for we all laugh and weepe, and blush, and bend the brow much after the same manner; and so for most part it is in other more subtile motions. As for *Chiromancy*, it is a meere imposture.

§ *And as touching the exposition of Dreames;* it is a subject handled in some mens writings, but foild with many idle vanities

vanities; only thus much for the preſent I doe Inſinuate, that this knowledge of *interpreting Dreams*, wants the ſupport of a ſolid Baſe; and that foundation is this, *where the ſame effect is wrought, by an inward cauſe, that uſeth to be wrought by an outward; that externe Act is transformed into a Dreame.* The ſurcharge of the ſtomack from a groſſe vapour, and from the poiſe of ſome outward waight, are a like; wherefore they that labour of the *Night-mare* doe dreame, that a waight is put upon them, with a great preparation of circumſtances. The fluctuation or penſility of the Bowells, from the agitation of the waves in the ſea, and from the winde gathered about the *Diaphragma*, are a like: therefore ſuch as are troubled with the Hypocondriaque wind, doe often dream of Navigations, and agitations upon the waters. There are an infinite number of ſuch like inſtances.

§ The other branch of the *knowledge of the league* (which we have called *Impreſſion*) hath not as yet bin collected into Art, but hath ſometimes intervened among other Treatiſes ſparſedly, and as in paſſage only. It hath the ſame Antiſtrophe with the former: for the conſideration is double; *either how, and how farre the humors and temperament of the body, doe alter or worke upon the mind?* Or againe, *How and how farre, the Paſsions and apprehenſions of the mind doe alter or work upon the Body.* The former of theſe we ſee ſometimes handled in the Art of Phyſique; but the ſame hath by ſtrange waies inſinuated it ſelfe into Religion. For the Phyſitian preſcribes Remedies to cure the Maladies of the mind; as in the cures of Frenzies and Melancholy: they doe alſo adminiſter Phyſique to exhilerate the Mind; to munite and ſtrengthen the heart, and ſo to increaſe the courage, to ſharpen and clarify the wits, to corroborate the Memory, and the like. But Dietes, and choice of meats, and drinks, and other obſervances touching the Body, in the ſect of the *Pythagoreans*; in the Hereſie of the *Manichees*, and in the law of *Mahomet* doe exceed all meaſure. So likewiſe *the ordinances of the Ceremoniall Law, interdicting the eating of the bloud; & the Fat*; and *diſtinguiſhing between beaſts clean and unclean*, ſo Deut. 12.

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farre as they are for meat, are many and ſtrict. Nay the Chriſtian faith it ſelfe, though cleere and ſyncere from all clouds of ceremonies; yet retaines the uſe of Faſtings; Abſtinences; and other obſervances, which tend to the maceration and humiliation of the Body; as things not meerely Figurative; but alſo Fruitfull. The root and life of all ſuch preſcripts as theſe, (beſides the Ceremony it ſelfe, and the practiſe of Canonicall obedience,) conſiſts in this whereof we ſpeak, namely, *that there may be a mutuall ſufferance and humiliation of the ſoule with the Body*. And if any man of weaker judgement doe conceive, that theſe impreſsions of the Body upon the Mind, doe either queſtion the immortality, or derogate from the ſoveraignty of the ſoule over the Body; to an eaſy doubt, an eaſy anſwere is ſufficient. Let him take theſe inſtances; *either from an Infant in the Mothers wombe, which is compatible with the Accidents and Symptomes of the mother, and yet ſeparable in its ſeaſon, from the Body of the Mother:* Or from Monarques, who though they have abſolute power, are ſome-times inclined by the ſway of their Servants; yet without ſubjection of their Perſons or diminution of their Power.

§ *Now as for the reciprocall part, the operations of the ſoule, and of the Effects and Paßions thereof upon the Body*; that alſo hath found a place in Medicine. For all wiſe Phyſitians doe ever conſider and handle, *Accidentia Animi*, as a matter of great moment, for their Cures; and which are of great force to further or hinder all other Remedies. But there is an other obſervation pertinent to this ſubject, which hath bin very ſparingly inquired into; and nothing to the depth and dignity of the thing; that is, (ſetting aſide the affections) *how farre the Imagination of the Mind, or a thought deeply fixt, and exalted as it were, into a beliefe, is of Power to alter the Body of the Imaginant?* For though it hath a manifeſt power to hurt, it followes not that it hath the ſame degree of power to help: No more indeed, than if a man ſhould conclude that becauſe their be peſtilent Aires able ſodainly to kill a man in health; therefore there ſhould be Soveraigne Aires, able

able ſodainly to cure a man in ſickneſſe. *This Inquiſition* would certainly be of excellent uſe, but as *Socrates* ſaid, it *needs a Delian Diver*, being covered with darkneſſe and obſcurity. *Againe*, of all theſe Knowledges *de Fœdere*, or of the *Concordances between the mind and the body*, there is no part more neceſſary than the diſquiſition of the *Seates* and *Domiciles*, which the ſeverall faculties of the mind doe take & occupate in the Body, and the Organes thereof. Which kind of knowledge hath not wanted Sectaries, but what is found in many ſuch Writers is either controverted, or ſlightly inquired, and would be ſearcht into with more diligence & perſpicacity. For the opinion introduced by *Plato* placing the underſtanding in the braine, as in a high Tower; *Animoſity* (which he unfitly calleth *Anger* being it is neere to Tumor and Pride) in the *Heart*; *Concupiſcence* and *Senſuality* in the *Liver*, deſerves not altogether to be deſpiſed, nor yet too haſtily embrac't. So the placing of the *Intellectuall Faculties*, *Imagination*, *Reaſon*, *Memory*, according to the ventricles of the Braine, is not without error. Thus have we explicated the Knowledge touching the *individuall nature of man*, as alſo touching the *League of the Body and the Mind*.

Laert. in V.

Plat. in Timæo. Ariſt. de Gen. Anim 4. Gal. de plac. Plat.

CAP. II.

I. The Partition *of the Knowledge reſpecting the Body of Man, into Art Medicinall*, §. *Coſmetique*, §. *Athletique*, §. *and Voluptuary*. II. The Partition *of Medicine into three duties*, §. *Conſervation of Health*. III. *Cure of Diſeaſes*. IV. *And Prolongation of Life*. And that the laſt part, *Prolongation of Life*, ſhould be ſeparate from the other two.

THE *Knowledge that concernes mans body*, is divided, as the *Good of Mans Body* is divided, unto which it is referr'd. *The Good of Mans Body*, is of foure kinds; *Health*, *Forme*, or *Beauty*, *Strength*, *Pleaſure*. Wherefore there are ſo many *Sciences*, *Medicine*, or the *Art of Cure*, *Coſmetique*, or the *Art of Decoration*, *Athletique*, or the

Art of Activity, and Art Voluptuary, which *Tacitus* calls *Eruditus Luxus*.

§ *Medicine* is a noble Art, and according to the Poets descended of a most generous race; for they have brought in *Apollo*, as the chiefe God of Medicine, to whom they have assigned *Æsculapius* for his sonne; a God too, & a Professor of *Physique*: *Because in things naturall the Sunne is the Auctor, and Fountaine of Life; the Physitian the Conserver of Nature; and as it were a second spring of Life.* But the greatest glory to *Physique* is from the workes of our Saviour, who was a Physitian both of Soule and Body. And as he made the Soule the peculiar object of his heavenly Doctrine, so he design'd the body the proper subject of his miracles. For we never read of any miracles done by him respecting Honour or Wealth, (besides that one when Tribute was to be given to *Cæsar*) but only respecting the Body of man, or to preserve, or to sustaine, or to cure it.

Homer. Hym. Pausan. alii.

§ *The Subject of Medicine* (namely *mans Body*) is of all other things which nature hath brought forth most capable of remedy, but then that remedy is most capable of Error: For the same subtility, and variety of the subject, as it affords great possibility of Cure, so it gives great facility to error. Wherefore as that Art (such as now it is) may well be reckon'd amongst Arts conjecturall, so the enquiry thereof may be placed in the number of the most difficult, and exacteſt Arts. Neither yet are we so senseleſse, as to imagine with *Paracelsus*, & the Alchymists; *That there are to be found in mans Body certaine Correspondences, and Parallels to all the variety of specifique Natures in the world* (as *Starres, Minerals*, and the rest) as they foolishly fancy and Mythologize, straining, but very impertinently, that embleme of the Ancients, *That man was Microcosmus, an abstract, or model of the whole world*, to countenance their fabulous, & fictious invention. Yet notwithstanding this is an evident truth, (which we were about to say) *That amongst all Bodies Naturall, there is not found any so multipliciously compounded as the Body of man.* For we see Hearbs, and Plants, are nourished by earth and water;

Paramiri. lib. 4. Rob. Flud. passim.

water; Beasts by Hearbes and Fruicts. But man by the flesh of living Creatures, as Beasts, Birds, Fish; and also of Hearbes, Graines, Fruicts, luice, and diverse Liquors; not without manifold commixtures, seasoning, and Preparation of these Bodies before they come to be mans meate, and aliment. Adde hereunto, that Beasts have a more simple order of life, and lesse change of affections to worke upon their Bodies, and they commonly working one way; whereas man in his Mansions, exercises, Passions, sleepe, and vigilancies is subject to infinite vicissitudes of changes. So that it is most evident that of all other naturall substances, the Body of man is the most fermentated, compounded, and incorporated Masse. The soule, on the other side, is the simplest of substances, as it is well exprest; ----*Purumq; relinquit*
Æthereum sensum, atq; Aurai simplicis ignem. Virg. Æn. 6.

So that it is no marvaile though the soule so placed, enjoy no rest; according to that Principle, *Motus rerum extrà locum est rapidus, placidus in loco*: But to the purpose, this various and subtle composition and fabrique of mans body, hath made it, as a curious and exquisite instrument, easy to be distemper'd; therefore the Poets did well *to conjoyne Musique, and Medicine in Apollo; becaus the Genius of both these Arts is almost the same*; and the office of a Physitian consisteth meerly in this, to know how to tune, and finger this Lyre of mans body, that the Harmony may not become discordant & harsh. So then this inconstancy, and variety of the subject, hath made the Art more conjecturall: And the Art being so conjecturall had given more large scope, not only to error, but even to imposture. *For almost all other Arts and Sciences are judg'd by their power and operation; and not by their successe and worke. The Lawyer is judg'd by the vertue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the Cause; the Master in the Ship approves his Art, by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage. But the Physitian, and perhaps the Politique hardly have any proper particular Acts, whereby they may make a cleer demonstration of their Art and abilities; but beare away honour or disgrace principally from the event which is ever an inequall*

Aristot. Phys. & de. cæl.

Pansan. in Eliacis. Ov. Met. 1.

quall judicature. For who can tell if a Patient dye or recover; or if a State be preserved or ruin'd; whether it be by Art or Accident? Therefore it often falls out, that the impostor beares away the Prize, virtue the Censure. Nay the weaknesse and credulity of men is such, *As they often preferre a Montebank, or Witch, before a Learn'd Physitian*. Therefore the Poets were cleer and quick-sighted when they made *Æsculapius* and *Circe*, Brother and Sister, both children of the Sun, as in the Verses, of *Æsculapius* the Suns Son,

Virg. Æn. 7 *Ille repertorem Medicinæ talis, & Artis,*
Fulmine Phœbigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas;

And likewise of *Circe* the Sunnes Daughter,

Ibid. *Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos*
Assiduo resonat cantu: tectisq; superbis
Urit odoratam nocturna in lumina Cedrum.

For in all times in the reputation and opinion of the Multitude, Witches, and old Women, and Impostors, have bin rivall Competitors with Physitians; and have even contended with them for the fame of Cures. And what I pray yee followes? Even this, that Physitians say to themselves, as *Salomon* expresseth it upon a higher occasion, *If it befalls to me,*
Eccles. 2. *as it befalls to the foole, why should I labour to be more wise?* And therefore I cannot much blame Physitians, if they use commonly to intend some other Art, or Practise, which they fancy more than their Profession: For you shall have of them Poets, Antiquaries, Critiques; Rhetoricians, Politiques; Divines; & in these Arts better seen, than in their own
Agrip. de van. scien. profession. Nor doth this come to passe, as I suppose, because (as a certaine Declaimor against sciences objects against Physitians) they have ever Conversant before their eyes such loathsome and sad spectacles, that they must needs retire their minds from these objects, to some other contemplations; for as they are men, *Nihil Humani a se alienum putent*, but for this reason, whereof we now speake, namely, that they find, *that Mediocrity, and excellency in their Art, maketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their Persons or Fortunes*. For the vexations of sicknesse, the sweetnesse of life,

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the flattery of hope; the commendation of friends; maketh men to depend upon Physitians with all their defects: But if a man seriously waigh the matter, these things rather redound to the imputation of Physitians, than their excusation: who should not for these prejudices cast away hope; but encrease their pains and diligence. For whosoever pleaseth to excite and awake his observation, and a litle look about him, shall easily deprehend even from common and familiar examples, what a command and soveraignty the subtletie and sharpnesse of the understanding hath over the variety either of matter, or of the forme of things. *Nothing is more variable than mens faces* and countenances; yet the memory retaines the infinite distinctions of them: Nay a Painter with a few shells of Collours; the benefit of his eye; the habit of his Imagination; and the steadinesse of his hand; can imitate, and draw with his pencill all faces that are, have bin, or ever shall be; if they were brought before him: *Nothing more variable than mans voice*; yet we can easily discerne their differences in every particular person; nay you shall have a Buffone, or a Pantomimus will render and expresse to the life, as many as he pleaseth. *Nothing more variable than articulate sounds of words*, yet men have found away to reduce them to a few letters of the Alphabet. And this is most certaine, *that it is not the insufficiency, or incapacity of mans mind, but rather the remote standing, or placing of the object that breeds these Mazes, and Incomprehensions.* For as the sense afarre off is full of mistaking; but within due distance erres not much; so it is in the understanding. *For men use commonly to take a Prospect of Nature, as from some high Turret, and to view hir afarre off; and are too much taken up with generalities, whereas if they would vouchsafe to descend and approach neerer to Particulars; and more exactly and considerately look into things themselves; there might be made a more true & profitable discovery & comprehension.* Now the remedy of this error, *it not alone this, to quicken or strengthen the Organ; but withall to goe neerer to the object*; And therefore there is no doubt but if Physitians, letting Generalities goe, for a while, and suspending their as-

cent thereto, would make their approaches to Nature; they might become Maſters of that Art, whereof the Poet ſpeakes,

Ovid.R.A. l. 2. *Et quoniam variant morbi variabimus Artes;*
Mille mali ſpecies, mille ſalutis erunt.

Which they ought the rather endeavour becauſe the Philoſophies theſelves, upon the which Phyſitians, whether they be Methodiſts or Chymiſts doe rely (*for Medicine not grounded upon Philoſophy is a weak thing*) are indeed very ſlight & ſuperficiall. *Wherefore if* too wide Generalities, though true, have this defect, that they doe not well bring men home to Action; certainly there is greater danger in thoſe Generalls, which are in themſelves falſe, and inſtead of directing to truth, miſlead the mind into the by-paths of Error.

§ *Medicine therefore* (as we have ſeene) hitherto hath bin ſuch, as hath bin more profeſſed, than laboured; and yet more laboured than advanced; ſeeing the paines beſtowed thereon, hath bin rather in circle, than in progreſſion. *For I find much Iteration but ſmall Addition in Writers of that Facultie.*

II We will divide it into three Parts, which we will call the three Duties thereof: *The firſt is Conſervation of health, the ſecond the Cure of Diſeaſes; the third Prolongation of Life.*

§ But for this laſt duty, Phyſitians ſeeme not to have acknowledg'd it as any principall part of their Art; but have (ignorantly enough) mingled and confounded it as one and the ſame with the other two. *For* they ſuppoſe, that if Diſeaſes be repelled before they ſeize upon the body; or be cured after they have ſurpriz'd the body; that *Prolongation of Life* muſt naturally follow. Which though it be ſo, without all queſtion, yet they doe not ſo exactly conſider; that theſe two offices of *Conſervation* and *Curation*, only pertain to diſeaſes; and to ſuch *Prolongation of Life* alone, which is abreviated & intercepted by diſeaſes: But *to draw out the thread of Life*, and to prorogue Death, for a ſeaſon which ſilently ſteales upon us, by naturall reſolution, and the Atrophie of Age

Age, is an argument that no Phyſitiã hath handled it according to the Merit of the ſubject. *Neither let that ſcruple trouble the minds of Men, as if this thing committed to the diſpenſation of Fate, & the divine providence, were now by us firſt repealed and commended to the charge and office of Art.* For without doubt Providence doth diſpoſe and determine all kind of deaths whatſoever, whether they come of violence, or from diſeaſes, or from the courſe of Age, and yet doth not therefore exclude Preventions and Remedies. For Art and human induſtry doe not command and rule Fate, and nature, but ſerve and adminiſter unto them. *But* of this part we ſhall ſpeak anon; thus much in the mean by way of anticipation, leaſt any ſhould unskilfully confound this *third office* of Medicine, with the two former, which uſually hitherto hath bin done. Fatũ, Stoicorr. Dogma.

§. *As for the duty of preſervation of Health*, the firſt duty of the three, many have written thereof, as in other points very impertinently, ſo (in our judgement) in this particular; in attributing too much to the quality of meats, & too little to the quantity thereof: & in the quantity it ſelfe, they have diſcourſed like Morall Philoſophers, exceſsively praiſing Mediocrity; whereas both *faſting* changed to cuſtome, and *full feeding*, to which a man hath inured himſelfe, are better *regiments of health*, than thoſe *Mediocrities* which commonly enervate Nature, and make hir ſlothfull, and impatient, if need ſhould be, of any extremity, exceſſe or indigence. And for the divers kinds of *Exerciſe*, which much conduce to the *conſervation of health*, none of that profeſsion hath well diſtinguiſht or obſerved, whereas there is hardly found any diſpoſition to a diſeaſe, which may not be corrected by ſome kind of exerciſe proper to ſuch an infirmity. As bowling is good againſt the weakneſſe of the Reines. ſhooteing againſt the obſtruction of the Longes: walking and upright deport of the body, againſt the crudities of the ſtomack, and for other diſeaſes other exercitations. But ſeeing this part touching *the conſervation of health*, hath bin in every point after a ſort handled, it is not our purpoſe to purſue leſſer deficiencies.

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III. *As concerning the cures of Diſeaſes*, that is a Part of Medicine, whereon much labour hath bin beſtowed, but with ſmall profit. It comprehendeth in it the *knowledge of Diſeaſes*, to which mans body is ſubject, together with the *Cauſes*, *Symptomes*, and *Cures* thereof. In this ſecond Duty of Medicine, many things are *deficient*, of theſe we will propound a few, which are more remarkable, which to enumerate without preciſe order or Method, we ſuppoſe ſufficient.

* NARRATIONES MEDICINALES.

§ *The firſt is the diſcontinuance*, of that profitable and accurate diligence of *Hippocrates*, whoſe cuſtome was to ſet down a *Narrative* of the ſpeciall caſes of his patients, what the Medicament, what the event. Therefore having ſo proper & notable a precedent from him, who was accounted the Father of the Art, we ſhall not need to alleage any example forraine, fetcht from other Arts; as from the wiſdome of the lawyers, with whom nothing is more uſuall, than to ſet downe and enter more notable caſes, and new deciſions, whereby they may the better furniſh and direct themſelves for the definition of future caſes. *Wherefore I finde this continuation of Medicinall Reports deficient*, ſpecially digeſted into one entire body, with diligence and judgement, which yet Underſtand not to be made ſo ample, as to extend to every common caſe that daily falls out (for that were an infinite work and to ſmall purpoſe) nor yet ſo reſerved and contracted as to admit none but Prodigies, and wonders; as many have done: for many things are new in the *manner* and circumſtances of the thing, which are not *new* in the *kinde*: and he that ſhall give his mind to obſerve, ſhall finde many things even in matters vulgar worthy obſervation.

* ANATOMIA COMPARATA.

§ So in *Diſquiſitions Anatomicall*, the manner is, that thoſe parts which pertaine in generall to Mans Body, are moſt diligently enquired and obſerved even to a curioſity, and that in every leaſt filet: *but as touching the variety which is found in diverſe bodies, there the diligence of Phyſitions failes.* And therefore I grant that *ſimple Anatomy* hath bin moſt cleerely

cleerely handled; *but* COMPARATIVE ANATOMIE, *I define to be deficient.* For men have made a good enquiry into all the parts, and into their conſiſtencies, figures, and collocations: but the diverſe figure, condition, and poſture of thoſe parts in diverſe men, they have not ſo well obſerved. The reaſon of this omiſsion I ſuppoſe is no other than this, that the firſt inquiry may be ſatisfied in the view of one or two Anatomies; but the later, being COMPARATIVE and Caſuall, muſt ariſe from the attentive and exact obſervation of many *Diſſections:* and the firſt is a matter, wherein learned Profeſſors in their Lectures, & the preſſe of ſpectators ſtanding about them, may vaunt themſelves; but the ſecond kind of *Anatomie*, is a ſevere knowledge, which muſt be acquired by a retired ſpeculation, and a long experience. Nevertheleſſe, there is no doubt but that the Figure and Structure of the inward parts is very litle inferior, for variety and lineaments, to the outward members; and that Hearts and Livers and Ventricles are as different in men, as are either their Foreheads, or Noſes, or Eares.

§ *And in theſe differences of inward parts*, there are often found the *Cauſes continent* of many diſeaſes; which Phyſitians not obſerving, doe ſometime accuſe the Humors which are not delinquent, the fault being in the very Mechanique Frame of ſome part. In the cure of which Diſeaſes, to apply *Alterative Medicines*, is to no purpoſe (becauſe the part peccant is incapable of ſuch alteration,) but the matter muſt be mended, and accommodated, or palliated by a preſcript Diet and familiar Medicines. So likewiſe to COMPARATIVE ANATOMY appertaine accurate obſervations, as well of all kind of humors, as of the footſteps and impreſsions of diſeaſes in diverſe bodies diſſected: for the Humors, in Anatomies are commonly paſt by, as if they were ſuperfluous Purgaments and Excrements; whereas it is a point very uſefull and neceſſary, to note of what nature and of how various kinds there be of different humors (not relieing herein too much upon the received diviſions,) which ſometimes may be found in the body of Man; and in what Cavi-

ties and Receptacles, every humor uſeth for moſt part to lodge and neſtle, and with what advantage or prejudice, and the like. In like manner the *foot-ſteps* and *Impreſſions* of *Diſeaſes*, and the leſions and devaſtations of the inward parts by them, are to be obſerved with diligence in diverſe *Anatomies*; as impoſthumes, ulcerations, ſolutions of continuity, putrefactions, corroſions, conſumptions, luxations, diſlocations, obſtructions, repletions, tumors; together with all preternaturall excreſcencies, found in mans body (as ſtones, carnoſities, wens, wormes, and the like;) I ſay all theſe, and ſuch other, ſhould be with great diligence inquired, and digeſted by that COMPARATITE ANATOMY, whereof we ſpeak, and the experiments of many Phyſitians collected and collated together. *But this variety of Accidents*, is by Anatomiſts, either handled perfunctorily, or elſe paſt over in ſilence.

§ *Touching that other Defect in Anatomie, (namely, that it hath not been uſed to be practiſed upon living Bodies,)* to what end ſhould we ſpeak of it? for this is an odious and an inhumane experiment, and by *Celſus* juſtly condemned: yet notwithſtanding, that obſervation of the Ancients is true, That many Pores, Paſſages and Pertuſions, which are more ſubtile than the reſt, appeare not in *Anatomicall diſſections*, becauſe they are ſhut and latent in Dead *Bodies*; whereas they are open and manifeſt in LIVE. Wherefore to conſult both for uſe and humanity, this *Anatomia vivorum*, is not altogether to be relinquiſht, or referred (as *Celſus* did) to the caſuall inſpections of ſurgions, ſeeing this may well be performed, being diverted upon the *Diſſection of Beaſts alive*, which, notwithſtanding the diſsimilitude of their parts with mans, may ſufficiently ſatisfie this enquiry, being done with judgement.

De Re Medica.

* DE CVRATIONE MORBORVM HABITORVM PRO INSANABILIBVS.

§ *Likewiſe in their Inquiry of Diſeaſes*, they finde many *diſeaſes which they decerne and judge to be incurable*; ſome, from the firſt acceſſe of the diſeaſe, others, after ſuch a certain period: ſo that the Proſcriptions of L. *Scylla*, and the *Triumvirs*, was nothing to the *Proſcriptions of Phyſitians* by which,

by

by their moſt unjuſt Edicts; they deliver over ſo many men to death; whereof numbers doe eſcape with leſſe difficulty, than they did in the Roman Proſcriptions. Therefore I will not doubt to ſet downe among DEFICIENTS *a work of the cures of Diſeaſes held incurable*; that ſo ſome excellent and Generous Profeſſors in that faculty, may be awakt and ſtirred up, to ſet this work (ſo farre as the latent operations of Nature, by mans induſtry, may be diſcloſed) ſeeing this very ſentence of *Pronouncing Diſeaſes to be incurable*, enacts a law, as it were, for ſloath and negligence, and redeemes ignorance from Diſcredit and Infamy.

§ *Nay farther, to inſiſt a little upon this Point, I eſtime it the office of a Phyſitian, not only to reſtore health, but to mitigate dolors, and torments of Diſeaſes*; and not only when ſuch mitigation of paine, as of a dangerous ſymptome, may make and conduce to recovery; but even when all hope of recovery being gone, it may ſerve to make a faire and eaſie paſſage out of life. For it is no ſmall felicity, which *Auguſtus Cæſar was wont to wiſh to himſelfe, that ſame* EUTHANASIA; which was alſo noted in the Death of *Antonius Pius*, who ſeemed not ſo much to dye, as to be caſt into a ſweet and deep ſleep. And it is written of *Epicurus*, that he procured this ſame eaſy departure unto himſelfe; for after his diſeaſe was judged deſperate, he drowned his ſtomacke and ſences with a large draught, and ingurgitation of wine; whereupon the Epigram was made --*hinc Stygias ebrius hauſit aquas*, *He took away by theſe draughts of wine, the bitter taſt of the Stygian water*. But in our times Phyſitians make a kind of ſcruple and nicity of it, to ſtay with a patient after the diſeaſe is paſt hope of cure; whereas in my judgement, if they would not be wanting to their profeſsion, and to humanity it ſelfe, they ought both to enquire the skill, and to give the attendance, *for the facilitating and aſſwaging of the paines and Agonies of Death at their departure*. And this part, the inquiry *de* EUTHANASIA EXTERIORI, (which we ſo call to diſtinguiſh it from that *Euthanaſia*, or *ſweet calme Dyeing*, procured by a due preparation of the ſoule) we referre to the number of DEFICIENTS.

* DE EUTHANASIA EXTERIORE.

Sueton. in Aug.

Laert. in Epicuro.

* DE MEDICINIS AVTHENTICIS.

§ *So in the Cures of Diſeaſes*, I finde generally this *Deficience*; that the Phyſitians of the time, though they doe not impertinently purſue the generall intentions and ſcope of Cures; yet for particular Receipts, which by a kind of propriety reſpect the cures of ſpecificall diſeaſes; either they doe not well know them, or they doe not religiouſly obſerve them. For the Phyſitians have fruſtrated and taken away the fruit of Traditions, and approved experience, by their *Magiſtralities*; in adding and taking out, and changing ingredients of Receipts at their pleaſure; and almoſt after the manner of Apothecaries, putting in *Quid pro Quo*; commanding ſo preſumptuouſly over Medicine, as the Medicine can no longer command the diſeaſe. For except *Treacle*, and *Mithridatum*, and of late *Dioſcordium*; and the confection of *Alkermes*, and a few more Medicines; they commonly tye themſelves to no receipts ſeverely and ſtrictly. For the confections of ſale, which are in the ſhoppes, they are in readineſſe rather for generall purpoſes, than accommodate and proper for particular cures; for they doe not exactly referre to any diſeaſe in ſpeciall; but generally to the opening of obſtructions, comforting concoction, altering Diſtemperatures. And this is the cauſe why *Empyriques* and *Old woemen* are more happy many times in their Cures, than Learned Phyſitians; becauſe they are faithfull, and ſcrupulous in keeping themſelves to the confection and compoſition of approved *Medicines*. *I remember that a Phyſitian* with us here in England, famous for practice, in religion halfe Iew, and almoſt an Arabian for his courſe of ſtudy wont to ſay, *your Europæan Phyſitians are indeed Learned men, but they know not the Particular Cures of Diſeaſes*: And the ſame perſon uſed to jeſt, but unreverently, ſaying, *That our Phyſitians were like Biſhops, they had the Keyes of binding and looſing, and nothing elſe*. But to ſpeake the truth in earneſt; in our opinion it would be a matter of good conſequence, if ſome Phyſitians of Note for Learning and Practice, would compile *a worke of Probations, and experimented Medicines for the cure of Particular Diſeaſes*. For that any man

man, induced by ſome ſpecious reaſon, ſhould be of opinion, that it is the part of a learned Phyſitian (reſpecting the complexions of *P*atients, their Age; the ſeaſon of the yeare, Cuſtomes and the like, rather to accommodate his Medicines as occaſions ſuggeſt, than to inſiſt upon ſome certain *P*reſcripts, is a deceiveable aſſertion, and which attributes too litle to experience, too much to judgment. *Certainly* as in the ſtate of Rome they were the men moſt uſefull, and of the beſt compoſition, which either being Conſuls favoured the People, or being Tribunes inclined to the Senate: So in the matter we now handle, they be the beſt Phyſitians, which either in their great Learning, doe much valew the Traditions of Experience; or being famous for Practice, deſpiſe not Methods and Generalities of Art. *As for qualifications* of Medicines (if at any time that be expedient) they are rather to be practis'd upon the Defferents of *P*hyſique, than incorporated into the Receipt, wherein nothing ſhould be innovated without apparent neceſſity. *Wherefore this Part which handleth Authentique and Poſitive Medicines*, we report as DEFICIENT: but it is a matter not to be attempted or undertaken without a ſharpe and piercing judgment; and as it were, in a Synod of ſelect Phyſitians. *

§ Alſo in the *Preparations of Medicines* I doe find it ſtrange (ſpecially conſidering how *Minerall Medicines* have bin ſo extolled and celebrated by Chymiſts; and that they are ſafer for the outward than inward Parts) *that no man hitherto hath endeavoured by Art to imitate Naturall Bathes, and Medicinable Fountaines*; and yet it is confeſſed that *thoſe Bathes and Fountaines* receive their vertues from minerall veines through which they paſſe: and for manifeſt proofe hereof mans induſtry knows well how to diſcerne and diſtinguiſh from what kind of Mineralls ſuch waters receive their tinctures; as whether from Sulphur, Vitriol, Steele, or the like: *which naturall tinctures of waters*, if it may be reduced to compoſitions of Art, it would be in mans power, both to make more kinds of them as occaſion required; and to command, at pleaſure, the temperament thereof. *Therefore this Part of the*

IMITATIO THERMARVM NATVRALIVM.

imitation of Nature in Artificiall Bathes (a thing without queſtion both profitable and eaſy to be done we take to be

* DEFICIENT.

§ *But leſt I ſhould purſue Particulars more preciſely*, than is agreeable to our intention, or to the proportion of this Treatiſe; I will cloſe and conclude *this Part* with a note of one *Deficience* more, which ſeems to us to be of great conſequence; which is, *that the Preſcripts in uſe are too compendious to effect any notable or difficult cure*. For in our judgment it is a more vain and flattering, than true opinion, to think that any *Medicine* can be ſo ſoveraign, or ſo happy, as that the ſimple uſe thereof ſhould be of force ſufficient for ſome great cure. It were a ſtrange ſpeech which ſpoken, or ſpoken oft, ſhould reclaim a man from a vice deeply rooted and inveterate. Certainly it is farre otherwiſe: *But it is order, Purſuit, ſequence, Artificiall interchange, that are potent and mighty in nature:* Which although they require more exact judgment in preſcribing; and more preciſe obedience in obſerving, yet this is amply recompenced in the greatneſſe of effects. And although a man would think, by the daily diligence of Phyſitians, their Viſitations, Seſſions, and Preſcriptions, which they performe to the ſick; that they did painfully purſue the Cure; and goe on in a certaine courſe: Yet let a man exactly look into their preſcripts, and miniſtrations, he ſhall find many of them full of wavering, inconſtancy, and every dayes deviſes; and ſuch as came into their minds without any certaine, or adviſed courſe of Cure. *For they ſhould even from the beginning, after they have made a full and perfect diſcovery of the diſeaſe, meditate and reſolve upon an orderly ſequence of Cure; and not without important reaſons depart therefrom.* And let Phyſitians know for certaine, that (for example) three perchance, or foure receipts, are rightly preſcribed for the Cure of ſome great diſeaſe; which taken *in due order, and in due ſpaces of time performe the Cure; which if they were taken ſingle, or by themſelves alone; or if the Courſe were inverted, or the intervalls of time not obſerved, would be hurtfull.* Nor is it yet our meaning that every ſcrupulous and

FILVM MEDICINALE.

and ſuperſtitious way of Cure in eſtimation ſhould be the beſt; no more than that every ſtrait way is the way to Heaven, but that the way ſhould be right as well as ſtrait and difficult. *And this Part* which we will call *Filum Medicinale* we ſet downe as *Deficient*. So theſe are the Parts which in the *Knowledge of Medicine*, touching the cure of Diſeaſes, are *deſiderate*, ſave that there remaines yet one part more of more uſe than all the other, which is here wanting, *A true and Active naturall Philoſophie, upon which the ſcience of Medicine ſhould be built:* but that belongs not to this Treatiſe.

DE PROLONGANDO CVRRICVLO VITÆ.

IIII *The third part of Medicine* we have ſet down to be that of the *Prolongation of Life*, which is a part new and *Deficient*, and the moſt noble of all: For if any ſuch thing may be found out, Medicine ſhall not be practis'd only in the impurities of Cures, nor ſhall Phyſitians be honour'd only for Neceſſity, but for a guift, the greateſt of earthly Donations that could be conferr'd on mortality, whereof men, next under God, may be the Diſpenſers and Adminiſtrators. *For although the world to a Chriſtian man, travailing to the land of Promiſe, be as it were a wilderneſſe, yet that our ſhooes and veſtments (that is our Body, which is as a converture to the ſoule,) be leſſe worne away while we ſojourne in this wilderneſſe, is to be eſtimed a gift comming from the divine goodneſſe.* Now becauſe this is one of the choiceſt parts of Phiſique, and that we have ſet it downe amongſt *Deficients*, we will after our accuſtomed manner give ſome Admonitions, Indications, and Precepts thereof.

§ *Firſt we advertiſe*, that of Writers in this Argument there is none extant that hath found out any thing of worth, that I may not ſay, any thing ſound touching this ſubject. *Indeed Ariſtotle* hath left unto poſterity a ſmall briefe Commentarie of this matter; wherein there is ſome acuteneſſe, *which he would have to be all can be ſaid, as his manner is:* But the more recent Writers have written ſo idlely, and ſuperſtitiouſly upon the point, that the Argument it ſelfe, through their vanity, is reputed vaine and ſenſeleſſe. De longitud. & Brev. vit.

§ *Secondly*

§ *Secondly, we advertiſe*, that the intentions of Phyſitians touching this Argument are nothing worth: and that they rather lead men away from the point, than direct them unto it. For they diſcourſe *that Death is a deſtitution of Heate and Moiſture, and therefore naturall heate ſhould be comforted and radical moiſture cheriſht*; as if it were a matter to be effected by Broaths, or Lettuces, & Mallows, or * Iujubs, or fine Wafer-cakes or elſe with hot ſpices, generous wine, or the ſpirits of wine, or chymicall oyles; all which doe rather hurt, than helpe.

* Arabian Plums.

§ *Thirdly*, we admoniſh men that they ceaſe to trifle, and that they be not ſo credulous as to think that ſuch a great worke as this is, *to retard and turne back the courſe of Nature*, may be brought to perfection by a morning draught, or the uſe of ſome precious Receipt; no not with *Aurum Potabile*, or the ſubſtances of Pearles, or ſuch like toyes; but that they take it for a grounded truth, that the *Prolongation of Life*, is a great work, and which conſiſts in many kinds of Receipts, and of an orderly courſe and connexion of them: And let no man be ſo ſtupid as to believe, *that what never yet was done, can be now effected, but by meanes yet never attempted.*

§ Fourthly we admoniſh men that they rightly obſerve and diſtinguiſh touching thoſe Receits which conduce to a *healthfull life*, and thoſe which conferre to a *long life*. For there are many things which exhilarate the ſpirits, ſtrengthē the active powers of nature, repell diſeaſes, which yet ſubduct from the ſumme of life, and without ſickneſſe accelerate aged *Atrophie*. And there are other receipts which conduce to the *Prolongation of life*, and the *retardation of the Atrophie of old-age*; but yet are not us'd without hazard of health: So that they who uſe theſe remedies for the *prorogation of life*, muſt likewiſe provide againſt ſuch inconveniences as upon their uſage may unexpectedly fal out. And thus much by way of Admonition.

§ *As for Indications*, the image, or Idea we have conceiv'd in our mind hereof, is this; Things are conſerv'd and

continued

Continued two wayes; either in their owne Identitie, or by *Reparation*. *In their proper Identitie*, as a Flie or an Ant in *Amber*; a flower, an apple or wood in Conservatories of Snow; a dead corps in Balsame. By *Reparation*, as in Flame, and Mechanique. He that goes about the worke of *Prolongation of Life*, must put in practice both these kinds, (for disunited, their strength is weakned) and *Mans body* must be *conserv'd* after the same manner *inanimate Bodies* are conserved; and againe, as *Flame* is conserved; and lastly, even as *Mechaniques* are conserved. *Wherefore there are three intentions for the Prolongation of Life; the Retardation of Consumption; the Integrity of the Reparation; and the Renovation of that which begun to decay and grow old*. *Consumption* is caus'd by two *Depredations*, *Depredation* of *innate Spirit*; and *Depredation* of *ambient Aire*. The resistance of both is two-fold, either when the *Agents* + (that is, the suc and moistures of the Body) become lesse *Predatory*; or the *Patients* are made lesse depredable. The *Spirit* is made lesse *Predatory*, if either it be condensed in substance, as in the use of Opiates, and nitrous application, and in contriftations; or be *diminished in Quantity*, as in spare Pythagoricall or Monasticall Diets: or is sweetned and *refresht with motion*, as in ease and tranquility. *Ambient Aire* is made lesse *Predatory*, either when it is *lesse heated with the beames of the Sunne*, as in colder countries; in Caves, in Hills, and in the Pillars or Stations of Anchorites; or when it is repell'd from the Body as in dens-close skin; in the Plumage of birds, and the use of oyle and unguents without Aromatique Ingredients. *The juyce* and succulencies of the Body, are made lesse depredable, if either they be made more indurate, or more *dewy*, and *oyly*: Indurate as in *austere course Diet*; in *a life accustomed to cold*, by *strong exercises*; by *certaine Minerall Bathes*. Roscide or dewy, as in the use of sweet meats and abstinence from meats, salt and acide; but especially in such a mixture of drinks, as is of parts very tenuious and subtle, and yet without all acrimony or tartnesse. *Reparation is done by Aliments*; and Alimentation is promoted foure wayes: *By the Concoction of the inward Parts*

+ (that is, y^e innate spirit & ambient aire)

for the ſending forth of the nouriſhment; as in *Confortatives* of the Principall Bowells; *by excitation of the outwart parts* for the attraction of nouriſhment, as in *due exerciſes* and fricationſ; and ſome kind of unctions and appropriate Bathes; *by preparation of the Aliment it ſelfe*; that it may more eaſily inſinuate it ſelfe, and in a ſort anticipate Digeſtions, as in diverſe and artificiall kinds of *ſeaſoning meat*, *mingling drinke*, *leavening bread*, and reducing the virtues of all theſe three into one; *by comfortiug* the laſt act of *Aßimilation*, as in *ſeaſonable ſleep*, and outward or *Topique Applications: the Renovation of that which began to waxe old*, is performed two waies, either by *inteneration of the habit of the body* it ſelfe, as in the uſe of ſuppleing or ſoftning applications by Bathes, emplaſters and unctions, of ſuch quality as may ſoak or inſinuate into the part, but not extract from it; or by *expurgation of the old moiſture, and ſubſtitution of new moiſture*, as in ſeaſonable and often purging; letting of blood; attenuating Diets, which reſtore the Flower of the Body, and ſo much for *Jndications*.

§ *As for Precepts*, although many of them may be deduced from the *Jndications*, yet we thought good to ſet downe three of the moſt principall. *Firſt* we give in *Precept* that the *Prolongation of life*, muſt be expected from a preſcript ſet Diet, rather than from any familiar regiment of Foode, or the excellency of particular receipts: for whatſoever are of ſuch virtue as they are able to make nature *retrograde*, are commonly more ſtrong and Potent to *alter*, than that they can be compounded together in any medicine, much leſſe be intermingled in familiar foode. It remaines therefore that ſuch receipts be adminiſtred regularly, and ſucceſsively and at ſet appointed times, returning in certain courſes.

§ *Our ſecond Precept is, that the Prolongation of life be expected, rather from working upon ſpirits, and from a malaciſſation or inteneration of Parts, than from any kinds of aliment or order of Diet.* For ſeeing the Body of Man and the Frame thereof (leaving aſide outward accidents) three waies becomes Paſſive, namely *from the ſpirits*; *from the parts*; *and from aliments*;

the

the way of *Prolongation of life* by means of aliment is a long way about, and that by many ambages and circuits; but the waies by working upon the ſpirits, and upon the parts, are more compendious and ſooner brings us to the end deſired; becauſe the ſpirits are ſodainly moved, both from vapours and paſsions, which work ſtrangely upon them: and the Parts, by Bathes, unguents or emplaiſters, which in like manner make way by ſodaine impreſsions.

§ *Our third Precept is, that Malaciſſation or intenerations of Parts by outward Topiques, muſt be performed by applications conſubſtantiall, Penetrating, and Sringent.* Conſubſtantialls are Willingly intertained with a kindly embrace, and properly intenerate and ſupple; *Penetrating* and inſinuating remedies are the Defferrents, as it were, of Malaciſſant and mollifying qualities, and convay more eaſily and impreſſedly the virtue thereof; and doe themſelves ſomewhat expand and open the Parts. *Reſtringents* keep in the virtue of them both, and for a time fixe it, and alſo cohibite and repreſſe perſpiration; which is a thing repugnant to *malaciſſation or ſuppleing*, becauſe it ſends forth the moiſture; wherefore by theſe three (but diſpoſed in order, and ſucceeding, then intermixt) the matter is effected. *In the mean* we give this caveat, that it is not the intention of *Malaciſſation* by outward topiques to nouriſh Parts; but only to render them more capable of nouriſhment: for whatſoever is more drie, is leſſe Active to aſsimilate. And thus much of the *Prolongation of life*, which is a third part newly aſsigned to Medicine.

§ *Come we now to Coſmetique medicaments, or the Art of Decoration*; which hath indeed, parts Civile, and parts effeminate. For cleanneſſe, and the *civile beauty* of the Body was ever eſtimed to proceed from a modeſty of behaviour, and a due reverence *in the firſt place* towards God, whoſe creatures we are, then towards ſociety, wherein we live; and then towards our ſelves, whom we ought no leſſe, nay much more to revere, than we doe any others. *But that Adulterate decoration by Painting and Ceruſſe*, it is well worthy of the imperfections which attend it; being neither fine

enough to deceive, nor handſome to pleaſe, nor ſafe and wholſome to uſe. And it is a wonder that this corrupt cuſtome of *painting*, hath ſo long eſcaped penall lawes, both of the Church and of the ſtate; which yet have bin very ſevere againſt the exceſsive vanity of Apparell, and the effe-
2 Reg. 9. minate trimming of haire. *We read indeed of Ieſabell that ſhe painted her face, but of Eſther and Judith, noe ſuch matter is reported.*

§ *Let us proceed to Athletique*, which we take in a ſomewhat more large ſence than uſually it is. For to this we referre any point of *Ability*, whereunto the body of man may be brought, or any aptitude thereto, whether it be of *Activity* or of *Patience*: whereof *Activity* hath two parts, *ſtrength* and *ſwifineſſe*; and patience likewiſe hath two parts, *Indurance* of *Naturall wants*, and *Fortitude* in *torments*. Of all theſe we ſee many times notable Inſtances in the practiſe of Tumblers; in the hard fare of ſome Salvages; in the wonderfull ſtrength of Lunatiques; and in the conſtancy of many in the midſt of exquiſite torments. Nay if there be any other faculty, which falls not within (as in thoſe that Dive, that obtain a ſtrange power of containing Reſpiration, and the like) we referre it to this part. And that ſuch things may ſometimes be done, is moſt certain: but the Philoſophy and enquiry of cauſes touching them, is commonly neglected; for this reaſon as we ſuppoſe, becauſe men are perſwaded, that ſuch maiſteries and commands over Nature, are obtained either by a peculiar imbred aptneſſe of ſome men, which falls not within the rules of diſcipline; or from a continuall cuſtome from childhood, which rather is commanded than taught. Which though it be not altogether ſo true, yet to what end ſhould we note any *Deficience?* for the *Olympique games* are down long ſince; and a mediocrity in theſe things is enough for uſe; but an excellency in them ſerveth commonly but for Mercenary oſtentation.

§ *In the laſt place we come to Arts of Pleaſure:* They, as the ſenſes to which they referre are of two kinds; *Painting* delights the eye, eſpecially, with an infinite number of ſuch

Arts

Arts appertaining to Magnificence about Buildings; Gardens; Garments; Veſſels; Cups; Gemmes, and the like. *Muſique delights the eare*, which is ſet out with ſuch variety and preparation of Voices; Aires, and Inſtruments. In ancient time water-Inſtruments were eſtimed the chiefe Organs of that Art which now are almoſt growne out of uſe. *Theſe Arts belonging to the eye and the eare* are principally above the reſt accounted *Liberall*; theſe *two ſenſes* are more chaſt; the ſciences thereof more learned, as having in their traine the Mathematique Art as their Handmaid: So the one is referr'd to Memory and Demonſtrations; the other unto Manners, and the Paſſions of the Mind. The delight of the other ſenſes and the Arts about which they are converſant, are in leſſe reputation and credit, as drawing neerer to ſenſuality than magnificence. Unguents; Odors; Dainties; Delicious fare, and incitements to Luſt; need rather a Cenſor to repreſſe them; than a Doctor to inſtruct them. And it is well obſerved by ſome, *That while States and Commonwealths have bin in their growth and riſing, Arts military have flouriſht; when they have bin ſetled and ſtood at a height, Arts liberall; and drawing to their declenſion and ruine, Arts voluptuarie*. And it is to be fear'd that this age of the world being ſomewhat upon the deſcent of the wheele, inclines to *Arts voluptuarie*: Wherefore we paſſe them over. With *Arts voluptuarie*, I couple *Practices Iocularie*; for the deceiving of the ſenſes, may be ſet downe as one of the delights of the ſenſes.

§ *And now we have gone through the Knowledges concerning the Body of man* (*Phyſique; Coſmetique; Athletique*, and *Voluptuarie*) we admoniſh this much by the way; that ſeeing ſo many things fall into conſideration about the *Body of man*, as *Parts; Humours; Functions; Faculties; Accidents*; & ſeeing (if we could aptly doe it) an entire Body ſhould be made touching the *Body of man*, which might comprehend all theſe (like to that of *the knowledge of the Soule*, whereof we ſhall ſpeake anon) notwithſtanding leſt Arts ſhould be too much multiplied, or the ancient Limits of Arts tranſpos'd, more than need muſt; we receive into the Body of Medi-

cine, *the knowledge of the Parts of mans Body, of Functions, of Humours; of Respiration, of Sleepe; of Generation; of the fruit of the Wombe, of Gestation in the Wombe; of Growth; of the flower of Age; of whit Haires; of Impinguation*, and the like; although they doe not properly pertaine to those three duties of *Conservation of Health; Cure of Diseases; Prolongation of Life.* But because mans body is every way the Subject of Medicine. *As for voluntarie motion*, and sense, we referre them to the *knowledge concerning the Soule*; as two principall Parts thereof. And so we conclude *the knowledge which concernes mans Body*, which is but the *Tabernacle of the Soule.*

CAP. III.

I The Partition of *Humane Philosophie concerning the Mind, into the knowledg of the inspired Essence; & into the knowledge of the sensible, or productted Soule.* §. A second Partition of *the same Philosophie, into the knowledge of the Substance and Faculties of the Soule, and the knowledge of the use and Objects of the Faculties.* II. Two Appendices of *the Knowledge concerning the Faculties of the Soule.* §. *The knowledge of Naturall Divination*; §. *And the knowledge of Fascination.* III. The Distribution *of the Faculties of the sensible Soule.* § *Into Motion; and* § *into Sense.*

NOW *let us proceed to the Knowledge which concerns the Mind or Soule of man*, out of the treasures whereof all other Knowledges are extracted. *It hath two Parts, the one entreateth of the Reasonable Soule, which is a thing Divine; the other of the unreasonable Soule, which is common to us with Beasts.* We have noted a litle before (where we speake of Formes,) those two different *Emanations of Soules*, which in the first Creation of them both, offer themselves unto our view, that is, that one hath it's originall from the *Breath of God*; the other from the *Matrices of the Elements*; for of the Primitive Emanation of the Rationall Soule, thus speakes the Scripture, *Deus formavit hominem de limo terræ, & spiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitæ*: But the

Gen. 2.

Generation

Generation of the unreaſonable Soule, or of Beaſts, was accompliſht by theſe words; *Producat Aqua, Producat Terra:* Gen. 1. And this irrationall Soule, as it is in man, is the Inſtrument only to the *Reaſonable Soule*; and hath the ſame originall in us, that it hath in Beaſts; namely, *from the ſlime of the earth*; for it is not ſaid *God form'd the Body of man, of the ſlime of the Earth, but God formed man*, that is the whole man *that Spiraculum* excepted. Wherefore we will ſtile that part of the generall knowledge concerning *mans ſoule*, the knowledge of the *ſpiracle, or inſpired ſubſtance*; and the other Part, the knowledge *of the Senſible* or *Product Soule*. And ſeeing that hitherto we handle Philoſophie only (placing *ſacred Theologie* in the cloſe of this worke) we would not have borrowed this Partition from *Divinity*, if it had not here concurr'd with the Principles of *Philoſophie*. *There are many and great Precellencies of the ſoule of man, above the ſoules of beaſts*, evident unto thoſe who philoſophize even according to ſenſe: And whereſoever the concurrent Characters of ſuch great excellencies are found, there ſhould ever, upon good reaſon, be made a *ſpecifique Difference*. Wherefore we doe not altogether ſo well allow the Philoſophers promiſcuous, and confuſe Diſcourſes touching *the Functions of the Soule*; *as if the Soule of man was differenced gradually, rather than ſpecifiquely, from the ſoule of Beaſts*; no otherwiſe than the Sun amongſt the Starres, or Gold amongſt Metals.

§ *There remaines another partition alſo to be annexed to the knowledge in Generall concerning the ſoule or mind of man*, before we ſpeake at large of the kinds: For what we ſhall ſpeake of the *ſpecies* hereafter, comprehendeth both the partitions; as well that which we have ſet downe already, as this which we now ſhall propound. *Wherefore the ſecond Partition may be, into the knowledge concerning the Subſtance and Faculties of the* Soule; and into the knowledge *concerning the uſe and objects of the Faculties.*

§ This two-fold Partition of the Soule thus premiſ'd, let us now come unto the ſpecies or kinds. The knowledge of the *Spiraculum*, or *inſpired Eſſence*, as that concerning the ſubſtance

Substance of the Reasonable Soule, comprehends these Inquiries touching the Nature thereof; as whether, *it be Native*, or *Adventive*; *Separable*, *or Inseparable*; *Mortall*, *or Immortall*; *how farre it is tied to the Lawes of Matter*, *how farre*, *not*, and the like? What other points soever there are of this kind, although they may be more diligently, and soundly inquired even in Philosophie, than hitherto they have bin; yet for all this, in our opinion, they must be bound over at last, unto Religion, there to be determined and defined; for otherwise they still lye open to many errors and illusions of sense. *For seeing that the substance of the Soule was not deduced and extracted in hir Creation from the Masse of Heaven and Earth, but immediatly inspired from God; and seeing the Lawes of of Heaven and Earth are the proper subjects of Philosophie; how can the knowledge of the substance of the Reasonable Soule be derived or fetch't from Philosophy? But it must be drawne from the same inspiration from whence the substance thereof first flowed.*

Animæ Origo Mysteriũ.

§ The Knowledge of the *sensible or producted Soule*, as touching the substance thereof is truly enquired into; but this inquiry seemes to us to be DEFICIENT: For what makes these termes *of Actus Vltimus*; and *Forma Corporis*; and such like wilde logicall Universalities, to the knowledge of the Soules substance? For the *sensible Soule*, or the soule of Beasts, must needs be granted, *to be a Corporall substance attenuated by heate and made Invisible: I say, a thinne gentle gale of wind swell'd and blowne up from some flamy and airy Nature, indeed with the softnesse of Aire to receive impression, and with the vigor of fire to embrace action; nourished partly by an oyly, partly by a watery substance; spread over the Body; residing (in perfect Creatures) chiefly in the head; running through the nerves; refresht and repair'd by the spirituous blood of the Arteries*; as *Bernardinus Telesius*, and his Scholler, *Augustinus Donius* in some points, not altogether unprofitably, have delivered it. Let there be therefore made a more diligent inquiry touching this knowledge; and the rather for that this point, not well understood hath brought forth superstitious and very con-

DE SVBSTANTIA ANIMÆ SENSIBILIS

Teles. de Rer. Nat. lib. 5.

Donius.

contagious opinions, and moſt vilely abaſing the Dignity of the *ſoule of man*; of *Tranſmigration of ſoules out of one Body into another*; *and Luſtrations of ſoules by Periods of yeares*; *and finally of the too neere affinity in every point of the ſoule of man, with the ſouls of beaſts*. This ſoule in *Beaſts is a principal ſoule*, where-of the body of Beaſts is the Organ; but *in man this ſoule is it ſelfe an Organ* of the Soule Rationall, and may rather be called by the appellation of a *Spirit*, than of a *Soule*. And thus much of the *ſubſtance of the Soule*.

§ *The Faculties of the Soule are well knowne, to be, Vnderſtanding, Reaſon, Imagination, Memory, Appetite*; *Will*, and all thoſe Powers, about which the Sciences of *Logique* and *Ethique* are converſant. But in the *knowledge concerning the ſoule, the Originall of theſe Faculties* ought to be handled, and that Phyſically, as they are connaturall with the Soule, and adhere to it: Only their *uſes* and *obiects* are deſigned to other Arts. And in this Part (in our opinion) there hath bin no extraordinary performance hetherto, although we doe not report it as *Deficient*.

II This Part *touching the Faculties of the Soule* hath *two Appendices*, which as they have bin handled have rather preſented us with ſmoake, than any lucide flames of truth; one of theſe is the Knowledge of *Naturall Divination*; the other of *Faſcination*.

§ *Divination* hath bin anciently and fitly divided into two Parts; *Artificiall* and *Naturall*. *Artificiall* by arguing from the Indication of ſignes, collectes a *Prediction*: *Naturall* from the internall *Divination* of the mind without the aſſiſtance of ſignes, makes a Preſage. *Artificiall is of two ſorts*; one argueth from *Cauſes*; the other from *Experiments* only, by a blind way of Auctoritie; which later is for the moſt part ſuperſtitious, ſuch as was the Heathen Diſcipline upon the *inſpection of the Intrals of Beaſts*; the flight of Birds, and the like: So the ſolemne Aſtrologie of the Chaldeans was litle better. Both the kinds of *Artificiall Divination* are diſtributed amongſt diverſe Sciences. The Aſtrologer hath his *Predictions* from the ſituation of the ſtarres; the Phyſitian

hath his *Predictions*, of the approach of Death, of Recovery, of enſuing Symptomes of Diſeaſes, from Vrines, Pulſes, aſpect of Patients, and the like. The Politique hath his *Predictions*; *O urbem venalem & citò perituram, ſi emptorem invenerit*, The truth of which *Propheſie* ſtaid not long, being firſt accompliſht in *Sylla*, after in *Cæſar*. Wherefore Predictions of this Nature are not pertinent to the preſent purpoſe, but are to be referred over to their proper Arts. But the *Divination Naturall*, which ſpringeth from the internall Power of the Soule, is that which we now ſpeak of. *This is of two ſorts, the one Native, the other by Influxion. Native* is grounded upon this ſuppoſition, *that the mind when it is withdrawne and collected into it ſelfe, and not diffuſed into Organs of the Body, hath from the naturall Power of its owne Eſſence, ſome Prenotion of things future.* And this appeares moſt in ſleepe; Extaſies; Propinquity of Death; more rare, in waking, or when the Body is healthfull and ſtrong. And this ſtate of the mind is commonly procured and furthered by abſtinencies, and thoſe obſervancies which doe moſt of all retire the *Mind* unto it ſelfe from the practique functions of the *Body*; that thus redim'd from the incombrances of exterior ingagements, it may poſſeſſe and enjoy its owne Nature. *But Divination by Influxion* is grounded upon another ſuppoſition, *That the Mind as a Mirror or Glaſſe ſhould take a ſecondary kind of Illumination from the fore-knowledge of God and Spirits, unto which the ſame State and Regiment of the Body which was to the firſt, doth likewiſe conduce.* For the ſame ſequeſtration of the mind cauſeth it more ſeverely to imploy its owne Eſſence; and makes it more ſuſceptive of *Divine Influxions*: ſave that the ſoule, in *Divinations by Influxion* is rapt with a kind of fervency and impatiency, as it were of the Deitie, wherewith it is poſſeſt (which the Ancients noted by the name of *ſacred Fury*), but in *Native Divination*, the mind is enfranchis'd and neerer to a repoſe rather, and an immunity from labour.

Saluſt. in Iugurth.

§ *Faſcination & the Power and intenſive Act of the Imagination upon the Bodie of another*; (for of the Power of the *Imagination* upon the Body of the imaginant, we have ſpo-

ken before). In this kind the *schoole of Paracelsus*, and the Disciples of pretended *Naturall Magique*, have bin so intemperate, as they have only not equall'd the force and apprehension of the *Imagination*, with the power of *miracle-working faith*. Others, drawing neerer to the similitude of truth, when they had more intentively considered the secret energies and impressions of things; the Irradiations of the senses; the transmissions of cogitations from Body to Body; the conveyances of Magnetique virtues; came to be of opinion, that much more might such Impressions; Informations; and Communications be made, from spirit to spirit; being that a spirit of all other things is more powerfull and strong to worke, and more soft and penetrable to suffer: whence the conceits have growne, made almost populare, of the Mastering spirit; of men ominous and unlucky; of the strokes of love and envy; and of others of like Nature. Incident unto this, is the enquiry, *How the Imagination may be intended and fortified?* For if the *Imagination* fortified be of such great power, then it is materiall to know by what waies it may be exalted, and made greater than it selfe? And here comes in crookedly, and as dangerously, a Palliation and Defence of a great part of *Ceremoniall Magique*. For it may be a specious pretence that Ceremonies; Characters; Charmes; Gesticulations; Amulets, and the like, *doe worke not by any tacite or sacramentall contract with evill spirits; but serve only to strengthen and exalt the imagination of him that useth them; even as the use of Images in religion hath prevail'd for the fixing of mens minds in the Contemplation of things, and the raising of the devotion of them that Pray.* But for my owne judgment, if it be admitted, that the force of *Imagination* is so Potent, and that Ceremonies exalt and fortifie that Power; and be it granted, that Ceremonies are used sincerely to that intention, & as a Physicall Remedy, without the least thought of inviting the assistance of Spirits by them; yet, for all this, I should hold them unlawfull, because they impugne and contradict that divine Edict pass'd upon man for sinne, *In sudore vultus comedes panem tuum*. For this kind of *Magique* propounds

Par. In Param.

Crollij Præf.

Gen 3.

propounds those noble fruits, (which God hath set forth to be bought at the price of Labour) to be purchas'd by a few easy and sloathfull observances.

III. There remaine two knowledges, which referre specially to the *Faculties of the inferiour or sensible Soule*, as those which doe most Communicate with corporall Organs; the one is of *Voluntary Motion*, the other of *sense and sensibility*.

* DE NIXIBVS SPIRITûs IN MOTV VOLVNTARIO.

§ In the former of these the Inquiry hath bin very superficiall, and one entire part almost quite left out. For concerning the office and apt fabrique of the Nerves and Muscles, and of other parts requisite to *this Motion*, and which part of the Body rests whilest another is moved, and that the Governour and Chariot-driver, as it were, of this *Motion*, is the *Imagination*; so as dismissing the *Image* to which the *Motion* was caried, the *Motion* it selfe is presently intercepted and arrested (as when we walke, if an other serious and fixed thought come into our mind, we presently stand still) and many other such subtleties not to be slighted, have now long agoe come into Observation and Enquiry. *And how Compressions*, and *Dilatations*, and *Agitations of the Spirit* (which without question is the spring of *Motion*) should incline, excite, and enforce the corporall and ponderous Masse of the Parts, *hath not yet bin enquired into*, and handled with diligence; and no marvaile, seeing the sensible soule it selfe hath bin hitherto taken for an *entelechie*, or *selfe moving Faculty*, and some Function, rather than a Substance. But now it is knowne to be a corporall and materiate Substance; it is necessary to be enquired, by what efforts such a pusill and a thin-soft aire should put in motion, such solid and hard bodies. Therefore seeing this part is DEFICIENT let *enquiry* be made thereof.

§ *But of sense and sensibility* there hath bin made a farre more plentifull and diligent enquiry, both in Generall Treatises about them, and in Particular Sciences, as in *Perspective*, and *Musique*; how truly, is not to our purpose to deliver. Wherefore we cannot set them downe as DEFICIENTS;

Not-

Notwithſtanding there are two noble and remarkable Parts, which in this knowledge we aſſigne to be DEFICIENT; the one concerning *the difference of Perception and Senſe*; the other concerning the *Forme* of *Light*.

* DE DIFFERENTIA PERCEPTIONIS ET SENSVS

§ *As for the Difference between Perception and Senſe*, Philoſophers ſhould in their writings *de ſenſu & ſenſibili* have premis'd a ſolid and ſound diſcovery thereof, as a matter Fundamentall. For we ſee that there is a manifeſt power of *Perception* even in all Bodies Naturall; and a kind of Election to embrace that which is any way allied in nature, and favourable to them; and to fly what is adverſe and forraine. Neither doe we meane of more ſubtile *Perceptions* only, *as when the Loadſtone drawes unto it Iron*; *Flame leapes to Bituminous Mould*; one Buble of water neere another Buble, cloſeth and incorporates with it; Rayes glance from a white object; the body of a living Creature aſſimilates that which is good for it, excerneth what is unprofitable; a peece of ſponge even when it is rais'd above the ſurface of the water, ſucks in water, expells ayre; and the like. For to what end ſhould we enumerate ſuch inſtances, ſeeing no body plac'd neere to another, changeth the other, or is changed of it, unleſſe a reciprocall *Perception* precede the operation. Every Body hath a *Perception* of the Pores & Paſſages by which it inſinuates it ſelfe; it feeles the invaſion of another Body, to which it yeeldeth; it *perceives* the remove of another Body, by which it was detained; when it recovers it ſelfe, it *perceives* the divulſion of its continuance, which for a time reſiſteth; and in a word *Perception* is diffuſed through the whole body of Nature. Aire doth ſo exactly *Senſe* Hot and Cold, that the *Perception* thereof is farre more ſubtile than mans Touch, which yet is taken for the diſcerning Rule of Hot and Cold. *Two faults* therefore are found concerning this knowledge; that men have for moſt part paſt it over toucht, & unhandled; which notwithſtanding is a moſt unble ſpeculation. The other is that they who perchance have addicted their minds to this contemplation, have in the heat of this Purſuit gone too farre, and attributed *Senſe to all Bodies*,

Campanella alij.

Virg. Æn. 3

dies, that it is amoſt a piaculare crime *to pull off a bow from a Tree, leſt it ſhould groane and complaine as Polydore did*. But they ſhould explore with diligence the difference of *Perception* and *Senſe*, not only in comparing of *Senſibles* with *Inſenſibles* according to the entire body (as of Plants, and living Creatures) but alſo to obſerve in the ſenſible Body, what ſhould be the cauſe that ſo many Actions ſhould be diſcharg'd, and that without any *Senſe* at all? Why Aliments are digeſted, egeſted: Humors and ſucculent moyſtures caried upwards and downwards; the Heart and Pulſe beate; the Guts as ſo many Shops, or Worke-houſes ſhould every one accompliſh his proper worke, and yet all theſe and many ſuch like are performed without *Senſe*? But men have not with ſufficient enquiry ſearcht or found out of what Nature the Action of *Senſe* is; and what kind of Body; what delay; what Conduplication of impreſſion are required to this, that pain or pleaſure ſhould follow? To cloſe this point they doe ſeem to be altogether ignorant of the difference betwixt *ſimple Perception and ſenſe; howfarre Perception may be made without ſenſe*? Nor is this Enquiry a Controverſie of words, but a matter of great and important moment. *Wherefore let* there be made a better *inquiry* of this knowledge, as of a matter very profitable, and of manifold uſe. Conſidering alſo that the ignorance of ſome of the Ancient Philoſophers touching this matter, ſo farre obſcured the light of reaſon, as that they thought, *there was without any difference, a Soule infuſed into all Bodies*; nor did they conceive how *Motion*, with a diſcerning inſtinct, could be made without *Senſe*; or *Senſe* exiſt without a *Soule*.

* RADIX PERSPECTIVÆ SIVE DE FORMA LVCIS.

§ *As for the Form of Light*, that there hath not bin made a due enquiry thereof (ſpecially ſeeing men have ſo painfully imploy'd their Studies in the *Perſpectives*) may well be cenſur'd as a ſtrange overſight. For neither in the *Perſpectives*, nor elſwhere, is there any thing inquired concerning *Light*, of any worth or waight: The Radiations of it are handled, the Originalls not: *But the placing of Perſpectives amongſt the Mathematiques hath begotten this defect; and others*

of

of like nature; becauſe men have made a too early departure from Phyſiques. So on the other ſide the handling of *Light* and the Cauſes thereof, in *Phyſiques* is commonly ſuperſtitious, as of a thing of a middle nature betwixt things naturall and Divine; in ſo much as ſome of *Platoes* School have introduced *Light* as a thing more ancient than *Matter it ſelfe*. For when the empty ſpace was ſpread abroad they affirm'd, in a vaine imagination that it was firſt fill'd with *Light*, and afterwards with a *Body*; whereas Holy writ ſets downe plainly *the Maſſe of Heaven and Earth to be a darke Chaos before the Creation of Light*. But what are handled Phyſically and according to ſenſe of this ſubject, preſently deſcendeth to *Radiations*; ſo as there is very litle Philoſophicall enquiry extant touching this point. And men ought to ſubmit their Contemplations a while, and to enquire what is common to all *Lucid Bodies*, as of the *Forme* of *Light*: For what an immenſe difference of Body is there (if they may be conſidered according to their dignity) betwixt the Sun and rotten wood, or the putrid ſcales of Fiſh? They ſhould likewiſe make enquiry, what ſhould be the Cauſe why ſome things take fire, and once throughly heated caſt forth a *Light*; others not? Iron; Metalls; Stones, Glaſſe, Wood, Oyle; Tallow by fire, either caſt forth a *Flame*, or at leaſt grow *Red*: But *Water* and *Aire* heated with the fury of the hotteſt Flames to the higheſt degree they are capeable of, acquire no ſuch light, nor caſt forth any Splendor. If any man think, it therefore thus comes to paſſe, becauſe it is the propertie of fire to *give light*; but *Water* and *Aire* are utter enemies to *Fire*; ſure he was never rowed with Oares in a dark night upon ſalt waters, and in a hot ſeaſon; where he might have ſeen ſmall drops of water rebounding from the claſhing of the Oares, to *ſparkle* and caſt forth a *light*: Which is likewiſe ſeen in the fervent froath of the Sea which they call the *Sea-longs*. And what affinitie with flame and fired matter have the *Cicindulæ*, the *Luciolæ*, and the *Indian Fly*, which caſt a light over a whole arched Roome; or the eyes of certaine living Creatures in the dark; and ſugar, as it is grated

Ficin. Card de Cuſa.

Gen. 1.

grated or broken; or the ſweat of a horſe hard ridden, in a ſoultry night; and many more? *Nay many have underſtood ſo litle in this point, as many have thought the ſparkes from a flint to be attrited Aire.* But when the Aire is not fired with heate, and apparantly *conceives Light*, how comes it to paſſe, that Owles and Cats, and many other Creatures ſee in the night? *So that it muſt needs be (ſeeing viſion cannot be convayed without light) that there is a native and inbred light in Aire, although very feeble and weake; yet ſuch as may be proportionated to the Opticke Beames of ſuch Creatures, and may ſuffice them for ſight.* But the cauſe of this evill, as of many more, that men have not drawn forth the *common Formes of things Naturall*, from *Particular Inſtances*; which is that we have ſet downe as the proper ſubject of *Metaphyſique*; which is it ſelfe a part of *Phyſique*, or of the knowledge of *Nature*. Therefore let there be *enquiry* made of the *Forme and Originalls of Light*, and in the meane, it may be placed among DEFICIENTS. And thus much of the *Knowledge concerning the ſubſtance of the Soule, Rationall, and Senſible*, with their *Faculties*, and of the *Appendices* of the *ſame Knowledge.*

THE

THE FIFTH BOOK OF
FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM
VICOUNT St ALBAN.

OF THE DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

I The Partition *of the Knowledge, which respecteth the Vse, and Objects of the Faculties of the Mind of Man, into Logique, and Ethique.* II. The Division of *Logique into the Arts, of Invention; of Iudgment; of Memorie; and of Tradition.*

THE Knowledge respecting the *understanding of Man* (*Excellent King*) and that other respecting *his Will*, are, as it were, Twinnes by Birth: For the *Puritie of Illumination; and the Libertie of will began together, fell together: Nor is there in the Vniversall Nature of things so intimate a Sympathy, as that of Truth and Goodnesse.* The more shame for Learned Men, if they be for Knowledge like *winged Angels*; for base Desires, they be like *Serpents* which crawle in the Dust, carrying indeed about them Mindes like a Mirror or Glasse; but menstruous and distain'd.

§ *We come now to the Knowledge which respecteth the use and objects of the Faculties of the Mind of Man.* This hath *two*

Parts, and they well knowne, and by generall consent received, *Logique and Ethique*: Save that we have a litle before set at liberty *Civile Knowledge*, which commonly was taken in as a Part of *Ethique*; and have made it an entire *Knowledge of man congregate or in societie*; handling here *only man segregate*. *Logique intreateth of the understanding and Reason*; *Ethique of the Will*; *Appetite*; *and Affections*; the one produceth *Decrees*; the other *Actions*. It is true that the *Imagination* in both Provinces, Iudiciall and Ministeriall, performes the Office of an Agent or Nuncius, or common Atturney. For *Sense* sends over all sorts of Ideas unto the *Imagination*, upon which, Reason afterwards sits in Iudgment: And *Reason* interchangeably sends over selected and approved Ideas to the *Imagination*, before the Decree can be acted. For *Imagination* ever preceedes voluntary motion and incites it; so that *Imagination* is a common reciprocall Instrument to both: Saving that this Ianus is bifronted, and turnes faces: For the face towards *Reason* hath the Print of *Truth*; but the face towards *Action* hath the Print of *Goodnesse*: which nevertheless are faces ---- *Quales decet esse sororum.*

Ovid. Met.

Neither is the *Imagination* a meer and simple Messenger, but is invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth no small Auctoritie besides the duty of the message. For it is well said by *Aristotle*, *That the mind hath over the Body that command which the Lord hath over a bond-man*; *but the* Reason *hath over the* Imagination *that command which a Magistrate hath over a free Citizen*; who may come also to rule in his turne. For we see that in matters of *Faith* & *Religion*, the *Imagination* mounts, and is elevated above *Reason*; not that *Divine Illumination* resideth in the *Imagination*; (nay rather in the high Tower of the mind, and understanding) but, *as in virtues Divine, grace makes use of the motions of the will*; *so in Illuminations Divine, grace makes use of the Imagination*. Which is the Cause that Religion sought ever an accesse, and way to the *Mind*, by *Similitudes*; *Types*; *Parables*; *Visions*; *Dreames*. Againe it is small Dominion the *Imagination* hath in perswasions, insinuated by the power of Eloquence: For where the minds

Polit. 1.

of

of men are gently intreated inflamed, and any way forcibly wonne by the ſmooth Artifice of ſpeech, all this is done by exalting the *Imagination*, which growing hot and impatient not only triumphes over *Reaſon*; but in a ſort offers violence unto it; partly by blinding, partly by extimulating it. Nevertheleſſe I ſee no reaſon why we ſhould depart from the former Diviſion: For the *Imagination* commonly doth not produce Sciences; for *Poeſy* which hath ever bin attributed to the *Imagination*, is to be eſtimed rather a play of the wit, than a knowledge. As for the power of the *Imagination in things Naturall*, we have aſſigned that, a litle before, to the *Doctrine de Anima*. And for the affinity it hath with *Rhetorique*, we think it fit to referre it to the Art it ſelfe whereof we ſhall intreate hereafter.

§ *This Part of humane Philoſophy which is Rationall or reſpecting Logique*, is to the taſt and Palate of many wits, not ſo delightfull; and ſeemeth nothing elſe but a net and ſnare of thorny ſubtletie. For as it is truly ſaid *that knowledge is animi Pabulum*; ſo in the nature of mens appetites, and election of this *foode*, moſt men are of the taſt and ſtomack of the Iſraelites in the Deſert, that would fain have turned *ad ollas Carnium*, and were weary of *Manna*; which thouh it were Celeſtiall, yet ſeemed it leſſe nutritive and comfortable. So generally thoſe *Knowledges* reliſh beſt, that have an infuſion ſomewhat more eſculent of fleſh in them; ſuch as are *Civile Hiſtory*; *Morality*; *Policy*, about the which mens Affections; Praiſes; Fortunes doe turne, and are converſant: But this ſame *lumen ſiccum*, doth parch and offend moſt mens watry and ſoft natures. But if we would meaſure & valew things according to their proper worth, *Rationall Sciences are the keyes of all other Arts*; *and as the Hand is the Inſtrument of Inſtruments*; *the Mind, the Forme of Formes*; *ſo theſe knowledges are to be eſtimed the Art of Arts*. Neither doe they direct only; but likewiſe ſtrengthen and confirme; as the uſe and habit of ſhooting, doth not only enable to ſhoot a neerer ſhoot; but alſo to draw a ſtronger Bow. Sen. alicubi

II. *Arts Logicall or intellectuall are foure in number*, divi-

ded according to the ends whereunto they are referred: For mans labour in *Rationall Knowledges* is, either to *invent that which is ſought*; *or to judge what is invented*; *or to retaine that which is judg'd*; *or to deliver over that which is Retained*: So as there muſt needs be ſo many *Rationall Sciences*; Art of *Inquiry*, or *Invention*; Art of *Examination* or *judgment*; Art of *Cuſtody* or *Memory*; and Art of *Elocution* or *Tradition*; whereof we will ſpeake, of every particular apart.

CAP. II.

I The Partition *of the Art of Invention into the Inventive of Arts: and of Arguments.* §. The former of theſe, which is the more eminent is *Deficient.* II. The Diviſion *of the Inventive Art of Arts, into literate Experience.* §. *And a New Organ.* III. A Delineation *of Experience Literate.*

I INvention is of two kinds, much differing; the one of *Arts and Sciences*; the other of *Arguments* and *Speeches*. The former of theſe I report to be wholly DEFICIENT, which ſeemes to me to be ſuch a *Deficience*, as if in the making of an *Inventory* touching the eſtate of a *Defunct*, it ſhould be ſet downe, *of ready money nothing*: For as *money* will fetch all other commodities; ſo all other *Arts* are purchas'd by *this Art*. And *as the weſt Indies* had never bin diſcovered, if the uſe of the *Mariners Needle* had not firſt bin diſcovered, though thoſe *Regions* be vaſt, the *Verſor* is a ſmall Motion: So it cannot be found ſtrange, if *in the diſcovery and advancement of Arts*, there hath not bin made greater Progreſſion, ſeeing the *Art of Invention and Perluſtration* hetherto was unknown.

* EXPERIENTIA LITERATA, ſive VENATIO PANIS.

§ *That this part of knowledge is wanting ſtands plainly confeſſed.* For firſt *Logique* doth not profeſſe, nay not pretend to *Invent* either Arts *Mechanicall*, or Arts (as they call them) *Liberall*; nor to elicite the *Operations* of the one, or the *Axioms* of the other; but ſpeakes to men as it were in Paſſage, and

ſo

to leaves them with this instruction, *cuiq; suâ arte credendum.* Ariſt Mo. *Celſus* a wiſe man, as well as a Phyſitian (though it be the ral. 1. cuſtome of all men to be copious in the commendation of their owne Profeſſion) acknowledgeth it gravely and ingeniouſly, ſpeaking of the Empyricall and Dogmaticall Sects of Phyſitians, *That Medicines and Cures were firſt found out,* De Re Me- *and then after the Reaſons and Cauſes were diſcovered: not the o-* dica. *ther way, that the Cauſes firſt extracted from the nature of things gave light to the invention of Remedies.* But *Plato* often notes In Timæo. Phileb. alibi. it; *That Particulars are infinite; againe that the higheſt Generalities give no ſufficient Direction; and that the Pyth of all Sciences, whereby the Arts-man is diſtinguiſh't from the Inexpert, conſiſteth in middle Propoſitions, which experience hath delivered and taught in every Particular* Science. And therfore we ſee that they which diſcourſe of the firſt *Inventors of things, and the Originalls of Sciences*, have celebrated rather *Chance* than *Art*; and have brought in *Beaſts; Birds; Fiſhes; Serpents*, rather than *Men*, as the firſt Doctors of Sciences.

Dictamnum Genetrix Cretæâ carpit ab Ida,
Puberibus Caulem foliis & flore comantem Virg. Æn. 12.
Purpureo, non illa feris incognita Capris
Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæſere ſagittæ.

So that is was no marvaile (the manner of Antiquitie being for to conſecrate *Inventors* of things profitable) that the Ægyptians, an ancient Nation, to whom many Arts owe their firſt Beginnings, had their Temples full of the Idols of Brutes, but almoſt empty of the Idols of men,

Omnigenumq; Deûm monſtra & Latrator Anubis, Vir. Æn. 8.
Contra Neptunum, & Venerem, contraq; Minervam &c.

And if you like better, from the Tradition of the Grecians, to aſcribe the *firſt invention of Arts to men*; yet you cannot ſay that *Prometheus* applied his contemplation on ſet purpoſe to the invention of Fire; or that when he firſt ſtroake Ovid. Horat. &c. the flint he expected ſparkes; but that he fell upon this experiment by chance, and as they ſay *---furtum Jovi feciſſe*; ſo as for the *Invention of Arts* we are more beholding to a wild Goat for Chirurgery, or to a Nightingale for modulati-

ons of Muſique; to the *Ibis* for Clyſteres; to a Potlid that flew open for Artillerie; and to ſay in a word to *Chance* or any thing elſe more than to *Logique*. Neither is the forme of *Invention* which Virgil deſcribes, much other,

Pamirollus Rer. Mem. Pa. 2.

Virg. G. 1. *Et varias uſus meditando extunderet Artes*
Paulatim----

For here is no other method of *Invention* propounded, than that which bruite Beaſts are capeable of, and often put in ure; *which is a moſt intentive ſollicitude about ſome one thing and a perpetuall practice thereof; which the neceſsity of their Conſervation impoſeth upon ſuch Creatures;* for *Cicero* ſaith very truly, *uſus uni rei deditus, & naturam & artem ſæpe vincit*, Therefore if it be ſaid of men

Oratio. pro L. Cor. Balbo.

Labor omnia vincit
Virg. G. 1. *Improbus, & duris urgens in rebus egeſtas.*

It is likewiſe ſaid of Beaſts,

Perſ. Prol. *Quis expedivit Pſittaco ſuum* Καῖρε?

Who taught the Raven in a drougth to throw Pebbles into a hollow tree where by chance ſhe ſpied water, that the water might riſe ſo as ſhee might come to it? Who taught the Bee to ſayle thorow ſuch a vaſt ſea of Aire, to the Flowers in the Fields; and to find the way ſo farre off to hir Hive againe? Who taught the Ant to bite every grain of Corne that ſhe burieth in hir hill, leſt it ſhould take root and grow, and ſo delude hir hope? And if you obſerve in Virgils verſe, the word *extundere*, which imports the *Difficulty*, and the word *Paulatim*, which imports the *ſlowneſſe*? we are where we were even amongſt the *Ægyptian Gods*, ſeeing hetherto men have made litle uſe of the facultie of *Reaſon*, none at all of the *duty of Art* for the *diſcouery of Inventions*.

Plin. Nat. H

§ Secondly if this which we affirme, be well conſidered, it is demonſtrated by the *Forme of Induction* which Logique propounds, namely by that *Forme of inference*, whereby the Principles of Sciences are found out and proved, which, as it is now framed, is utterly vitious and incompetent, and ſo farre from perfecting nature that it rather perverts and diſtorts it. For he that ſhall exactly obſerve how this

this *Æthereall Dew of Sciences*; like unto that the Poet ſpeaks of *Aerei mellis Cæleſtia dona.*
is gather'd (ſeeing that even Sciences themſelves are extracted out of particular examples, partly Naturall, partly Artificiall; or from the flowers of the field, and Garden) ſhall find that the mind of hir owne nature, and imbred diſpoſition doth more ingeniouſly, and with better Invention, Act an *Induction*, than Logicians deſcribe it. For from a *nude enumeration of Particulars* (as Logicians uſe to doe) without an Inſtance Contradictory, is a vitious Concluſion; nor doth ſuch an *Induction* inferre more than a probable Conjecture. For who will take upon him, when the Particulars which a man knowes, and which he hath mention'd, appeare only on one ſide, there may not lurke ſome Particular which is altogither repugnant? As if *Samuell* ſhould have reſted in thoſe ſons of *Iſhay* which were brought before him in the houſe; and ſhould not have ſought *David* which was abſent in the field. And this *Forme of Induction* (to ſay plainly the truth) is ſo groſſe and palpable, that it might ſeeme incredible, that ſuch acute and ſubtile wits as have exerciz'd their meditations in theſe things, could have obtruded it upon the world; but that they haſted to Theories, and Dogmaticalls; and from a kind of pride and elation of mind deſpiſed *Particulars*, ſpecially any long ſtay upon them. *For they have uſed theſe examples and Particular Inſtances, but as Sergeants, and whifflers, ad ſummovendam turbam, to make way and roome for their opinions; and never advis'd with them from the beginning; that ſo a legitimate and mature deliberation, concerning the truth of things, might be made.* Certainly it is a thing hath touch'd my mind with a pious, and religious wonder, to ſee the ſame ſteps leading to error, trodden in divine and humane enquiries. For as in the apprehending of divine truth, men cannot endure to become as a child; ſo in the apprehending of humane truth, for men, come to yeares, yet to read, and repeate, the firſt Elements *of Inductions*, as if they were ſtill children; is reputed a poore and contemptible imployment.

§ Thirdly

§ Thirdly if it be granted, that the *Principles* of Sciences may be rightly inferr'd from the *Induction*, which they uſe, or from ſenſe and experience; yet nevertheleſſe, certaine it is, that inferior Axioms, cannot rightly and ſafely be deduced, by Syllogiſme from them, in things of nature, which participate of matter. For in *Syllogiſme* there is a reduction of Propoſitions to *Principles* by middle Propoſitions. And this Forme, whether for *Invention*, or for *Proofe*, in Sciences Popular, as *Ethiques*; *Politiques*; *Lawes*, and the like takes place; yea, and in Divinity; ſeeing it hath pleaſed God of his goodneſſe to accommodate himſelfe to mans capacitie: but in Naturall Philoſophy where nature ſhould be convinc'd and vanquiſht by deeds, and not an Adverſary, by Argument; truth plainly eſcapes our hands: *becauſe that the ſubtlety of the operations of Nature, is farre greater than the ſubtlety of words*. So that the *Syllogiſme* thus failing, there is every way need of helpe and ſervice, of true and rectified *Induction*, as well for the more generall Principles, as inferior Propoſitions. *For Syllogiſmes* conſiſt of Propoſitions, Propoſitions of words, words are the currant tokens or markes of the Notions of things; wherefore *if theſe Notions (which are the ſoules of words)* be groſſely, and variably abſtracted from things, the whole building falls. Neither is it the laborious examination either of Conſequences, Arguments, or the verity of Propoſitions, that can ever repaire that ruine; being the error is, as the Phyſitians ſpeake, in the *firſt Digeſtion*; which is not rectified by the ſequent functions of Nature. And therefore it was not without great and evident Cauſe, that many of the Philoſophers, and of them, ſome of ſingular note, became *Academiques*; and *Sceptiques*; which took away all *certainty of knowledge* or of *Comprehenſions*; and denyed that the knowledge of man extended further than apparence and probability. It is true that ſome are of opinion, that *Socrates*, when he put off certainty of ſcience from himſelfe, did this but by a forme of *Irony*, *& ſcientiam diſſimulando ſimulaſſe*; that is that by renouncing thoſe things which he manifeſtly knew, he might be reputed to know even that

Cic. in Acad.

which

which he knew not; neither in the later Academy which *Cicero* imbraced was this opinion of *Acatalepſie* held ſo ſincerely. For all thoſe which excell'd for eloquence, commonly made choice of this Sect, as fitter to give glory to their copious ſpeech, and variable diſcourſe both wayes; which was the cauſe they turn'd aſide from that ſtraight way by which they ſhould have gone on to truth, to pleaſant walks made for delight and paſtime. *Notwithſtanding* it appeares that there were many ſcatter'd in both Academies, the old and new (much more among the *Sceptiques*) that held this *Acatalepſie* in ſimplicitie and integritie: But here was their chiefe error, that they charged the *Perceptions* of the *Senſes*, whereby they did extirpate and pluck up Sciences by the roots. For the ſenſes although they many times deſtitute, and deceive men, yet aſſiſted by much induſtry they may be ſufficient for Sciences; and that not ſo much by the helpe of *Inſtruments* (though theſe are in ſome ſort uſefull) as of experiments of the ſame kind, which may produce more ſubtile objects, than, for the facultie of ſenſe, are by ſenſe comprehenſible. And they ought rather to have charged the defects in this kind upon the errors, and contumacie of the mind, which refuſeth to be pliant and morigerous to the Nature of things; and to crooked demonſtrations and rules of arguing and concluding, ill ſet downe and propounded from the *Perception of Senſe*. This we ſpeake not to diſable the mind of man; or that the buſineſſe ſhould be abandoned; but that apt and proper aſſiſtances may be acquired; and applied to the underſtanding; whereby men may ſubdue the difficulties of things, and the obſcurity of Nature. *For no man hath ſuch a ſteadineſſe of hand by nature or Practiſe, that he can draw a ſtraight line or make a perfect circle with his hand at liberty, which yet is eaſily done by rule or compaſſe.* This is that very buſineſſe which we goe about and with great paines endeavour *that the mind by the helpe of Art might be able to equall Nature*; and that there might be found out an Art of Diſcovery, or Direction, which might diſcloſe, and bring to light other Arts, and their Axiomes and Workes. In Acad. Q.

This upon good ground wee report DEFICIENT.

* EXPERIENTIA LITERATA five VENATIO PANIS

II. This Art of *Discovery* (for so we will call it) hath two parts; for either the Indication is made from *Experiments* to *Experiments*; or from *Experiments to Axioms*; which may likewise designe *new Experiments*; whereof the former we will term, *Experientia Literata*; the later *Interpretatio Naturæ*, or *Novum Organum*. Indeed the former (as we have touched heretofore) is not properly to be taken for an *Art*, or a part of Philosophy, but a kind of *sagacity*; wherefore we sometimes call it *Venatio Panis*, borrowing the name from the Fable. *But as a man may goe on his way after a three-fold manner; either when himselfe feeles out his way in the darke; or being weak-sighted is led by the hand of another; or else when he directs his footing by a light:* So when a man essayes all kind of *Experiments* without sequence or method that is a meere palpation; but when he proceeds by direction and order in *Experiments*, it is as if he were led by the hand; and this is it which we understand by *Literate Experience:* For the *light it selfe* which was the third way is to be derived from the *Interpretation of Nature, or the New Organum.*

III. *Literate Experience, or the Hunting of Pan* shews the diverse wayes of making *Experiments*: This (seeing wee have set it downe as DEFICIENT, and that it is a matter not altogether so plaine and perspicuous) we will according to our manner and designe give some light touches and shadowes of it. The manner of *making Experiment* chiefly proceeds; either by *variation of the experiment*; or by *Production of the Experiment*; or by *translation of the Experiment; or by inversion of the Experiment; or by compulsion of the Experiment; or by Application of the Experiment; or by Copulation of the Experiment; or else by the lots and chance of the Experiment.* And all these are limited without the termes of any *Axiome* of *Invention*: For that other part of the *New Organ* takes up and containeth in it all *Transition of Experiments into Axioms; or of Axioms into Experiments.*

§ *Variation* of *Experience* is first practis'd upon *Matter*; that is when the *Experiment* in things already knowne commonly

monly adheareth to ſuch a *kind of matter*; and now it is tried in other things of like kind; as the *making of Papyr* is only tried in linnen, & not in ſilk, (unleſſe perchance amongſt the Chineſes; nor yet in ſtuffes intermixt with haire and briſtles, of which is made that which we call chame-lot; nor yet in woolen, cotton, and skins, although theſe three laſt ſeeme to be more Heterogeneous, and ſo rather may become uſefull mingled, than ſeparate: So inſition in fruit-Trees, is practis'd, but rarely tried in Trees-wild; although it is affirm'd that an Elme grafted upon an Elme, will produce wonderfull ſhades of leaves. Inſition likewiſe in flowers is very rare, though now the Experiment begins to be made upon musk-Roſes, which are ſucceſſefully inoculate upon common Roſes. So we place the *variation in the Part of a thing amongſt the variations in Matter*. For we ſee a ſcion, or young ſlip grafted upon the trunck of a tree, to ſhoot forth more proſperouſly, than if it had bin ſet in earth: And why, in like manner, ſhould not the ſeed of an Onion inſerted into the head of another Onion while it is green, germinate more happily than if it had bin ſowen in the bare earth? And here the *Root* is varied for the *Trunck*, that the thing may ſeeme to be a kind of inſition in the root. *Secondly*, *the variation of an Experiment may be made in the efficient*. The *beames of the Sun* through burning-Glaſſes are ſo fortified, and intended to ſuch a degree of heate, that they are able to ſet on flame any matter, which is apt eaſily to conceive fire: Now whether *may the beames of the Moone*, by the ſame Glaſſes be actuated by ſome weake degrees of warmth; that we may ſee whether all heavenly Bodies be hot in power? So *bright and radiant heates* are exalted by Glaſſes: Whether are *gloomy and opaque heates* (as of ſtones and metals, before they be made burning hot by the force of fire) ſubject to the ſame impreſſion; or are they rather in this ſome portions of light? So Amber, and Iet, or an Agat, chaffed draw unto them ſtraw; whether warmed at the fire will they doe the like? *Thirdly*, *the variation of an Experiment may be made in Quantity*, concerning which a very diligent care is to be taken being it

is encompaſſed with many errors. For men are of opinion *that if the Quantity be augmented and multiplied, the virtue is proportionably augmented and multiplied*; and this commonly is with them a Poſtulatum, and a ſuppoſed truth, as if the matter were a Mathematicall certitude, which is utterly untrue. *A globe of Lead, or a pound in waight* let fal from a Tower, ſay it deſcends to the earth in the ſpace of ten Pulſes; whether will *a Globe of two pound waight* (in which that force of Motion, which they call Naturall, ſhould be doubled,) light upon the earth in the ſpace of five Pulſes? But that Globe ſhall come downe almoſt in an equall ſpace of time with this, and ſhall not be accelerated according to the meaſure of *Quantity*. So (imagine,) one dragme of Sulphur mingled with halfe a pound of Steele, it will make it fluid and liquid; Will therefore an ounce of Sulphur ſuffice to the diſſolving of foure pounds of Steele? But that followes not; *For it is certaine that the obſtinacy of the matter in the Patient is more encreas'd by Quantity, than the Activity of the virtue in the Agent.* Beſides, too much, as well a too litle fruſtrates the effect. For in the excoctions and depurations of Metalls it is a familiar error, that to advance excoction, they augment the heate of the Fornace, or the *Quantity of the Iniection*; but if theſe exceed due proportion, they hinder the operation; becauſe through their force and acrimony, they turne much of the pure Metall into fumes, and carry it away; ſo as there is a loſſe in the Metall; and the maſſe which remaines through the emiſſion of the Spirits becomes more obſtinate and indurate. *Men ſhould* therefore remember the mockery of *Æſopes* huſwife, who conceited that by doubling hir meaſure of Barley, hir Hen would daily lay hir two egges; But the Hen grew fat and laid none. It is not altogither ſafe to rely upon any Naturall experiment, before proofe be made *both in a leſſer, and greater Quantity*.

Æſop. Fab.

§ *Production of an Experiment is of two ſorts, Repetition and Extenſion; namely when the Experiment either is iterated, or driven to a kind of ſubtiltie.* Example of *Repetition* may be this; *the ſpirit of wine* is made of wine once diſtilled, and it is much

much more quick and ſtrong than wine it ſelfe; will likewiſe the ſpirit it ſelfe of wine diſtilled, or ſublimated, proportionably exceed it ſelfe in ſtrength? *But Repetition* alſo is not without deceit; for neither doth the ſecond exaltation equal the exceſſe of the firſt; and many times by *iteration of the Experiment* after a certaine ſtate, and height of operation, Nature is ſo farre from a further progreſſion, as ſhe rather falls into a relapſe. Wherefore the *experiment* muſt be made with Caution and judgment. So *Quickſilver* in linnen, or elſe in the midſt of moulten Lead when it begins to grow cold the Quickſilver inſerted is ſtupified, and is no longer fluid; Will the ſame *Quickſilver* if it be often ſo practis'd upon, become ſo fixt as to be made malleable? The example of extenſion may be this, *water placed upwards*, and made penſile; and by a long neb of a glaſſe dipt in wine, mixt with water, will unmingle, the water from the wine, the wine leaſurely aſcending, and ſetling in the top; the water deſcending, and ſetling in the bottome. Now as wine and water which are two diverſe bodies are ſeparate by this deviſe; may the more ſubtile parts of wine in like manner, which is an entire body, be ſeparate from the more groſſe, that ſo there may be a diſtillation, as it were, by weight; and that there may be found floating in the top, a ſubſtance neereſt to the ſpirit of wine, but perchance more delicate? So the Load-ſtone draweth Iron ſolid, and entire, unto it; will a piece of a Load-ſtone, plonged into diſſolv'd parcels and fragments of Iron, allure the Iron unto it, and cover it ſelfe with it? So *the verſor of a Mariners needle* applies it ſelfe to the Poles of the world. Doth it doe this after the ſame manner, and upon the ſame conſequence whereby Celeſtiall Bodies move? Namely if you ſhould place the Needle in a contrary poſture, that is, in the South-point, and there ſtay it a while, and then ceaſe your forcing it, and leave it to it ſelfe; would this *Needle* turne it ſelfe perchance to the North; and chuſe rather to wheele about by the Weſt into its deſired-naturall ſite, than by the Eaſt? *So gold imbibeth* Quickſilver which is contiguous to it; doth the gold ingulfe, and ſuck up this

Quickſilver into it ſelfe without extenſion of its ſubſtance, that it becomes a Maſſe more ponderous than gold it ſelfe? *So ſome men ſubminiſter helpes to their memories* by ſetting up Images and Pictures of Perſons in certaine roomes; would they attaine the ſame end, if (ſetting aſide ſuch Images) they ſhould effigiate to themſelves an Idea of their geſts and habits. And thus much of the Poduction of an experiment.

§ *The tranſlation of an experiment is three-fold, either from Nature, or chance into Art; or from Art, or one Practice into another; or from a part of ſome Art, into a diverſe part of the ſame Art. Of Tranſlation from Nature, or chance into Art*, there are innumerable examples; for that almoſt all Mechanicall Arts owe their originalls from ſlender beginnings preſented by *Nature* or *Chance*. It is a receiv'd Proverb, *That Grapes conſorted with Grapes ſooner come to maturity*: Which from the Nature of mutuall aſſiſtance and friendſhip grew popular. But our makers of Cyder, which is a wine of Apples, doe well imitate this: For they provide that they be not ſtampt or preſt, before, by being caſt into heapes for a time, they mature by mutuall contact; whereby the acidity and tartneſſe of the liquor is corrected. So the *imitation of Artificiall Rainbowes* by the ſpiſſe aſperſion of litle drops, is by an eaſy derivation from naturall Rain-bowes compoſed of a dewy Cloud. *So the manner of diſtilling* might be taken either from above, as from ſhowers or dew; or from that homely experiment of Drops adhearing to Covers put upon Pots of boyling water. *And a man would have bin affeard to have imitated Thunder and Lightning, if the Potlid of that chymique Monke had not by being toſt up into the ayre, inſtructed him.* But the more plentifull *this experiment* is of examples, the fewer we need to produce. And if men would be at leaſure to imploy their ſtudies in the inquiry of things profitable; they ſhould view attentively, by degrees and of ſet purpoſe all the workmanſhip, and the particular workings of Nature; and perpetually, and thoroughly meditate with themſelves, which of thoſe may be transferr'd to Arts, *For Nature is the Mirror*

Pancirollus par. 2.

Mirror of Art : And the experiments are as many which may be *translated from Art into Art* ; *or from one Practice into another*, though this is not so much in use: For nature every way is obvious to all men ; but Arts appropriate to particular Professors, are only knowne to them. *Spectacles* are invented to helpe a weake sight ; might there be contrived a instrument which fastned to the eare, might helpe such as are thick of hearing? So *embalming*, *and hony conserve dead Corps* ; might not some of those ingredients be transferr'd into a medicine, which might be usefull to bodies alive? So the practice of Seales upon wax, cements for walls, and upon Lead is ancient; but this invention shewed the way to Impression upon Paper, or the Art of Printing. *So in the Art of Cookerie salt seasons flesh*, and that better in Winter, than in Summer : Might not this be profitably translated to Bathes and their temperament, as occasion shall require, either to impresse some good moisture, or extract some peccant humor. *So salt* in the new-found experiment of *Artificiall Congliciations* is found to have great power to condense: Might not this be transferr'd to the condensation of Metalls, seeing it is knowne long since that strong-waters being compositted of some kinds of salts, have a power to deject and precipitate small sands of Gold out of certaine Metalls, not so dense and compact as Gold? *So painting revives the memorie of a thing, by the Image of a Picture* : Is not this traduced into an Art, which they call *the Art of Memorie*? Let this in generall serve for admonition; that nothing can so much conduce to the drawing downe, as it were, from heaven, a whole showre of new and profitable Inventions, as this, that the experiments of many Mechanique Arts, may come to the knowledge of one man, or some few, who by mutuall conference may whet and sharpen one another ; that so by this which we call *Translation of Experiments*, Arts may nourish, and, as it were, by a commixture, and communication of Rayes, inflame one the other. For although the rationall way by an artificiall *Organum*, promise farre greater matters; yet nevertheless this *sagacitie by literate experience*, may

may in the meane project and ſcatter to the benefit of man (as miſſive Donatives amongſt the Ancients) many rudiments to knowledge, which may be had at hand. *There remaines the Tranſlation of a Part of Art into another part diverſe from it*, which litle differs from the *Tranſlation of Art into Art*. But becauſe many *Arts* exerciſe great ſpaces, ſo as they may very well ſuſtaine a *Tranſlation* within the limits of their owne operations; we thought good to annex this kind of *Tranſlation*; ſpecially ſeeing it is in ſome Arts of very great import. For it maketh much to the advancement and amplification of the Art of Phyſique; if the *Experiments* of that part of Medicine *concerning the Cures of Diſeaſes*, be transferr'd to thoſe Parts concerning the *Regiment of Health*, and the *Prolongation of Life*. For if ſome excellent *Opiate* be of that force and virtue, as to repreſſe and aſſwage the raging inflamation of the ſpirits, in a peſtilentiall Fever; let no man queſtion, but that a like receipt by a due proportioned Doſe made familiar, may in ſome degree put back and retard inflamation which growes and creepes upon us by age. Thus much for the *Tranſlation of Experiments*.

§ *Inverſion of Experiment* is, when the contrary to that which is by *Experiment* manifeſt, is tried. For example, *Heat by Glaſſes is intended*, is cold ſo too? So *Heate* when it diffuſeth it ſelfe is yet rather caried upwards: Is cold likewiſe in diffuſing it ſelfe caried rather downwards? For inſtance, take a ſmall Barre of Iron, and heate it on one end, then ſet it upright, (that end which is heated placed downwards) laying your hand upon the end, it will preſently burne your hand; but now inverſe the Barre, placeing the hot part upwards, and your hand upon the part which is downwards, and you ſhall not feele the heate ſo ſoone by many Pulſes: Whether or no if the Barre was heated all over, and one end ſhould be moiſtned with ſnow, or with a ſponge dipt in cold water; if the ſnow or ſponge were applied to the part which is upward, would (I ſay) the cold ſooner pierce downward, than if the ſnow or ſponge placed at the lower end, the cold would ſhoote upward. *So the Beams of the Sun* rebound

rebound from a white, upon a black are congregate: Whether are ſhadowes alſo diſperſed upon white, and united upon black? The Experiment we ſee made in a dark room, the light being let in thorow a narrow chinck only, where the Images of things which are without, are taken upon white Paper, not upon black. So a veine is opened in the fore-head for the Megrim, or Head-ach. Muſt alſo the Hemicraine be ſcarified for the *Soda*; or the paine of the head in generall? So much for the *Inverſion of Experiment*.

§ *Compulſion of Experiment, is when Experiment is urged, and extended to annihilation, or privation of the vertue.* For in other kinds of hunting, the game is only taken, but in this kill'd. Example of *Compulſion* is this; *The Loadſtone drawes Iron*, inforce therefore the Iron, or vexe the Loadſtone, ſo, as the virtue of attraction be ſtifled or expir'd: As, ſuppoſe the Loadſtone were burnt or macerate in ſtrong-waters, whether will it forgoe, or abate its virtue? Contrariwiſe *if Steele*, or Iron be reduced *in Crocum Martis*, or into prepar'd ſteel, as they call it; or be diſſolved in *Aqua-fortis*; will the Loadſtone ſtill allure them? *Again, the Loadſtone* draws Iron through all interpos'd Bodies that we know, as Gold; Silver; Glaſſe, &c. Fixe therefore ſome medium upon it (if it may be) that may intercept, and arreſt its virtue. Make a triall of Quickſilver; of Oyle; Gummes; a burning coale; and the like, which yet have not bin experimented. *Sothere have* bin brought in of late, *certaine Perſpectives* which multiply after a ſtrange manner the minuteſt viſibles: Preſſe the uſe of them, either upon ſmall objects, as they may not be able to worke upon; or upon ſo vaſt, as they may be confounded in working: As whether they can cleerly diſcover thoſe moates in Urin, which otherwaies could not be diſcernd? Whether in Iewells, every way pure and ſpotleſſe, they can make the graines and imperceptible clouds to become viſible? *Whether* can they expoſe to view the moates in the Snn (which are untruely charged upon *Democritus* for his Atomes, and the Principles of Nature) as if they were great Bodies? Can they ſo diſtinguiſh to the ſight the groſſer duſt made of Ceruſſe, and

Hippoc. Epiſt. Laert. in vita Plin. Lib. 30.

and Vermillion, that the ſmall graines may appeare; here the red, there the white? *Againe, can* they multiply greater Figures (imagine a face, an eye, or ſo) to the ſame bigneſſe they can a flea, or a litle worme? *Can they* make a piece of Cypres, or Cobweb-Lawne appeare ſo full of holes, as if it were a Net? *But we ſtay* the leſſe upon the *Compulſions of Experiments* becauſe commonly they fall not within the limits of literate experience; but are rather referr'd to *Cauſes*; and *Axioms*; and the *New Organum*. For whereſoever there is a Negative; Privative; or excluſive facultie; there is already ſome light given to the *Invention of Formes*. Thus farre of the *Compulſion of Experiment*.

§ *Application of Experiment is nothing elſe than a witty Tranſlation of it to ſome other profitable Experiment*. Example may be this; All Bodies have their owne dimenſions, and their owne weights: Gold is of greater weight, of leſſe dimenſion, than Silver; Water than Wine. From this is traduced a profitable Experiment; that from a juſt weight and meaſure being taken, you may know how much Silver hath bin mixt with Gold; how much Water with Wine; which was that celebrated Εὕρηκα of Archimedes. So fleſh ſooner putrifies in ſome Cellers, than it doth in others. It will be of uſe to make application of this *Experiment* to the finding out of Aires, more or leſſe healthfull, for habitation; namely, there where fleſh is longeſt preſerv'd from putrefaction. The ſame may be applied to the diſcovery of healthfull, or peſtilentiall ſeaſons of the yeare. *But there* are innumerable examples of this Nature: Only let men awake, and pepetually fixe their eyes, one while, on the nature of things; another while, on the application of them to the uſe and ſervice of mankind. So much concerning the *Application of Experiment*.

§ *Copulation of Experiment is the Linkes and Chaine of Application; when as things, ſingle, and ſeparate had bin to litle uſe, are, (connexed) of force and efficacy*. For example, you deſire to have late Roſes or fruit, this is effected if you pull off the more early buds when they are newly knotted; the ſame is done

done, if you lay the roots bare untill the ſpring be well come on, and expoſe them unto the open Aire; but it will take the better, if you joyne both theſe practiſes of putting back germination. So Ice and Nitre doe much conduce to refrigeration; but commixt togither much more. But this Experiment is cleere of it ſelfe, notwithſtanding here may covertly a fallacy lie hid, (as there may in all other effects, and concluſions where Axioms are wanting) if the *Copulation* be made of things which worke after a different, and as it were, repugnant manner. And ſo much for *Copulation of Experiment*,

§ *There remaine the Chances, or Fortunes of Experiment. This is altogether an irrationall, & as it were, a paſſionate manner of experimenting, when you have a mind to try a concluſion not for that any reaſon, or other Experiment induceth you to it; but only becauſe the like was never attempted before.* Yet I doe not know whether or no, in this kind, there may not lie hid ſome ſecret of great uſe, if you trie nature every way. *For the* wonders of Nature commonly lie out of the high roade, and beaten paths; ſo as the very abſurdity of an attempt may ſometimes be proſperous. But if reaſon goe along with this practice; that is, that it is evident that ſuch an Experiment was never yet tried; and yet there is great reaſon why it ſhould be attempted; then it is a choice *Experiment*, and ſearcheth the very boſome of Nature. *For example:* In the operation of fire upon ſome Naturall Body, one or other of theſe effects hitherto ever comes to paſſe; as that either ſomething flies out, (as flame and fume in ordinary burning fewell) or at leaſt there is made a locall ſeparation of Parts, and that for ſome diſtance; as in Diſtillation where the lees ſettle, the vapours, after they have play'd about, are gathered into receptacles: But no man ever yet made triall of an Impriſon'd Diſtillation, for ſo we may call it: And it ſeemes very probable, that if the force of heat immur'd within the Cloiſters of a body, doe ſuch great matters, and worke ſuch alterations; and yet without loſſe, or manumiſſion to the Body; that then this Proteus of matter, fetter'd as it were, with Mana-

cles, may in time be forced to many transformations, if so be, that the heat be so temper'd; and intermutually chang'd, that the vessels be not broken. *For this* operation is like that of the wombe, where the heat workes without emission, or separation of any part of the Body, save that in the Matrix, there is conjoyn'd Alimentation; but for version, the thing is the same. These are the *fortunes, or adventures of Experiment. In the meane*, we give this advise, touching Experiments of this Nature; that no man be discouraged, or confounded if the *Experiments* which he puts in practice answer not his expectation: *For what succeeds pleaseth more; but what succeeds not, many times informes no lesse*. And this ought ever to be remembred (which we often presse) *that Experimenta Lucifera Experiments of Light, & discovery, ought for a time to be much more enquired after, than Experimenta fructifera Experiments of use and practice*. And thus much of *Literate* Experience, which (as we have said before) is rather a sagacity, and a hunting sent, than a Science.

§ *Now for the Novum Organum*, we say nothing, nor give any fore-tast thereof; being we have projected in our minds, by the assistance of the Divine favour, to make a perfect entire work of that subject; seeing it is a matter of higher consequence, than all the rest.

CAP.

CAP. III.

I The Partition *of the Inventive Art of Arguments, into Promptuary, or Places of Preparation; and Topique, or Places of Suggestion.* II. The Division *of Topique Art into Generall.* §. *And Particular Topiques.* III. In example *of Particular Topique in the Inquiry De* Gravi *&* Levi.

INvention *of Arguments, is not properly an Invention; for to Invent is to discover things unknowne, and not to recover, or recall that which is knowne already. The Vse and Office of this kind of Invention seemes to be no other, than out of the Masse of Knowledge, congested, and stored up in the Mind, readily to produce, that which may be pertinent to the Matter, and Question propounded.* For he that is litle or nothing acquainted before hand with the Subject in question, *Topiques of Invention* will litle advantage him: On the contrary he that hath Provision at home which may be applied to the purpose, even without *Art & Places of Invention*, will at length, (though not so readily and aptly) find out and produce Arguments. *So that this kind of Invention (as we have said) is not properly Invention, but only a Reduction into Memory, or suggestion with Application.* But because custome & consent hath authoriz'd the word, it may in some sort be called *Inventiõ: For it* may be as wel accompted a chase, or finding of a Deere, which is made within an inclosed Park; as that within a Forrest at large. But setting aside curiosity of words it may appeare that the scope and end of this kind of *Invention*, is a certaine promptitude, and expedite use of our Knowledge; rather than any encrease, or Amplification thereof.

I *To procure this ready Provision for discourse, there are two waies; either that it may be designed and pointed out, as it were, by an Index, under what Heads the matter is to be sought; and this is that we call* Topique: *Or else that Arguments may be be-*

fore hand framed, and ſtored up, about ſuch things as are frequently incident, and come into diſceptation; and this we will call promptuarie Art, or of Preparation. This later ſcarcely deſerveth to be called a *Part of Knowledge*, ſeeing it rather conſiſteth in diligence, than any artificiall erudition. And in this part *Ariſtotle* doth wittily indeed, but hurtfully deride the Sophiſts neare his time, ſaying; *They did as if one that profeſſed the Art of ſhoo-making, ſhould not teach how to make up a ſhooe; but only exhibite in a readineſſe a number of ſhooes, of all faſhions and ſizes.* But yet a man might here reply, that if a Shoomaker ſhould have no ſhooes in his ſhop, but only work as he is beſpoken, he would be but a poore man, and weakly cuſtomed. But our Saviour ſpeaking of Divine knowledge, ſaith farre otherwiſe; *Every Scribe inſtructed for the Kingdome of heaven, is like a good houſholder that bringeth forth both new and old ſtore.* And we ſee the ancient Writers of Rhetorique doe give it in Precept, *That Pleaders ſhould have diverſe common Places prepared long before hand, and handled*, and illuſtrated both waies; for example, For the ſenſe and equity of Law againſt the words, and letter of Law; and on the contrary. And *Cicero* himſelfe being broken unto it by great experience, delivers it plainly; *That an Orator if he be diligent and ſedulous, may have in effect premeditate, and handled, whatſoever a man ſhall have occaſion to ſpeake of*; ſo that in the Pleading of the Cauſe it ſelfe he ſhall have no need to inſert any new or ſodaine matter, beſides new names, and ſome individuall Circumſtances. *But* the paines and diligence of *Demoſthenes* went ſo farre, that in regard of the great force that the entrance and acceſſe into a Cauſe hath to make a good Impreſſion upon the Minds of Auditors, he thought it worth his labour to frame, and to have in readineſſe a number of *Prefaces* for Orations and Speeches. And theſe Preſidents, & Authorities, may deſervedly overwaigh *Ariſtotles* Opinion, that would adviſe *to change a Wardrope for a paire of Sheares*. Therefore this part of knowlede touching *Promptuary Preparation*, was not to be omitted; where of for this place this is ſufficient. And ſeeing it is common

De Repr. Soph. lib. 2. c. 9. 8. ult.

Mat. 13.

Cic. de Orat.

Ad Attic. Lib. XVI. EP. VI.

Ejus 65 Exordia, ſi ejus

to

to both *Logique* and *Rhetorique*, we thought good here amongst *Logiques*, only in Paſſage, to touch it; referring over a more ample handling of it to *Rhetorique*.

II The other Part of *Invention*, *which is* Topique, *we will divide into Generall and Particular* Topique. Generall *is that which is diligently and copiouſly handled in Logique, or rationall knowledge*; as it were needleſſe to ſtay upon the explication thereof. Yet thus much we thought meet to admoniſh by the way; that this *Topique* is of uſe, not only in argumentations, when we come to diſpute with another; but in meditations alſo, when we reaſon and debate matters within our ſelves. Neither doe theſe places ſerve only for *ſuggeſtion*, or *admonition*, what we ought to *affirme* or *aſſert*; but alſo what we ought to *inquire* and *demand*. And a facultie of wiſe interrogating, is halfe a knowledge; for *Plato* ſaith well, *Whoſoever ſeekes, comprehends that he ſeekes for, in generall notion; elſe how ſhall he know it, when he hath found it? And therefore the larger and more certaine our anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is our ſearch.* The ſame places therefore, which will conduce to ſearch the mind of our inward conceptions, and underſtanding; and to draw forth the knowledge there ſtored up; will alſo helpe us to produce knowledge from without. So as if a man of Learning, and underſtanding be in preſence, we might be able, aptly and wiſely to propound a Queſtion thereof; and likewiſe profitably ſelect and peruſe Auctors and Books, or parts of Books, which might teach and informe us of thoſe points we enquire. In Menone.

§ *But Particular Topiques doe much more conduce to the Purpoſe we ſpeake of; and it to be accompted a thing of farre greater uſe.* There hath bin indeed ſome ſlight mention made hereof, by ſome Writers; but it hath not yet bin handled fully, and according to the dignity of the Subject. But to let paſſe that humour and pride, which hath raigned too long in Schools, which is, *to purſue with infinite ſubtiltie, things that are within their command; but never to touch at things any whit removed*; we doe receive and embrace *Particular Topique* as a matter of great uſe, that is, *Places of Enquiry, and Invention*, ✠ TOPICÆ PARTICVLARES.

Invention, appropriate to Particular Subjects and Sciences; and these *Places are certaine mixtures of Logique, and the proper matter of Particular Sciences*. For he is but a weake man, and of narrow capacity, who conceives that the Art of *finding out Sciences* may be found out, propounded, and perfected, at once, even in their first conception; and presently be set downe, and practised in some worke. But let men know for certaine, *That solid and true Arts of Invention doe shoote up, & come to maturity with the Inventions themselves. So as when a man first enters upon the search of a knowledge, he may have many profitable Precepts of Invention; but after he hath made farther progresse in the knowledge it selfe, he may, and must excogitate new Precepts of Invention, which may lead him more prosperously to further Discoveries*. For this kind of Pursuite is like a going upon a Plaine and open Champion; for after we have gone a part of the way; we have not only gained this, that we are now neerer to our journeyes end; but we gaine the better sight of that part of the way, which remaines. So every degree of *Proceeding in Sciences*, having past over that which is left behind, gives a better prospect to that which followes. And because we set downe this Part of Topique as DEFICIENT, we will annex an example thereof.

III *A Particular Topique*, or the Articles of Enquiry *de* GRAVI & LEVI.

LEt *it be enquired* what Bodies those are which are susceptible of the *Motion* of *Gravity*; *what of Levity*, and whether there be any of a midle and indifferent Nature?

2 *After an absolute Inquiry de Gravi & Levi*; proceed to *comparative Inquiry*; as of *Ponderous Bodies*, which doth *weigh* more, which lesse, in the same dimension? so of *Light Bodies*, which are more speedily caried upward, which more slowly?

3 *Let it be inquired*, what the *Quantum* of a Body may contribute, and effect towards the *Motion of Gravitie*. But this, at first sight, may seeme a superfluous *Inquiry*, because the computation of Motion must follow the *Computation* of *Quantity*:

Quantity: But the matter is otherwiſe; for although the *Quantity* in the skales doe compenſate the *weight* of the Body it ſelfe, (the force of the Body every way meeting by repercuſſion, or by reſiſtance, of the Baſins, or of the Beame) yet where there is but ſmall reſiſtance (as in the falling downe of a body thorow the Aire) the *Quantity* of a body litle availes to the *incitation of the deſcent*; ſeeing two Balls of Lead, one of *twenty*, *the other*, of one *pound waight*, fall to the earth almoſt in an equall ſpace of time.

4 *Let it be inquired*, whether the *Quantity* of a Body may be ſo increaſed, as that the *Motion of Gravitie* may be utterly depoſed and caſt off; as in the Globe of the earth, which is penſile, and fallsnot? Whether may there be other maſſive ſubſtances, ſo great, as may ſuſtaine themſelves? *For Locall Deſcent to the Centre of the Earth, is a meere fiction*; and every great Maſſe abhorres all Locall Motion, unleſſe it be overrul'd by another more predominant Appetite. V. DIGRES.

5 *Let it be inquired*, what the *reſiſtance* of a *Body interpoſing*, or *incountring* may doe, or actuate towards the managing of the *Motion of Gravitie*: For a Body deſcending, either *penetrates* and cutteth the Body occurrent; or is arreſted by it: If it *Penetrate*, then there is *Penetration*; or with weaker reſiſtance, as in Aire, or with more ſtrong, as in Water: If it be *ſtaid*, it is ſtaid either by a reſiſtance *unequall*, where there is a *Pregravation*; as if wood ſhould be put upon wax; or *equall*, as if water ſhould be put upon water, or wood upon wood of the ſame kind: which the Schooles, in a vaine apprehenſion call the *non-Ponderation of a body within its owne Spheare*. All theſe doe vary the *Motion of Gravitie*; for *heavy ſubſtances* are otherwaies moved in skales, otherwiſe in falling downe; nay otherwiſe (which may ſeem ſtrange) in Ballances hanging in the Aire, otherwiſe in Ballances immerſed in water, otherwiſe in falling down thorow water, otherwiſe in ſwimming, or tranſportation upon water.

6 *Let it be inquired*, what the *Figure* of a body deſcending may, or doth worke, to the moderating of the *Motion of Gravitie*, as a broad *Figure* with tenuity; a cubique *Figure*;

long;round; Pyramidale; when they turne; when they remaine in the ſame Poſture, wherein they were deliver'd.

7 *Let inquiry be made*, of that which the *Continuance* and *Progreſſion* of a *Fall* or *Deſcent*, may, and doth worke to this effect, that it may be caried with a greater incitation and force; and with what proportion, and how farre that Incitation will carry? For the Ancients, upon a ſlight contemplation, were of opinion, *that becauſe that was a naturall Motion,* V. DIGRES. *it would continually be augmented, and improv'd.*

8 Let *Inquiry* be made of that which *Diſtance* and *Proximitie of a Body deſcending from the earth*, may, and doth worke to this end, that it may fall more ſpeedily, more ſlowly, or elſe not at all, (if ſo be that it be without the Orbe of Activity of the *terrene Globe*, which was *Gilbert*s opinion): De Magn. as likewiſe what the *immerſion of a Body deſcending more in the deepe of the earth*; or the placing thereof *neerer to the ſuperficies of the earth*, may produce? For theſe kindes of Poſitures vary the motiõ, as they experience that work in Mines.

9 *Let there be Enquiry made* of that which the difference of Bodies, by which Motion of Gravitie is diffuſed, and communicated, can doe and doth: And whether it may equally be communicated by Bodies ſoft, and Poroſe; as by hard and ſolid: As if the Beame of the Ballance be on one ſide of the tongue wood, on the other ſide ſilver, (though they be reduced to the ſame waight) whether doth it not beget a variation in the Skales? In like manner, whether Metall put upon Wooll, or upon a blown bladder waigh the ſame, it would doe, if laid in the bottome of the Skale?

10 *Let there be Enquiry made* what the diſtance of a Body from the levell-Poiſe; that is the quick, or late perception of the incumbent, or of depreſſion, can doe or doth: As in a Ballance where one part of the beame is longer (though of the ſame waight) whether this doth ſway the Ballance? Or in crooked Pipes, where certainly the longer part will draw the water, although the ſhorter part, made more capacious, may containe a greater waight of water.

11 *Let there be Enquiry made* of that which the intermixtion

mixtion or Copulation of a light body with a waighty, may doe to the raiſing of the *waight* of a Body, as in the poiſe of Living Creatures, and Dead?

12 *Let Enquiry be made* of the ſecret aſcenſions, and deſcenſions of the parts more light and more waighty in one, and the ſame entire Body. Whereby there may be made oftentimes exact ſeparations; as in the ſeparation of wine and water; in the Aſcenſion of the flower of milk, and the like.

13 *Let it be Enquired* what is the line and direction of the Motion of Gravitie; and how farre it may follow either the centre of the earth, that is the maſſe of the earth; or the centre of the Body it ſelfe; that is, the contention and driving on of the parts thereof; for thoſe Centres are profitable in demonſtration, but of no uſe in Nature.

14 *Let it be inquired* touching the Compariſon of the Motion of Gravitie, with other Motions; what Motions it maſters; to what it yeelds? As in the Motion, which they call, *violent*, which is repreſt and bridled for a time; as when a farre greater waight of Iron is drawne up by a ſmall Load-ſtone, the Motion of *Gravitie* gives place to the Motion of *Sympathy*.

15 *Let Enquiry be made of the Motion of Aire*, whether it be caried upwards, or be collaterall and indifferent? Which is a hard thing to find out, but by ſome exquiſite Experiments: for the glittering apparition of Aire in the bottome of water, is rather by the percuſſion of water, than by the Motion of Aire; being the ſame emication may be made in wood. But Aire mingled with Aire diſcovers no *Experiment*; becauſe Aire in Aire exhibites Levity no leſſe, than water in water doth Gravity: But in a bubble drawne over with the incloſure of a thin skin, it ſtayes for a time.

16 *Let it be Inquired what is the Terme of Levitie*, for ſure their meaning (who made the Centre of the earth, the Centre of *Gravitie*) is not, that the ultimate convexity of heaven ſhould be the ſtint and limits of *Levitie*: Or rather, that as ponderous Bodies ſeeme to be ſo farre caried, that there they may caſt Anchor as at a fixt Piller; ſo light Bodies are ſo

farre caried, that they may begin to wheele about, and come to a *motion without termination*?

17 *Let Enquiry be made*, why vapours and exhalations ſhould be caried as high as the *midle Region* of the Aire (as they call it); ſeeing they are ſomewhat a groſſe ſubſtance, and the beames of the Sunne by turnes (as in the night) ceaſe their Operation.

18 *Let Enquiry be made of the Conduct of the Motion of Flame upwards*; which is the more abſtruſe, becauſe *Flame* expires every moment; ſave perchance in the imbracement of greater *Flames*: For *Flames* ſeparated & broken off from their continuation, laſt not long.

19 *Let Enquiry be made of the aſcendent Motion of the Activity of Heate*, as when the Heat of red-hot Iron affecteth rather to mount upwards, than to move downwards? *The example* therfore of *Particular Topique* may be made in this manner; in the meane, what we have begun to adviſe, we doe agen admoniſh, which is, that men vary their *Particular Topiques* ſo, as after further Progreſſion made by *Inquiry*, they doe ſubſtitute one, and after that another *Topique*, if ever they deſire to reach the top of Sciences. As for us, we attribute ſo much to *Particular Topiques*, as we doe deſigne to make a Particular Worke of them upon ſome Subjects in Nature, which are more obſerveable, and more obſcure; *For we are Commanders of Queſtions, not ſo of things*. And thus much of *Invention*.

CAP.

CAP. IV.

I The Partition *of the Art of Iudging, into Iudgment by Induction.* §. *And by Syllogiſme. Of the firſt a Collection is made in the New Organ.* §. The firſt Partition *of Iudgment by Syllogiſme into Reduction, Direct, and Inverſt.* §. The ſecond Partition thereof, *into Analytique Art: and the Knowledge of Elenches.* II. The Diviſion of the *Knowledge of Elenchs, into Elenchs of Sophiſmes.* §. *Into Elenchs of Interpretation of Termes.* §. *And into Elenchs of Images, or Idolaes.* III. The Diviſion *of Idolaes.* §. *Into Impreſſions from the Generall Nature of Man, or* Idola Tribûs. §. *Into Impreſſions from the Individuall temper of Particulars, or* Idola Specûs. §. *into Impreſſions by Words, and Communicative Nature, or* Idola Fori. IV. An Appendix *of the Art of Iudging, namely of the Analogie of* Demonſtration *according to the* Nature *of the* Subject.

LET us now paſſe to *Iudgment, or the Art of Iudging, which handleth the Nature of Proofes, or Demonſtrations.* And in this *Art of Iudging* (as alſo generally it is accepted) *a Concluſion is inferred, either by Induction, or elſe by Syllogiſme:* For *Enthymemes*, and *Examples* are only the abridgements of theſe two. *As for Iudgment* that it is by *Induction* we need nothing doubt. *For by one and the ſame Operation of the Mind, that which is ſought, is both found and Iudged.* Neither is the thing perfected by any meane, but immediately after the ſame manner, for moſt part, as it is in *Senſe*: For *Senſe*, in hir Primarie objects, doth at once ſeize upon the ſpecies of an object, and conſent to the truth thereof. *But it is otherwiſe in Syllogiſme*, the Proofe whereof is not *Immediate*, but perfected by a *Mean*; and therefore *the Invention of the Medium is one thing; and the Iudgment of the conſequence of Argument, is another. For the mind firſt diſcourſeth, afterwards reſts ſatisfied.* But a *vitious forme of Induction* we utterly diſclaime; a *Legitimate Forme* we referre over to the *New Organ*. Therefore enough in this place, of *Iudgment by Induction.*

§ For that other *Iudgment by Syllogiſme*, to what purpoſe is it to ſpeake, ſeeing this is by the ſubtle files off mens wits almoſt worne away, and reduced into many minute peeces? And no marvell being it is a thing hath ſuch Sympathie with mans underſtanding. *For the mind of man doth wonderfully endeavour, and extremely covet this, that it may not be penſile, but that it may light upon ſomething fixt, and immoveable, on which as on a firmament it may ſupport it ſelfe in its ſwift motions and diſquiſitions.* Surely, as *Ariſtotle* endevoureth to prove, *That in all motion of Bodies there is ſome point quieſcent; and very elegantly expoundeth the Ancient Fable of* Atlas, *that ſtood fixed, and bare up the heavens from falling, to be meant of the Poles of the World, whereupon the Converſion is accompliſht. In like manner men doe earneſtly ſeeke to have ſome Atlas, or Axeltree of their Cogitations within themſelves, which may in ſome meaſure moderate the fluctuations, and wheelings of the underſtanding*, fearing it may be, the falling of their heaven. Therefore *men have haſtned too faſt to ſet downe Principles of Sciences, about which all the varietie of Diſputations might turne without perill of ruine or Subverſion. In truth not knowing that he who too early layes hold on certainties, will conclude in ambiguities; and he that ſeaſonably ſuſpends his Iudgment, ſhall attaine to Certainties.*

De Animal. Motione.

§ So then it is manifeſt, that this *Art of Judging by Syllogiſme* is nothing elſe, but the reduction of Propoſitions to Principles, by middle termes; and Principles are underſtood to be agreed of by all, and are exempt from Argument. But the invention of middle termes is permitted to the free ſagacity, & purſuit of mens wits. This *Reduction is of two kinds, Direct, and Inverted. Direct* is, when the Propoſition is reduced to the Principle, which is call'd *Probation Oſtenſive. Inverſed* is, when the Contradictorie of the Propoſition is reduced to the Contradictorie of the Principle; which they terme a *Probation from incongruitie, or an abſurdity*. The number alſo of middle terms, or their ſcale is diminiſhed or increaſed, as they are remov'd from the Principle of the Propoſition.

§ *Theſe*

§ *These grounds laid, we will divide the Art of Iudgment* (as for most part generally it is) *into Analytique Art; and the Doctrine of Elenchs;* the one giveth Direction; the other Caution. *For Analytique* setteth downe the true formes of Consequences of Arguments; by a variation, and deflection, from which, the Conclusion is deprehended to be erroneous; and this part containes in it a kind of *Elench*, or Redargution. For, as it is said, *Rectum & sui index est, & obliqui.* Notwithstanding it is the safest way to set downe *Elenchs* as Monitors, whereby *Fallacies*, which otherwise might insnare the Iudgment, may be more easily detected. *In the Analytique* Part we find nothing DEFICIENT, which rather is loaden'd with superfluities, than any way is wanting in accessions. V. Euclid. & Cõment.

II *The Knowledge of Elenchs* we divide into three Parts: *Elenchs of Sophismes; Elenchs of Interpretation*; and *Elenchs of Images or Idôlaes*. The Doctrine of *Elenchs of Sophismes* is very usefull; for although the more grosse sort of *Fallacies* is (as *Seneca* makes the comparison very well;) *But as the feates of Iuglers which though we know not how they are done; yet we know well it is not as it seemes to be*. Yet the more subtile sort of *Sophismes* doth not only put a man besides his answer, but doth in good earnest abuse his Judgment. Epist. 45.

§ *This Part concerning the Elenchs of Sophismes* is excellently handled by *Aristotle* in *Precept*; but more excellently by *Plato* in example, not only in the Person of the Ancient Sophists; *Gorgias*; *Hippias*; *Protagoras*, and *Euthidemus*, and the rest; but even in the Person of Socrates himselfe, who professing to affirme nothing, but to infirme whatsoever others avouch, hath exactly expressed all the formes of *Objections, Fallacies*, and *Redargutions*. Wherefore in this part we have nothing DEFICIENT. But this, in the meane time, is to be noted, that though we make the ingenuous and principall use of this Knowledge to consist in this, *That Sophismes may be redargued; yet it is manifest, that the degenerate and corrupt use thereof, is imploy'd to contrive, and impose, captions and Contradictions, by these Sophismes; which passeth for a great Faculti* In Dial. ità inscript.

cultie, and no doubt is of great advantage. Though the difference was elegantly made by one betwixt an Orator, and a Sophist, *That the one is as the Grey-Hound, which hath his advantage in the race; the other as the Hare which hath hir advantage in the turne.*

§ Now follow *Elenchi Hermeniæ*, for so we will call them, borrowing the Word, rather than the Sense, from *Aristotle*. And here let us call to mens memorie what we have said before; (when we handled *Primitive Philosophie*) of *transcendent, and adventitious Conditions, or Adjuncts of Entitie*, they be *Majoritie, Minoritie; Much, Litle; Prioritie, Posteioritie; Identitie, Diversitie; Power, Act; Habit, Privation; Totality, Partialitie; Activitie, Passivitie; Motion, Quietude; Entity, Non-Entity*, and the like. But specially let men remember, and observe the different Contemplations of these Properties, which is, that they may be inquired, either *Physically*, or *Logically*. The Physicall handling of these adherent Qualities we have assigned to *Primitive Philosophie*. The *Logicall* remaineth, & that is the very thing which we here stile *Doctrinam de Elenchis Hermeniæ*, the *Knowledge of the Elenches of Interpretation*. This indeed is a sound & materiall Portion of Knowledge: *For these Cõmune and generall Notions have this Nature, that in all disputations they every where intervene, so as if they be not by a carefull Iudgment accurately distinguisht at first; they may wonderfully overcloud the whole light of Disputations; and even bring the case to that passe, that the Disputations shall be resolved into a skirmish of words. For Æquivocations, and erronious acception of words* (specially of this Nature) *are the Sophismes of Sophismes*. Wherefore it seemeth better to constitute a Treatise of them apart, than to receive them into *Prime Philosophy*, I meane *Metaphysique*; or to annexe them as a part of *Analytiques, which Aristotle very confusedly hath done*. And we have given it a name from the nature and Use; *for the right use is plainly Redargution, and Caution about the acception of words*. Nay that Part of *Predicaments* touching Cautions, of not confounding, and transposing the termes of *Definitions* and *Divisions*, if it were rightly instituted,

Arist. Analyt.

tuted, would be of ſingular uſe, in our judgment, and might fitly be referred hether. And thus much of the *Elenchs of Interpretation.*

III *As for the Elenchs of Images or Idolaes; certainly Idolaes are the profoundeſt Fallacies of the mind of man.* Nor doe they deceive in *Particulars*, as the reſt doe; caſting a Cloud, and ſpreading ſnares over the Iudgment; but apertly from a corrupt, and crookedly-ſet prediſpoſition of the mind; which doth, as it were, wreſt and infect all the anticipations of the underſtanding. *For the mind of man* (drawn over, and clouded with the ſable Pavillion of the Body) is ſo farre from being like a ſmooth, equall, and cleere Glaſſe, which might ſincerely take and reflect the beames of things, according to their true incidence; that it is rather like an inchanted Glaſſe, full of Superſtitions; Apparitions, and Impoſtures. * ELENCHI IDOLORVM.

§ *Idolaes are impoſed upon the underſtanding, either by the univerſall Nature of man in generall. Or from the individuall Nature of Particulars*; or *by words, or nature Communicative.* The firſt ſort of Images we wont to call, *Idola Tribûs*; the ſecond, *Idola Specûs*; the third, *Idola Fori.* There is alſo a fourth kind, which we call, *Idola Theatri*; *and is introduced by depraved Theories or Philoſophies, and perverſe Lawes of Demonſtrations*; but this kind may be denied and put off, wherefore we paſſe it over for the preſent. But the other doe plainly beſiege the mind, nor can they ever be quite removed, or extirpated. Therefore let none expect any Analytique Art in theſe; but the knowledge of *Elenchs* concerning theſe *Idolaes* is a Primarie Knowledge. Nor (to ſpeake truth) can this Knowledge of *Idolaes* be reduced into Art; but only by a contemplative wiſdome, we may be inſtructed to beware of them. As for a juſt and more ſubtile Treatiſe thereof, we referre that to the *Novum Organum*, touching upon them in a generality in this place. NOV. OR. LIB. I. APH. LXI. ad LXIX.

§ *Idola Tribûs* is thus exemplified, *The Nature of the mind of man is more affected with Affirmatives and Actives, than with Negatives and Privatives; whereas in a juſt and regular courſe it ſhould preſent it ſelfe equall to both.* But the mind of man NOV. OR. Lib. I. Aph. XLV. ad LIII. excluſive.

man, if a thing have once bin exiſtent, and held good, receives a deeper Impreſſion thereof, than if the ſame thing, farre more often faild and fell out otherwiſe; which is the roote, as it were, of all ſuperſtition and vaine Credulity. *So that he* anſwered well to him that ſhewed him the great number of Pictures of ſuch as had ſcaped Shipwrack, and had paid their vowes; and being preſt with this Interrogative, *Whether he did not now confeſſe the Divinity of Neptune?* returnd this counter-queſtion by way of anſwer; *yea, but where are they painted, that are drowned?* And there is the ſame reaſon of all ſuch like Superſtitions, as in Aſtrologie; Dreames; Divinations, and the reſt. An *other Inſtance* is this, *The Spirit of man being it ſelfe of an equall and uniforme Subſtance, doth preſuppoſe, and faine a greater equality, and uniformitie in Nature, than in truth there is.* Hence that fiction of the Mathematicians, *that in the heavenly Bodies all is moved by perfect Circles;* rejecting ſpirall Lines: ſo it comes to paſſe that whereas there are many things in Nature, as it were *Monodica*, and full of imparity; yet the conceipts of men ſtill faine and frame unto themſelves, *Relatives; Parallels*, and *Conjugates*. For upon this ground, *the Element of Fire and its Orbe is brought in to keepe ſquare with the other three, Earth; Water; Aire.* The *Chymiques* have ſet out a fanaticall Squadron of the word, faining by a moſt vaine conceipt, in thoſe their foure Elements (*Heaven; Aire; Water*, and *Earth*) there are found to every one parallel and conforme ſpecies. *The third Example* hath ſome affinitie with the former, *That man is, as it were, the common meaſure and mirror, or glaſſe of Nature*; for it is not credible (if all Particulars were ſcann'd and noted) what a troupe of *Fictions* and *Idolaes* the reduction of the operations of Nature, to the ſimilitude of humane Actions, hath brought into *Philoſophie*; I ſay this very fanſie, *that it ſhould be thought that Nature doth the ſame things that man doth.* Neither are theſe much better than the Hereſie of the *Anthrôpomorphites*, bred in the Cells and ſolitude of groſſe and ignorant Monkes, or the Opinion of *Epicurus* anſwerable to the ſame in Heatheniſme, who ſuppoſed God to be of Humane

Cic. de N. D. lib. V.

V. DIGRES.

Elem. Ignis vide Digreſſ.

Paracel. Fludde paſſim.

Epiphan. lib. 3. Niceph. Hiſt. Eccl. lib 11

mane ſhape. But *Velleius* the Epicurean needed not to have asked, why God ſhould have adorned the heavens with ſtarres and lights, as if he had bin an *Ædilis*; one that ſhould have ſet forth ſome magnificent ſhewes or playes: for if that great Workman had conform'd himſelfe to the imitation of an *Ædilis*, he would have caſt the ſtarres into ſome pleaſant and beautifull workes, and orders, like the curious roofs of Palaces, whereas one can ſcarce find in ſuch an infinite number of ſtarres a Poſture in ſquare, or Triangle, or right-Line. *So different a harmony there is betweene the Spirit of man, and the Spirit of the world.*

§ *Idola Specûs are derived from the Individuall Complexion of every Particular in reſpect of Mind, and of Body, as alſo, from Education; Cuſtome; and Fortuitous Events*, which befall every man. For it is an excellent embleme that of *Plato's Cave*; for certainly (to let goe the exquiſite ſubtiltie of that Parable) if a man were continued from his Childhood unto mature Age in a Grot, or a dark and ſubterraneous Cave, and then ſhould come ſodainly abroad, and ſhould behold this ſtately Canopie of heaven, and the Furniture of the World; without doubt he would have many ſtrange and abſurd imaginations come into his mind, and people his braine. So in like manner we live in the view of heaven; yet our Spirits are incloſed in the Caves of our Bodies; Complexions, and Cuſtomes, which muſt needs miniſter unto us infinite images of errors, and vain Opinions, if they doe ſo ſeldome, & for ſo ſhort a ſpace appear above ground, out of their holes; and doe not continually live under the Contemplation of Nature, as in the open Aire. That Parable of *Heraclitus* doth well ſuite with this embleme of *Plato's Cave, that men ſeek Sciences in their owne proper World, and not in the greater World.*

NOV. OR. LIB. I. Aph. LIII ad LIX.

Plat. de Rep. VII.

N. L.

§ But *Idola Fori are moſt troubleſome, which out of a tacite ſtipulation amongſt men, touching the impoſition of words, and names, have inſinuated themſelves into the underſtanding.* Words commonly are impoſed according to the capacity of the People; and diſtinguiſh things by ſuch differences, as the

NOV. OR. LIB. I. Aph. LIX. ad LXI.

Vulgar are capeable off; and when a more preſciſive conception, and a more diligent obſervation would diſcerne, and ſeparate things better; the noiſe of popular words confounds and interrupts them. And that which is the remedy to this inconvenience (namely *Definitions*) in many points is not a remedy ſufficient for the diſeaſe, becauſe the *Definitions* themſelves conſiſt of words, and words beget words. For although we preſume that we are maſters of our words, and expreſſions; and it is ſoon ſaid, *loquendum ut vulgus, ſentiendum ut ſapientes*, and that words of Art, which are of authority only with the Learn'd, may ſeeme to give ſome ſatisfaction to this defect; and that the *Definitions* whereof we have ſpoken, premiſed, and preſuppoſed in Arts according to the wiſdome of the Mathematicians, may be of force to correct the depraved acceptations of words; yet all this ſecures us not from the cheating ſlights and charms of words, which many waies abuſe us, and offer violence to the underſtanding; and after the manner of the Tartars Bow, doe ſhoot back upon the judgment from whence they came. Wherefore this diſeaſe muſt have a new kind of remedy, and of more efficacy. But we doe now touch theſe in paſſage briefly, in the meane time reporting this Knowledge which we will call, *the Great Elenchs*, or the Doctrine of *Idolaes*, *Native* and adventuall of the mind of man, to be DEFICIENT. But we referre a juſt Treatiſe thereof to the *Novum Organum*.

Agell. N. A. alicubi.

IV There remains one part of *Judgment* of great excellency, which likewiſe we ſet downe as DEFICIENT. For indeed *Ariſtotle* noteth the thing, but no where purſueth the manner of acquiring it. The Subject of this Canon is this; *The different kind of Demonſtrations, and Proofes, to different kind of Matter and Subjects*; ſo that this Doctrine containeth the *Indications* of *Indications*. For *Ariſtotle* adviſeth well, *That we may not require Demonſtrations from Orators, or Perſwaſions from Mathematicians*; ſo that if you miſtake in the kind of Proofe, the judicature cannot be upright and perfect. And ſeeing there are foure kinds of *Demonſtrations* either by *immediate*

* DE ANALOGIA DEMONSTRATIONVM.

Eth. Lib. 1.

mediate Conſent, and commune Notions; or by *Induction*, or by *Syllogiſme*; or by that which *Ariſtotle* calls *Demonſtration in orbe, or in Circle*; (that is not from the more knownnotions, but down right); every of theſe *Demonſtrations* hath certaine Subjects, and matter of Sciences, wherein reſpectively they have chiefeſt uſe; other Subjects from which reſpectively they ought to be excluded. *For a rigor and curioſity in requiring too ſevere proofes in ſome things; much more a facilitie and remiſſion in reſting ſatisfied in ſlighter Proofes, are to be numbred amongſt thoſe prejudices, which have bin the greateſt Cauſes of detriment, and impediment to Sciences.* Thus much concerning the *Art of Iudging.*

CAP. V.

I The Partition *of Art Retentive, or of Memorie, into the Knowledge of the Helpes of Memorie.* § *and the Knowledge of the Memorie it ſelfe.* II. The Diviſion *of the Doctrine of Memorie into Prenotion.* § *and Embleme.*

I WE *will divide the Art of Retaining, or of Cuſtodie, into two Knowledges; that is, into the Knowledge of the Helps of Memorie, and the Knowledge of the Memory it ſelfe.* Aſſiſtant to *Memory* is *writing*; and it muſt by all means be noted, that *Memory* of it ſelfe, without this ſupport, would be too weake for prolixe and acurate matters; wherein it could no way recover, or recall it ſelfe, but by Scripture. And this *ſubſidiary ſecond*, is alſo of moſt ſpeciall uſe in *Inductive Philoſophy, and the Interpretation of Nature*. For a man may as well perfect, and ſumme up the *Computations* of an *Ephemerides* by meere *Memory*; as comprehend the *Interpretation* of *Nature* by meditations, and the nude, and native ſtrength of *Memory*; unleſſe the ſame *Memory* be aſſiſted by *Tables*, and *Indices* provided for that Purpoſe. But to let goe the *Interpretation of Nature*, which is a new Knowledge; there ſcarcely can be a thing more uſefull even to ancient,

and popular Sciences, than a ſolid, and good *Aide* to *Memory*; that is, a ſubſtantiall and Learned *Digeſt* of *Common places*. Neither am I ignorant, *that the referring of thoſe things we read, or learne, into Common-Places, is imputed by ſome as a Prejudice to Learning; as cauſing a retardation of Reading, and a ſlothfull relaxation to Memory*. But becauſe it is a Counterfeit thing in Knowledge, to be forward and pregnant, unleſſe you be withall deepe and full; I hold that the diligence, and paines in collecting *Common-Places*, is of great uſe and certainty in ſtudying; as that which Subminiſters Copie to *Invention*; and contracteth the ſight of Iudgment to a ſtrength. *But this is true, that of the Methods and Syntagmes of Common-Places, which we have ſeene, there is none that is of any worth; for that in their Titles, they meerly repreſent the face, rather of a Schoole, than of the world; exhibiting Vulgar and Pedanticall Diviſions, and not ſuch as any way penetrate the Marrow and Pith of things.*

§ As for *Memory* it ſelfe; that in my Iudgment hetherto hath bin looſely, and weakly inquired into. There is indeed an Art extant of it, but we are certaine that there may be had both better Precepts for the confirming and increaſing *Memory*, than that Art comprehendeth; and a better Practice of that Art may be ſet downe, than that which is receiv'd. Neither doe we doubt (if any man have a mind to abuſe this Art to oſtentation) but that many wonderfull and prodigious matters may be performed by it. But for uſe (as it is now managed) it is a barren thing. Yet this in the meane time we doe not taxe it withall, that it doth ſupplant, or ſurcharge *Naturall Memory* (as commonly is objected) but that it is not dexterouſly applied to lend aſſiſtance to *Memory* in buſineſſe, and ſerious occaſions. And we have learned this (it may be from our practiſed Courſe in a civile calling) that whatſoever makes oſtentation of Art, and gives no aſſurance of uſe, we eſtime as nothing worth. For to repeate on the ſodaine a great number of names or words, upon once hearing, in the ſame order they were delivered; or to powre forth a number of a verſes upon any argument *ex tempore*;

or

or to taxe every thing that falls out in ſome ſatyricall ſimile; or the turning of every thing to a jeſt; or the eluding of every thing by a contradiction or cavill; and the like; whereof in the faculties of the mind there is a great ſtore; and ſuch as by wit and practice may be exalted to a great degree of wonder. All theſe and the like, we make no more eſtimation of, than we doe of the agilities, and tricks of Tumblers; Buffones, & Iuglers. For they are almoſt all one thing, ſeeing theſe abuſe the Powers of the Body, theſe the Powers of the mind; and perchance they may have ſome ſtrangeneſſe in them; but litle or no worthineſſe.

II *This Art of Memory* is built upon two Intentions, *Prenotion* and *Emblem*. we call *Prenotion a Preciſion of endleſſe inveſtigation*; for when a man would recall any thing to *Memory*, if he have no *Prenotion* or *Preception* of that he ſeeketh, he ſearcheth indeed, and taketh paines, rounding this way and that way, as in a maze of infinitie. But if he have any certaine *Prenotion*, preſently that which is infinite is diſcharged & cut off; and the queſting of the *Memory* is brought within a more narrow compaſſe; as in the hunting of a Fallow Deere within the Parke. Therefore it is evident, *that Method helpes the* Memory; for *Prenotion* ſuggeſteth that it muſt agree with order. So verſes are ſooner gotten by heart than Proſe; for if a man make a doubtfull ſtand at a word, *Prenotion* prompts him that the word which agrees with the verſe, muſt be of ſuch a Nature. And this *Prenotion* is the firſt part of Artificiall *Memory*. For in *Memory Artificiall* we have places digeſted & provided before hand: But we make *Images extempore*, according as the preſent ſhall require. But *Prenotion* doth admoniſh that the *Image* muſt be ſuch as hath ſome reſemblance with the *Place*; this is that which awaketh, and in ſome ſort muniteth the *Memory* in the chaſe of what we ſeeke.

§ *Embleme deduceth Conceptions Intellectuall* to *Images ſenſible, and that which is ſenſible, more forcibly ſtrikes the Memory, and is more eaſily imprinted, than that which is Intellectuall*. So we ſee that even the *Memory* of Beaſts is ſtirr'd up by

a *ſenſible* object, not by an *Intellectuall*. So you will more eaſily *remember* the *Image* of a Hunts-man purſuing the Hare, or of an Apothecary ſetting in order his Boxes, or of a Pedant making a ſpeech, or of a boy reciting verſes by heart, or of a Ieſter acting upon a ſtage, than the *Notions of Invention*; *Diſpoſition*; *Elocution*; *Memory*; *Action*. There are other things that pertaine to the *helpe of Memory* (as we ſaid even now) but the *Art* which now is in uſe conſiſts of theſe two Intentions now ſet downe. To purſue the *Particular Defects* of Arts, would be to depart from our intended Purpoſe. Wherefore let thus much ſuffice for the Art of *Retaining*, or of *Cuſtodie*. Now we deſcend in order to the fourth member of *Logique*, which handles *Tradition* and *Elocution*.

THE

THE SIXTH BOOK OF
FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM
VICOUNT St ALBAN.

OF THE DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

I The Partition *of the Art of Tradition into the Doctrine of the Organ of Speech. The Doctrine of the Method of Speech; And the Doctrine of the Illustration of Speech.* § The Partition *of the Doctrine of the Organ of Speech; into the Knowledge of the Notes of things; of Speaking; and of Writing; of which the two last constitute* Grammar, *and the Partitions thereof.* §. The Partition *of the Knowledge of the Notes of things; into* Hieroglyphiques; *And into Characters Reall.* II. A second Partition *of Grammar, into Literarie; and Philosophicall.* III. An Aggregation *of Poesie, referring to Measure, unto the Knowledge of Speech.* An Aggregation *of the Knowledge of Cyphers to the Knowledge of Writing.*

CERTAINLY any man may assume the liberty (*Excellent King*) if he be so humourd, to jest and laugh at himselfe, or his owne Projects. Who then knowes whether this worke of ours be not perchance a Transcript out of an Ancient Booke found amongst the Books of that famous Library of *S. Victor*, a Catalogue whereof *M. Fra. Rabelais* hath collected? For there a Book is found entitled FORMICARIUM ARTI-

Liv. 2. c. 7. *des faicts & dicts du bon Pantagr.*

UM; wee have indeed accumulated a litle heape of *ſmall Duſt*; and laid up many *Graines of Arts and Sciences* therein, whereto Ants may creepe, and there repoſe a while, and ſo betake themſelves to new labours. Nay the wiſeſt of Kings *ſends the ſlothfull*, of what ranke or qualitie ſoever, *unto the Ants*; and thoſe we define to be *ſlothfull*, *whoſe only care is to live upon the maine ſtock, but not to improve it by ſowing the Ground of Sciences over againe, and reaping a new Harveſt.*

Prov. 6.

I *Now let us come unto the Art of Delivery, or of Expreſſing, and Transferring thoſe things which are Invented; Iudged; and laid up in the Memory; which, by a generall name, we will terme Tradition.* This comprehendeth in it all Arts touching Words, & Speeches; for *though Reaſon be*, as it were, *the Soule of Speech*, yet in the manner of handling, *Reaſon* and *Speech* ſhould be ſeparate, even as the *Soule* and the *Body* are. We will divide theſe *Traditive Sciences* into three Parts; *into the Knowledge concerning the Organ of Speech; into the Knowledge concerning the Method of Speech; and into the Knowledge concerning the Illuſtration or Ornament of Speech.*

§ The Knowledge *concerning the Organ of Speech* generally receiv'd, which is alſo called *Grammer*, hath two Parts; the one of *Speech*; the other of *Writing*. For *Ariſtotle* ſaith well, *Words are the Images of Cogitations; letters are the Images of words*; we will aſſigne both to *Grammer*. But to derive the matter ſomewhat higher before we come to *Grammer*, and the parts thereof now ſet downe; we muſt ſpeake of the *Organ of Tradition* in generall. For there ſeemes to be other *Traditive Emanations* beſides *Words* and *Letters*. For this is certaine whatſoever may be diſtinguiſht into differences, ſufficient for number, to expreſſe the variety of Notions (ſo thoſe differences be perceptible to ſenſe) may be the Convoy of the Cogitations from man to man. For we ſee Nations of different Language to trade with one the other, well enough to ſerve their turne, by *Geſtures*. Nay in the Practice of many, that have bin dumbe and deafe from their birth, and otherwiſe were ingenious, we have ſeen ſtrange Dialogues held between them, and their friends, who have learn'd

De Interpret.

learn'd their Geſtures. *Moreover it is now* generally knowne that in in China, and the Provinces of the high Levant, there are at this day in uſe, certaine *Reall*, and not *Nominall Characters*; that is, ſuch as expreſſe neither *Letters*, nor *Words*; but *Things*, and *Notions*: in ſo much that many Countries that underſtand not one an others Language, but conſenting in ſuch kind of *Characters* (which are more generally receiv'd amongſt them) can communicate one with another by ſuch *Figures* written; ſo as every Country can read and deliver in his owne native tongue, the meaning of any Book written with theſe *Characters*.

§ *Notes* therefore of things, which without the helpe and mediation of *Words* ſignifie *Things*, are of two ſorts; whereof the firſt ſort is ſignificant of *Congruitie*; the other *ad placitum*. Of the former ſort are *Hieroglyphiques* and *Geſtures*; of the later are thoſe which we call *Characters Reall*. The uſe of *Hieroglyphiques* is very ancient, and had in a kind of Veneration; eſpecially amongſt the Ægyptians, one of the moſt Ancient Nations: So that *Hieroglyphiques* ſeem to have bin a *firſt-borne writing*, and elder than the *Elements* of *Letters*; unleſſe, it may be, the *Letters* of the Ebrews. *As for Geſtures* they are, as it were, Tranſitory *Hieroglyphiques*. For as words pronounced vaniſh, *writings* remaine; ſo *Hieroglyphiques* expreſſed by *Geſtures*, are tranſient; but *Painted*, permanent. As when *Periander* being conſulted with, how to preſerve a Tyranny, bid the Meſſenger ſtand ſtill, *and he walking in a Garden, topt all the higheſt Flowers*; ſignifying the cutting of, and the keeping low of the Nobility; did as well make uſe of a *Hieroglyphique*, as if he had drawne the ſame upon Paper. This in the meane is plain, that *Hieroglyphiques* and *Geſtures* ever have ſome ſimilitude with the thing ſignified, and are kind of *Emblemes*; wherefore we have named them the *Notes of things from Congruitie*. But *Characters Reall* have nothing of Embleme in them; but are plainly dumbe and dead Figures, as the *Elements* of *Letters* are; and only deviſed *ad Placitum*, and confirmed by Cuſtome, as by a tacite agreement. And it is manifeſt alſo that there muſt needs be

DE NOTIS RERVM.

Herodot. Laert.

a vaſt number of them for writing; at leſt ſo many as there are Radicall words. Wherefore this portion of Knowledge *concerning the Organ of Speech, which is of the Notes of Things, we report as* DEFICIENT. And though it may ſeeme of no great uſe, conſidering that *Words & writings by Letters* are the moſt apt *Organs* of *Tradition*; yet we thought good to make mention of it here, as of a knowledge not to be deſpiſed. For we here handle, as it were, the *Coynes of things Intellectuall*; and it will not be amiſſe to know, that as Money may be made of other matter beſides Gold and Silver; ſo there may be ſtamped other *Notes* of things beſides *Words* and *Letters*.

II Let us proceed to *Grammer*; *this doth beare the office as it were, of an Vſher to other Sciences; a place not very honourable, yet very neceſſary, eſpecially ſeeing that in our age Sciences are chiefly drawne from Learned Languages, and not from Mother-tongues*. Nor is the dignity thereof to be eſtimed meane, ſeeing it ſupplies the place of an Antidote, againſt that *Malediction* of the *Confuſion* of *Tongues*. Surely the Induſtry of man ſtriveth to reſtore, and redintegrate himſelfe in thoſe Benedictions, which by his guilt he forfeited; and by all other Arts, armes and ſtrengthens himſelfe againſt that firſt generall Curſe of the *ſterility of the earth, and the eating of his bread in the ſweat of his browes*. But againſt that ſecond Curſe, which was the *Confuſion* of *Tongues, he calls in the aſſiſtance of Grammer*. The uſe hereof in ſome Mother-tongues is indeed very ſmall; in forraine tongues more large; but moſt ample in ſuch tongues, as have ceaſed to be vulgar, and are perpetuated only in Books.

Gen. 3.

§ *We will divide Grammer into two ſorts, whereof the one is Literary, the other Philoſophicall*. The one is meerly applied to Languages, that they may be more ſpeedily learned; or more correctedly and purely ſpoken. *The other* in a ſort doth miniſter, and is ſubſervient to *Philoſophie*. In this later part which is *Philoſophicall*, we find *that Cæſar writ Books* DE ANALOGIA; and it is a queſtion whether thoſe Books handled this Philoſophicall Grammer whereof we ſpeake? Our opinion is that there was not any high and ſubtile matter

Suet. in Iul.

* GRAMMATICA PHILOSOPHANS.

ter in them, but only that they deliver'd Precepts of a pure and perfect ſpeech, not depraved by popular Cuſtome; nor corrupted and polluted by over-curious affectation; in which kind *Cæſar* excell'd. *Notwithſtanding*, admoniſh't by ſuch a worke, we have conceiv'd and comprehended in our mind, a kind of Grammer, that may diligently enquire, not the *Analogie of words one* with another, but the *Analogie* between Words and Things, or Reaſon; beſides that *Interpretation of Nature*, which is ſubordinate to *Logique*. Surely *Words* are the *foot-ſteps of Reaſon*; and foot-ſteps doe give ſome indications of the Body; wherefore we will give ſome generall deſcription of this. And firſt we doe not allow that curious inquiry which *Plato* an excellent man purſued, touching the *impoſition* and *originall Etymology of names*. conceiving it, *as if words had not bin impoſed at firſt, ad Placitum; but were ſignificantly derived and deduced from a certaine reaſon and intendment*. Certainly an elegant and pliant ſpeculation, which might be aptly fain'd and made ſquare to the purpoſe; and by reaſon it ſeemeth to ſearch the ſecrets of Antiquity, in ſome kind reverend. But yet ſparingly mixt with truth, and without fruit. *But without* queſtion that would be a moſt excellent kind of *Grammer* (as we ſuppoſe) if ſome man throughly inſtructed in many *Languages*, as well *Learned*, as *Mother-tongues*, ſhould write a Treatiſe of the diverſe Proprieties of *Languages*; ſhewing in what points every particular Language did excell; and in what points it was Deficient. For ſo *Tongues* might be enricht and perfected by mutuall intertrafique one with another; and a moſt faire Image of ſpeech (like the Venus of Apelles); and a goodly patterne for the true expreſſion of the inward ſenſe of the mind, might be drawne from every part which is excellent in every Language. *And withall* no ſlight Conjectures, but ſuch as were well worth the obſervation, might be taken (which a man perchance would litle think) touching the naturall diſpoſitions and cuſtomes of People, and Nations, even from their Languages. *For I willingly* give eare to *Cicero* noting that the Grecians have not a word which may In Cratyl.

De Orat. lib. 2.

expreſſe this Latine word, *Ineptum*; *becauſe* (ſaith he) *this vice was ſo familiar to the Grecians, that they did not ſo much as acknowledge themſelves guilty thereof.* Certainly a Cenſure worthy a Roman gravity. And what may that inferre, that the Grecians uſed ſuch a Liberty in compoſition of words; contrarywiſe the Romans were in this point ſevere? Surely a man may plainly collect that the Grecians were more fit to ſtudy Arts; the Romans to manage affaires of ſtate. For diſtinctions of *Arts*, for moſt part, require compoſition of words; but matters and buſineſſe, ſimple words. *But the Ebrewes ſo ſhunne Compoſition, that they make choice rather to ſtraine a Metaphor too farre, than to bring in a Compoſition.* Nay they uſe ſo few words, and ſo unmingled, that a man may plainly perceive by their Tongue, that they were a Nazarite People, and ſeparate from other Nations. *And is not that* worthy obſervation (though it may ſerve to abate our high conceipt of our owne times) *that Ancient Languages were more full of Declenſions; Caſes; Conjugations; Tenſes, and the like; the moderne commonly deſtitute of theſe, doe looſely deliver themſelves in many expreſſions by Prepoſitions, and auxiliary verbes.* Certainly a man may eaſily conjecture (however we may pleaſe our ſelves) that the wits of former times were farre more acute and ſubtile than ours are. There are an infinite number of obſervations of this kind which might make up a juſt Volume. Wherefore it will not be amiſſe to diſtinguiſh *Grammer Philoſophicall*, from *meere and literary Grammer*, and to ſet it downe as DEFICIENT. Vnto *Grammer* alſo belongs the conſideration of all *Accidents* of words; ſuch as are *Meaſure*; *Sound*; *Accent*; but thoſe firſt infancies of ſimple Letters (as, with what Percuſſion of the Tongue, with what opening of the mouth; with what drawing of the lips, with what ſtraining of the throat; the ſound of every Particular *Letter* is to be made) belongs not unto *Grammer*; but is a Portion of the *knowledge of ſounds*, to be handled *under ſenſe* and *ſenſibility*. *Grammaticall ſound*, whereof we ſpeake, belongs only to ſweetneſſe & harſhneſſe of ſounds; of which ſome are common; for there is no Tongue but in

ſome

ſome ſort ſhunnes the too much overture of concurrent Vowels, and the aſperities of concurrent Conſonants. There are other reſpective ſounds which are pleaſing, or unpleaſing to the eare, according to the temper of diverſe Nations. *The Greeke Tongue* is full of Diphthonges; the Latine is farre more ſparing; the Spaniſh Tongue hates ſmall-ſounding Letters, and preſently changeth them into Letters of a middle tone; the Tongues derived from the Gothes delight in Aſpirates; there are innumerable of this nature, but perchance theſe are more than enough.

III *But the meaſure of words* hath brought us forth an immenſe body of Art, namely *Poeſie*; not in reſpect of the matter (of which we have ſpoken before) but in reſpect of ſtile and the forme of words, as *Metre* or *Verſe*; touching which the Art is very ſmall and briefe, but the acceſſe of examples large and infinite. Neither ought that Art (which the Grammarians call *Proſodia*) to be only reſtrain'd to the kinds and meaſures of *Verſe*; for there are Precepts to be annext, what kind of *Verſe* beſt fitteth every matter or ſubject. The Ancients applied *Heroicall Verſe* to *Hiſtories* and *Laudatories*; *Elegies* to *Lamentations*; *Jambiques* to *Invectives*; *Lyriques* to *Songs* and *Hymnes*. And this wiſdome of the Ancients is not wanting in the *Poets* of later Ages in Mother-tongues; only this is to be reprehended, that ſome of them too ſtudious of Antiquity have endevoured to draw moderne Languages to Ancient Meaſures (as *Heroique*; *Elegiaque*; *Saphique*, and the reſt) which the fabrique and compoſition of thoſe Languages, will not beare; and withall is no leſſe harſh unto the eare. In matters of this Nature the judgment of ſenſe is to be preferr'd before precepts of Art, as he ſaith,

——Cœnæ Fercula noſtræ Mart. Ep. 9
Mallem Convivis quam placuiſſe Cocis.

Nor is *this Art*, but the abuſe of Art, ſeeing it doth not perfect, but perverts Nature. *As for Poeſie* (*whether we ſpeake of Fables*

Fables, or Metre) *it is, as we have ſaid before, as a Luxuriant Herb brought forth without ſeed, and ſprings up from the ſtrength and rankneſſe of the ſoyle. Wherefore it runs along every where, and is ſo amply ſpread, as it were a ſuperfluous labour to be curious of any* DEFICIENTS *therein*; the care therefore for this is taken already.

§ *As for Accents of Words*, there is no need, that wee ſpeake of ſo ſmall a matter; unleſſe, perchance, ſome may think it worth the noting, that there hath bin exact obſervation made of the *Accents of Words*, but not of the *Accents of Sentences*; yet this, for moſt part, is the generall Cuſtome of all men, that in the cloſe of a Period they let fall their voice, in a demand they raiſe it, and many ſuch like uſages.

§ *As for writing*, that is perform'd either by the vulgar Alphabet, which is every where receiv'd; or by a ſecret and private Alphabet, which men agree upon between themſelves, which they call *Cyphers*. But the *Vulgar Orthography* hath brought forth unto us a Controverſie, and Queſtion, namely, *Whether words ſhould be written as they are ſpoken, or rather after the uſuall manner*. But this kind of writing, which ſeemes to be reformed, which is, *that writing ſhould be conſonant to ſpeaking*, is a branch of unprofitable ſubtelties; for *Pronunciation* it ſelfe every day encreaſes and alters the faſhion; and the derivation of words, eſpecially from forrain Languages, are utterly defac'd and extinguiſht. In briefe, ſeeing *writing*, according to the receiv'd Cuſtome, doth no way prejudice the *manner of ſpeaking*, to what end ſhould this innovation be brought in?

§ *Wherefore let us come to* CYPHARS. Their kinds are many, as *Cyphars ſimple*; *Cyphars intermixt with Nulloes*, or non-ſignificant Characters; *Cyphers of double Letters under one Character*; *Wheele-Cyphars*; *Key-Cyphars*; *Cyphars of words*; *Others*. But the virtues of them whereby they are to be preferr'd are Three; *That they be ready, and not laborious to write; That they be ſure, and lie not open to Deciphering; And laſtly, if it*

be

be poſsible, that they may be managed without ſuſpition. For if Letters Miſsive fall into their hands, that have ſome command and authority over thoſe that write; or over thoſe to whom they were written; though the Cypher it ſelfe bee ſure and impoſsible to be *decypher'd*, yet the matter is liable to examination and queſtion; unleſſe the *Cypher* be ſuch, as may be voide of all ſuſpition, or may elude all examination. *As for the ſhifting* off examination, there is ready prepared a new and profitable invention to this purpoſe; which, ſeeing it is eaſily procured, to what end ſhould we report it, as *Deficient.* The invention is this: That you have two ſorts of *Alphabets*, one of *true Letters*, the other of *Non-ſignificants*; and that you likewiſe fould up two *Letters*; one which may carrie the ſecret, another ſuch as is probable the Writer might ſend, yet without perill. Now if the Meſſenger be ſtrictly examined concerning the *Cypher*, let him preſent the *Alphabet* of *Non-ſignificants* for true *Letters*, but the *Alphabet* of true *Letters* for *Non-ſignificants*: by this Art the examiner falling upon the *exterior Letter*, and finding it probable, ſhall ſuſpect nothing of the *interior Letter.* But that jealouſies may be taken away, we will annexe an other invention, which, in truth, we deviſed in our youth, when we were at *Paris*: and is a thing that yet ſeemeth to us not worthy to be loſt. It containeth the *higheſt degree of Cypher*, which is to ſignifie *omnia per omnia*, yet ſo as the *writing infolding*, may beare a quintuple proportion to the *writing infolded*; no other condition or reſtriction whatſoever is required. It ſhall be performed thus: Firſt let all the *Letters* of the *Alphabet*, by tranſpoſition, be reſolved into two *Letters* onely; for the tranſpoſition of two *Letters* by five placeings will be ſufficient for 32. Differences, much more for 24. which is the number of the *Alphabet.* The example of ſuch an *Alphabet* is on this wiſe.

An Example of a Bi-literarie Alphabet.

A	B	C	D	E	F
aaaaa	aaaab.	aaaba.	aaabb.	aabaa.	aabab.
G	H	I	K	L	M
aabba	aabbb	abaaa.	abaab.	ababa.	ababb.
N	O	P	Q	R	S
abbaa.	abbab.	abbba.	abbbb.	baaaa.	baaab.
T	V	W	X	Y	Z
baaba.	baabb.	babaa.	babab.	babba.	babbb.

Neither is it a ſmall matter theſe *Cypher-Characters* have, and may performe: For by this *Art* a way is opened, whereby a man may expreſſe and ſignifie the intentions of his minde, at any diſtance of place, by objects which may be preſented to the eye, and accommodated to the eare: provided thoſe objects be capable of a twofold difference onely; as by Bells, by Trumpets, by Lights and Torches, by the report of Muskets, and any inſtruments of like nature. But to purſue our enterpriſe, when you addreſſe your ſelfe to write, reſolve your inward-infolded Letter into this *Bi-literarie Alphabet*. Say the *interiour Letter* be

Fuge.

Example of Solution.

F.	V.	G.	E
aabab.	baabb.	aabba.	aabaa.

Together

Together with this, you must have ready at hand a *Bi-formed Alphabet*, which may represent all the *Letters* of the *Common Alphabet*, as well Capitall Letters as the Smaller Characters in a double forme, as may fit every mans occasion.


An Example of a Bi-formed Alphabet.




Now to the interiour letter, which is Biliterate, you ſhall fit a biformed exteriour letter, which ſhall anſwer the other, letter for letter, and afterwards ſet it downe. Let the exteriour example be,

Manere te volo, donec venero.

An Example of Accommodation.



We have annext likewiſe a more ample example of the cypher of writing *omnia per omnia*: An interiour letter, which to expreſſe, we have made choice of a Spartan letter ſent once in a *Scytale* or round cypher'd ſtaffe.



An exteriour letter, taken out of the firſt Epiſtle of *Cicero*, wherein a Spartan Letter is involved.

Ego

Ego omni officio, ac potiùs pietate erga te, cæteris satisfacio omnibus: Mihi ipsenunquàm satisfacio. Tanta est enim magnitudo tuorum erga me meritorum, vt quoniam tu, nisi perfectâ re, de me non conquiêsti; ego, quia non idem in tuâ causâ efficio, vitam mihi esse acerbam putem. In causâ hæc sunt: Ammonius Regis Legatus apertè pecuniâ nos oppugnat. Res agitur per eosdem creditores, per quos, cùm tu aderas, agebatur. Regis causâ, si qui sunt, qui velint, qui pauci sunt, omnes ad Pompeium rem deferri volunt. Senatus Religionis calumniam, non religione, sed malevolentia, et illius Regiae Largitionis invidiâ comprobat. &c.

The knowledge of Cyphering, hath drawne on with it a knowledge relative unto it, which is the knowledge of *Diſcyphering*, or of Diſcreting *Cyphers*, though a man were utterly ignorant of the *Alphabet* of the *Cypher*, and the Capitulations of ſecrecy paſt between the Parties. *Certainly* it is an Art which requires great paines and a good witt and is (as the other was) conſecrate to the Counſels of Princes: yet notwithſtanding by diligent previſion it may be made unprofitable, though, as things are, it be of great uſe. For if good and faithfull *Cyphers* were invented & practiſed, many of them would delude and foreſtall all the Cunning of the *Decypherer*, which yet are very apt and eaſie to be read or written: but the rawneſſe and unskilfulneſſe of Secretaries, and Clarks in the Courts of Princes, is ſuch, that many times the greateſt matters are Committed to futile and weake Cyphers. But it may be, that in the enumeration, and, as it were, taxation of Arts, ſome may thinke that we goe about to make a great Muſter-rowle of Sciences, that the multiplication of them may be more admired; when their number perchance may be diſplayed, but their forces in ſo ſhort a Treatiſe can hardly be tried. *But for* our parts wee doe faithfully purſue our purpoſe, and in making this *Globe of Sciences*, we would not omitt the leſſer and remoter Ilands. *Neither* have we (in our opinion) touched theſe Arts perfunctorily, though curſorily; but with a piercing ſtile extracted the marrow and pith of them out of a maſſe of matter. The judgement hereof we referre to thoſe who are moſt able to judge of theſe *Arts*. *For ſeeing it is the faſhion of many who would be thought to know much, that every where making oſtentation of words and outward termes of* Arts, *they become a wonder to the ignorant, but a deriſion to thoſe that are Maſters of thoſe* Arts: *we hope that our Labours ſhall have a contrarie ſucceſſe, which is, that they may arreſt the judgment of every one who is beſt vers'd in every particular* Art; *and be undervalued by the reſt.* As for thoſe *Arts* which may ſeeme to bee of inferior ranke and order, if any man thinke wee attribute too much unto them; Let him looke about him and hee ſhall ſee that there bee many of ſpeciall note and great account in their

their owne Countrie, who when they come to the chiefe City or ſeat of the Eſtate, are but of mean ranke and ſcarcely regarded: ſo it is no marvaile if theſe ſleighter *Arts*, placed by the Principall and ſupreme *Sciences*, ſeeme pettie things; yet to thoſe that have choſen to ſpend their labours and ſtudies in them, they ſeeme great and excellent matters. And thus much of the *Organ of Speech*.

CAP. II.

1. The Doctrine touching *the Method of Speech is aſsigned a ſubſtantiall and principall part of Traditive knowledge*: It is entituled, *The wiſedome of Deliverie*. 2. The divers kindes of *Methods are enumerated*: *their Profits and Diſprofits are annexed*. 3. *The parts of Method two*.

1. LEt us now come to the doctrine concerning the Method of Speech: This hath bin handled as a part of *Logick*, ſo it hath found a place in *Rhetoricke* by the name of *Diſpoſition*. But the placeing of it as a part of the Traine of other *Arts*, hath bin the cauſe that many things which referre unto *it*, and are uſefull to be knowne, are pretermiſs'd: wherefore we thought good, to conſtitute a *ſubſtantiall and principall Doctrine* touching *Method*, which by a generall name we call the *wiſedome of Tradition*. *The kinds of Method*, ſeeing they are divers, we will rather reckon them up, then divide them. *But for one onely* Method, *and continued* Dichotomies *we neede not ſpeake much of them; for it was a little Cloude of knowledge which was ſoon diſperſed. Certainly a triviall invention, and an infinite prejudice to Sciences; for theſe* Dichotomiſts, *when they would wreſt all things to the Lawes of their Method, and whatſoever doth not aptly fall within thoſe* Dichotomies *they would either omitt or bow contrarie to their naturall inclination*; they bring it ſo to paſſe, that the *Kernels and Graines of Sciences leape out, and they claſpe and incloſe*

incloſe onely the drie and emptie huskes : So this kinde of Method brings forth fruitleſſe Compends, deſtroyes the ſubſtance of Sciences.

II. Wherefore let the firſt difference of *Method* be ſet downe, to be either *Magiſtrall* or *Initiative*: neither do wee ſo underſtand the word *Initiative*, as if *this* ſhould lay the ground-worke, the *other* raiſe the perfect building of *Sciences*; but in a farre different ſenſe, (borrowing the word from ſacred Ceremonies) wee call that *Initiative Method*, which diſcloſeth and unvailes the Myſteries of Knowledges: For *Magiſtrall teacheth, Initiative inſinuateth : Magiſtrall requires our beliefe to what is delivered, but Initiative that it may rather be ſubmitted to examination.* The *one* delivers popular *Sciences* fit for Learners; the *other Sciences* as to the *Sonnes of Science*: In ſumme, the one is referred to the uſe of *Sciences* as they now are; the other to their continuation, and further propagation. *The latter of theſe*, ſeemes to bee a deſerted and an incloſed path. For Knowledges are now delivered, as if both Teacher and Scholler ſought to lay claime to errour, as upon contract. *For hee that teacheth, teacheth in ſuch a manner as may beſt bee beleeved, not as may bee beſt examined : and hee that learneth, deſires rather preſent ſatisfaction, then to expect a juſt and ſtayed enquirie; and rather not to doubt, then not to erre : So as both the Maſter, out of a deſire of glorie, is watchfull, that hee betray not the weakeneſſe of his knowledge; and the Scholler, out of an averſe diſpoſition to labour, will not try his owne ſtrength.* But Knowledge, which is delivered as a thread to bee ſpunne on, *ought to bee intimated* (if it were poſsible) *into the minde of another, in the ſame method wherein it was at firſt invented.* And ſurely this may bee done in knowledge acquired by *Induction* : But in this ſame anticipated and prevented knowledge, which wee uſe, a man cannot eaſily ſay by what courſe of ſtudy hee came to the knowledge hee hath obtained. But yet certainly more or leſſe a man may reviſite his owne *Knowledge*, and meaſure over againe the foot-

✣ TRADITIO LAMPADIS, SIVE METHODUS AD FILIOS.

footsteps of his *Knowledge*, and of his consent; and by this meanes so transplant *Science* into the mind of another, as it grew in his owne. For it is in *Arts*, as it is in *Plants*; if you meane to use the *Plant*, it is no matter for the Roots; but if you would remove into another soyle, than it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips. So the *Delivery* of Knowledge, as it is now used, *doth present unto us faire Bodies indeed of Sciences, but without* the *Roots*; good, doubtlesse for the Carpenter, *but not for the Planter*. But if you will have *Sciences* grow, you need not be so sollicitous for the *Bodies*; apply all your care that the *Roots* may be taken up sound, and entire, with some litle earth cleaving to them. Of which kind of *Delivery, the Method* of the *Mathematiques* in that subject, hath some shadow, but generally I see it neither put in ure, nor put in *Inquisition*; and therefore number it amongst DEFICIENTS; and we will call it *Traditionem Lampadis, the Delivery of the Lampe, or the Method bequeathed to the sonnes of Sapience.*

§ *Another diversity of Method* followeth, in the intention like the former, but for most part contrary in the issue. In this both these *Methods* agree, that *they* separate the vulgar *Auditors* from the *select*; here *they* differ, that the *former* introduceth a more open way of *Delivery* than is usuall; the *other* (of which we shall now speake) a more reserved & secret. *Let therefore* the distinction of them be this, *that the one is an Exotericall or revealed; the other an Acroamaticall, or concealed Method*. For the same difference the Ancients specially observed in publishing Books, the same we will transferre to the manner it selfe of *Delivery*. *So the* Acroamatique *Method* was in use with the Writers of former Ages, and wisely, and with judgment applied; but that *Acroamatique* and Ænigmatique kind of expression is disgraced in these later times, by many who have made it as a dubious and false light, for the vent of their counterfeit merchandice. But the pretence thereof seemeth to be this, that by the intricate envelopings of *Delivery*, the Prophane Vulgar may be removed from the secrets of Sciences; and they only admitted,

mitted, which had either acquired the interpretation of Parables by Tradition from their Teachers; or by the ſharpneſſe and ſubtlety of their own wit, could pierce the veile.

§ *Another diverſity of Method* followes, of great conſequence to *Sciences*, which is when Sciences are delivered by way of *Aphoriſme*, or *Methods*. For it is a thing worthy to be preciſely noted, that it hath bin often taken into Cuſtome, that men out of a few Axiomes and Obſervations upon any Subject, have made a compleat and ſolemne Art, filling it with ſome diſcourſes of wit, illuſtrating it with examples, and knitting it togither by ſome *Method*. But that other way of *Delivery* by *Aphoriſmes*, brings with it many advantages, whereto *Delivery by Method* doth not approach. For firſt it tries the Writer whether he be ſuperficial or ſolid in knowledge. For *Aphoriſmes* except they ſhould be altogither ridiculous, cannot be made but out of the pyth and heart of Sciences: For Illuſtration and Excuſſion are cut off; variety of examples is cut off; Deduction and Connexion are cut off; Deſcription of Practice is cut off; ſo there remaineth nothing to fill the Aphoriſmes, but a good quantity of obſervations. And therefore no man can ſuffice, nor in reaſon will attempt to write *Aphoriſmes*, who is not copiouſly furniſh't, and ſolidly grounded. But in *Methods*,

Horat. de Art. P.

——Tantum ſeries, junctura q; pollet:
Tantum de medio ſumptis accedit Honoris.

As oftentimes they make a great ſhew of (I know not what) ſingular Art, which if they were disjoynted, ſeparated, and laid open, would come to litle or nothing. Secondly *Methodicall Delivery* is more fit to win conſent or beliefe; but leſſe fit to point to Action; for *they* carry a ſhew of *Demonſtration in orbe* or Circle, one part illuminating another; and therefore doe more ſatisfie the underſtanding; but being that Actions in common courſe of life are diſperſt, and not orderly digeſted, they doe beſt agree with diſperſed Directions. Laſtly *Aphoriſmes* repreſenting certaine Portions only, and as it were fragments of Sciences, invite others to contribute, and adde ſomething; whereas *Methodicall Delivery*

very carrying shew of a totall & perfect Knowledge forthwith secureth men as if they were at the furtheſt.

§ An other diverſity of Method followes, which is likewiſe of great waight, which is when *Sciences* are delivered either by *Aſſertions* with their *Prooſes* annext; or by *Queſtions* togither with their *Determinations*. The later kind whereof if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicious to the progreſſion of Sciences, as it is to the fortunes and proceedings of an Army, to goe about to beſiege every litle Fort or Hold. For if the field be kept, and the ſumme of the enterprize with diligence purſued, thoſe ſmaller places will come in of themſelves. Yet this I cannot deny, that it is not alway ſafe to leave any great, and fortified towne at his back. *In like manner the uſe of Confutations* in the Delivery of Sciences ought to be very ſparing, and to ſerve only to remove and breake ſtrong Preoccupations and Prejudgments of mens minds, and not to excite and provoke *ſmaller Doubts*.

§ *Another diverſity of Method* followeth which is that the *Method be accommodated to the purpoſed matter which is to be handled*. For there is a great difference in Delivery of the *Mathematiques*, which are of knowledges the moſt abſtracted and moſt ſimple; and the *Politiques* which are the moſt immerſed and compounded: Neither can an *uniformity of Method* (as we have obſerv'd already) be fitly ſorted with *multi-formity of Matter*; and therefore as we have allowed *Particular Topiques* for *Invention*; ſo we would likewiſe in ſome meaſure have *Particular Methods* for *Tradition*.

§ *Another diverſity of Method* followeth, with judgment to be practis'd in the Delivery of Sciences; and it *is directed according to the light of Informations, and anticipations, of the Knowledge to be delivered, infuſed, and impreſſed in the minds of the Learners*. For that Knowledge which is new and forraine to mens minds, is to be delivered in an other forme than that which by long-receiv'd, and imbibed opinions is naturalized and made familiar: And therefore *Ariſtotle* when he thinks to taxe *Democritus* doth in truth commend

mend him, where he ſaith, *If we ſhall indeed diſpute, and not follow after ſimilitudes &c.* Charging it as a defect upon *Democritus* that he was too copious in *Compariſons*. *But thoſe whoſe conceits are ſeated in popular opinions, have nothing elſe to doe but to diſpute and prove. Whereas on the contrary thoſe whoſe conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; firſt, that what they produce may be conceiv'd; then, that they be proved.* So that it is of neceſſity with them to have recourſe to *Similitudes* and *Tranſlations*, whereby they may inſinuate themſelves into mens capacities. *Therefore* we ſee in the infancy of Learning, in rude times, when thoſe Comprehenſions which are now Vulgar and triviall, were then new and unheard of; the world was full of *Parables* and *Similitudes*; for otherwiſe men would have paſſed over without mark or due attention, or elſe rejected for Paradoxes, that which was propounded. For it is a rule of Traditive Art, *That whatſoever Science is not conſonant to Anticipations or Preſuppoſitions, muſt pray in ayd of Similitudes and Compariſons.* And thus much of the diverſe ſorts of Methods, namely ſuch as have not heretofore bin noted by others. As for thoſe other *Methods, Analytique; Syſtatique; Dieritique; Cryptique; Homericall*, and the like; they have bin well invented and diſtributed; nor doe we ſee any cauſe why we ſhould dwell upon them.

III *But theſe are the kinds of Method; the Parts are two;* the one of the *Diſpoſition of a whole worke, or of the Argument of ſome Book*; the other of the *Limitation* of *Propoſitions*. For there belongs to *Architecture* not only the frame of the whole Building; but likewiſe the forme and figure of the Columnes, Beames, and the like; and *Method is as it were the* Ramus. *Architecture of Sciences*. And herein *Ramus* merited better a great deale in reviving thoſe excellent Rules Καθ' ὅλου πρώτου, παντος, καθ' αυτο; than in obtruding *one only Method* and *Dichotomie*. But it falls out, I know not by what fate, *that of humane things (according as the Poets often faigne) the moſt precious have the moſt pernicious Keepers*. Certainly diligent endeavours about the ranke and file of Propoſitions, caſt him upon

upon those *Epitomes* and *shallowes of Sciences*; for he had need set out in a lucky houre, and to goe on by the conduct of a happy Genius, that attempts to make *Axiomes of Sciences Convertible*; and yet withall not make them *Circular*, or returning into themselves; notwithstanding we deny not, but that *Ramus* intention in this kind was profitable. *There remaines yet two Limitations of Propositions*, besides that they may be made *Convertible*; the one touching the *Extension*; the other touching the *Production* of them. Surely Knowledges have, if a man marke it well two other dimensions besides *Profunditie*; namely *Latitude* and *Longitude*. For *Profunditie* is referr'd to the Truth and Reality of them; and these make them solid. As for the other two, *Latitude* may be taken and reckoned of Science into Science; *Longitude* may be accepted and understood from the higest generall Proposition, to the lowest particular in the same science. The one comprehends the bounds and true limits of Sciences, that Propositions may be properly, not promiscuously handled; and that all Repetition; Excursion, & Confusion may be avoided: the other gives rule how farre, and to what degree of Particularitie, Propositions of sciences may be deduced. Certainly there is no doubt but somewhat must be left to use and Practice; for we ought to avoid the precise error of *Antoninus Pius*, that we be not *Cumini sectores in Scientijs*, *Mincers of Commin in sciences*; nor that we multiply divisions to the lowest Particularity. Wherefore how we should moderate our selves in this point, is well worth the inquiry. For we see too remote Generalities unlesse they be drawne downe, doe litle informe, nay rather expose Knowledge to the scorne of Practicall men; and are no more ayding to Practice, than an *Ortelius Universall Mappe* is to direct the way between *London* and *York*. Surely the better sort of Rules have not unfitly bin compared to Glasses of steele, wherein you may see the Images of things, but first they must be filed and burnisht: so Rules and Precepts doe then help, after they have bin laboured and polisht by Practice; but if those Rules may be made cleere and Chrystalline a-

Dion. in Anton. P.

fore-hand, it would be the more excellent, becauſe they would leſſe ſtand in need of diligence, labour, and exerciſe after. *And thus much of the Knowledge of Method*, which we have named the *Wiſdome* of *Delivery*. Nor can we here pretermit that many more vain-glorious, than learned have laboured about a *Method*, which is not worthy the name of a lawfull *Method*, ſeeing it is rather a *Method of Impoſture*; which yet to ſome vaporous, and vain-boaſting natures, without doubt hath bin moſt acceptible. This *Method* doth ſo ſprinkle drops of any Knowledge, that any halfe-learned Clark may with a litle ſuperficiary Knowledge make a glo-
Lullius. rious ſhew. Such was the *Art* of *Lullius*; ſuch the *Typocoſmie* drawne by many; which were nothing elſe but a heap and maſſe of words of all Arts, to give men countenance; that thoſe which have the termes of Art, might be thought to underſtand the Arts themſelves. Which kind of Collections are like a Frippers or Brokers ſhop, that hath ends of every thing, but nothing of worth.

CAP. III.

I The *Grounds and Duty of Rhetorique.* II. *Three Appendices of Rhetorique which appertaine only to the Preparatorie Part.* The *Colours of Good and Evill, as well ſimple as Compared.* III. *The Antitheta of things.* IV. *Leſſer Stiles, or uſuall Formes of Speech.*

NOw come we to the *Knowledge which concerneth the Illuſtration of Speech*; it is that which is called *Rhetorique*, or Art of *Eloquence*; a Science certainly both excellent in it ſelfe, and by Authors excellently well laboured. But *Eloquence*, if a man value things truly, is without doubt inferior to *Wiſdome*. For we ſee how farre this leaves that behind, in thoſe words of *God* to *Moſes*, when he diſabled himſelfe for that ſervice impoſed upon him, for want of
Exod. 7. this *Facultie*; *There is Aaron, he ſhall be thy Speaker, thou ſhalt be to him as God.* Yet in profit and popular eſtime, *Wiſdome* gives place

place to *Eloquence* for ſo *Salomon*, *Sapiens corde appellatur prudens; ſed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet*, ſignifying not obſcurely *that profoundneſſe of Wiſdome will help a man to fame & admiration; but that it is Eloquence which prevailes in buſineſſe and active Life.* And as to the labouring and culture of this Art, the Æmulation of *Ariſtotle* with the *Rhetoricians* of his time, and the earneſt and vehement diligence of *Cicero*, labouring with all might to raiſe & enoble that *Art*, joyned with long Experience, hath made them in their Books written of this *Art* to exceed themſelves. Againe, the excellent examples of *Eloquence* in the *Orations* of *Demoſthenes*, and *Cicero*, added to the ſubtlety and diligence of Precepts, have doubled the Progreſſion in this *Art*. Wherefore the DEFICIENTS which we find in this *Art*, will be rather in ſome Collections, which may as Hand-maids attend the *Art*, than in the Rules and the uſe of the *Art it ſelfe*. For even then when we made mention of a *Promptuarie Knowledge* in *Logique*, we engaged our ſelves by Promiſe, to exhibite examples at large thereof in *Rhetorique*. Prov. XVI.

1 *Notwithſtanding that* we may ſtirre up and ſubdue the earth a litle, about the Roots of this *Science*, as our manner is to doe in the reſt; ſurely *Rhetorique* is *ſub-ſervient* to the *Imagination*, as *Logique* is to the *Vnderſtanding*. And the office and duty of *Rhetorique* (if a man well weigh the matter) is no other, then *to apply and commend the Dictates of Reaſon to the Imagination, for the better moveing of the appetite and will.* For we ſee the goverment of Reaſon is diſquieted, and aſſailed three waies; either by *Illaqueation* of *Sophiſmes*, which pertaines to *Logique*; or by the *deceits* of *words*, which pertaines to *Rhetorique*; or by the *violence of Paſſions*, which pertaines to *Morality*; And as in negociation with others, a man may be wrought and overcome either by *cunning*, or by *Importunity*, or by *vehemency*, ſo in that inward negociation which we practiſe within our ſelves, either we are undermined *by the Fallacies of Arguments*; or ſollicited and diſquieted by the *aſſiduity of impreſſions and obſervations*; or ſhaken and tranſported *by the aſſault of affections & Paſſions.*

But

But yet the ſtate of mans nature is not ſo unfortunate, as that thoſe *Powers* and *Arts* ſhould have force to diſturbe *Reaſon*, and not to eſtabliſh and advance it; nay rather much more doe they conduce to this effect, than to the contrary. For the end of *Logique*, is to teach a forme of Arguments, to ſecure Reaſon and not to entrap it; ſo the end of Morality is to compoſe the *Affections*, that they may fight for Reaſon, and not that they may invade it; the end likewiſe of *Rhetorique*, is to fill the *Imagination* with obſervations and reſemblances, which may ſecond Reaſon; and not oppreſſe and betray it: for theſe abuſes of *Arts* come in but *ex obliquo* for prevention, not for practiſe. And therefore it was great in-
In Gorg. juſtice in *Plato* (though ſpringing out of a juſt hatred to the *Rhetoricians* of his time) to place *Rhetorique* amongſt *Arts voluptuary*, reſembling it to *Cookery*, that did marre wholſome meats, and help unwholſome by the abuſe of variety of ſawces and ſeaſonings, to the pleaſure of the taſt. But be it farre away, that ſpeech ſhould not be much more converſant in adorning that which is faire and honeſt, than in colouring that which is foule and evill: for this is every where at hand; and there is no man but ſpeaks more honeſtly, than he can doe or think. Indeed it was excellently noted by *Thucydides*, that ſome ſuch thing as this, uſed to be objected to
Lib. 3. *Cleon*, that becauſe he uſed to hold the bad ſide in cauſes he pleaded, therefore he was ever inveighing againſt *Eloquence*, and *good ſpeech*, for he knew no man could ſpeak faire of things ſordid and baſe, but in things honeſt it was an eaſy
In Menon. matter to be *eloquent*. *Plato* ſaith elegantly (though the ſaying be now popular) *That virtue if ſhe could be ſeene, would move great love and affection:* but Rhetorique paints out virtue and goodneſſe to the life, and makes them in a ſort conſpicuous. For ſeeing they can not be ſhewed to ſenſe in corporall ſhape, the next degree is by the faire attire of words, to ſhew them to the Imagination, ſo farre as may be in a lively repreſentation: for the cuſtome of the Stoiques was
Tuſc. Q. lib. 2. deſervedly derided by *Cicero*, who labour'd to thruſt virtue upon men, by conciſe and ſharpe ſentences and concluſions,

which

which have no ſympathy with the Imagination and will. Againe if the *Affections* themſelves were brought into order, and ſo reclaim'd from exorbitant courſes, as to be pliant and obedient to *Reaſon*, it were true, there ſhould be no great uſe of Perſwaſions and inſinuations, which might give acceſſe to the mind; but it would be enough if things were nakedly and ſimply propoſed and proved: but on the contrary, the *Affections* make ſuch revolts; and raiſe up ſuch mutinies and ſeditions (according to that

---- video meliora Proboque Ovid. Met.
Deteriora ſequor)---- 7.

That *Reaſon* would be forcibly led away into ſervitude and captivity, if the perſwaſion of *Eloquence* did not practiſe, and winne the Imagination from the Affections part, and contract a league between *Reaſon* and *Imagination* againſt *Affections*. For it muſt be noted that the *Affections* themſelves are ever carried to a good Apparent, and, in this reſpect, have ſomewhat common with *Reaſon*: but herein they differ; *that the affections behold Principally Good in Preſent; Reaſon beholds a farre off even that which is future, and in ſumme.* And therefore ſeeing things in preſent ſight doe more ſtrongly fill the *Imagination*; Reaſon commonly yeelds and is vanquiſht: but after that by *Eloquence* and the force of Perſwaſion, things *future* and *remote* are propoſed, and beheld, as if they were actually preſent; then upon the falling off of the *Imagination* to take part with *Reaſon*, *Reaſon* prevailes. *Let us* conclude therefore, that *Rhetorique*, can no more be charged with the colouring and adorning of the worſe part, than *Logique*, with the ſetting out and ſuborning of Sophiſmes: for who knowes not that the doctrine of contraries are the ſame, though they be oppoſite in uſe. Againe, *Logique* differs from *Rhetorique*; not only in this, that the one (as commonly is ſaid) *is like the Firſt, the other like the Palme*; that is, one handleth things cloſely, the other at large: but much more in this, that *Logique* conſidereth Reaſon in its Naturalls; *Rhetorique*, as it is planted in vulgar opinion. Therefore *Ariſtotle* doth wiſely place *Rhetorique*

between *Logique* on the one ſide, and *Ethique* with *Civile Knowledge*, on the other: as participating of both. For the Proofes and Demonſtrations of *Logique*, are to all men indifferent and the ſame; but the Proofes and perſuaſions of *Rhetorique*, muſt be varied according to the Auditors; that a man, like a skilfull Muſitian accommodating himſelfe to different eares, may become ----

✻ PRVDEN. TIA SERMONIS PRIVATI

Orpheus in ſylvis, inter Delphinas Arion. Which *Application and variation of ſpeech* (if a man deſire indeed the Perfection and height thereof) ought to be ſo farre extended, *that if the ſame things ſhould be ſpoken to ſeverall perſons, he ſhould ſpeak to them all reſpectively, and ſeverall waies.* Though it is certain that the greateſt Orators many times may want *this Politique and Active Part of Eloquence in private ſpeech;* whileſt by the obſerving the grace, and Elegant formes of Expreſsion, they looſe that *voluble application*, & *characters of ſpeech*, which in diſcretion they ſhould have uſed towards particular perſons. Surely it will not be amiſſe to recommend this whereof we now ſpeak, to a new *Inquiry*, and to call it by name THE WISDOME OF PRIVATE SPEECH, and to referre it to *Deficients*; a thing certainly which the more ſeriouſly a man ſhall think on, the more highly he ſhall valew; and whether this kind of *Prudence* ſhould be placed between *Rhetorique* and the *Politiques*, is a matter of no great conſequence.

§ Now let us deſcend to the *Deficients* in this Art, which (as we have ſaid before) are of ſuch nature as may by eſtimed rather *Appendices*, than *Portions of the Art* it ſelfe; and pertaine all to the *Promptuary* part of *Rhetorique*.

✻ COLORES BONI ET MALI. In Top.

II. Firſt we doe not find that any man hath well purſued or ſupplied the Wiſdome and the diligence alſo of *Ariſtotle:* for he began to make a collection of the *Popular ſignes and Colours of Good and Evill in appearance, both ſimple and comparative*, which are, indeed, the *Sophiſmes of Rhetorique:* they are of excellent uſe, ſpecially referred to buſineſſe, and the *wiſdome of Private ſpeech.* But the labours of *Ariſtotle* concerning theſe Colours, is three waies *Defective*; *Firſt* that

that there being many, he recites very few. *Secondly* becauſe their *Elenches* or *Reprehenſions* are not annext. *Thirdly* that he conceiv'd but in part the uſe of them, for their uſe is not more for Probation, then for impreſsion and raiſeing the affections. For many *Formes of ſpeaking* are equall in *ſignification*, which are different in *impreſsion:* for that which is ſharp pierceth more forcibly, than that which is flat, though the ſtrength of the percuſsion be the ſame. Surely there is no man but will be a litle more raiſed by hearing it ſaid, *Your enimies will triumph in this*

Hoc Ithacus velit & magno mercentur Atridæ, Virg. Æn. 2.

Then if it ſhould be merely thus rendred, *This will be to your diſadvantage*; wherefore the *ſharpe-edged*, and *quick-pointed ſpeeches* are not to be deſpiſed. And being we report this part as DEFICIENT, we will according to our cuſtome confirme it by examples, for precepts have not ſufficiently illuſtrated the Point.

EXAMPLES OF THE COLOURS OF GOOD AND EVILL, BOTH SIMPLE AND COMPARATIVE.

The COLOUR.

1 *What men Praiſe and Celebrate, is Good; what they Diſpraiſe, and Reprehend is Evill.*

THE REPREHENSION.

THis *Colour* deceives foure waies; either through *Ignorance*, or through *Fraude*, or out of *Partialities* and *Faction*; or out of the *naturall diſpoſition* of ſuch as *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*. Out of *Ignorance*; for what's the judgement of the common People to the triall and definition of *Good* and *Evill*? *Phocion* diſcern'd better, who when the People gave him an unuſuall applauſe, demanded *whether he had not perchance ſome way or other done amiſſe*? Out *of Fraude* & circumventive *cunning*, for Praiſers and Diſpraiſers many times Plutar. in vita.

doe but aime at their own ends, and doe not think all they ſay *Laudat venaleis qui vult extrudere merces,*

Horat. lib. 2. Epl. Prov. 20.

So, *It is naught, it is naught ſaith the Buyer, and when he is gone he vaunteth.*---- Through *Factions*; for it is plaine that men are wont to extoll their own ſide, beyond the modeſt bounds of deſert, but to depreſſe thoſe of the contrary part below their demerit. *Through an inbred diſpoſition*; for ſome men are by nature made and moulded to ſervile Flattery; others on the other ſide are by nature Sower and Cenſorious; ſo as in their commendations, or vituperations they are only indulgent to their own humors, litle or nothing ſollicitous of truth.

THE COLOVR.

2 *What drawes Commendation even from an enimy, is a great Good, What moves Reprehenſion even from a Friend, is a Great Evill.*

The *Colour* ſeems to be built upon this foundation; that whatſoever we ſpeak againſt our will, and contrary to the affection and propenſion of our own mind, it is eaſily beleeved, that the force of truth wreſted the ſame from us.

THE REPREHENSION.

THis *Colour deceives* through the Art and Subtilty both of Enimies and Friends: for Enimies doe ſometimes aſcribe *Praiſes*, not unwillingly, nor as urg'd from the force of truth: but yet ſelecting ſuch points of *Praiſe*, as may create envy and danger to their Enimies. wherefore a ſuperſtitious conceit went currant amongſt the Grecians as they believed, *that he who was praiſed by another maliciouſly, and to his hurt, ſhould have a puſh riſe upon his noſe.* Againe it *deceives*, becauſe enimies ſometimes attribute *Praiſes*, as certain briefe prefaces, that ſo they may more freely and ſpitefully traduce afterwards. On the other ſide this *Colour* deceives through the ſlight and cunning of friends; for their cuſtome is ſometimes to acknowledge and lay open the infirmities of

of their Friends, not out of a tender conſcience from the impreſsion of truth, but making choice of ſuch imperfections, as may leaſt prejudice the reputation, or provoke the indignation of their friends; as if in all other points they were excellent men. *Againe it deceives*, becauſe friends uſe their Reprehenſions (as we have obſerved enimies doe their praiſes) as certain ſhort introductions, that they may expatiate more amply in their commendations afterwards.

THE COLOVR.

3 *Whoſe Privation is Good, that ſame is Evill; Whoſe Privation is Evill, that ſame is Good.*

THE REPREHENSION.

THis *Colour* deceives two waies; either by reaſon of the *Compariſon* of *Good* and *Evill*; or by reaſon of the *Succeſſion* of *Good* to *Good*, or of *Evill* to *Evill*. By reaſon of *Compariſon*; if it were *Good* for man kind to be *deprived* of the eating of Acornes, it followes not that ſuch food was *Evill*, but that Maſt was *Good*, Corne *Better*. Neither if it were *Evill* for the ſtate of *Sicilie* to be deprived of *Dionyſius* the Elder; doth it follow that the ſame *Dionyſius* was a *Good* Prince; but that he was *leſſe evill* than *Dionyſius* the younger. By reaſon of *Succeßion*; for the *Privation* of ſome *Good*, doth not alwaies give place to *Evill*, but ſometimes to a *Greater Good*; as when the *Flower* falleth, fruit *ſucceedeth*. Nor doth the *Privation* of ſome *Evill* alwaies yeeld place to *Good*, but ſometimes to a *greater Evill*; for *Clodius* an enimy being taken away, *Milo* withall forfeited a faire harveſt of Glory.

THE COLOVR.

4 *That which drawes neere to Good or Evill, the ſame is likewiſe Good or Evill: But that which is remov'd from Good is Evill; from Evill, is Good.*

Such commonly is the internall condition of things, that things of like quality and conſenting in nature, conſent

likewiſe in place, and are as it were quartered together, but ſuch things as are contrary and diſtant in nature, are alſo ſevered and disjoyned in place; in regard that all things deſire to approach things ſymbolizing with them, to exterminate and chaſe away their contraries.

THE REPREHENSION.

BUt the *Colour* deceives three waies; Firſt in reſpect of *Deſtitution;* Secondly in reſpect of *Obſcuration;* Thirdly in reſpect of *Protection.* In regard of *Deſtitution,* it comes to paſſe that thoſe things, which in their kind are moſt ample and doe moſt excell, doe (as much as may be) ingroſſe all to themſelves, and leave that which is next them deſtitute and pined; wherefore you ſhall never finde thriving ſhootes or under-wood neere great ſpread Trees: ſo he ſaid well *---- Divitis ſervi maximè ſervi;* --- and the diriſion was pleaſant of him that compared the lower train of Attendants in the Courts of Princes, to *Faſting-daies* which were next to Holy-daies, but otherwaies were the leaneſt daies in all the week. In regard of *Obſcuration* for this is the quality of things in their nature excellent and predominant, that though they doe not extenuate and impoveriſh the ſubſtance of things adjoyning to them, yet they darken and ſhadow them: And this the Aſtronomers obſerve of the Sunne that it is good by aſpect, but evill by conjunction and approximation. In regard of *Protection*; for things approach and congregate not only for conſort and ſimilitude of nature; but even that which is evill (eſpecially in Civile matters) approacheth to good for concealment and *Protection*; ſo wicked perſons betake themſelves to the ſanctuary of the Gods, and vice it ſelfe aſſumes the ſhape and ſhadow of virtue.

Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni.

So on the other ſide *Good* drawes neere to *Evill*, not for ſociety but for converſion and reformation of it into *Good*; and therefore Phyſitians are more converſant with the ſick than the ſound; and it was objected to our Saviour *that he converſed with Publicans and ſinners.* Mat. 9.

THE

THE COLOVR.

5 *That ſide to which all other Parties and Sects unanimouſly conferre ſecond voices after every Particular hath aſſerted a Primacy to it ſelfe, ſeems to be juſtly preferr'd before the reſt: for every ſect may be preſum'd to uſurpe the firſt place, out of Paſſion and Partiality; but to yeeld the ſecond Place, out of truth and merit.*

So *Cicero* went about to prove the *Sect* of *Academiques*, which ſuſpended all aſſeveration for to be the beſt of all Philoſophies; for (ſaith he) *aske a Stoique which ſect is better then other, he will preferre his own before the reſt: Then aske him which approacheth next in dignity, he will confeſſe the Academique, ſo deale with an Epicure that will ſcant endure the Stoique to be in ſight of him, ſo ſoone as he hath placed himſelfe in the chiefe roome, he will place the Academique next him.* So if a place were void, and a Prince ſhould examine competitors ſeverally, whom next themſelves they would ſpecially commend, it were like that the moſt ſecond voices would concurre upon the ableſt man. Cicero. Q. A.

THE REPREHENSION.

THe fallax of this *Colour* is in reſpect of *Envy:* for men are accuſtomed after themſelves, and their own faction, to incline and bend unto them, which of all the reſt are the ſofteſt and weakeſt, and are leaſt in their way in deſpight and derogation of them who have moſt inſulted over them, and have held them hardeſt to it.

THE COLOVR.

6 *That whoſe excellency, and ſupereminency is better, the ſame is every way better.*

Appertaining to this are the uſuall *formes; Let us not wander in generalities, Let us compare Particular with Particular.*

THE

THE REPREHENSION.

THis *Apparence* ſeems to be of ſtrength, and rather *Logicall*, than *Rhetoricall*: yet is it very often a *fallax*. Firſt becauſe many things are caſual, which if they eſcape, prove excellent; ſo that in kind they are inferior, becauſe they are ſo ſubject to peril, and to periſh before they come to perfection; but in the *Individuall* more noble. Of this ſort is the *Bloſſome of March*, whereof the French Proverb goes

Burgeon de Mars, Enfans de Paris,
Si un eſchappe bien vaut dix.

So that the *Bloſſome of May generally* is better than the *Bloſſome of March*, and yet in particular the beſt *Bloßome of March* is better than the beſt *Bloſſome of May*. Secondlyit deceives, becauſe the nature of things in *ſome kinds, or ſpecies*, is to be more *equall*, in ſome kinds more *inequall*: as it hath bin obſerved that warmer climates produce generally more acute wits; but in Northerne climates the wits of chief ſurpaſſe the acuteſt wits of hotter Regions. So in many Armies if the matter ſhould be tried by duell between particular champions ſingled out, perchance the victory ſhould goe on the one ſide; if it be tried by the groſſe, it would goe on the other ſide: for *excellencies*, and *eminencies* goe, as it were, by chance, but kinds are governed by nature and Art. So likewiſe generally mettall is more precious than ſtone; and yet a *Diamond* is more precious than *Gold*.

THE COLOVR.

7 *That which keeps the matter entire in our own hands, is Good; that which leaves no paſſage open for retrait, is Evill: for not to be able to come off is a kind of impotency, but the Power of diſengaging our ſelves is good.*

Hereof *Æſop* framed the Fable of the two Froggs, that conſulted togither in the time of Drouth (when many plaſhes they had repaired to were drie) what was now at laſt to be done; the firſt ſaid *let us goe downe into a deep well, for it is*

Æſop.

not

not like the water would faile there, to whom the other replied, *yea, but if it doe faile, how shall we get up againe?* The ground of this colour is, that humane actions are so uncertaine and exposed to perills, as that seemeth to be the best course, which hath *most passages out of it.* Appertaining to this perswasion the *Formes* are; *you shall wholly engage and oblige your selfe, non tantum quantum voles sumes ex fortuna, you shall not be your own carver, nor keep the matter in your own hand, &c.*

THE REPREHENSION.

THe *Fallax* of this Colour is first, because in humane Actions fortune urgeth us at length to decree, and to resolve upon somewhat: for as he saith elegantly, *not to resolve, is to resolve*; so that many times a suspension of a finall decision engageth and implicates us in more necessities, than if we had determin'd of somewhat. And this disease of the mind is like that of covetous men translated from the desire of retaining wealth, to the desire of retaining Free will and Power: for the Covetous man will enjoy nothing, least he should substract from the totall; and this kinde of *Sceptique* will execute nothing, that all things may be entire and indifferent to him. Secondly it *deceives* because necessity, and this same *jacta est alea*, awakens the powers of the Mind, and puts the spurres to any enterprise; as he saith, *Cæteris pares, necessitate certè superiores estis.*

THE COLOVR.

8. *What a man hath contracted through his own Default, is a greater* Evill; *what is imposed from without, is a lesse* Evill.

The reason hereof, is, because the sting and remorse of the Mind accusing it selfe, doubles all adversity; contrariwise the recording inwardly that a man is cleere and free from fault, and just imputation, doth much attemper outward calamities. Wherefore the *Poets* doe exceedingly aggravate those pasionate Lamentations, as fore-runners to desperation, when a man accuseth and tortures himselfe.

Virg. Æn. 12. *Se cauſam clamat, crimenq́, caputq́, malorum.*

Contrariwiſe the *conſcience of Innocence* and good deſerving, doth mollify and mitigate the calamities of worthy perſons. *Beſides* when the evill comes from without, caſt upon us by others, a man hath whereof he may juſtly and freely complaine, whereby his griefes may evaporate and not ſtifle the heart: for what comes from the injuries of men, we are wont to take indignation at, and to meditate revenge; or elſe to implore, or expect, that the divine Nemeſis, and Retribution, may take hold on the Authors of our hurt; or if it be inflicted from *Fortune*, yet there is left a kind of expoſtulation againſt the Divine Powers,

Virg. Buc. *Atq́, Deos atq́, Aſtra vocat Crudelia Mater.*

But on the other ſide where the evill is derived from a mans own fault, there the griefe ſtrikes inward, and does more deepely wound and pierce the heart.

THE REPREHENSION.

THe *Fallax* of this *Colour* is, firſt in reſpect of *Hope*, which is a great Antidote againſt *Evills*: for the reformation of a fault is many times in our own power, but the amendment of fortune is not. Wherefore in many of his Orations *Demoſthenes* ſaith thus to the People of *Athens*: *That which having regard to the time paſt, is the worſt point and Circumſtance of all the reſt; that as to the time to come, is the beſt: what is that? Even this, that by your ſloth, irreſolution, and miſgoverment, your affaires are grown to this declination and Decay; for had you uſed and ordered your means and forces to the beſt, and done your parts every way to the full, and notwithſtanding your matters ſhould have gone backward in this point as they doe, there had bin no hope left of recovery or reputaton for hereafter; but ſince it hath bin only by your own errors chiefly, you may have good aſſurance, that theſe errors amended, you may againe recover the honour of your former ſtate.* So *Epictetus* ſpeaking of the Degrees of the Tranquillity of mind, ſaith *the worſt ſtate of man is to accuſe externe things; better then that to accuſe a mans ſelfe; and beſt of all to accuſe neither.* Secondly this colour deceives

Demoſt. orat.

Epictet. Cap. 10.

in

in respect of *that pride* which is implanted in the minds of men, whereby they are with much adoe induced to an acknowledgement of their own personall errors; but that they may shift off this acknowledgement, they can suffer with farre greater patience such *evills*, as they have by their own oversights drawn upon themselves. For as we see it comes to passe that when a fault is committed; and it is not yet known who is the delinquent, men make much adoe; grow hot and impatient above measure upon the matter: but after, if it appeare to be done by a sonne; or by a wife, or by a neere friend, then it is light made of, and presently all is quiet: so is it when any thing falls out ill, the blame whereof must needs light upon our selves. And this is commonly seen to come to passe in women, who if they have done any thing unfortunately against their Parents or friends consents, what ill soever betide them upon it, yet you shall see them seldome complaine; but set a good face on it.

THE COLOVR.

9 *The Degree of Privation seems greater than the Degree of Diminution; and againe, the Degree of Inception, seems greater than the Degree of Increase.*

It is a position in the Mathematiques; *that there is no proportion between somewhat and nothing: therefore the Degrees of Nullity and Quiddity, seeme larger, than the Degrees of Increase and Decrease.* As to a Monoculus, it is more to loose one eye; than to a man that hath two eyes: so if one have diverse children, it is more griefe to him to loose the last surviving sonne, than all the rest. And therefore *Sibylla* when she had burnt her two first *Books*, doubled the prise of the *Third*, because the losse of that had bin *gradus privationis*, and not *Diminutionis*. Agell. lib. 1 No. Ac.

THE REPREHENSION.

THe *Fallax* of this *Colour* is reprehended; *first in those things, the use and service whereof resteth in sufficiency, or*

competency, that is in a determinate Quantity. As if a man be bound upon penalty to pay a ſumme of mony at an appointed day, it would be more to him to want one *Noble*, than if, (ſuppoſing he could not tell where to be furniſht with this one Noble) ten Nobles more were wanting. So in the decay of a mans eſtate, the degree of Debt which firſt breaks the ſtock, and caſts him behind, ſeems a greater dammage, then the laſt Degree, when he proves nothing worth. And hereof the common *Formes* are *Sera in fundo Parſimonia: and as good never a whit, as never the better, &c. Secondly this Colour deceives in reſpect of that Principle in Nature, Corruptio unius, Generatio alterius:* ſo that the *degree of ultimate Privation, doth many times leſſe diſadvantage, becauſe it gives the cauſe, and ſets the wits aworke to ſome new courſe.* Which is the cauſe that *Demoſthenes* often complaines before the people of Athens, *That the conditions impoſed by Philip, and accepted by them, being neither profitable nor honorable, were but aliments of their ſloath and weakneſſe, that it were much better they were taken away; for by this means their induſtries might be awaked to find out better remedies and ſtronger reſolutions.* We knew a Phyſitian was wont to ſay pleaſantly and yet ſharply to delicate Dames, when they complained they were they could not tell how, but yet they could not endure to take any Phyſique, he would tell them, *your only way is to be ſick indeed, for then you will be glad to take any medicine.* So further, this *Degree of Privation*, or of the higheſt period of want, ſerveth not only to ſtirre up induſtry, but alſo to command patience. As *for the Second* branch of this *Colour*, it depends upon the ſame reaſon, which is the degrees of *Quiddity and Nullity*; hence grew the common Place of extolling the *begining* of every thing.

Heſiod.

Ariſt. 1. de Gen. & Cor.

Orat. 1. in Philip.

Dimidium facti qui bene cæpit habet.

This made the Aſtrologers ſo idle as to make a judgement upon a mans nature and Deſtiny, from the moment or point of conſtellation in his Nativity, or Conception.

THE

THE REPREHENSION.

THis Colour *first deceives, because in many things, the first inceptions are nothing else than what* Epicurus *termes them in his Philosophy,* TENTAMENTA, *that is imperfect Offers, and Essaies, which vanish and come to no substance without iteration and improvement.* Wherefore in this case the *second degree* seems the worthier, and more potent than the *First:* as the Body-horse in the Cart that drawes more than the formost. And it is a common saying, and not without good sense, *The second blow is that which makes the fray:* for the first, it may be, would have vanisht without farther harme: and therefore *Prius Malo Principium dedit, sed posterius modum abstulit. Secondly this colour deceives in respect of the dignity of Perseverance, which consists in the Progression, and not in the Aggression.* For chance, or instinct of Nature, may cause inception; but setled affection and judgement makes the continuance. *Thirdly, this Colour deceives in such things which have a naturall course and inclination contrary to an Inception; so that the first Inception is perpetually evacuated, unlesse the force and faculty be continued.* As in those common formes it is said *Non progredi est Regredi;* and *Qui non proficit deficit,* as in running against the hill; Rowing against the streame; for if it be with the Hill or with the Streame, then the *degree of Inception* is more than all the rest. Againe this Colour is not only extended to the *Degree of Inception, which is from Power to Act, compar'd with the Degree, which is from Act to increment; but also is to be understood of the degree which is from Impotency to power, compared with the Degree which is from power to Act: for the Degree from Impotency to Potency, seems greater, than from Power to Act.*

THE COLOVR.

10 *That which is referred to Truth, is more than that which is referred to opinion. The manner and Proofe of that which pertaines to Opinion, is this; that a man would never have done it, if he thought it should be sepulchred in secrecy and oblivion.*

So the Epicures ſay to the Stoiques, *Felicity placed in virtue*, that it is like the *Felicity* of a Player, who if he were left of his Auditors, and their applauſe, he would ſtraight be out of heart and countenance; therefore they call virtue out of a ſpitefull emulation *Bonum Theatrale*. But it is otherwiſe of Riches whereof the Poet ſaith

Horat. ----*Populus me ſibilat: at mihi plaudo.*

Likewiſe of *Pleaſure*,

----*Grata ſub imo*
Gaudia Corde premens, vultu ſimulante pudorem.

THE REPREHENSION.

THe *Fallax* of this *Colour* is ſomewhat ſubtile; though the anſwer to the exemple alleaged be ready; for neither is virtue choſen *propter Auram Popularem*; ſeeing that alſo is given in Precept, *That a man ſhould above all things, and perſons, revere himſelfe*; ſo that a *Good* man is the *ſame* in *ſolitude* which he is in the *Theater*; though perchance virtue will be more ſtrong by glory and fame, as heat is increaſed by reflection. But this denies the ſuppoſition, but doth not redargue the *Fallax*. The Reprehenſion is this. Be it granted that virtue (eſpecially ſuch as is joyned with labour and conflict) would not be choſen but for hir concomitants, *Fame* and *Opinion*; yet it followes not that an Appetite and chiefe Motive to virtue, ſhould not be reall, and for it ſelfe; for Fame may be only *cauſa impulſiva*, *or ſine qua non*, and not a cauſe *Conſtituent* or *Efficient*. For exemple, if there were two Horſes, whereof the one would performe with good ſpeed, without the ſpurre; but the other with the ſpurre would farre exceed, the performance of the former; this latter (I ſuppoſe) will bear away the prize, and be judg'd to be the better *Horſe*; and it will not move any man of ſound judgement to ſay, *Tuſh the life of this Horſe, is but in the ſpurre*: for ſeeing the ordinary inſtrument of Horſmanſhip is the *ſpurre*, and that it is no matter of impediment or burden; the *Horſe* is not to be leſſe accounted of, which will not doe well without the ſpurre: nor is that other which with-

without the ſpurre will doe great matters, therefore to be reckoned the better, but the more delicate. So in like manner, *Glory and Honour are the Goades and ſpurres to virtue*; and though virtue would ſomewhat languiſh without them, yet ſince they be alwaies at hand to attend virtue, even when they are not invited; there is no impeachment but that virtue may be deſired for it ſelfe; and therefore the Poſition, *That the note of a thing choſen for Opinion and not for Truth, is this; That if a man thought that what he doth, ſhould never come to light, he would never have done it*; is reprehended.

The COLOUR.

11 *What is purchaſed by our own induſtry and virtue, is a greater Good; what is derived upon us, from the benefit of others, or from the indulgence of Fortune, is a leſſer Good.*

The reaſons are theſe? *Firſt in reſpect of future Hope; becauſe in the favour of others, or the good windes of fortune, we have no ſtate or certainty; in our own endeavours or abilities we have.* So when they have procured us one good fortune, we have the ſame inſtruments ready for a new purchaſe; nay by cuſtome and ſucceſſe, ſtronger than before. *Secondly becauſe theſe Properties which we enjoy by the benefite of others, we are debtors to others for them; whereas what we derive from our ſelves, brings no burden with it, nor draws upon us an obligation to another.* Againe, if the Divine Providence conferre a favour upon us, it importunes a kind of Retribution towards the goodneſſe of God, which ſtings ungracious and wicked men; whereas in that other kind of happineſſe, that of the Prophet commonly falls out, *They rejoyce and triumph; they ſacrifice unto their net, and burne incence unto their drag.* Hab. 1. *Thirdly becauſe*, that which cometh unto us without our own abilities, yeeldeth not that commendation and reputation. For Actions of great Felicity draw wonder, not praiſe; as *Cicero* ſaid to *Caſar*, *Quæ miremur habemus, quæ laudemus expectamus.* Pro. M. Marcel. *Fourthly*, becauſe the purchaſes of our own induſtry are joyned commonly with labour and ſtrife, which

makes

makes the fruition of our desires more pleasant, as saith *Solomon*, *Suavis cibus à venatu.*

THE REPREHENSION.

BUt there are foure *Contre-Colors*, which incline the case to the contrary Part, and may be as Reprehensions to the former *Colours*. *First because Felicity seems to be* a seale and character of Divine favour; *and accordingly begets both confidence and alacrity in our selves; and respect and authority from others*: And this Felicity comprehends many casualties, whereunto the power and providence of a man can not aspire; As when *Cæsar* encouraging the Sailer, said *Cæsarem portas & fortunam ejus*; but if he had said *Cæsarem portas & virtutem ejus*, it had bin a cold comfort against a tempest. *Secondly because that such things as proceed from virtue and industry, are imitable, and feasable by others to be practised; whereas Felicity is a thing inimitable, and a Prerogative of some few singular persons.* Wherefore we generally see, that things of Nature are preferd before things of Art, because they be inimitable: for what is imitable is in effect Prostitute and common. *Thirdly the Revenues of Felicity, seeme to be no purchase of our own, but a Donative from others: but what is acquired by our own proper virtue, is, as it were, bought at a price.* whereupon *Plutarch* saith elegantly of the Arts of *Timoleon*, a man of all men most fortunate, compared with the Acts of *Agesilaus* and *Epaminondas* who lived in the same Age, *That they were like Homers verses, which as they excell'd in other points, so they seem'd to have an easy native slide in them, and to be conducted by a happy Genius.* Fourthly *because what falls out beyond hope and expectation, insinuates it selfe more sweetly, and with greater delight, into the minds of men*; but this can not be incident to those things, which proceed from our own care and compasse.

Suet. in Iul.

In Timol.

THE COLOVR.

'What consists of many and divided parts, is greater than 'that which consists of few Parts, and is more entire, for all

'*all things considered by parts seem greater: wherefore both*
'*plurality of parts hath a shew of Magnitude; and the same*
'*Plurality works more strongly, if it be presented unto us*
'*without order; for it induceth a resemblance of* Infinity, *and*
'*hinders comprehension.*

This *Colour* seems a *Fallax*, at first sight very palpable: for not the *Plurality of Parts* alone, but the *Majority*, may make the totall Greater; yet nevertheless the *Colour* many times carries the imagination away; yea it deceives sense. For it seems to the eye, a shorter distance of way, if it be all dead and continued, so as nothing intercurre which may break the sight; then in such a coast or quarter, where there are Trees and Buildings, and other markes, which may measure and Divide the space. So when a great Monied-man hath divided and distributed his chests and baggs into severall and distinct roomes, he seemeth to himselfe richer than he was. Therefore a way to *Amplify* any thing, is to *break* it into *many Parts*, and to handle every part severally by it selfe. And this againe will more fill the imagination, if it be done promiscuously and without order; for *confusion* raiseth an opinion of multitude; so what are presented and propounded in *order*, both seem to be more finite, and demonstrate, that nothing is left out, but all is there: whereas on the contrary, whatsoever things are represented confusedly, are not only thought to be more numerous in themselves; but they leave a suspicion that more might be said than is expressed.

THE REPREHENSION.

THe Fallax of this Colour is. *First when a man doth overconceive, or prejudicate of the greatnesse of any thing, comprehending it beyond the true limits of Magnitude; for then the breaking of it will make it seem lesse, and rectify that false opinion, and present the object in its native verity, and not with amplification.* Wherefore if a man be in sicknesse or in paine, the time will seem longer to him without a Clock or an

Hower-glaſſe, then if it were meaſured with them: for if the wearisomeneſſe, and vexation of a diſeaſe, make the time ſeeme longer then in truth it is; yet the computation of time reformes that miſtake, and makes it ſhorter than that erroneous opinion conceived it to be. So in a dead Plaine (whereof even now we gave a contrary inſtance) it ſometimes falls out; for though at firſt the eye preconceiv'd the way ſhorter, becauſe it was undivided, yet if upon this ſuppoſition, an opinion poſſeſſe the imagination of a farre ſhorter ſpace of ground then it proves to be, the fruſtrating of that vaine conceit, makes it ſeem longer than the truth. Therefore if any man deſire to humor and ſecond the falſe opinion of another, touching the *greatneſſe* of any thing, let him beware of diſtributions, and breaking it in ſeverall conſiderations, but let him out of hand extoll the matter entire, and in the groſſe. *Secondly this Colour deceives when the Diſtribution is diſtracted or ſcattered, or is not preſented intire, or doth not at once object it ſelfe to the ſight.* Therefore if flowers in a Garden be divided into ſeverall bedds, they will ſhew more than if they were all growing in one bed; ſo the Beds be within a plot that they be the object of view at once; otherwiſe, union is of more force in this caſe than ſcattered diſtribution. Therefore their Revenues ſeem greater, whoſe Lands and Livings lye together in one ſhire; for if they were diſperſed, they would not fall ſo eaſily within notice and comprehenſion. *Thirdly this Colour deceives in reſpect of the dignity of unity above multitude; for all compoſition is a ſure mark of deficiency, in particularities ſeverally conſidered, which thus pieces out one thing with the addition of another.* *Et quæ non proſunt ſingula multa juvant.*

And therefore *Mary* had choſen the better part; *Martha,* Luk. 10. *Martha, attendis ad plurima, unum ſufficit.* Hereupon *Æſop,* Æſop. framed the fable of the *Fox* and the *Cat*. *The Fox bragged what a number of ſhifts and devices he had to get from the Hounds; the Cat ſaid ſhe had but one only way to truſt to, which was this; ſhe had a poore ſlender faculty in climbing up a Tree;* which yet in proof was a ſurer guard then all Vulpones policies & ſtrata-

gems:

gems, whereof the proverb grew, *multa novit Vulpes, ſed Felis unum magnum*, the Fox knowes many practiſes, but the Cat one ſpeciall; one that will help at a dead lift. And in the Morall of this Fable it comes likewiſe to paſſe, *that a potent and faithfull friend, is a ſurer card at a pinch, then all the Plots and Policies of a mans own wit.* Æſop.

And theſe ſhall ſuffice for example: we have an infinite number more of *Colours*, of this nature, which we collected in our youth; but without their *Illuſtrations* and *Reprehenſions*, which at this time we have no leaſure to perfect and digeſt; wherefore we thought it incongruous to expoſe thoſe *Colours* naked, without their *Illuſtrations*, ſeeing theſe other come abroad attired. Yet thus much in the mean we admoniſh, that this branch of knowledge, in our judgement, whatſoever it may ſeem, is of no contemptible conſequence, but a matter of high price and uſe, as that which participates both of *Primitive*, *Philoſophy*, of *Policy*, and of *Rhetborique*. Thus much of Popular markes, or of the *Colours of Good and Evill in apparance*, as well *ſimple as comparative*.

III. A ſecond collection which appertaines to a ready *Proviſion*, or *Preparatory ſtore*, is that which *Cicero* intimates (as we have noted before in *Logique*) where he gives it in precept, that we have *Common-places* in ready preparation argued and handled *Pro* and *Contra*; ſuch as are *For the words and letters of Law; for the ſence and mind of Law*, and the like. And we extend this Precept to other things alſo; as that it may be applied, not only to Judiciall Formes; but to *Deliberative* and *Demonſtrative* alſo. Generally this is it we would have done; namely, that we have all *Places*, whereof there is more frequent uſe (*whether we reſpect Probations and Confutations; or Perſwaſions and Diſſwaſions; or Praiſes and Vituperations*;) ſtudied and meditated before-hand; and the ſame extoll'd and depreſſed by the higheſt ſtraines of wit and invention; and perverſely wreſted, as it were, of purpoſe utterly beyond Truth. And in our opinion the manner of this *Collection*, as well for uſe as for brevity, would be the beſt of ſuch common-places, and ſeeds of ſeverall ✲ ANTITHETA RERVM. Cicero.

Arguments were abridg'd and caſt up into ſome briefe and acute ſentences, as into skaines or bottomes of Thread to be drawn out, and unwinded into larger Diſcourſes as occaſion ſhould be preſented. A *collection of this nature* we find in *Seneca*, but in ſuppoſitions only or Caſes. Of this ſort (in regard we have many ready prepared) we thought good to ſet down ſome of them for example; Theſe we call *Antitheta Rerum.*

Sen. Contro.

EXAMPLES OF THE *ANTITHETA.*

NOBILITY. I.

Pro.

THey whoſe virtue is altogether deriv'd from the ſtock; theſe not only have not a will, but want a power to be wicked.

Nobility is a Garland of Bayes, wherewith time Crownes men.

We reverence Antiquity even in dead Monuments, how much more in living.

If you regard not the honour of an ancient Houſe? Then what difference will there be between the Race of Men, and the Race of Beaſts?

Nobility removes virtue from Envy; recommends it to Grace and Favour.

Contra.

NObility ſeldome ſprings from Virtue; Virtue more ſeldome from Nobility.

Nobles by birth more often uſe the interceſſion of their Anceſtors for Pardon; than their ſuffrage for Honors.

The induſtry of new riſeing men is oftentimes ſuch, as Nobles *compar'd with them are but* Statues.

Nobles by blood, look too often back in the courſe; which is the quality of an ill Racer.

Beauty

BEAUTY. II.

Pro.

Deformed persons commonly have their revenge of Nature.

Virtue is nothing else but inward Beauty; and Beauty nothing else but an outward virtue.

Deformed Persons seek to rescue themselves from scorne, by malice and boldnesse.

Beauty makes virtues shine, vices blush.

Contra

Virtue is like a rich stone, best plain set.

What a faire vestment is to a deformed body, the same is a comely Body to a deformed Mind.

They usually are of no great parts, whom Beauty commendeth, or moveth.

YOUTH III.

Pro.

Our first cogitations, and the counsils of Youth stream more divinely.

Old men are more wise for themselves, then they are for others and the Repub.

If it could be made visible, Old age doth more deforme the mind then the Body.

Old men fear all things save the Gods.

Contra.

Youth *is the field of Repentance.*

There is in Youth an imbred disesti me of the Authority of Age, that every one may grow wise at his own Perill.

Those counsils to which Time was not call'd, Time will not ratify.

In old men Venus *is changed into the* Graces.

HEALTH IV.

Pro.

The regard of Health makes the mind humble, and obsequious to the Body.

Contra.

Often to recover health, is often to grow young againe.

A ſound body is the Soules Hoſt, *but a ſickly her* Jalour.

Nothing ſo promotes the ſumme of Buſineſſe, as a proſperous ſtate of Body; but on the contrary, a ſickly conſtitution makes too many Holy-Daies.

Indiſpoſition *of* Health *is a common excuſe, hither we fly even when we are well.*

Health unites the Soule and the body in too ſtrict a league.

The Couch hath govern'd mighty Empires; and the Litter mighty Armies.

WIFE and CHILDREN.

Pro.

Charity to the Commonwealth, begins at a private Family.

Wife and Children are a kind of Diſcipline of Humanity; but unmarried men are cruell and hard-hearted.

Single life and a Childleſſe ſtate, are good for nothing but for flight.

He that procreates no Children, ſacrificeth to Death.

They that are happy in all other things, are commonly unfortunate in their Children: leaſt being men they ſhould approach too neere to a condition Divine.

Contra.

He that hath Wife and Children, hath given Hoſtages to Fortune.

Generation and iſſue are Human Acts; Creation and its works are Acts Divine.

Iſſue is the Eternity of Beaſts; Fame, merit, and wholſome Precepts, the eternity of Men.

Oeconomicall reſpects many times ſupplant Politicall Duties.

To ſome natures the Fortune of Priamus is acceptable, who ſurviv'd his whole Poſterity.

RICHES. VI.

Pro.

They deſpiſe Riches, that deſpaire of them.

An envy conceiv'd againſt Riches, hath extolled virtue to a Deity.

Contra.

Of great Riches, there is either a Cuſtody, or a diſpenſation, or a fame; but no ſolid Uſe.

Whileſt

Whileſt Philoſophers call in doubt whether all things are to be referr'd to virtue, or Pleaſure; ſurvay the inſtruments of them both.

Virtue, by means of Riches, is converted into a common good.

All other kinds of Good have a Provinciall Command, only Riches a Generall.

Doe you not ſee what fained Priſes are ſet upon litle ſtones, and ſuch kind of Rarities, that there may be ſome uſe made of great Riches?

Many, whileſt they have entertain'd an opinion that all things might be bought with their mony; have in this conceit, firſt ſold themſelves.

I can not call Riches better then the Baggage of virtue; for they are both neceſſary to virtue, and yet comberſome, hindering the March.

Riches are a good Handmaid, but the worſt Maiſtreſſe.

HONOURS. VII.

Pro.

Honours are not the ſuffrage of Tyranns, but of Divine Providence.

Honours make both virtues and vices conſpicuous; therefore thoſe they excite, theſe they repreſſe.

No man can tell what proficience he hath made in the Race of virtue, unleſſe Honours afford him an open field.

The motion of virtue as of other things, is violent to its place, calme in its place; and the place of virtue is honour.

Contra.

Whileſt we ſeek Honours, we looſe liberty.

Honours commonly give men a Power over thoſe things, wherein the beſt condition is, not to will; the next not to Can.

The ſtaires to Honours are ſteep, the ſtanding ſlippery, the regreſſe a downefall.

They that are in great place had need to borrow other mens opinions, to think themſelves happy.

Empire

EMPIRE VIII.

Pro.

It is a great bleſsing to enjoy Happineſſe; but to have the power to Conferre it on others, is farre greater.

Kings are rather like ſtarres, than men; for they have a powerfull influxe upon all men, and upon times themſelves.

To reſiſt Gods-vicegerents, is not only the Guilt of Treaſon, but a kind of Theomachie.

Contra.

What a miſerable ſtate is it, to have a few things to deſire, infinite things to feare?

Princes are like heavenly bodies, which have much veneration, but no reſt.

None of Humane condition is admitted to the Banquet of the Gods, but to his reproach.

PRAISE, REPUTATION. IX.

Pro.

Praiſes are the reflexed Beams of virtue.

That Praiſe is an Honour which comes from voices freely conferr'd.

Many ſtates conferre Honours; but Praiſes are every where the Attributes of Liberty.

The voice of the people hath ſome divineneſſe in it; elſe how ſhould ſo many men agree to be of one mind?

You need not wonder if the communalty ſpeak more truly than the Nobility; for they ſpeak more ſafely.

Contra.

Fame is a better Nuncio, than a Iudge.

What hath a good man to doe with the dull approbation of the vulgar?

Fame like a River bears up things light and ſwolne, drowns things waighty and ſolid.

The loweſt virtues draw praiſe from the common people; the middle virtues work in the Aſtoniſhment, or Admiration; but of the higheſt virtues they have no ſence or perceiving at all.

Praiſe proceeds more out of a bravery then out of merit; & happens rather to vaine and windy perſons, then to perſons ſubſtantiall and ſolid.

Nature

Nature X.

Pro.

The Progresse of Custome is Arithmeticall; of Nature Geometricall.

As lawes are to Custome in Civile states, so is Nature to custome in every particular Person.

Custome against Nature is a kind of Tyranny, and is quickly and upon light occasion suppressed.

Contra.

Mens thoughts are according to nature; their words according to precept; but their deeds according to custome.

Nature is a kind of Pedant; Custome a Magistrate.

Fortune XI.

Pro.

Ouvert and apparent virtues bring forth praise; secret and hidden virtues bring forth fortune.

Virtues of duty bring forth praise; virtues of Ability bring forth fortune.

The way of Fortune is like the milken way in the skie; which is a meeting or knot of certain small obscure virtues without a name.

Fortune is to be honour'd and respected, and it be but for her daughters confidence *and* Reputation.

Contra.

The folly of one man, is the Fortune of another.

In Fortune this I may chiefly commend, that being she makes no election, she gives no protection.

Men of place and quality while they decline the Envy of their own virtues; have bin found among the worshippers of Fortune.

LIFE. XII.

Pro.

It is a fooliſh and prepoſterous affection, to love the Acceſſories of life more then life it ſelfe.

A full courſe is better then a ſhort; a faire advantage to all things, yea even to virtue.

Without a good ſpacious compaſſe of life, we can neither fully perfect, nor learne, nor repent.

Contra.

The Philoſophers, whileſt they raiſe ſo great preparations againſt Death, have made it but appear more terrible.

Men fear Death becauſe they know it not; as Children fear the Darke.

You can finde no Paßion in the mind of man ſo weak, which if it be but a litle preſt, maſters not the feare of death.

To be willing to die, not only a valiant man, or a miſerable man may, or a wiſe; but even a faſtidious man, and a coward may doe as much.

SUPERSTITION. XIII.

Pro.

They that erre out of a well-ment zeale, may not be approved, but yet may be beloved.

Mediocrities are due to Morall virtues; extremities to divine.

A ſuperſtitious man is a religious Formaliſt.

I ſhould ſooner believe all the Fabulous wonders of any Religion, than that this univerſall Frame was built without a Deity.

Contra.

As it addes deformity unto an Ape, to be ſo like a man; ſo the ſimilitude of ſuperſtition to Religion, makes it more deform'd.

Look how odious Affectation is in matters Civile; ſo hatefull is ſuperſtition, in matters Divine.

It were better to have no opinon of God at all, than ſuch an opinion as is reproachfull unto him.

It

It is not the Schoole of Epicurus, but the Porch of the Stoiques that hath perturbed ancient States.

It cannot come into the mind of man to be a meere Atheist in Opinion; but your great Hypocrites are the true Atheists, who are ever handling holy things, but never revere them.

Pride. XIV.

Pro.

Pride is even with vices incompatible: And as poison is expelled by poison, so many vices are by Pride.

A soft nature becomes guilty of the crimes of others; but a proud spirit only of his own.

Pride if it ascend from contempt of others to a contempt of it selfe, at last is chang'd into Philosophy.

Contra

Pride is the insinuating Ivie to virtues, and all good Qualities.

All other vices are only contrary to virtues, Pride alone is contagious.

Pride wants the best condition of vice, that is, concealement.

A proud man while he despiseth others, prejudiceth himself.

Ingratitude. XV.

Pro.

The guilt of ingratitude is nothing else but a too precise consideration and inquisition into the cause of a benefit con-ferr'd.

Whilest we endeavour to be gratefull to others, we neither performe justice to others, nor reserve liberty to our selves.

Contra.

The crime of Ingratitude is not to be repressed by punishments, but to be referred over to the Furies.

The obligations of benefits are more strict than of Duties, wherefore he that is unthankfull is unjust and any thing

Where the valuation of a Benefit is uncertaine, there the leſſe thank is due.

Such is mans condition; no man is borne to ſo high a fortune, but that he is a debtor to the retribution both of Private thanks, and perſonall revenge.

ENVY. XVI.

Pro.

It is naturall for a man to hate the reproach of his Fortune.

Envy in a ſtate is a wholſome Oſtraciſme.

Contra-

Envy never makes Holy-Day.

Nothing but death reconciles Envy to virtue.

Envy doth put virtue to it, as Juno *did* Hercules.

INCONTINENCE. XVII.

Pro.

Chaſtity may thank Iealouſy that ſhe is become a virtue.

He had need be endewed with much Gravity, that makes the ſports of Venus any matter of Earneſt.

Why doe you place either a ſpare diet, or a ſhew of Honeſty, or the Daughter of Pride, amongſt the virtues?

Of loves, as of wild-foule, there is no property; but the right is paſt over with the poſſeſſion.

Contra

Incontinence is one of Circes worſt transformations.

An unchaſt liver hath utterly loſt a reverence to himſelfe, which is the bridle of all vice.

They that with Paris, *make beauty their wiſh, looſe, as he did, Wiſdome and Honour.*

Alexander *fell upon no popular truth, when he ſaid, that ſleep and luſt were the earneſts of Death.*

CRUELTY. XVIII.

Pro.

No virtue is ſo often guilty as clemency.

Contra.

He that delights in blood, is either a wild beaſt or a Fury.

Cruelty

Cruelty if it proceed from revenge, it is justice; if from Peril it is wisdome.

He that shewes mercy to his enimy, denies it to himselfe.

Phlebotomy is not more necessary in the Body Naturall, than it is in the body Politique.

Cruelty to a Good man, seems to be but a Fable, and some Tragicall fiction.

VAIN-GLORY. XIX.

Pro.

He that seeks his own praise, withall seeks the profit of others.

He that is so reserv'd, as to regard nothing that is forraine; it may be suspected, that he will account publique affaires, forraine impertinencies.

Such Dispositions as have a commixture of Levity in them; more easily undertake a Publique charge.

Contra.

Vaine-glorious persons are alwaies factious, Lyars, Inconstant, over-doing.

Thraso *is* Gnathoes *prey.*

It is a shame for a Lover to make suit to the hand-maid; but Praise is virtues hand-maid.

JUSTICE. XX.

Pro.

Kingdomes and States are only the Appendices of Iustice: for if Justice otherwise could be executed, there would be no need of them.

It is the effect of Iustice, that man is to man a God, and not a Wolfe.

Though Justice can not extirpate vice; yet it repreßeth it

Contra.

If this be to be just, not to doe to another what you would not have done to your selfe; then is mercy Iustice.

If we must give every one his due, then surely pardon to Humanity.

What tell you me of equity when to a wise man all things are unequall?

from doing hurt.

Doe but consider what the conditiõ of the guilty was in the Roman ſtate; and then ſay juſtice is not for the Re-publique.

The common Iuſtice of ſtates is as a Philoſopher in Court; that is, it makes only for a reverentiall reſpect of ſuch as bear Rule.

FORTITUDE. XXI.

Pro.

Nothing but feare is terrible. There is nothing ſolid in pleaſure, nor aſſur'd in virtue, where fear diſquiets.

He that confronts dangers with open eyes, that he may receive the charge; marketh how to avoid the ſame.

All other virtues, free us from the Dominion of vice; only Fortitude from the Dominion of Fortune.

Contra.

That's a goodly virtue to be willing to dye, ſo you may be ſure to kill.

That's a goodly virtue ſure, which even drunkenneſſe may induce.

He that is prodigall of his own life, will not ſpare the life of an other.

Fortitude is a virtue of the Iron Age.

TEMPERANCE. XXII.

Pro.

To Abſtaine *&* *to* Suſtaine, *are virtues proceeding commonly from the ſame habit.*

Vniformities, concords, and Meaſures of motions, are things celeſtiall, and the characters of Eternity.

Temperance as wholſome coldes, concenterate and ſtreng-

Contra.

I like not theſe negative virtues; for they argue Innocence not Merit.

That mind languiſheth which is not ſometimes ſpirited by exceſſe.

I like thoſe virtues which induce the vivacity of Action, and not the dulneſſe of Paſſion.

When

then the forces of the Mind.

Too exquisite and wandring senses, had need of Narcotiques; and so likewise wandring affections.

When you set downe the equall tempers of the mind, you set downe but few; nam pauperis est numerare pecus.

These Stoicismes (not to use that so you may not desire; not to desire that so you may not feare) are the resolutions of pusillanimous and distrustfull natures.

CONSTANCY. XXIII.

Pro.

Constancy is the foundation of virtue.

He is a miserable man that hath no perception of his future state, what it shall or may be.

Seeing mans judgement is so weak, as that he cannot be constant to things; let him at least be true to himselfe, and to his own designes.

Constancy gives reputation even to vice.

If to the Inconstancy of fortune we adde also, the inconstancy of mind, in what mazes of darknesse doe we live!

Fortune is like Proteus, *if you persist, she returnes to her true shape.*

Contra.

Constancy like a sullen-selfe-will'd Portereſſe, drives away many fruitfull informations.

There is good reason that Constancy should patiently endure crosses, for commonly she causeth them.

The shortest folly is the best.

MAGNANIMITY. XXIV.

Pro.

When once the mind hath propounded to it ſelfe honourable ends; then not only virtues, but even the divine powers are ready to ſecond.

Virtues ſpringing from Habit or precept, are vulgar; but from the end heroicall.

Contra.

Magnanimity is a virtue Poeticall.

KNOWLEDGE, CONTEMPLATION. XXV.

Pro.

That delight only is according to Nature, whereof there is no ſatiety.

The ſweeteſt proſpect is that, which looks into the errors of others, in the vale below.

How pleaſing and profitable a thing is it, to have the orbs of the mind concentrique, with the orbs of the World.

All depraved affections are falſe valuations; but goodneſſe and Truth are ever the ſame.

Contra.

A contemplative life is a ſpecious ſloth.

To think well is litle better, then to dreame well.

The divine providence regards the world; thou thy country.

A right Politique procreates Contemplations.

LEARNING. XXVI.

Pro.

If there were Books written of the ſmalleſt matters; there would hardly be any uſe of experience.

Contra.

In Schooles men learne to believe.

What Art did yet ever teach the ſeaſonable uſe of Art?

Reading

Reading is a converſe with the wiſe; Action for the moſt part a commerce with fooles.

Thoſe ſciences are not to be reputed altogether unprofitable, that are of no uſe; if they ſharpen the wits, and marſhall *our conceptions.*

To be wiſe from Precept and from experience, are two contrary habits, ſo as he that is accuſtomed to the one, is unapt for the other.

There is many times a vain uſe of Art, leaſt there ſhould be no uſe.

This commonly is the humor of all Schollers, that they are wont to acknowledge all they know, but not to learne what they know not.

PROMPTITUDE. XXVII.

Pro.

That is not ſeaſonable wiſdome which is not quick and nimble.

He that quickly erres, quickly reformes his error.

He that is wiſe upon deliberation, and not upon preſent occaſion, performes no great matter.

Contra

That wiſdome is not farre fetcht, nor deeply grounded which is ready at hand.

Wiſdome, as a veſtment, that is lighteſt which is readieſt.

Age doth not ripen their wiſdome, whoſe Counſils deliberation doth not ripen.

What is ſuddenly invented ſuddenly vaniſheth, ſoon ripe ſoon rotten.

Silence in matters of Secrecy. XXVIII.

Pro.

From a ſilent man, nothing is conceal'd; for all is there ſafely laid up.

He that eaſily talkes what

Contra.

Alteration of Cuſtomes placeth the mind in the darke, and makes men goe inviſible.

he knowes, will alſo talke what he knowes not.

Myſteries are due to ſecrecies.

Secrecy is the virtue of a confeſſor.

From a ſilent man all things are conceal'd, becauſe all is repai'd with ſilence.

A cloſe man is next to an unknown man.

FACILITY. XXIX.

Pro.

I like the man that is pliant to anothers inclination, but yet reſerves his judgement from flattery.

He that is flexible comes neereſt the nature of Gold.

Contra.

Facility is a weak privation of judgement.

The good offices of facile natures ſeem debts, their denialls injuries.

He owes the thanks to himſelfe, that obtaines any thing of a Facile natur'd man.

All difficulties preſſe upon a too acceßible and yeelding nature, for he ingages himſelfe in all.

Facile natures ſeldome come off with credit.

POPULARITY. XXX.

Pro.

The ſame things commonly pleaſe wiſe men, but it is alſo a point of wiſdome, to humor the changeable diſpoſition of fooles.

To honour the people is to be honoured.

Men in place uſually ſtand

Contra.

He whoſe nature rightly ſorts with fooles, may himſelfe be ſuſpected.

He that hath the Art to pleaſe the people, commonly hath the power to raiſe the people.

No termes of moderation takes place with the vulgar.

in

in awe, not of one man, but the multitude.

To fawne on the people, is the loweſt degree of Flattery.

Loquacity. XXXI.

Pro.	Contra.
Silence argues a man to be jealous, either of others, or of himſelfe.	*Silence addes grace and authority to a mans words.*
Reſtraint of liberty in what kind ſoever is an unhappy caſe, but the worſt of all is that of ſilence.	*Silence like a kindly ſleep refreſheth wiſdom, & ſettles the judgement.*
Silence is the virtue of fooles; where he ſaid truly to a ſilent man, If you be wiſe you are a Foole; if you be a Foole you are wiſe.	*Silence is the Fermentation of our thoughts.*
Silence like night is fit for Treacheries.	*Silence is the ſtile of wiſdome.*
Cogitations are like waters, moſt wholſome in the running ſtreame.	*Silence is a candidate for Truth.*
Silence is a kind of ſolitude.	
He that is ſilent proſtitutes himſelfe to cenſure.	
Silence neither diſchargeth it ſelfe of evill thoughts, nor contributes any good.	

Dissimulation. XXXII.

Pro.	Contra.
Diſſimulation is a compendious wiſdome.	*When we cannot think according to the verity of things yet at leaſt let us ſpeak according as we think.*
We are not tied to ſay the ſame, but to intend the ſame.	*Whoſe ſhallow capacities cõpre-*

Nakedneſſe even in the Mind is uncomely.

Diſſimulation is both a Grace and a Guard.

Diſſimulation is the fence of counſils.

Some through their too apert faire dealing become a prey.

He that carries all things with an open frankneſſe, deceives, as he that ſomewhat diſſembles: for many either doe not comprehend him, or doe not believe him.

Open dealing is nothing elſe, but a weakneſſe of mind.

hend not the Arts of State; in them, a habit of diſſimulation goes for wiſdome.

He that Diſſembles, deprives himſelfe of one of the moſt principall inſtruments for Action which is beliefe.

Diſſimulation invites Diſſimulation.

A diſſembler is not exempt from bondage.

BOLDMESSE. XXXIII.

Pro.

A ſhamefac'd ſutor teaches the way how to be denied.

What Action is to an Orator, the ſame is boldneſſe to a Politique; the firſt, the ſecond, the third virtue.

I love him that confeſſeth his modeſty, but I cannot endure him that accuſeth it.

A confidence in carriage ſooneſt unites affections.

I like a reſerved countenance. and an open ſpeech.

Contra.

Boldneſſe is the verger to folly.

Impudence is good for nothing but for Impoſture.

Confidence is the fooles Empreſſe, and the wiſe mans buffone.

Boldneſſe is a kind of Dulneſſe of ſence, togither with a perverſeneſſe of the will.

Ceremonies, Puntoes, Affectation. XXXIV.

Pro.

A comely moderation of Counte-

Contra.

What can be a more deformed ſpectacle

Countenance and Gesture, is the true seasoning of virtue.

If we observe the vulgar in the use of words, why not in habit and Gesture?

He that keeps not a decorum in smaller matters, and in his daily customes, though he be a great man, yet set it down for truth, that such a personage is wise, but at certain seasons.

Virtue and wisdome, without all points of respect and complement, are like forraine languages, they are not understood by the common people.

He that apprehends not the meaning of the common people, neither by a congruous application, nor yet by observation, is of all men most senseless.

Puntoes and ceremonies are the translation of virtue into a mother tongue.

spectacle, than to transferre the sence into our common course of life?

Faire ingenious behaviour winnes grace and favour; but affectation and art procures hatred.

Better a painted face and crisped haire; then painted and crisped manners.

He cannot comprehend great matters, who breaks his mind to small observations.

Affectation is the shining Putrefaction of ingenuity.

JEASTS. XXXV.

Pro.

A conceit is the altar of an Orator.

He that mingles modest mirth in all his commerce with others, reserves a freedome of mind.

It is a matter more politique, then a man would think, smoothly to passe from jest to earnest,

Contra

What man despiseth not those that hunt after these deformities and concinnities.

To put off the importance of businesse with a jest, is a base slight of wit.

Then judge of a jest, when you have done laughing.

Merrily conceited men, seldome

and from earneſt to jeſt.

A witty conceit is oftentimes a convoy of a Truth, which otherwiſe could not ſo handſomely have bin feried over,

dome penetrate farther then the ſuperficies of things, which is the point where the jeſt lies.

To put a leſt, as a matter of moment upon ſerious affaires, is a childiſh Levity.

LOVE. XXXVI.

Pro.

Doe you not ſee how all men ſeek themſelves, but a lover only findes himſelfe.

There is no better goverment of the mind, then from the command of ſome powerfull affection.

He that is wiſe, let him purſue ſome deſire or other; for he that doth not affect ſome one thing in chiefe, unto him all things are diſtaſtfull and tedious.

Why ſhould not that which is one, reſt in unity?

Contra.

The ſtage is much beholding to love; the life of man nothing.

There is nothing hath ſo many names as love; for it is a thing either ſo fooliſh, that it knowes not it ſelfe, or ſo baſe that it muſt needs diſguiſe it ſelfe under a counterfeit habit.

I like not ſuch natures as are only intent upon one thing.

Love is a poore-narrow contemplation.

FRIENDSHIP. XXXVII.

Pro.

Friendſhip accompliſheth the ſame things that Fortitude doth, but more ſweetly.

Friendſhip is a pleaſant ſauce to any temporall happineſſe.

The worſt ſolitude is to be deſtitute of ſincere friendſhip.

Contra.

Who contracts ſtrict leagues of Amity, drawes upon himſelfe new engagements.

It is a note of a weak ſpirit to divide fortune.

If

It is a juſt puniſhment for falſe-hearted diſpoſitions, to be deprived of friendſhip.

Flattery. XXXVIII.

Pro.

Flattery proceeds more out of cuſtome then out of Malice.

It was ever a forme of civility due to Great Perſons, by praiſing them to inſtruct them.

Contra.

Flattery is the ſtile of Servants.

Flattery is the cement of vice.

Flattery is that kind of fowling, which deceives Birds by reſemblance of voice.

The deformity of flattery is Comicall, but the damage Tragicall.

To give wholſome counſill, is a taske moſt difficult.

Revenge. XXXIX.

Pro.

Private Revenge is a kind of wild Iuſtice.

He that returnes wrong for wrong, violates the Law not the Perſon.

The fear of private revenge is a profitable reſtraint, for lawes are too often aſleep.

Contra.

He that does a wrong is the beginner of a quarrell; but he that returnes it, takes away all means of ending it.

Revenge by how much the more naturall, by ſo much the more to be repreſſed.

He that is inclinable to retribute a wrong, is behind-hand perchance in time, but not in will.

Innovati-

INNOVATION. XL.

Pro.

Every medicine is an innovation.

He that will not apply new remedies, muſt expect new diſeaſes.

Time is the greateſt innovator; why then may we not imitate time.

Ancient preſidents are inconformable, recent, corrupt, and degenerate.

Let ſimple and contentious perſons, ſquare their actions, according to examples.

As thoſe that firſt bring honour into their Family, are commonly more worthy than moſt that ſucceed.

So the Innovation of things for the moſt part excells thoſe things which are done out of Imitation.

A froward retention of Cuſtomes, is as turbulent a thing as Innovation.

Seeing that things of their own courſe alter to the worſe, if they be not by counſill altered to the better, what ſhall be the end of Evill.

The ſervants of cuſtome, are the ſcorne of Time.

Contra.

New Births are deformed things.

No author is accepted untill time haue authoriz'd him.

All novelty is with injury, for it defaceth the preſent ſtate of things.

Thoſe things which cuſtome hath confirmed, if they be not profitable, yet they are conformable and piece well togither.

What Novator followes the example of time, which inſinuates innovations ſo quietly, as is ſcarce perceptible to ſence.

Whatſoever comes unlooked for, is the leſſe acceptable to him whom it helps; and the more troubleſome to him whom it hurts.

Delay

DELAY. XLI.

Pro.

Fortune ſelleth many things to the haſty, which ſhe gives to the ſlow and deliberate.

Whileſt we make too much haſt to ſurprize the beginnings and onſets of things, we claſpe ſhadowes.

Whileſt things are at a doubtfull ſtand we muſt waigh them; when they incline we may fall a work.

It is good to commit the begining of Actions to Argus, *with his hundred eyes; the ends to* Briareus *with his hundred hands.*

Contra.

Occaſion turnes the handle of the Bottle firſt, to be received; and after the belly.

Occaſion like, Sibylla, *diminiſheth the commodity, but enhanſeth the Price.*

Celerity is the helmet of Pluto.

Thoſe things which are ſeaſonably undertaken, are performed with judgement; but what are put off too long, are compaſs'd with trouble and by ambages.

PREPARATION. XLII.

Pro.

He that attempts a great matter with ſmall means, fancies to himſelfe the advantage of opportunity, that he may not deſpaire.

With ſlender proviſion we buy wit not fortune.

Contra.

The firſt occaſion of action is the beſt point of Preparation.

Let no man think to fetter fortune with the chaines of his preparation.

The alteration of Preparation, and Action, are politique Arts; but the ſeperation of them is a vaporous conceit, and unproſperous.

Great Preparation is a prodigall bath of time and buſineſſe.

To Encountre first Assaults. XLIII.

Pro.

More dangers deceive us by fraud, then overcome us by force.

It is lesse trouble to meete danger by early remedies, then to watch and ward the approaches and progresse thereof.

A danger is no more light, if it once seem light.

Contra.

He teacheth danger to come on, who over-early addresseth himselfe against danger; and fixeth it by application of a remedy.

In the redresse of dangers, lighter dangers fall off of themselves.

It is better to deale with a few authentique and approv'd remedies; then to venture upon a world of unexperienc'd particular receipts.

VIOLENT CONSILS. XLIV.

Pro.

Those that affect a milde and gentle kind of Prudence; to them the augmentation of an evill, is a wholsome remedy.

That necessity which resolves upon desperate courses; commonly goes through with them.

Contra.

Every violent remedy is pregnant of a new evill.

No man gives violent advice, but out of fury or feare.

SUSPICION. XLV.

Pro.

Diffidence is the nerves of wisdome; but suspicion a remedy for the joynts.

That syncerity is justly suspected, which suspicion weakens

kens or overthrowes.

Suſpicion defeats an inconſtant integrity, but confirmes a ſtrong and reſolute.

The words of Law. XLVI.

Pro.

It is no expoſition, but a divination, which departs from the letter.

When there is made a departure from the letter of Law, the judge, of an interpreter, becomes a Law-giver.

Contra.

Out of all the words in the generality, ſuch a ſence muſt be extracted, as may expound the mind of every particular paſſage.

The worſt tyranny, is Law upon the rack.

For witneſſes againſt Arguments. XLVII.

Pro.

He that relies upon Arguments, defines according to the pleader, not according to the cauſe.

He that gives credit rather to Arguments then witneſſe, muſt withall truſt more to wit, then ſence.

It were a ſafe way to believe Arguments of Reaſon, if men were not guilty of Abſurdities againſt Reaſon.

Arguments brought againſt Teſtimonies accompliſh thus much, that the caſe ſeems ſtrange, but not that it ſeems true.

Contra.

If proofs by witneſſe, are to be preferr'd before Proofs from Reaſon, then there needs no more adoe, but that the Judge be not deafe.

Arguments are an Antidote againſt the poiſon of Teſtimonies.

Thoſe kind of Proofs are moſt ſafely believed, which doe moſt ſeldome lye.

Now theſe *Antitheta* which we have propounded, are not perchance ſo much worth; but being they were prepared and collected by us long agoe, we were loath the diligence of our youth ſhould periſh: ſpecially ſeeing they are (if one exactly conſider them) *ſeeds, and not Flowers.* But herein they doe plainly breath a youthly heate, in that they are ſo plentifull in the *morall* or *Demonſtrative* kind, ſo thinne and ſparing in the *Deliberative* and *Judiciale.*

FORMVLÆ MINORES.

IV. A third collection which pertaines to *Preparatory ſtore* or *Proviſion* and is DEFICIENT is that which we think fit to call FORMULÆ MINORES *Leſſer Formes or Stiles of Speech.* And theſe are (as it were) the Portals Poſterne-dores; outer Roome, Back roomes, Paſſages of ſpeech, and the Like; which indifferently may ſerve for all ſubjects. Such are *Prefaces, Concluſions, Digreßions, Tranſitions, Promiſes, Excuſations,* and many of like nature. *For as in Building* there is great Pleaſure and uſe in the well-caſting of the Frontiſpieces, ſtaire-caſes, doores, windowes, entries, paſſages, and the like: ſo in ſpeech of the acceſſory conveyances and interpoſures, be decently and skilfully contrived and placed, they are of ſpeciall ornament and effect, to the whole ſtructure of the ſpeech. Of theſe *Formulæ,* we will propoſe an exrmple or two, and ſtay no longer upon them. For although they be matters of no ſmall uſe, yet becauſe we adde nothing here of our own, but deſcribe the naked *Formes* only, out of *Demoſthenes* or *Cicero,* or ſome other ſelect Author, they may ſeem a more triviall and common obſervation, than that we ſhould waſt much time therein.

EXAMPLES OF MINOR *FORMES.*

A Concluſion of a ſpeech Deliberative.

"*So wee may both redime the Fault which is Paſſed, and*
"*with the ſame diligence provide againſt future Inconveniences.*

The

The Corollary of an accurate Partition.

"That every one may underſtand that I ſeek not to balke any "thing by ſilence, or to cloud any thing by words.

A Tranſition With a Caveat.

But let us ſo paſſe by theſe, that reflecting upon them, and keeping them within view, we may leave them.

A preoccupation againſt an inveterate opinion.

I ſhall ſo open the matter as you may underſtand in the whole manage of the buſineſſe, what the caſe it ſelfe hath brought forth; what error hath faſtned upon it; what envy hath rais'd. And let theſe ſuffice for example, where with (annexing two *Rhetoricall Appendices*) which reſpect the PROMPTUARY PART we conclude.

CAP. IV.

I. *Two Generall Appendices of the Art of Delivery,* Art Criticall. II. *And* Pedanticall.

THere remaines two *Appendices* in generall, *touching the Tradition of knowledge; the one Criticall; the other Pedanticall.* For as the principall part of *Tradition of Knowledge* conſiſteth in writing of books; ſo the relative part thereof conſiſts in reading of Books: but reading is governed and directed, either by the help of Preceptors and Tutors; or perfited by every mans particular and proper endeavour and induſtry: and to this purpoſe conduce thoſe two knowledges whereof we have ſpoken. *To the Criticall part appertaines; firſt, an emaculate correction and amended edition of approved Auctors;* Whereby both the honour of Auctors themſelves is vindicated, and a light given to the ſtudious Readers. Wherein nevertheleſſe, the raſh diligence of ſome writers hath done great prejudice to ſtudies. For it

is the manner of many Critiques, when they fall upon a paſſage which they doe not underſtand, preſently to preſume a fault in the copy, as in that place in *Tacitus*, when a certain Colony in the open Senate, claimed the priviledge of an *Aſylum*, *Tacitus* reports that the reaſons they preferr'd were not much favour'd by the Emperour and the Lords of the Senate; wherefore the Embaſſadors miſtruſting the iſſue of the buſineſſe, gave a round ſumme of mony to *Titus Vinius*, that he would mediate their cauſe, and take upon him the protection of their liberties; by this means their petition was heard and granted; *Tum dignitas & antiquitas Coloniæ valuit* ſaith *Tacitus*, as if the arguments that ſeemed light before, were now made waighty, through bribes, and corruption. But one of the Critiques, a man of no obſcure note, hath expunged the word *Tum*, and in ſtead thereof, put in *Tantum*. And by this perverſe cuſtome of *Critiques*, it comes to paſſe (as one wiſely noteth) *that the moſt corrected copies, are commonly the leaſt correct*. Nay (to ſpeak truth) unleſſe the *Critiques* be well skill'd in the knowledges, handled in the Books which they ſet forth, their diligence is with perill, and prejudice. *Secondly there appertaines to the Critique Art, the Expoſition, and Explication of Auctors by commentaries, Scholies, Notes, Spicilegies, and the like.* In labours of this kind that worſt diſeaſe of *Critiques* hath ceas'd on many; that they blanch and wave many obſcurer paſſages; and ſuch as are plaine and perſpicuous, thoſe they dwell and expatiate upon, even to a faſtidious tediouſneſſe; and it is not ſo much intended, that the Auctor may be illuminated, as that the *Critique* may take occaſion hereby to glorify himſelfe, in his multiplicious and various learning. It could be eſpecially wiſhed (although this point belongs to *Tradition* in chiefe, and not to Appendices) that the writer which handles obſcure and noble Arguments, ſhould annexe his own *explications*; that neither the text it ſelfe may be broken off, by *Digreſſions* and *Explications*; and that the Annotations may not depart from the mind and intentiou of the writer. Some ſuch thing we conceive of *Theon* upon

Euclid.

Euclid. Thirdly it belongs to Critique Art (from whence it derives the name) *to interpoſe a briefe cenſure and judgement of the Auctors which they publiſh, and to compare and valew them with other Auctors upon the ſame ſubject:* That by ſuch a cenſure the Learned and ſtudious, may be both advertis'd of the choice of Books; and come better provided to the peruſeing of them. This laſt duty is, as it were, *the Chaire of the Critiques*, which many great and famous men in our age have ennobled; greater ſurely in our judgement, than for the model of *Critiques*.

II. *For Pedanticall knowledge*, it were ſoon ſaid, *conſult the Schooles of the Ieſuites, for there is nothing for the uſe and practice better then their Precepts:* but we will according to our manner, as it were, gleaning a few eares, give ſome few advertiſements. *We doe by all means approve a Collegiat education and Inſtitution of Childhood and Youth*; not in private houſes, nor only under Schoolemaſters. There is in Colledges a greater emulation of Youth towards their equalls; beſides, there is the ſight and countenance of Grave men, which ſeems to command modeſty; and faſhions and moulds tender minds, even from their firſt growth to the ſame Patterne: in ſome there are many other utilities of *Collegiat Education*.

§ *For the order* and manner of Diſcipline, this I would principally advile; *that Youth beware of compends and abridgements, and too forward maturation of knowledge, which maks men bold and confident; and rather wants great proceeding, than cauſeth it.*

§ *Further there is an indulgence to be given to the liberty and vent of nature in particulars*; as if there be any which performes ſuch taskes as the diſcipline of the place requires; and yet withall ſteales ſome howers to beſtow on other ſtudies, to which he hath a naturall propenſity; ſuch a diſpoſition by no means ſhould be checkt or reſtrain'd.

§ *Againe*, it will be worth the paines diligently to obſerve (which perchance hetherto hath not bin noted) that there are two waies, and they as it were, reflexively oppoſite

ſite of *training* up of wits, and of *exerciſing* and *preparing* them. The one *begins with* the *more eaſy precepts, and by degrees leads us to the more difficult; the other at firſt commands and preſſeth more difficult practiſes*, which when they are conquered, the other ſweetly yeeld and are won with eaſe. For it is one *Method* to practiſe ſwimming by bladders which lift up, and an other *Method* to practiſe dauncing with heavy ſhooes which preſſe down the Body; and it is not eaſy to expreſſe, how much a wiſe intermixtion of theſe *Methods*, conduceth to the advanceing of the faculties, both of Mind and of the Body.

§ *So the Application and Election of ſtudies according to the propriety of wits, which are inſtructed, is a matter of ſingular uſe and judgement; a true and perfit diſcovery whereof, Schoolemaſters and Tutors owe to the Parents of Children, from whom they may expect ſuch informations, that ſo they may the better adviſe upon the particular courſe of life, unto which they would deſigne, and dedicate their ſonnes.* But this alſo is to be exactly obſerved, that not only exceeding great progreſsion may be made in thoſe ſtudies, to which a man is ſwayed by a naturall proclivity; but alſo that there may be found, in *ſtudies* properly ſelected for that purpoſe, cures and remedies to promote ſuch kind of knowledge, to the impreſsions whereof, a man may, by ſome imperfection of nature, be moſt unapt and inſufficient. As for example, if a man be *Eird-witted*, that is, quickly carried away, and hath not the patient faculty of attention; the *Mathematiques* gives a remedy thereunto, wherein, if the wit be caught away but for a moment, the demonſtration is new to beginne.

§ *So of exerciſes in courſe of teaching, there is matter of great conſequence: but there is a point here that hath bin noted of few, that there ſhould be of exerciſes, not only a wiſe inſtitution, but alſo a wiſe intermiſſion.* It hath bin excellently obſerved by *Cicero, That in exerciſes it often falls out, that men practiſe as well their faults, as their faculties*; ſo that an *ill habit* is ſometimes gotten, and inſinuates it ſelfe togither with a *Good*; wherefore it is a ſafer way to break off exerciſes, and after

to fall to them againe, than inceſſantly to purſue and preſſe them. *But of theſe inough.* Certainly theſe things at firſt view ſeem no ſuch ſolemne and grave matters, yet are they in the iſſue found efficacious and uſefull. *For as in Plants*, the wronging or cheriſhing of them while they are Young, is that, that is moſt important to their thriving or miſcarrying: or as the immenſe greatneſſe of the ſtate of Rome, is by ſome deſervedly attributed to the virtue and wiſdome of thoſe ſixe Kings, which were as Tutors and Foſter-fathers of that ſtate in the Infancy thereof: ſo ſurely the culture and manurance of minds in young and tender years, hath ſuch a forcible operation (though unſeen and not obvious to every mans obſervation) which neither length of time or aſſiduity and contention of Labour in riper age afterwards, can any way countervaile. And it is not amiſſe to obſerve how ſmall and mean faculties, if they fall into Great men, or upon Great matters, doe ſometimes work Great and important effects. *Hereof we* will ſet downe a memorable example, which we the rather ſet downe, becauſe the Jeſuites themſelves ſeem not to deſpiſe this kind of Diſcipline, in our opinion upon ſound judgement, and it is a matter which if it be made profeſſory is ignominious, if diſciplinary, one of the beſt qualities: *We mean Action upon the ſtage; as that which ſtrengthens memory, moderates the tone and emphaſis of voice, and Pronunciation; compoſes the countenance and geſture to a Decorum, procures good aſſurance, and likewiſe inureth Youth to the faces of Men.* The example ſhall be taken out of *Tacitus*, of one *Vibulenus*, who had bin ſometimes an Actor upon the ſtage, but at that time a common ſouldier in the Pannonian Garriſons. This fellow upon the death of Auguſtus had rais'd a mutiny, ſo that *Blæſus* the Livetenant, committed ſome of the mutiners to Priſon; but the ſouldiers by violent impreſsion brake open the Priſons, and ſet them at liberty; & *Vibulenus* about to make a Tribunitiall ſpeech before the Souldiers, began in this manner, "You have gi-"ven light and life, to theſe poore innocent wretches; but "who reſtores my brother to me, or life unto my brother,

"that was ſent hither in meſſage from the Legions of Ger-
"many, to treat of the common cauſe, and he hath mur-
"thered him this laſt night by ſome of his Fencers, that he
"hath about him for his executioners upon ſouldiers. An-
"ſwer *Blæſus*, where haſt thou thrown his body? the moſt
"mortall enimies, doe not deny buriall: when I have per-
"formed my laſt duties unto the corpes with kiſſes, with
"tears, command me to be ſlaine beſides him; ſo that theſe
"my fellowes for our good meaning, and our true hearts
"to the Legions, may have leave to bury us. With which
ſpeech, he put the Army into ſuch an infinite fury and a-
maze, that if it had not incontinently appeard, that there
was no ſuch matter, and that he never had any brother, the
Souldiers would hardly have ſpared the Lievetenants life;
for he played it merily, as if it had bin ſome interlude upon
the Stage.

§ Now we are come to a period of our Treatiſe con-
cerning *Rationall knowledges*, wherein if we have ſometimes
departed from the *receiv'd partitions*, yet let no man think
that we diſallow all thoſe *Partitions* which we have not u-
ſed: for there is a double neceſsity impoſed upon us, of al-
tering the *Diviſions*; *The one becauſe theſe two, namely to ſort
togither thoſe things which are next in nature, and to caſt into one
Pile thoſe things which are next in uſe, are in their end and pur-
poſe altogiter differing.* For example; A Secretary of a Prince
or of Eſtate, ſo digeſts his Papers, without doubt, in his ſtu-
dy, as he may ſort togither things of like nature, as Treaties
apart, Inſtructions apart, Forraine letters, Domeſtique let-
ters, all apart by themſelves; on the contrary in ſome parti-
cular Cabinet, he ſorts togither thoſe that he were like to
uſe togither though of ſeverall nature: ſo in this generall
Cabinet of knowledge, we were to ſet downe *Partitions* ac-
cording to the nature of things themſelves, whereas if any
particular ſcience were to be handled, we ſhould have re-
ſpected the diviſions fitteſt for uſe and practice. *The other
reaſon of changing the Diviſion is, becauſe the adjection of Defi-
cients to Sciences, and the reduction of them into an intire Body,*
did

did by conſequence, alter the Partition of the Sciences themſelves. For admit the Arts which are extant (for demonſtratiõ ſake) be in number 15. and the Deficients ſuperadded make up the number 20. I ſay that the Parts of 15. are not the parts of 20, for the parts of 15. are 3. and 5. but the parts of 20. are 2. 4. 5. and 10. ſo is it plaine theſe could not otherwiſe be. And ſo much of *Logicall Sciences.*

THE SEVENTH BOOK OF FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM VICOUNT St ALBAN.

OF THE DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

¶ The Partition *of Morale knowledge, into the Doctrine of Exemplar, or Platforme; and into the Georgiques or Culture of the Mind.* § The Division of the *Platforme of Good, into Good Simple, and Good Compar'd.* II. *The Division of Good ſimple, into Individuall Good, and Good of Communion.*

WEE are now come (Excellent KING) *unto Morale knowledge, which reſpecteth and handleth the will of Man: Right Reaſon governes the will, Good Apparent ſeduceth it; the Incentives of the will are the Affections, the Organs and voluntary Motions, are his Miniſters;* of this faculty *Salomon* ſaith, *Above all keepings, keep thy Heart, for out of it iſſue the actions of life.* Prov. IV. In handling of this Science, thoſe which have written thereof, ſeem to me to have done, as if a man that profeſſed the Art of writing, ſhould only exhibite faire copies of *Alphabets* and letters joyned, without giving any precepts for the carriage of the hand and framing of the Characters: ſo have they propounded unto us good and faire examples and draughts,

or accurate portraitures of *Good, Virtue, Duties, Felicity*, as the true objects and ſcopes of *mans Will* and *Deſires*: but how to take a juſt levell at *theſe marks* (excellent indeed and by them well ſet downe) that is, by what precepts and directions, the *Mind* may be ſubdued and framed, to purſue and attaine *them*; either they paſſe it over altogither, or performe it ſlightly and unprofitably. It is not the diſputeing that *Morall vertues are in the mind of Man by habit, and not by Nature*; or formally diſtinguiſhing between *Generous ſpirits and the obſcure vulgar; that thoſe are wonne by the waight of Reaſons; theſe by reward and Puniſhment*; or the witty precept, *that to rectify the mind of man, it muſt like a ſtaffe, be bowed the contrary way to its inclination*; and the like glances, ſcattered here and there. Theſe and the like are farre ſhort of being a juſt excuſe of the deficience of that thing, which now we ſeeke. *The reaſon of this neglect I ſuppoſe to be, that hidden Rock, whereupon ſo many Barkes of Knowledges have runne and bin caſt away; which is, that writers deſpiſe to be converſant in ordinary and common matters; which are neither ſubtile enough for Diſputation; nor flouriſhing enough for Ornament.* Verily it cannot eaſily be expreſſed, what calamity this thing we now ſpeak of hath brought upon Sciences; *that out of an imbred Pride and vaine-glory, men have made choice of ſuch ſubjects of Diſcourſe, and of ſuch a manner & method of handling, as may commend rather their own wit, than conſult the Readers profit.* *Seneca* ſaith excellently, *Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum facit cupiditatem, ſed ſui.* For writings ſhould be ſuch, as ſhould make men in love with the *Leſſons*, and not with the *Teachers*. Therefore they take a right courſe, which can openly avouch the ſame of their Counſils, which *Demoſthenes* once did, and can conclude with this clauſe, *which if you put in execution, you ſhall not only commend the Orator for the inſtant, but your ſelves likewiſe, not long after, in a more proſperous ſtate of your affaires.* As for my ſelfe (Excellent KING) *to ſpeak the truth of my ſelfe, I have often wittingly and willingly neglected the glory of mine own Name, and Learning, (if any ſuch thing be) both in the works I now publiſh, and in thoſe*

Ariſtot. Eth. lib. 2.

In Epiſt.

Demoſt. Orat.

I contrive for hereafter; whileſt I ſtudy to advance the good and profit of mankind. And I, that have deſerv'd perchance to be an Architect in Philoſophy and Sciences, am made a Work-man and a Labourer, and at length anything elſe whatſoever, ſeeing I ſuſtaine and work out my ſelfe, many things that muſt needs be done, and others out of a naturall diſdaine ſhift off and refuſe to doe. But, (to returne to the matter) which we were about to ſay, *Philoſophers in Morall Science, have choſen to themſelves a reſplendent and luſtrous maſſe of matter, wherein they may moſt glorify themſelves, for ſharpneſſe of wit, or ſtrength of Eloquence: but ſuch precepts as ſpecially conduce to practice, becauſe they cannot be ſo ſet out, and inveſted with the ornaments of ſpeech, they have in a manner paſs'd over in ſilence.* Neither needed men of ſo excellent parts, to have deſpaired of a fortune like that, which the Poet *Virgil*, had the confidence to promiſe to himſelfe, and indeed obtaind; who got as much glory of Eloquence, Wit, and Learning, in the expreſsing of the obſervations of husbandry, as in deſcribeing the Heroicall Acts of *Æneas*.

Nec ſum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere, magnum,
Quam ſit, & anguſtis his addere rebus honorem.

And ſurely if the purpoſe be in good earneſt, not to write at leaſure, that which men may read at leaſure; but really to inſtruct and be a ſubſidiary to Active life; theſe GEORGIQUES OF MANS MIND, ought to be had in as great eſtime with men, as thoſe heroicall portraitures of Virtue, Goodneſſe, and Felicity, wherein ſo much labour and coſt hath bin beſtowed.

I. We will therefore divide *Morall Philoſophy*, into two maine and Principall Knowledges; *the one concerning the Exemplar or Image of Good; the other concerning, the Regiment and Culture of the Mind*, which we are wont to call, the GEORGIQUES OF THE MIND: that deſcribes the *Nature of Good*; this preſcribes rules, how to ſubdue and accommodate the mind of Man thereunto.

§. *The Doctrine touching the Platforme*, which reſpects and deſcribes the *Nature of Good*, conſiders Good either *Simple*

ple or *Compared*, I ſay either the *kinds* of Good, or the *Degrees of Good*. In the latter of *theſe*, thoſe infinite Diſputations and ſpeculations *touching the ſupreme degree of Good*, which they terme *Felicity*, *Beatitude*, the *higheſt good*, (the Doctrines of which were the Heathens Divinity) are by the Chriſtian Faith, taken away and diſcharged. For as *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *That Young men may be happy but not otherwiſe, but by hope;* ſo muſt we all, being ſo taught by Chriſtian Faith, acknowledge our ſelves to be but children and in our Minority; and think of no other felicity, than that which is in hope of the future world. Freed therefore by happy fate from this doctrine, which was the *Heathens Heaven* (wherein without doubt, they attributed a higher elevation of mans Nature, than it was capeable of; for we ſee in what a height of ſtile *Seneca* writes, *verè Magnum habere fragilitatem hominis, ſecuritatem Dei*) we may certainly with leſſe loſſe of ſobriety and Truth, receive for moſt part, the reſt of their inquiries concerning the doctrine of the *Platforme*. As concerning the *Nature of Good Poſitive and Simple*, ſurely they have ſet it out in beautifull colours and drawne it to the life, upon excellent Tables; repreſenting with exact diligence to the eye, *the Formes, Poſtures, Kinds, Affinities, Parts, Subjects, Provinces, Actions, Adminiſtrations of virtues and Duties*. Nor doe they ſo leave the purſuit; for they have commended and inſinuated all theſe into the ſpirit of man, with great quickneſſe and vivacity of Arguments, and ſweetneſſe, and beauty of Perſwaſions; yea and fortified and intrenched the ſame (as much as diſcourſes can doe) againſt corrupt and populare opinions and invaſions. *As touching the nature of comparative good*, they have alſo well handled that, in ſetting downe that *triplicite Order of Good*, in *comparing contemplative life with Active; in diſtinguiſhing between virtue with reluctation, and virtue ſetled by ſecurity and confirmed; in the conflict and encounter; between honeſty and profit; in the ballancing of virtue with virtue, to ſee which preponderates other*; and the like. So as this part touching the *Platforme*; I finde excellently laboured, and that the ancients herein have ſhewed themſelves

Rhet. lib. 2.

In Epiſt.

ſelves admirable men: yet ſo as the pious and painfull diligence of Divines, being practis'd in *Duties, Morall virtues, Caſes of Conſcience, and circumſcriptions of ſinne*, have farre outgone the Philoſophers. *Notwithſtanding* (to returne to the Philoſophers) if before they had addreſs'd themſelves to the popular and reciv'd notions of *Virtue, Vice, Paine, Pleaſure*, and the reſt; they had ſtayd a litle longer and had ſearched the *Rootes of Good and Evill, and the ſtrings of thoſe Rootes*; they had given in my judgement a great light unto all which might fall into enquirie afterwards: eſpecially if they had conſulted as well with the *Nature of things, as with the Axioms of Moralitie*, they had made their Doctrines leſſe prolixe, and more profounde: which being by them eyther altogither omitted, or very confuſedly handled, wee will briefely reexamine and endeavour to open and cleare the ſprings of *Morall habits*, before we come unto the doctrine of the *Culture or Manurance of the Minde*, which we ſet downe as DEFICIENT.

II. There is imbred and imprinted in every thing an appetite to a *duple Nature of Good: the One as every thing is a Totall or Subſtantive in it ſelfe; the other as it is a part or membre of ſome greater Totall*: and this *latter* is more excellent and potent than the *other*, becauſe it tendeth to the conſervation of a more *ample forme*. *The firſt may be called Individuall or ſelfe-Good; the latter the Good of Communion. Iron* in a particular Sympathie moves to the *Loadſtone*, but yet if it exceed a certaine Quantitie, it forſakes thoſe affections, and like a good Citizen & a true Patriot moves to the Earth, which is the Region and Country of its connaturalls. To proceed a litle further; *Denſe* and *Maſſie Bodies* move to the earth, to the great Congregation of *cloſe-compacted Bodies*; yet rather than to ſuffer a divulſion in the continuance of nature, and that there ſhould be, as they call it, a *Vacuum*, theſe Bodies will move upwards, forſaking their dutie to the *Earth*, that they may performe the generall duty they owe unto the *World*. So it is ever ſeen *that the Conſervation of the more generall and publique forme, commands and governs the leſſer and*

more particular Appetites and Inclinations. But this Prerogative of the *Good of Communion*, is especially engraven upon Man, if he degenerate not, according to that memorable speech of *Pompeius Magnus*, who being in Commission for purveyance for a Famine at Rome, and being disswaded with great vehemence and instance by his friends that hee would not hazard himselfe to Sea in an extremitie of weather, he answered only this, *Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam.* So as the love of life which in every Individuall Creature is so predominant an affection, could not out-ballance his love and loyaltie to the state. But why doe we dwell upon this Point? There was never extant in any age of the world, either Philosophy, or Sect, or Religion, or Law, or Discipline, which hath so highly exalted the *Good of Communion* and depress'd *Good private and particulare*, as the *Holy Christian Faith*, whereby it cleerely appeares, that it was one and the same *God* that gave the Christian Law to Men, who gave those Lawes of Nature to Creatures of inferior order. Wherefore we read that many of the elect Saints of God have rather wished themselves anathematiz'd and raz'd out of the *Book of Life* than that their brethren should not attain salvation; provoked through an extasie of Charitie and an infinite feeling of the *Good of Communion.* This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine many of the profoundest Controversies in *Morall Philosophie.* For first, it decideth the Question *touching the preferment of the Contemplative or Active life*; and that against the opinion of *Aristotle:* for all the reasons which he brings for the *Contemplative*, respect a *private Good*, and the pleasure and dignitie of an Individual only; in which respects (no question) a *Contemplative life* hath the preheminence. For the *Contemplative life* is not much unlike to that comparison to which *Pythagoras* made for the gracing and magnifying of *Philosophie* and *Contemplation*; who being askt by *Hiero* what he was, answered; "*That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian* "*Games, he knew the manner that some came to trie their fortunes* "*for the prizes; and some came as Merchants to utter their com-*

"*modities*

S: Paul Rom. ix.

Iamb. in vita.

modities; and some came to make good cheere; to be merry, and "to meet with their friends; and some came to look on and that hee "was one of them that came to look on. But men must know that in this Theatre of Mans life, it is reserved onley for God and Angels, to be Lookers on. Neither surely could it have bin that any doubt touching this point, should ever have bin rais'd in the Church (notwithstanding that saying was frequent in many mens Mouths, *Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum ejus*: by which place they use to exalt their *Civile Death* and the Lawes of a Monastique and Regulare course of life;) but upon this defence, *that the Monasticall life is not simply Contemplative*; but is altogether conversant in *Ecclesiastique Duties*, such as are incessant Prayer; Sacrifices of Vowes performed to God; the writing also, in such great leasure, Theologicall Books for the propagation of the knowledge of the *Divine Law*, as *Moses* did when he abode so many daies in the *retir'd secresie of the Mount*. And so we see *Enoch* the seventh from *Adam*, who seemes to be the first founder of a *Contemplative life*, (for he is said to *have walked with God*) yet endowed the Church with a Book of Prophecie, which is also cited by S^t *Iude*. But as for a *meere Contemplative life*, and terminated in it selfe, which casteth no Beames of heat or light upon humane society; assuredly Divinity knowes it not. It decides also the Question controverted with such heat between the Schooles of *Zeno* and *Socrates*, on the one side, who placed Felicitie in Virtue simple or attended, which hath a great share in the *Duties of life*: and on the other side other Sects and Professions, as the Schooles of the *Cirenaiques* and *Epicureans*, who placed it in pleasure; and made Virtue, (as it is used in some Comœdies, where the Mistresse and the Maid change habits) to be but as a hand-maid, without which Pleasure cannot be well waited and attended upon; as also that other, as it were, reformed Schoole of *Epicurus*, which asserted *Felicity* to be nothing else than a Tranquilitie and Serenitie of Minde free and void of all Perturbations; as if they would have deposed *Jupiter* from his Throne and restored *Saturne* with the

Psal. cxvi.

Exod. xxiii.

Gen. v.

In Epist.

Laert vita.

Golden Age, when there was no Summer nor Winter, nor Spring nor Autumne, but all after one Aire and Seaſon. Laſtly the exploded Schoole of *Pyrrho* and *Herillus*, which placed Felicity in the utter extinction and extirpation of all the ſcruples and diſputes of the mind, making no fixt and conſtant nature of Good, and Evill, but eſtiming Actions Good or Evill, as they proceed from the Mind in a cleere and reſolute motion; or contrariwiſe with averſation and reluctance. Which opinion notwithſtanding hath revived in the Ereſy of the *Anabaptiſts, who meaſur'd all things according to the Motions & Inſtincts of the ſpirit, and the conſtancy, or wavering of Beliefe.* But it is manifeſt that all this we have recited, tends to private repoſe and complacency of Mind, and no way to the Point of *Society*, and the *Good of Communion.* Againe, it cenſures alſo the Philoſophy of *Epictetus*, who laies downe this preſuppoſition; *That felicity "muſt be placed in thoſe things which are in our power, leſt we "be liable to fortune and diſturbance*; as if it were not a thing much more happy, to be diſtributed and fruſtrated of a good ſucceſſe in worthy and generous intentions and ends, which concerne the *Publique Good*, than to obtaine all that we can wiſh to our ſelves, in thoſe things which referre to our *Private Fortune.* As *Conſalvo* ſhewing his Souldiers *Naples*, bravely proteſted, *That he had rather runne himſelfe upon certaine ruine with one foot forward, than to have his life ſecur'd for long, by one foot of reretrait.* Whereunto the wiſdome of that heavenly leader and commander hath ſign'd, who hath affirm'd, *That a good conſcience is a continuall feaſt*; by which words is plainly ſignified, *that a Mind Conſcious of good Intentions, however ſucceeding, affords more ſolid and ſincere joy, and to nature more agreeable, than all that proviſion wherewith man may be furniſht either for the fruition of his deſires, or the repoſe of his Mind.* It cenſureth likewiſe that abuſe of Philoſophy, which grew generall about the time of *Epictetus*, which was, that *Philoſophy* was converted into a profeſſory kind of life, and as it were into an Occupation or Art; as if the purpoſe of Philoſophy

Epict. Enchir. Arrian. Lib. 1.

Prov. xv.

ſophy, was not to repreſſe and extinguiſh perturbations, but to fly and avoid the cauſes and occaſions of them; and therefore to ſhape a particular kind and courſe of life to that end; introducing indeed ſuch a kind of health of mind, as was that of *Herodicus* in body, whereof Ariſtotle makes mention, which was, *that he did nothing all his life long but intend his health*, and therefore abſtained from infinite number of things, being amerc'd by the fruition of his body: whereas if men referre themſelves to duties of ſociety, that health of Body is principally to be deſired, which may beſt endure and overcome all alterations and extremities: ſo likewiſe that mind is properly ſound and ſtrong, which can breake through the moſt and greateſt temptations and perturbations. So as *Diogenes* ſeems to have ſpoken well, who commends thoſe powers of the Mind, *which were able not warily to abſtaine but valiantly to ſuſtaine*, and which could refraine the violent encounter of the Mind, even in the ſteepeſt Precipices, and which could give unto the Mind (which is commended in well-broken horſes) the ſhorteſt ſtoppe and turne. Laſtly, it cenſures the tenderneſſe and the want of Morigerous application, noted in ſome of the moſt ancient and reverend Philoſophers, that did retire too eaſily from Civile buſineſſe, that they might diſcharge themſelves of all indignities and perturbations, and ſo might live, in their opinion, more unſtained, and as it were, ſanctified perſons; whereas the reſolution of a man truly morall, ought to be ſuch, as the ſame *Conſalvo* required in a ſouldier, which is that his Honour ſhould be woven *è Tela Craßiore*, and not ſo fine as that every thing ſhould catch in it, and teare it.

Αριστ. Summa Stoic. Philoſ.

CAP. II.

I The Partition of *Particular or private Good, into Good Active, and Good Passive.* II. The Division *of Good Passive, into Conservative Good, and Perfective Good.* III. The Division *of the Good of Communion into Generall and Respective Duties.*

I. WHerefore let us now resume and prosecute first *Private* or *Particulare Good*: we will divide it into *Good Active* and *Good Passive*, for this difference of *Good* (not unlike surely to those Appellations, which amongst the Romans, were familiar in their Household Termes of *Promus* and *Condus*) is found impress'd in the whole course of Nature: but chiefly discloseth it selfe in the two severall Appetites of Creatures; the one of *Conserving and fortifying* themselves; the other of *multiplying and dilating* themselves; and this latter which is *Active*, and as it were, the *Promus* seems to be the more powerfull and the more worthy; but the former which is *Passive*, and, as it were, the *Condus*, may be taken as inferior and lesse worthy. For in the universal frame of Nature, the Heavenly nature is chiefly the *Agent*; the Terrestriall nature the *Patient*: so in the Pleasures of living Creatures, the pleasure of Generation is greater, then that of Nutrition: and in the divine Oracles it is pronounced, *Beatiùs esse dare quam accipere.* Nay farther, in the common course of life, there is no mans spirit so soft and effeminate, but estimes the effecting, and bringing to some issue that which he hath fixt in his desire; more than any sensuality or pleasure. And certainly this preheminence of *Active Good*, is infinitely exalted from the consideration of our humane condition, that it is mortal, and also exposed to the stroak of Fortune: for if there could be obtained, a licence of perpetuity and certainty in humane Pleasures, their price would be advanced, for their security and continuance. And in as much as we see, that the summe of all comes

Act. 20.

comes to this, *Magni æſtimamus mori tardiu; Et ne glorieris de craſtino, neſcis partum Diei:* it is no wonder if with all contention of ſpirit, we purſue thoſe things, which are ſecur'd and exempt from the injuries and affronts of time: and theſe things can be nothing elſe but only our *deeds*, as it is ſaid, *opera eorum ſequuntur eos.* Apoc. xiv.

§ There is likewiſe another preheminence of *Good Active* of import, implanted in, and ſupported by that affection, which cleaves cloſe to mans nature, as an individuate companion; which is the *love of Novelty and Variety*. And this *Affection* in the pleaſures of the ſences (which are the very principall part of *Paſſive Good*) is exceeding narrow and hath no great latitude: *Doe but think* (ſaith *Seneca*) *how often you have acted over the ſame things, Meat, Sleep, Mirth, we runne round in this circle, to be willing to dye; not only a valiant, or a wretched, or a wiſe man may, but even a faſtidious and nice nature may.* But in the Enterpriſes, Purpoſes and Purſuits of our life, there is much variety, whereof we are ſenſible in our inceptions, progreſſions, reſts, recoiles, to redintegrate our forces, approaches, attainings and the like; ſo as it was very well ſaid, *vita ſine Propoſito languida & vaga eſt:* which indifferently befalls both to the wiſe and unwiſe, as ſaith *Solomon, A light-brain'd man, ſeeks to ſatisfy his fancy, and intermixeth himſelfe in all things.* Nay we ſee likewiſe, that many great Princes, who may have at command whatſoever can delight the Senſes, notwithſtanding many times, have procured to themſelves poore deſires, and ſet their hearts upon toies; (as *Nero, in playing upon the Harpe; Commodus in playing at Fence; Antoninus in driving Chariots*, and others taken up with other delights) which to them were more acceptable than all the affluence of ſenſual Pleaſures: *ſo much greater refreſhing and contentment it is, to goe forward in Action, than to ſtand at a ſtay in fruition.* This, in the mean, is to be ſomewhat more diligently noted; that this *Active individuall Good*, altogither differs from the *good of Society*, thoe oftentimes they are coincident; for althoe that *Particular Active Good*, doth many times breed, and bring forth

Sen. alicubi.

Sen in Ep.

Prov.

forth *Acts of Beneficence*, which is *a virtue of Communion*; yet here's the difference, that those Acts are by most men performed, not with intention to benefit and make happy others, but meerely in a private respect to themselves, & their own power and amplification. This best appeares when *Good Active* lights upon a subject which is contrary to the *Good of Communion:* for that Gigantive state of minde which possesseth the troublers of the world (such as was *L. Sylla*, and infinite others, thoe in a far smaller Modell) who seeme to endeavour this, to have all men happy or unhappy as they were their Friends or Enimies, and that the world might beare their stamp and be formd to their humours (which is the true *Theomachie*,) this I say, aspires to *Active Particulare Good*, at least in appearance, altho it doth most of all recede from the *Good of Societie*.

II. But we will divide *Passive Good* into *Good Conservative* and *Good Perfective*. For there is implanted in every thing a triple Appetite in respect of *Private* or *Particular Good*; *the first of preserving or continuing it selfe; the second of advancing and perfecting it selfe; the third of multiplying and extending it selfe*: but this last Appetite is referr'd to *Active Good*, whereof we spake even now. There remaine therefore the two other kindes of *Good*, of which the *Perfective* excells; for it is lesse to conserve a thing in its naturall state, but greater to advance the same thing to a higher nature; for there are found through all Essences some noblet natures, to the dignity and excellency whereof inferiour natures doe aspire, as to their originals and springs. So concerning Men, the Poet doth not impertinently describe,

Virg. Æn. 6 *Igneus est Ollis vigor & Cœlestis Origo*;

Mans assumption or approach to a divine or Angelicall Nature is the perfection of his Forme; a depraved and preposterous imitation of which *Perfective Good*, is the destruction of humane life and a violent Tempest which beares downe and ruines all, that is, while men insteed of a formal and essential advancement are carried in a blinde Ambition to an Advancement onely Locall. *For as those* which are sick

ſick and finde no Remedie, doe tumble up and downe and change place, as if by a remove Locall, they could obtaine a remove internall, and ſhift of their diſeaſe: ſo it is in Ambition that men being poſſeſs'd and led away with a falſe reſemblance of exalting their nature, purchaſe nothing elſe but an eminence and celſitude of *Place*.

§ But *Good Conſervative* is no other then *the reception and fruition of things agreeable to our Nature*; and this *Good* tho it bee moſt ſimple and Native; yet ſeemes it to be of all other kinds of *Good* the ſofteſt and loweſt. And this *Good* alſo admits a difference, which hath neither bin well judg'd of, nor well inquired; for the *Good of Fruition*, or (as it is commonly called) the dignitie and commendation *of delightfull Good*, is placed either in the *Syncerity of the Fruition*, or in the *quickneſſe and vigor* of it; whereof the one is ſuperinduced by *Equality*, the other by *Variety* and *Viciſcitude*: the one having a leſſe mixture of *Evill*; the other a more ſtrong and lively impreſsion of *Good*. But of theſe, *whether is the greater Good*, is a queſtion controverted; But *whether a mans nature may becapeable of both at once, is a queſtion not inquired.*

§ As touching that whereof a Queſtion is rais'd: a Controverſie began to be debated between *Socrates* and a *Sophiſt*; *Socrates* affirm'd; *That Felicitie was placed in a conſtant Peace and Tranquility of minde*; but the Sophiſt in this, *That a man deſire much and enjoy much.* And ſo they fell from Arguments to ill words; the Sophiſts ſaying *that Socrates Felicity was the Felicity of a block or ſtone*; *Socrates* on the other ſide, *That the Sophiſts Felicitie was the Felicitie of one that had the Itch, who did nothing but itch and ſcratch.* And both theſe opinions doe not want their ſupports; for to *Socrates* opinion aſſents even the Schoole of *Epicurus* which deemes not but that Virtue beareth a great part in Felicitie; and if ſo, *Certaine it is, that Virtue hath more uſe in cleering Perturbations, then in compaſſing deſires.* The Sophiſts opinion is much favoured by the aſſertion we laſt ſpake of; namely that *Good Perfective is greater than Good Preſervative, becauſe the obtaining of things deſired, ſeemes by degrees to perfit nature, which* Plato in Gorg.

though it doe not doe it indeed, yet the very motion it ſelfe in circle hath a ſhew of Progreſſive Motion.

§ But the ſecond Queſtion, (*whether humane nature may not at once retaine, both the tranquilitie of Minde and the active vigor of fruition*) decided the true way makes the former idle and ſuperfluous. For doe we not often ſee that ſome men are ſo fram'd and compoſed by nature, as they are extremely affected with pleaſures while they are preſent; and yet are not greatly troubled at the leaving or loſſe of them. So as the Philoſophicall conſequence, *Non uti, ut non appetas, non appetere ut non metuas*, ſeemes to be the reſolution of a poore and diffident ſpirit,. Surely moſt of the Doctrines of Philoſophers ſeeme to be ſomewhat more fearefull & cautionary, then the nature of things requireth; as when they encreaſe the feare of death by curing it: for when they would have a mans whole life to be but a diſcipline or preparation to die; how can it be that that enimie ſhould not ſeeeme wonderfull terrible, againſt whom there is no end of preparing? better ſaith the Poet thoe a Heathen,

Iuven. Satir. 10. *Qui ſpacium vitæ extremum, inter munera ponat Naturæ.----*

So have the Philoſophers ſought to make the Minde in all things uniforme and Harmonicall; by not breaking them to contrary Motions and extremes. The reaſon whereof I ſuppoſe to have bin, becauſe they dedicated themſelves to a private courſe of life, exempt & free from active imploiments and obſervances to others. But let men rather imitate the wiſdome of Iewellers, who, if perchance, there be in the Gemme a Cloud or an Ice, which may ſo be ground forth, as it abate not thē ſtone too much, they help it, otherwiſe they will not meddle with it: ſo ought men ſo to procure *Serenitie* of minde as they deſtroy not *Magnanimitie*. Thus much of *Particulare Good*.

III. Now therefore after we have ſpoken of *Selfe-good* (which alſo we uſe to call *Good Particular, Private, Individuall*, let us reſume the *Good of Communion*, which reſpecteth *Society*, This is commonly termed by the name of *Duty*, becauſe

because the terme of *Duty*, is more proper to a mind well fram'd and dispos'd towards others, the terme of *Virtue*, to a mind well form'd and compos'd in it selfe. But this part at first sight may seeme to pertaine to *Science Civile*, or *Politique*, but not if it be well observed, for it concernes the Regiment and Goverment of every man over himselfe, and not over others. *And as in Architecture*, it is one thing, to frame the Posts, Beams, and other parts of an Edifice, and to prepare them for the use of building; and another thing, to fit and joyne the same parts togither: and as in Mechanicalls, the direction how to frame, and make an instrument or engine, is not the same with the manner of erecting, moving, and setting it on work: So the doctrine of the conjugation of men, in a *Citty or Society*, differs from that which makes them conformed, and well affected to the weale of such a *Society*.

§ This Part of Duties is likewise distributed into two portions, whereof the one respects the *common duty of every man*; the other *the speciall and respective Duties*, of every man in his profession, vocation, state, person, and place. The first of these, hath bin well laboured, and diligently explicated by the Ancients and others, as hath bin said: the other we find to have bin sparsedly handled, althoe not digested into an entire body of a *Science*; which manner of dispersed kind of writing, we doe not dislike; howbeit in our judgement, to have written of this Argument by parts, were farre better. For who is endewed with so much perspicacity and confidence, as that he can take upon him to discourse, and make a judgement skilfully, and to the life, of the *peculiar and respective duties*, of every particular order, condition and profession? *And the treatises which are not seasond with experience, but are drawne only from a generall and Scholasticall notion of things, are touching such matters, for most part, idle and fruitlesse discourses.* For althoe sometimes a looker on may see more then a gamester, and there be a common proverbe, more arrogant than sound, proceeding from the censure of the vulgar, touching the actions of Princes,

That the vale best discovereth the Hills; yet it could be especially wished, that none would intermeddle or engage themselves in subjects of this nature, but only such as are well experienc'd and practis'd in the particular customes of men.

Cic. Lib. 2. de Oratore. *For the labours and vigilancies of speculative men, in Active Matters, doe seem to men of experience, little better than the discourses of Phormio of the warres, seemed to Hannibal, which estimed them but dreames and dotage.* Onely there is one vice which accompanies them, which write books of matters pertaining to their own profession, and Arts, which is, that they magnify and extoll them in excesse.

K. IAMES. DORON. BASIL. § *In which kind of Books, it were a crime Piacular, not to mention,* Honoris causa, *Your Majesties excellent work* touching the duty of a King: *for this writing hath accumulated and congested within it many treasures as well open as secret of* Divinity, Morality, *and* Policy, with great aspersion of all other Arts; *and it is in my opinion one of the most sound and healthfull writings that I have read. It doth not float with the heat of Invention, nor freez and sleepe with the coldnesse of negligence: it is not now & than taken with a wheeling dizzines, so to confound and loose it selfe in its order; nor is it distracted and discontinued by digressions, as those discourses are, which by a winding expatiation, fetch in and enclose matter that speaks nothing to the purpose; nor is it corrupted, with the cheating Arts of Rhetoricall perfumes and paintings, who chuse rather to please the Reader, than to satisfy the nature of the Argument. But chiefly that work hath life and spirit, as Body and Bulke, as excellently agreeing with truth, and most apt for use and action: and likewise clearely exempt from that vice noted even now, (which if it were tolerable in any, certainly, it were so in* KINGS, *and in a writing concerning Regal Majesty) namely, that it doth not excessively and invidiously exalt the Crowne and Dignity of Kings. For* Your Majesty *hath not described a King of* Persia *or* Assyria, *radiant, and shining in extreme Pompe and Glory; but really, a* Moses *or a* David, *Pastors of the People. Neither can I ever loose out of my remembrance, a Speech, which* Your Majesty, *in the sacred*

ſacred Spirit, wherewith you are endowed to governe Your people, delivered in a great cauſe of Iudicature, which was, That Kings rul'd by the Lawes of their Kingdomes, as God did by the Lawes of Nature; and ought as rarely to put in uſe that their prerogative, which tranſcends Lawes, as we ſee God put in uſe his power of working Miracles. *And yet notwithſtanding in that other book, written by* Your Majeſty, of a free Monarch, *You give all men to underſtand, that* Your Majeſty, *knowes and comprehends the Plenitude of the Power of Kings, and the Latitudes (as the Schooles ſpeak) of Regall Rights, as well as the circle and bounds of their Office, and Royall Duty.* Wherefore I have preſumed, to alleage *that book* written by *Your Majeſty*, as a prime and moſt eminent example of Tractates, concerning *ſpeciall and Reſpective Duties*. Of which Book, what I have now ſaid, I ſhould in truth have ſaid as much, if it had bin written by any King a thouſand years ſince. Neither doth that kind of nice Decency move me, whereby commonly it is preſcribed *not to praiſe in preſence*, to thoſe Praiſes exceed not meaſure, or be attributed unſeaſonably or upon no occaſion preſented. Surely *Cicero* in that excellent oration *Pro M. Marcello* ſtudies nothing elſe, but to exhibite a faire Table drawne by ſingular Art, of *Cæſars virtues*, thoe that Oration was made to his face; which likewiſe *Plinius ſecundus* did to *Trajan*. Now let us reſume our intended purpoſe.

IACOB. R. dictum memorab.

DE LIB MONAR.

Cicero.

Plin. Iun.

§ There belongs farther to this part, touching the *Reſpective Duties of vocations and particular Profeſſions*, and other *knowledge*, as it were, Relative and Oppoſite unto the former, concerning the *Fraudes, Cautels, Impoſtures*, and *vices of every Profeſſion*: For Corruptions and Vices, are oppoſed to Duties and Virtues. Nor are theſe *Depravations* altogither ſilenced in many writings and Tractates; but for moſt part, theſe are noted only upon the By, and that by way of Digreſsion: but how? rather in a Satyre and Cynically after *Lucians* manner, than ſeriouſly and gravely, for men have rather ſought by wit to traduce, and to expoſe to

* SATYRA SERIA, ſive de Interioribus rerum.

ſcorne that which is uſefull and ſound, in Arts and Profeſſions; than to ſever that which is good and wholſome, from that which is corrupt and vicious. But *Solomon* ſaith excellently; *A ſcorner ſeeks wiſdome and findes it not; but knowledge is eaſy unto him that underſtands*: for he that comes to ſeek after knowledge, with a mind to ſcorne, and cenſure; ſhall be ſure to find matter for his humor, but no matter for his inſtruction. And certainly a grave and wiſe Treatiſe of this argument, whereof we now ſpeak, and that with ſincerity and integrity, ſeemeth worthy to be reckoned one of the beſt fortifications of virtue and honeſty, that can be planted. *For as the Fable goes* of the Baſiliske, that if he ſee a man firſt, the man dies; but if a man ſee him firſt, the Baſiliske dies; ſo it is with Fraudes, Impoſtures, and evill Arts; if a man diſcover them firſt, they looſe their power of doing hurt; but if they prevent, then, and not otherwiſe, they endanger. So that we are much beholding to *Machiavill*, and ſuch writers, who diſcover apertly and plainly, what men uſe to doe, not what men ought to doe: for it is not poſsible to joyne the *wiſdome of the Serpent, with the Innocency of the Dove*, except a man know exactly the nature of evill it ſelfe; for without this skill, virtue lies open and unſenced; nay a ſincere and honeſt man, can doe no good upon thoſe that are wicked, to reclaime them, unleſſe he know all the coverts and profundities of Malice. For men of corrupt minds and deprav'd judgements, preſuppoſe, that honeſty growes out of the weakneſſe of Nature, and ſimplicity of Manners, and only out of a beliefe given to Preachers and Schoole-Maſters; as likewiſe to Books, Morall Precepts; and popular opinions: ſo that unleſſe you can make them plainly to perceive, that their deprav'd and corrupt Principles, and crooked Rules, are as deeply founded, and as plainly diſcovered, by thoſe who exhort and admoniſh them, as they are to themſelves, they deſpiſe all the integrity of Morall Practices or Precepts; according to that admirable Oracle of *Solomon*, *Non recipit ſtultus verba prudentiæ, niſi ea dixerit, quæ verſantur in corde ejus*. But this part

Prov. XIV.

Prov. 18.

concern-

concerning *Respective Cautels and vices*, we place in the number of DEFICIENTS, and will call it by the name of SATYRA SERIA, or of a Treatise *De Interioribus Rerum.*

So to this kind of knowledge, touching *Respective Duties*, doe also appertaine the *Naturall Duties* between Husband and wife; Parents and Children, Master and Servant: so likewise the lawes of Friendship and Gratitude; as also the Civile bonds of Corporations, Companies, Colledges, Neighbour-hood and the like. But it must ever be presupposed, that they are here handled, not as parts of *Civile society* (for that is referr'd to the Politiques) but as to the framing and predisposing of the Minds of Particular persons, to the maintaining of those *Bonds of Society.*

§ *But the Knowledge concerning the Good of Communion or of Society*, even as that of *Good Individuall*, doth handle *Good* not *simple alone*, but also *comparatively*; whereunto belongs the waighing of Duties between Person and Person; Case and Case; Private and Publique; between time Present and Future: as we may see in the severe and cruell proceeding of L. *Brutus* against his own Sonnes, which by the most was extoll'd to the heavens; yet another said

Infelix utcunq; ferent ea fata Minores.

Liv. Hist. lib. 2. Florus Hist. lib. 1. Plutar. in M. Bruto.

The same we may see in that supper unto which *M. Brutus*, and *C. Cassius* were invited, for there when there was a question shrewdly cast forth, *Whether it was lawfull to kill a Tyranne?* on purpose to feele the minds of the company, touching a conspiracy intended against *Cæsars* life; the guests were divided in opinion; some said it was directly lawfull, *for that servitude was the extreme of Evills*; Others were of a contrary mind, *for that Tyranny was not so great a misery as Civile warre*; a third sort, as if they had issued out of the Schoole of *Epicurus*, avouched; *That it was an unworthy thing, that wise men should hazard their lives and States for Foole.* But there are many Cases touching *comparative Duties*, amongst which, that of all other is the most frequent; *Whether a man ought to swerve from the rule of Justice, for the safety of his Country, or some such notable Good; to ensue afterward?*

ward? Touching which caſe *Jaſon* of *Theſſalie* was wont to ſay, *Aliqua ſunt injuſtè facienda ut multa juſtè fieri poſsint*, but the Reply is ready, *Auctorem preſentis juſtitiæ habes, ſponſorem futuræ non habes:* Men muſt purſue things which are juſt in preſent, and leave the future to the Divine Providence. And thus touching the *Exemplar*, or of the deſcription of *Good*.

Plut. Moral. Præc. gerend. Reip.

CAP. III.

I. The Partition *of the Doctrine of the Culture of the Mind, into the Knowledge of the Characters of the Mind.* II. *Of the Affections or Paſsions.* III. *And of the Remedies or Cures.* IIII. *An Append of the ſame Doctrine, touching the Congruity between the Good of the Mind, and the Good of the Body.*

NOw that we have ſpoken in a Philoſophical ſenſe of the *fruit of Life*, it remaines that we ſpeak of the *Culture of the Mind*, which is due unto it, without which the former part ſeems nothing elſe, than an Image or Statue, beautifull to contemplate, but deſtitute of Life and Motion; to which opinion, *Ariſtotle* himſelfe ſubſcribes in theſe plain words, *Wherefore it is neceſſary to ſpeak of vertue, both what it is, and from what it proceeds: for it would be to litle purpoſe, to know vertue, and to be iguorant of the manner and means how to compaſſe it. Crncerning vertue therefore inquiry muſt be made, not only of what kind it is, but by what wayes it may be acquired: for we deſire both theſe, the knowledge of the thing it ſelfe, and the fruition thereof; but this cannot be effected, unleſſe we know of what materialls it is compounded, and how to procure the ſame:* In ſuch full words, and with ſuch iteration doth he inculcate this Part; which yet notwithſtanding himſelfe purſues not. This likewiſe is the very ſame which *Cicero* attributes to *Cato* the Younger, as a great commendation, which was, that he had applyed himſelfe to Philoſophy, *Non diſputandi cauſa, ut magna pars, ſed ita vivendi*. And althoe through the negligence of the times wherein

Mag. Moral. lib. 1.

Pro. L. Muræn.

wherein we live, few hold any conſultation diligently, to manure and till the Mind, and frame their courſe of life (according to ſome Rule; according to that of *Seneca*, *De partibus vitæ quiſque deliberat, de ſummâ nemo*; ſo as this part may ſeem ſuperfluous,) yet this moves us not, ſo as to leave it untouched, but rather we conclude with that Aphoriſme of *Hippocrates*, *They who are ſick of a dangerous diſeaſe, and feele no paine, are diſtempered in their underſtanding*: Such men need medicine, not only to aſſwage the diſeaſe, but to awake the ſenſe. And if it be ſaid that the *Cure of mens minds*, belongs to ſacred Divinity, it is moſt truly ſaid; but yet why may not *Morall Philoſophy* be accepted into the traine of *Theology*, as a wiſe ſervant and a faithfull hand-maid, ready at all commands to doe her ſervice? For as it is in the Pſalme, *That the eyes of the Hand-maid, look perpetually towards the Miſtreſſe*; and yet no doubt many things are left to the diſcretion and care of the Hand-maid; ſo ought *Morall Philoſophy* to give all due obſervance to Divinity, and to be obſequious to hir Precepts; yet ſo, as it may yeeld of it ſelfe, within its own limits, many ſound and profitable directions. *This Part therefore*, when I ſeriouſly conſider the excellency thereof, I can not but find exceeding ſtrange, that it is not yet reduced into *a Body of Knowledge*. Wherefore ſeeing we have reported it as DEFICIENT, we will after our manner give ſome Adumbrations thereof.

De Brev. vitæ.

Aphor. l. 2.

Pſal. 123.

1. *First therefore*, in this as in all things which are Practicall, we ought to caſt up our account, *what is in our power, and what not: for the one may be dealt with by way of Alteration; the other by way of Application only*. The Husband-man cannot command either the nature of the Earth, or the ſeaſons of the weather; no more can the Phyſitian the natural temper or conſtitution of the Patient or the variety of Accidents. Now in the *Culture of the mind of man*, and the cure of the Diſeaſes thereof; three things fall into conſideration: *The diverſe Characters of Diſpoſitions; the Affections; and the Remedies*. As in curing the Body three things are propounded, the *Complexion or Conſtitution of the Patient; the Diſeaſe; and the*

GEORGICA ANIMI, ſive de culturâ Morum.

Cure; and of theſe three, the laſt only is in our power, the two former are not. Yet even in thoſe things which are not in our power, no leſſe diligent inquiry is to be made thereof, then in thoſe which are ſubject to our power; for a diſtinct and exact knowledge of them, is to be laid as a ground-work to the *knowledge of the Remedies*; that they may be more aptly and ſucceſſefully applied; for neither can a garment be well fitted to the Body, unleſſe you firſt take the meaſure of the Body.

§ *Wherefore* the firſt article of this knowledge *of the Culture of the Mind*, ſhall be converſant about the *diverſe Characters of mens natures or diſpoſitions*. Neither doe we here ſpeak of thoſe common Proclivities to virtues and vices; or Perturbations and paſsions: but of thoſe which are more intrinſique and radicall. Surely for this part of knowledge, I doe much wonder that it ſhould be, for moſt part, ſo neglected or ſlightly paſt over, by writers Moral and Political; conſidering it caſts ſuch reſplendent beams upon both thoſe kinds of knowledges. In the Traditions of *Aſtrology*, the natures & diſpoſitions of men, are not without ſome colour of truth, diſtinguiſht from the Prædominancies of Planets; as that ſome are by nature made and proportioned for *contemplation*; others for *matters Civile*; others for *Warre*; others for *Advancement*; others for *Pleaſure*; others for *Arts*; others for changeable courſe of life. So among the Poets, Heroicall, Satyricall, Tragedians, Comedians, you ſhall finde every where, the Images of wits, althoe commonly with exceſſe and beyound the bounds of Truth. Nay this ſame Argument of the *divers Characters of Nature*, is one of thoſe ſubjects, wherein the common diſcourſes of men, (which very ſeldome, yet ſometimes falls out) are more wiſe then Books. But the beſt proviſion and collection for ſuch a treatiſe, ought to be fetcht from the obſervations of the wiſeſt ſort of Hiſtorians; not only from Elogies and Panegyriques, which commonly follow the death of a Perſon; but much more from the entire body of a Hiſtory, ſo often as ſuch a perſonage doth, as it were, enter upon the ſtage. For this inter-woven Image, ſeems to be a more lively deſcription

tion, than the cenſure of an Elogy, ſuch as is that in *T. Livius, of Africanus*, and of *Cato the Elder*; *in Tacitus of Tiberius, Claudius and Nero*; *in Herodian, of Septimius Severus*; *in Philip de Commines, of Lewis the XI.* K. of France; *in Fra. Guicciardine, of Ferdinand King of Spaine*; *Maximilian the Emperour*; *Leo and Clemens, Biſhops of Rome*. For thoſe writers fixing their eyes continually on the Images of theſe Perſons, whom they made choice of to decipher, and purtrait, ſeldome mention their Acts and Atchievements, but withall, inſert ſomething touching their nature and diſpoſitions; ſo likewiſe many *Relations, touching the Conclaves of Popes*, which we have met withall, repreſent *good Characters, and lively impreßions*, of the naturall diſpoſitions of *Cardinalls*; as the letters of Ambaſſadors, ſet forth the nature and manners of Counſilors to Princes. Wherefore let there be a full, and perfect collection made of this argument, whereof we have ſpoken, which certainly is fertile and copious. *Neither would we*, that thoſe *Characters* in the *Ethiques* (as it is with Hiſtorians, Poets, and in common ſpeech,) ſhould be accepted as perfit politique Images; but rather as the firſt draughts and rude lineaments of thoſe Images, which compounded and commixt, conſtitute any reſemblances whatſoever; how many and of what ſort they may be; and how they are connext and ſubordinate one with another: that there may be made, as it were, an artificiall and accurate diſſection of natures and diſpoſitions, and a diſcovery of the ſecret inclinations of Individual tempers; and that from a knowledge thereof, precepts of cure may be more pertinently preſcribed.

§ And not only the *Characters of diſpoſitions*, impreſſed by nature, ſhould be received into this Tractate; but thoſe alſo which are impoſed upon the mind, from Sex, Age, Region, Health, Beauty, and the like: as alſo thoſe from externe fortune, as of Princes, Nobles, obſcure Perſons; Rich, Poore, Private perſons, Proſperous, Miſerable, and the like. For we ſee *Plautus* makes it a wonder to ſee an old man Beneficent, *Benignitas quidem huius, oppidò ut adoleſcentuli eſt.* Mil. Glo.

and S. *Paule*, commanding that the ſeverity of diſcipline, ſhould be uſed to the *Cretans*, (*rebuke them ſharply*) accuſeth the nature of that Nation from a Poet; *Cretenſes ſemper mendaces, malæ beſtiæ, ventres pigri.* *Saluſt* notes this in the nature of Kings, that it is uſuall with them to deſire contradictories; *Plerunq; Regiæ voluntates ut vehementes ſunt, ſic mobiles, ſæpeq; ipſæ ſibi adverſæ.* *Tacitus* obſerves that Honours and advancements, oftner change mens natures to the worſe, than to the better, *Solus Veſpaſianus mutatus in melius.* *Pindarus* makes an obſervation, that great and *Sodoms* fortune for moſt part, looſens and diſsinues mens minds; *ſunt, qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non poſſunt:* ſo the Pſalme ſheweth, that it is more eaſy to keep a meaſure and temperament, in a modeſt conſiſtency; than in the increaſe of Fortune, *If Riches increaſe ſet not your heart upon them.* These obſervations and the like, I deny not, but are touched a litle by *Ariſtotle*, as in paſſage, in his Rhetoriques; as likewiſe in the writings of others diſperſedly by the way; but they were never yēt incorporated into *Morall Philoſophy*, to which they doe principally appertaine; no leſſe certainly, than the handling of the diverſity of grounds and moulds, doth to *Agriculture*; or the handling of the diverſity of complexions and conſtitutions of the body, doth to *Medicine*. The ſame muſt be obſerved here, except we mean to follow the indiſcretion of Empiriques, which miniſter the ſame medicines to all Patients, of what conſtitution ſoever.

Ad Tit. c. 1 exEpimen

In Iugurth.

Hiſt. lib. 1.

Pindar.

Pſal. 62.

II. *After the knowledge of Characters* followes the *knowledge* of *Affections* and *Paſsions*, which are as the *Diſeaſes of the Mind*, as hath bin ſaid. For as the Ancient Politiques in Populare States were wont to ſay, *That the people were like the Sea, and the Orators like the windes*; becauſe as the *Sea* would of it ſelfe be calme and quiet, if the *winds* did not move and trouble it; ſo the *People* of their nature would be peaceable and tractable, if the *ſeditious Orators* did not ſet them in working and agitation. So it may be truly affirmed, that *mans mind* in the nature thereof, would be temperate

perate and ſtaid, if the *affections* as windes, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here againe I finde it ſtrange, that *Ariſtotle*, who writ ſo many books of *Ethiques*, ſhould never in them, handle the *Affections*, as an eſſentiall member of *Ethiques*; and yet in the *Rhetoriques* where they are conſidered but Collaterally, and in a ſecond degree (that is ſo farre as they may be rais'd and moved by ſpeech) he findes place for them, (in which place notwithſtanding, for ſuch an abridgement, he diſcourſeth acutely and well,) for his diſputations about *pleaſure and paine*, no way ſatisfy this inquiry; no more than he that ſhould write only of *light* and *lightening*, could be ſaid, to have written of the nature of *particular Colours*; for *Pleaſure* and *Paine*, are to the particular affections, as *light* is to *Colours*. Better travailes the Stoiques have taken in this argument, as farre as may be conjectured from ſuch Remaines as are extant; but yet ſuch as conſiſted rather in curioſity of Definitions, than any full and ample deſcriptions. So likewiſe I find ſome elegant Bookes of ſome *affections*, as of *Anger*, *of tenderneſſe*, *of countenance*, and ſome few other. But to ſpeak the truth, the beſt Doctors of *this knowledge* are the Poets, and writers of Hiſtories, where we may finde painted and diſſected to the life, how affections are to be ſtirred up and kindled; how ſtill'd and laid a ſleep; how againe contain'd and refrain'd, that they break not forth into Act? likewiſe how they diſcloſe themſelves thoe repreſſed and ſecreted? what operations they produce? what turnes they take? how they are enwrapt one within another? how they fight and encounter one with another? and other the like Particularities. Amongſt the which, this laſt is of ſpeciall uſe in Morale and Civile matters, *How I ſay, to ſet Affection againſt Affection; and by the helpe of one to maſter and reclaime another*? After the manner of Hunters and Fowlers, who hunt Beaſt with Beaſt; and fly Bird with Bird; which percaſe of themſelves without the aſsiſtance of Bruit Creatures, a man could not ſo eaſily recover. Nay farther, upon this foundation, is erected that excellent and univerſall uſe in matters

Civile of *Præmium* and *Pœna*, which are the *Pillars of Civile States*, ſeeing thoſe *predominant Affections* of *Feare* and *Hope* doe bridle & ſuppreſſe all other exorbitant *Affections*. Again, as in goverment of States, it is ſometimes neceſſary to confront and bridle one Faction with another; ſo it is in the inward *Goverment of the Minde*.

III Now come we to thoſe Points which are *within our own commande*, and have force and operation upon the mind, and alſo affect, diſpoſe, and manage the *Will* and *Appetite*; and therefore are of great force to alter the manners. In which part the Philoſophers ought to have made a painefull and diligent *Inquirie* touching the *Power and Energie of Cuſtome*, *Exerciſe*, *Habit*, *Education*, *Converſation*, *Friendſhip*, *Praiſe*, *Reprehenſion*, *Exhortation*, *Fame*, *Laws*, *Books*, *Studies*, and other points of like nature. *Theſe* are *they* which have the ſway and dominion in *Moralitie*; from theſe Agents the mind ſuffereth and is diſpoſed; of theſe, as of Ingredients, receits are compounded, which conduce to the conſervation and recovery of the Health and good eſtate of the Minde as far as may bee performed by Humane Remedies. Of which number we will ſelect one or two whereupon wee will a litle inſiſt as an example to the reſt. We will therefore inſinuate a few points *touching Cuſtome* and *Habit*.

Moral. Nicom. lib. 2. That opinion of *Ariſtotle* ſeemeth to me to ſavour of negligence and a narrow Contemplation, where he aſſerts--*that thoſe Actions which are naturall can not be changd by cuſtome*; uſing for example--*that if a ſtone bethrowne a thouſand times up, it will not learne to aſcend of its own accord: Moreover, that by often ſeeing or hearing, we doe not learne to heare or ſee the better:* for though this principle be true in ſome things wherein Nature is Peremptotory (the reaſons whereof wee cannot now ſtand to diſcuſſe) yet it is otherwiſe in things wherein Nature according to a *Latitude* admits *intention* and *remiſſion*. He might ſee that a ſtraight glove by often drawing on, is made wider; and that a wand by uſe and continuance is bowed contrary to its naturall bent in the growth, and ſoone after ſtayes in the ſame poſture; that the voice

voice by exercizing it becomes louder and ſtronger; that heat and cold are better endur'd by cuſtome; and many inſtances of like kinde. Which two latter examples have a neerer reſemblance and come neerer to the point, than thoſe he there alleadgeth. But however this caſe be determin'd, by how much the more true it is; *that both Virtues and Vices conſiſt in habit*; he ought, by ſo much the more, to have endeavour'd, to have ſo preſcrib'd rules *how ſuch habits might be acquired, or remov'd:* for there may be many Precepts made of the wiſe ordering of the *Exerciſes of the Minde*, no leſſe then of the *Exerciſes of the Body*; whereof wee will recite a few.

§ *The firſt ſhall be; that we beware even at firſt of higher or ſmaller taskes, than the nature of the buſineſſe requires, or our leaſure or abilities permit:* For if too great a taske be impos'd, in a meane diffident nature, you blunt the edge of cheerefulneſſe and blaſt their hopes; in a nature full of Confidence, you breed an opinion whereby a man promiſeth to himſelfe more than he is able to performe; which drawes on ſloath and ſecurity; and in both thoſe temperatures, it will come to paſſe that the experiment doth not ſatisfie the expectation; which ever diſcourageth and confounds the minde: but if the Tasks be too weake and eaſie, in the ſumme of proceeding there is a loſſe and prejudice.

§ *A ſecond ſhall be; that to the practiſing of any facultie, whereby a habit may be ſuperinduced, two Seaſons are chiefly to be obſerved; the one when the minde is beſt diſpoſed to a buſineſſe; the other when it is worſt*: that by the one, we may be well forwards on our way; by the latter, we may by a ſtrenuous contention worke out the knots and ſtonds of the minde; which makes midle times to paſſe with more eaſe and pleaſure.

§ *A third Precept ſhall be that which Ariſtotle mentions by the way, which is to beare ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclin'd, ſo it be without vice.* Like as when we rowe againſt the ſtreame; or when wee make a crooked wand ſtraight by bending it the contrary way. Moral. Nicom. lib. 2.

§ *The*

§ *The Fourth Precept is grounded upon that Axiome which is moſt true. That the minde is brought to any thing, with more ſweetneſſe and happineſſe, if that whereunto we pretend, bee not principal in the intention of the Doer; but be overcome, as it were, doing ſomewhat elſe; becauſe the inſtinct of nature is ſuch a freedome as hates neceßity and compulſive commands.* Many other rules there are which might profitably be preſcribed touching the *Direction of Cuſtome*: for *Cuſtome*, if it be wiſely and skilfully induced, *proves* (as it is commonly ſaid) *an other nature*; but being conducted abſurdly and by chance, *it is only the Ape of Nature*; which imitates nothing to the life, but in a fooliſh deformity onely.

§ *So if we ſhould* ſpeake of *Bookes* and *Studies*, and of their power and influence upon Manners; are there not divers Precepts and fruitfull Directions appertaining thereunto? Hath not one of the Fathers in great indignation called *Poeſie vinum Dæmonum*; being indeed it begets many Temptations, Luſts, and vaine Opinions? It is not a wiſe opinion of *Ariſtotle* and worthy to be regarded: *That young men are no fit auditors of Morall Philoſophy, becauſe the boyling heat of their affections, is not yet ſetled, nor attemperd with Time and Experience.* And to ſpeake truth, doth it not hereof come that thoſe excellent Books and Diſcourſes of ancient Writers, (whereby they have perſwaded unto virtue moſt effectually; repreſenting as well her ſtately Majeſtie to the eyes of the world, as expoſing to Scorne, popular Opinions in diſgrace of Virtue, attired as it were, in their *Paraſite Coats*) are of ſo litle effect towards honeſty of life and the reformation of corrupt Manners; becauſe they uſe not to be read and revolv'd by men mature in yeeres and judgement; but are left and confin'd onely to Boyes and Beginners. *But is it not true alſo that young men are much leſſe fit Auditors of Policie than Moralitie*, till they have bin throughly ſeaſon'd with *Religion* and the knowledge of Manners and Duties; leſt their judgements be corrupted and made apt to think that there are no *Moral* differences true and ſolid of things; but that all is to be valued according to a utilitie and fortune. As the Poet ſaith, *Proſperum*

Moral. Nicom. Lib. 1.

Proſperum & felix ſcelus virtus vocatur. Iuvenal. Sat. 13.

And againe,

Ille crucem pretium ſceleris tulit, hic Diadema.

But the Poets ſeeme to ſpeak this Satyrically, and in indignation; be it ſo, yet many Books of Policie doe ſuppoſe the ſame ſeriouſly and poſitively: for ſo it pleaſed *Machiavell* to ſay, *That if Cæſar had bin overthrowne hee would have bin more odious than ever was Catiline*; as if there had bin no difference but in *fortune* onely, between a very fury compoſed of Luſt and Blood, and the moſt excellent ſpirit (his ambition reſerved) in the world. By this we ſee how neceſſary it is, for men to drink deeply *Pious and Morall knowledges*, before they taſt *Politique*; for that they who are bred up in the Courts of Princes from tender yeeres, and in affaires of ſtate, commonly never attaine an inward and ſyncere Probitie of Manners; how much further of from honeſtie, if to this fire of corrupt education there be adminiſtred the fewell of corrupt Books? *Againe*, even in Morall inſtructions themſelves, or at leaſt in ſome of them is there not a Caution likewiſe to be given, leſt they make men too Preciſe, Arrogant, and Incompatible; according to that of *Cicero* touching *M. Cato*, *Theſe Divine and excellent qualities which we ſee are his own proper endowments, but ſuch as are ſometimes deficient in him, are all deriv'd from Teachers and not from Nature.* There are many other Axioms touching thoſe properties and effects which Studies and Books doe inſtill into the mindes of men: for it is true that he ſaith, *abeunt ſtudia in mores*; which may likewiſe be affirm'd of thoſe other points touching *Companie*; *Fame*, the *Lawes of our Country*, and the reſt which a litle before we recited. But there is a kinde of *Culture of the Minde* which ſeemes yet more acurate and elaborate than the reſt, and is built upon this ground, *That the mindes of all Mortals are at ſome certaine times in a more perfect ſtate; at other times in a more depraved ſtate.* The purpoſe therefore and direction of *this Culture* is, that thoſe good ſeaſons may be cheriſht, & the evill croſt, and expunged out of the Kalender. *The fixation of good Times* is procured by two meanes, by *vowes or at*

Pro L. Murena.

Leaſt *moſt conſtant Reſolutions* of the Mind; and by *Obſervances and exerciſes*, which are not to be regarded ſo much in themſelves, as becauſe they keep the mind in her devoir and continuall obedience. The *obliteration of evill Times* may be in like manner perfected two waies; by ſome *kind of Redemption or expiation of that which is paſt*; and by a *new courſe of life*, as it were, *turning over a clean leafe*. But this part ſeems wholly to appertaine to Religion, and Juſtly, conſidering that true and genuine *Morale Philoſophy*, as was ſaid, ſupplies the place of a Hand-maid only to *Divinity*. wherefore we will conclude this part of the *Culture of the Mind*, with that remedy which of all other meanes is the moſt compendious and ſummary; and againe the moſt noble and effectuall, to the reducing of the mind to virtue, and the placing of it in a ſtate next to perfection: and this is, *That we make choice of, and propound to our ſelves, right ends of life and Actions, and agreeing to virtue; which yet muſt be ſuch as may be in a reaſonable ſort within our compaſſe to attaine*. For if theſe two things be ſuppos'd, *that the ends of Actions be Honeſt and Good*; and *that the Reſolution of the mind, for the purſuing and obtaining them, be fixt, conſtant, and true unto ſuch ends*; it will follow that the mind ſhall forthwith transforme and mould it ſelfe into all virtues at once. And this indeed is an operation, which reſembleth the *work of nature*, whereas other courſes whereof we have ſpoken, are like the *work of the hand*. For as when a Carver cuts and graves an Image, he ſhapes only that part whereupon he works, and not the reſt; as if he be faſhioning the Face, the reſt of the Body is a rude and formeleſſe ſtone ſtill, till ſuch time as he come to it: but contrariwiſe, when *Nature* makes a Flower or *Living Creature*, ſhe ingenders and brings forth rudiments of all the parts at one time. So in obtaining virtues by *habite*, while a man practiſeth *Temperance*, he doth not profit much to *Fortitude* and the like; but when we wholly dedicate and devote our ſelves to good and honeſt ends, look what virtue ſoever *ſuch ends* commends and commands, our mind unto, we ſhall find our ſelves already inveſted and

prediſ-

prediſpoſited with a kind of hability and propenſion to purſue and expreſſe the ſame. And this may be that *State of Mind* which is excellently deſcribed by *Ariſtotle*, and expreſſed with the character, not of *virtue*, but a kind of *Divinity*, his words are theſe; *And with* IMMANITY, *we may not unaptly countre-ballance, that ability which is above humanity;* HEROICK OR DIVINE VIRTUE: and a litle after, *for as Savage Creatures are incapable of Vice or Virtue; ſo is the Deity: but this ſtate is a thing higher than virtue; that, ſomewhat elſe than vice.* Indeed *Plinius Secundus*, from the licence of Heathen magniloquence, ſet forth the virtue of *Trajane*, not as an imitation, but as a patterne too divine, when he ſaith, *That men need to make no other praires to the Gods, but that they would continue as good and as gracious Lords to them, as Trajane had bin.* But theſe are the prophane and unhallowed Aires of Heathens, who apprehend ſhadowes greater then the Body: but true Religion, and the Holy Chriſtian Faith, laies hold on the ſubſtance it ſelfe, imprinting upon mens Minds *Charity*, which is moſt properly called, *The bond of perfection;* becauſe it comprehends and faſtens all virtues togither. Surely it is elegantly ſaid by *Menander* of *vaine Love*, which is but a counterfeit imitation of *Divine Love*, *Amor melior ſophiſtâ lævo, ad humanam vitam*; by which words he inſinuates, *that good and decent carriage, is better learn'd from* Love, *then from a* Sophiſt, *or an inept Tutor*; whom hee calls *Left-handed*, becauſe with all his tedious Rules and Precepts, he cannot forme a man ſo dexterouſly, and with that facility to valu himſelfe, and governe himſelfe, as *Love* can doe. So certainly, if a mans mind be truly inflamed with the *heat of Charity*, he ſhall be exalted to a greater degree of Perfection, then by all the *Doctrine of Morality*, which, indeed, is but a *Sophiſt* in compariſon of the other. Nay farther as *Xenophon* obſerved truly, *That all other affections thoe they raiſe the Mind, yet they diſtort and diſorder it by their extaſies and exceſſes; but only love doth at the ſame inſtant, dilate and compoſe the mind.* So all other humane excellencies, which we admire; thoe they advance nature, yet they

Moral. Nicom. lib. 7.

Paneg.

Coloſ. 3.

De Inſt. Cyri.

are ſubject to *exceſſe*; only *Charity* admits no exceſſe. So we ſee the Angels while they aſpired to be like God in power, prevaricated and fell, *I will aſcend above the altitude of the cloudes, I will be like the moſt high.* So man, while he aſpired to be like God in Knowledge, digreſſed and fell: *ye ſhall be like Gods knowing Good and Evill:* but by aſpiring to a ſimilitude of Gods *Goodneſſe* or *Love*, neither Man nor Angell ever was endangered, nor ſhall be endangered. Nay we are invited to this imitation *Bleſſe them that curſe you, and pray for them that deſpitefully uſe you and perſecute you; that you may be the ſonnes of your father which is in Heaven: for he makes his Sunne to riſe on the Evill and on the Good; and ſends Raine upon the juſt, and upon the unjuſt.* So in the firſt Platforme of the Divine Nature, the Heathen Religion placeth Gods attributes thus, *Optimus Maximus*; and ſacred Scripture ſpeaks thus, *Miſericordia ejus, ſupra omnia opera ejus.*

Eſa. 14.
Gen. 3.
Mat. 5.
Pſal. 145.

§ Wherefore we have now concluded this part of *Morall knowledge* concerning the *Culture and Regiment of the Mind*; wherein if any from a contemplation of the Portions thereof, which we have ſtrictly enumerated, doth judge that our labour is only this, *to Collect and Digeſt, into an Art or Science, that which hath bin pretermitted by other writers, as matter of common ſenſe and experience, and of themſelves cleere and perſpicuous; let him freely enjoy his judgement:* yet in the meane let him be pleaſed to remember what we premoniſht at firſt; that our purpoſe was not to purſue the flouriſh and beauty of things; but their uſe and verity. Likewiſe let him a while ponder in his mind that invention of the Ancient Parable, touching the *two gates of ſleepe.*

Virg. Æn. 6.

Sunt geminæ ſomni Portæ, quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris;
Altera candenti perfecta nitens Elephanto
Sed falſa ad Cœlum mittunt inſomnia Manes.

A gate of *Ivory* is indeed very ſtately, but true Dreams paſſe through the *Gate of Horne.*

IV. By way of ſupplement that obſervation about *Morall Knowledge*, may be ſet downe, which is, *that there is a kind*

kind of relation and Conformity between the Good of the mind, and the Good of the Body. For as the *Good of the Body* consists as hath bin said, of *Health, Beauty, Strength,* and *Pleasure;* So the *Good of the Mind,* if we consider it according to the Axioms and Precepts of *Morale Knowledge,* we shall perceive tend to this point, *to make the mind sound, and discharg'd from Perturbation; Beautifull and graced with the ornaments of true Decency; strong to all duties of life; Lastly not stupid, but retaining an active and lively sence of Pleasure and honest Recreation.* But these foure, as in the Body, so in the mind, seldome meet altogither. *For it is easy to* obserue, that many have strength of wit and courage; who yet notwithstanding are infested with perturbations, and whose manners are litle season'd with elegancy and Beauty of Behaviour, in their doings: *some againe,* have an Elegancy and fineness of cariage, which have neither soundness of honesty, nor substance of sufficiency in their doings: *some have* honest Minds, purified from the staine of Guilt, which yet can neither become themselves, nor manage business: *others* which perchance are capable of all these three Qualities; but possest with a sullen humor of Stoical sadness, and stupidity, they practise virtuous Actions, but enjoy neither themselves, nor the fruit of their good Parts: and if it chance that of these foure *two* or *three* sometimes meet, yet a concurrence of all *foure* very seldome falls out. And now we have concluded that Principall member of *Humane Philosophy,* which considers *Man, as he consists of Body and Soule; but yet, as he is segregate and separate from society.*

THE EIGHTH BOOK OF
FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM
VICOUNT St ALBAN.

OF THE DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

I. *The* Partition *of Civile knowledge into the* Knowledge *of Converſation; the* Knowledge *of Negociation; and the* Knowledge *of Empire, or of State Goverment.*

THere is an ancient Relation (Excellent KING) of a ſolemne Convention of many Philoſophers before the Ambaſſador of a forraine Prince, and how that every one according to their ſeverall abilities made demonſtration of their wiſdome; that ſo the Ambaſſador might have matter of report touching the admired wiſdome of the Grecians: But amongſt theſe, one there was, as the ſtorie goes, that ſtood ſtill and utter'd nothing in the aſſemblie, inſomuch as the Ambaſſador turning to him ſhould ſay: *And what is your guiſt, that I may report it?* To whom the Philoſopher, *Report* (ſaith he) *unto your King, that you found one amongſt the Grecians that knew how to hold his peace:* and indeed I had forgotten in this compend

Plutar. in Moral.

compend of Arts to interſert the *Art of Silence*; which notwithſtanding (becauſe it is DEFICIENT) I will teach by mine own example. For ſeeing the order and contexture of matter hath brought me at length to this point, that I muſt now a litle after handle the *Art of Empire*; and being I write to ſo *Great a King*, which is ſo perfect a Maſter in this ſcience, wherein he hath bin trained up even from his infancy; nor can I be altogither unmindfull, what place I hold under your Majeſtie; I thought it would beſt become me in this point to approve my ſelfe unto your Majeſtie, by *Silence*, rather than by *Writing*. *Cicero* makes mention not only of an *Art*, but of a kinde of *Eloquence* found in *Silence*: for after he had commemorated in an *Epiſtle to Atticus* many conferences which had interchangeably paſt between him and another, he writeth thus, *In this place I have borrowed ſomewhat from your Eloquence, for I have held my peace.* And *Pindar* to whom it is peculiar ſuddenly to ſtrike, as it were, with a divine Scepter, the mindes of men, by rare ſhort ſentence, darts forth ſome ſuch ſaying as this, *Interdum magis afficiunt non dicta quam dicta:* wherefore I have reſolv'd in this part to be *Silent*, or which is next to *Silence*, to be very briefe. But before I come to the *Arts of Empire*, ſome things by way of Preoccupation are to be ſet downe concerning other *Portions of Civile Doctrine*.

Ad Atticũ.

Pindar.

§ *Civile Science* is converſant about a ſubject which of all other is moſt immers'd in matter, and therefore very difficultly reduced unto *Axioms*: yet there are many circumſtances which help this difficultie: for firſt, as *Cato* the Cenſor was wont to ſay of his Romans: *That they were like Sheepe, a man were better drive a flock of them, then one of them; for in a Flock, if you could get but ſome few to goe right, you ſhall have all the reſt follow of their own accord:* So in this reſpect indeed, the *Dutie of Moralitie* is ſomewhat more difficult then that of Policy. *Secondly Moralitie* propounds to it ſelfe that the Minde be imbued and furniſht with *Internal Goodneſſe*; but *Civile Knowledge* requires no more, but *Goodneſſe externall* onely, for this as reſpecting ſociety, ſufficeth.

Plutar. in M. Catone.

Wherefore

Wherefore it often comes to passe that the Goverment is Good, the Times Bad: for in sacred story the saying is often repeated, speaking of Good and Godly Kings, *And yet the People directed not their hearts to the Lord God of their Fathers*; wherefore in this respect also the parts of Ethique are more austere and difficult. *Thirdly*, States have this nature, that like great Engines they are slowly moved, and not without great paines; whence it comes that they are not so easily put out of frame; *For as in Ægipt* the seven good yeares upheld the seven bad; so in States, the good goverment and Lawes of Precedent times cause that the errors of succeeding times, doe not so quickly supplant and ruine, but the Decrees and Customes of particular persons, are more suddenly subverted. And this likewise doth charge Moralitie, but easeth Policy.

I. *Civile Knowledge* hath three parts, according to the three summarie Actions of Society; *The Doctrine of Conversation; the Doctrine of Negociation; and the Doctrine of Empire or Republiques.* For there are three sorts of Good, which men seek to procure to themselves from civile Society; *comfort against solitude, Assistance in buisnesse; and Protection* against Injuries: and these be three wisdomes distinct one from the other, and often times disjoyn'd; *Wisdome in Conversation; Wisdome in Negociation, & Wisdome in Gubernation.*

§ *As for Conversation*, certainly it ought not to be affected, but much lesse despised; seeing a wise moderation thereof, hath both an honour, and grace of Manners in it selfe; and a powerfull influence for the apt manage of Businesse; as well Publique, as Private. *For as Action in an Orator*, is so much respected, (thoe it be but an outward quality) that it is preferr'd before those other Parts which seeme more grave and intrinseque; so *Conversation* & the government thereof, in a man of a Civile Practique life (however it consisteth in outward ceremonies) finds, if not the chiefest, yet certainly a very eminent place. Of what speciall importment the very *Countenance* is, and the composure thereof, the Poet insinuats where he saith,

Nec vultu deſtrue verba tuo.

A man may cancell and utterly betray the force of his words, with his *Countenance*. Nay the *Deeds* as well as *Words* may likewiſe be deſtroyed by the *Countenance*, if we may believe *Cicero*, who when he would commend to his Brother *Affabilitie* towards the Provincials ſaid, that *it* did not chiefly conſiſt in this to give eaſie acceſſe unto his Perſon, unleſſe likewiſe he received them courteouſly even with his *Countenance; Nil intereſt habere oſtium, apertum, vultum clauſum: It is nothing wonne, to admit men with an open dore, and to receive them with a ſhut and reſerved countenance.* So we ſee *Atticus* before the firſt interview between *Cæſar* and *Cicero*, the warre depending did diligently and ſeriouſly adviſe *Cicero* by a letter touching the compoſing and ordering of his *countenance* and *geſture*. And if the government of the *Face* and *Countenance* alone be of ſuch effect, how much more is that of familiar *ſpeech* & other *earriage* appertaining to *Converſation*. And indeed the ſumme and abridgement of the Grace and Elegancy of Behaviour, is for moſt part comprized in this, *that we meaſure in a juſt ballance and maintaine both our own* Honour *and the Reputation of others*. The true Module whereof *T. Livius* hath well expreſſed (thoe intended to an other purpoſe) in the Character of a Perſon, *Leaſt* (ſaith he) *I ſhould ſeem either arrogant or obnoxious; wher eof the one is the humor of a man that forgets the libertie of another; the other of a man that forgets the liberty of himſelfe.* But on the other ſide if *Urbanity and outward Elegancy of Behaviour* be intended too much, they paſſe into a deformed & counterfeit *Affectation. Quid enim deformius quam ſcenam in vitam transferre. To Act a mans life.* But though they fall not by inſenſible degrees into that vitious extreme; yet too much time is conſumed in theſe ſmall matters; and the mind by ſtudying them is too much depreſs'd and broken. And therefore as Tutors and Preceptors uſe to adviſe young Students in Univerſities, too much addicted to keep company; by ſaying, *Amicos eſſe fures temporis:* ſo certainly this ſame continuall intention of the minde upon the *comelineſſe of Behaviour*, is a great theefe

De Petit. Conſulatûs

Lib. XII. Epiſt. ad Att.

Livius.

to

to more ſolemne Meditations. *Againe*, ſuch as are ſo exactly accompliſht *in Vrbanitie*, and ſeeme, as it were, form'd by nature for this quality alone, are commonly of ſuch a diſpoſition, as pleaſe themſelves in this one habit onely, and ſeldome aſpire to higher and more ſolide virtues: whereas on the contrary, thoſe that are conſcious to themſelves of a Defect this way, ſeek *Comelineſſe* by *Reputation*; for where *Reputation* is, almoſt every thing becommeth; but where *that* is not, it muſt be ſupplied by *Puntoes* & *Complement*. *Againe*, there is no greater or more frequent impediment of Action than an overcurious obſervance of *Decency* & of that other ceremony attending on it, which is a too ſcrupulous *Election of time* & *opportunities*: for *Solomon* ſaith excellently, *qui obſervat ventũ non ſeminat, & qui conſiderat nubes nunquã metet*. We muſt make opportunity oftner then finde it. To conclude, this *comely grace* of *Behaviour* is, as it were, the Garment of the Minde, and therefore muſt have the conditions of a Garment: for firſt it ought to be ſuch as is in faſhion; againe, it ought not to be too curious or coſtly; than it ought to be ſo ſhaped as to ſet forth any good making of the mind, and to ſupply and hide any deformity, laſtly and above all, it ought not to be too ſtrait, or ſo to reſtraine the ſpirit, as to repreſſe and hinder the motion thereof in buſineſſe. But this part of *Civile knowledge* touching *Converſation*, hath bin indeed elegantly handled, nor can it any way be reported as *Deficient*.

Eccleſ. 11.

CAP. II.

I. The Partition *of the Doctrine of Negociation into the knowledge of* diſperſed Occaſions. II. And into *the Knowledge of the Advancement of life.* § Examples *of the knowledge of Scatter'd Occaſions from ſome of* Solomons *Parables.* § Precepts *touching the Advancement of fortune.*

THe knowledge touching *Negotiation*, we will divide into a knowledge concerning *Scatter'd Occaſions*; and the Knowledge concerning the *Advancement of Life*; whereof the one comprehends all the variety of *Buſineſſe*, and is, as it were, the *Secretary* of a Practique courſe of life; the other onely ſelects and ſuggeſts ſuch obſervations as appertaine to the *advancing of a Mans proper fortune*, which may be to every man as intimate and reſerved *Table-Books*, and *Memorials* of their Affaires.

§ But before we deſcend to the Particular kinds, wee will ſpeak ſomething by way of Preface, in generall, touching the *The knowledge of Negociation. The knowledge of Negociation* no man hath handled hetherto according to the dignity of the Subject; to the great derogation of Learning, & the Profeſſors of Learning: for frō this root ſpringeth that note of *Dullneſſe* which hath defamed the Learned, which is; *That there is no great concurrence betweene Learning and Practique wiſdome.* For, if a man obſerve it well, of the three *wiſdomes* which we have ſet downe to pertaine to Civile life, that of *Converſation* is by learned men for the moſt part deſpiſed as a ſervile thing and an enimie to Meditation. As for that *wiſdome* concerning *Government*, Learned men acquit themſelves well, when they are called to the manage of Civile Affaires in ſtate; but that is a Promotion which happeneth to few. Concerning the WISDOME OF BUSINESSE (whereof we now ſpeak) wherein mans life is moſt converſant; there be no Books at all written of it except

cept a handfull or two of ſome few *Civile Advertiſements*, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this Subject. For if there were Books extant of this Argument, as of other, I doubt not, but Learned men with meane experience would farre excell men of long experience without Learning; and *out-ſhoot them* (as they ſay) *in their own Bowe*. Neither is there any cauſe why we ſhould feare leaſt the Matter of this *Knowledge* ſhould be ſo various, that it could not fall under Precepts, for it is much narrower than the *Science of Government*, which notwithſtanding we ſee is exactly labour'd, and ſubdued. Of this kinde of *Wiſdome*, it ſeemes there have bin ſome Profeſſors amongſt the *Romans* in their beſt and wiſeſt times. For *Cicero* reports that it was in uſe a litle before his time for Senators, that had the the name and opinion for wiſe and experienced men (the *Coruncanii*, *Curii*, *Lælii*, and others) to walke at certaine houres in the *Forum*, where they might give acceſſe and audience to the Citizens, and might be conſulted withall; not onely touching *point of Law*, but of al *ſorts of Buſineſſe*; as of the *Marriage of a Daughter*; or of *the bringing up of a Sonne; or of a Purchaſe, of a Bargaine, of an Accuſation, Defence*; and every other occaſion incident to mans life. By this it plainly appeares, that there is *a Wiſdome of giving Counſil and Adviſe* even in Private Buſineſſe; ariſing out of an univerſall inſight into the Affaires of the World; which is uſed indeed upon particular Cauſes, but is gathered by generall obſervation of Cauſes of like nature. For ſo we ſee in the Book which *Q. Cicero* writeth unto his Brother, *De Petitione Conſulatus* (being the onely Booke of Particular Buſineſſe, that I know written by the Ancients) althoe it concerned ſpecially an Action then on foot, yet it containes in it many Politique Axiomes, which preſcribe not only temporarie uſe, but a perpetual direction in the caſe of Popular Elections. *And in this kinde* nothing is extant which may any way be compar'd with thoſe Aphoriſmes which *Solomon the King* ſet forth, of whom the Scriptures teſtifie, *That his Heart was as the Sands of the Sea*: For as the Sands of the Sea do incompaſſe al the utmoſt bounds of the

Cicero.

Q. Cicero de Petitione Conſul.

1. Reg. IV.

world; ſo his wiſedome comprehended all matters, as well humane, as divine. In theſe *Aphoriſmes* you ſhall cleerely diſcover, beſide thoſe precepts which are more divine, many moſt excellent Civile precepts and advertiſements, ſpringing out of the profound ſecrets of *wiſdome*, and flowing over into a large field of variety. Now becauſe we report as DEFICIENT, *the Doctrine touching diſperſed occaſions*, (which is a firſt portion of *the knowledge of Buſineſſe*) we will, after our manner, ſtay a while upon it, and propound an example thereof, taken out of thoſe *Aphoriſmes*, or *Parables* of *Solomon*. Neither is there in our judgement, any cauſe of juſt reprehenſion, for that we draw from writers of ſacred Scripture, ſomething to a politicall ſenſe; for I am verily of opinion, that if thoſe *Commentaries of the ſame Solomon were now extant concerning Nature* (wherein he hath
1. Reg. IV. written of all *Vegetables*, *From the Moſſe upon the wall*, *to the Cedar of Libanus*; *and of living creatures*) it were not unlawfull to expound them according to a naturall ſenſe; the ſame liberty we may take in the *Politiques*.

* AMANVENSIS VITÆ, ſivè de occaſionibus Sparſis.

¶ AN EXAMPLE OF A PORTION OF the Doctrine concerning DISPERSED OCCASIONS, from ſome *Parables of Solomon*.

THE PARABLE.

Prov. XV. 1. *A ſoft Anſwere appeaſeth Wrath.*

THE EXPLICATION.

If the wrath of a Prince or of a great Perſon be kindled againſt thée, and it be now thy turne to ſpeak, *Solomon* gives in precept two points; one is, *that an anſwere be made*; the other, *that the ſame be ſoft*. The Firſt containes three precepts; *Firſt that you beware of a ſad, and ſullen ſilence*: for that either charges the fault wholly upon your ſelfe, as if you had nothing to ſay for your ſelfe; or cloſely appeacheth your Maiſter

ſter of ſome injuſtice, as if his eares were not open to a juſt Defence. *Secondly that you beware of delaying and putting off a Buſineſſe*, and that you crave not a longer day to give in your defence: for this procraſtination, either inſinuates the ſame prejudice the former did, (which is that your Lord and Maſter is led away with too much paſsion and partiality) and plainly betraies, that you are diviſing ſome cunning and counterfeit Apology, ſeeing you have no preſent anſwere ready. Wherefore it is ever the beſt courſe to ſay ſomething inſtantly in your own defence, according as the occaſion of the preſent buſineſſe ſhall adminiſter. *Thirdly that by all means, an anſwere be made*; an anſwere (I ſay) not a meere confeſsion or a meere ſubmiſsion, but yet not without ſome ſprinklings of an Apology and excuſe let fall here and there; nor is it ſafe to beare your ſelfe otherwiſe, unleſſe you have to deale with very generous and noble diſpoſitions; which are very rare. *It followes in the ſecond place*, that the anſwere made, be ſoft and temperate, and not harſh and peremptory.

THE PARABLE.

II. *A wiſe Servant ſhall have command over a reproachfull Sonne, and ſhall divide the Inheritance among the brethren.* Prov. xvii.

THE EXPLICATION.

IN all troubled and diſagreeing Families, there ever ariſeth up ſome ſervant or gentle friend, powerfull with both ſides; which may moderate, and compound the differences of the Family; to whom, in that reſpect, the whole houſe and the maſter himſelfe are engag'd and beholding. *This Servant*, if he aime only, at his own ends, cheriſhes and aggravates the Diviſions of a Family, but if he be ſincerely faithfull, and upright, certainly he deſerves much, ſo, as to be reckoned as one of the brethren, or at leaſt, to receive a Fiduciary Adminiſtration of the inheritance.

THE

THE PARABLE.

Prov.xxix. III *If a wiſe man conteſts with a Foole, whether he be in anger, or in jeſt, there is no quiet.*

THE EXPLICATION.

WE are often admoniſht to *avoid unequall commerce*; in this ſenſe, *not to contend with our Betters*: but it is a no leſſe profitable inſtruction, which *Solomon* here ſets downe, *Not to undertake a worthleſſe perſon*; for ſuch a buſineſſe is uſually concluded upon termes of diſadvantage; for to overcome is no victory, but to be conquer'd a foule diſgrace: and it is all one in the heat of this engagement, whether we deale by way of jeſting, or by way of diſdaine and ſcorne; for howſoever we change Copy, we are embaſed and made the lighter thereby; nor ſhall we handſomely come off with credit. *But* the worſt inconvenience of all is, when the Perſon with whom we contend (as *Solomon* ſpeaks) hath ſomewhat of the *Foole* in him; that is, if he be witleſſe and wilfull; have ſome heart, no braine.

THE PARABLE.

Eccleſ.vii IV. *Lend not an Eare to all words that are ſpoken, leſt perchance thou hearſt thy ſervant curſe thee.*

THE EXPLICATION.

IT is a matter almoſt beyond beliefe, what diſturbance is created by *unprofitable curioſity*, about thoſe things which concerne our perſonall intereſt: that is, when we make a too ſcrupulous enquiry after ſuch ſecrets; which once diſcloſed and found out, doe but cauſe moleſtation of mind, and nothing conduce to the advanceing of our deſignes. *For firſt there followes vexation and diſquietneſſe of Mind*; being that

that all humane affaires are full of faithlesnesse and ingratitude; so as if there could be procured some enchanted glasse wherein we might behold the hatred, and whatsoever malice is any way raised up against us; it were better for us that such a glasse, were forthwith throwne away and broken. *For slanders* of this nature, are like the impotent murmures of Leaves or Trees, and in short time vanish. *Secondly, this Curiosity fills the mind with ungrounded jealousies*, which is a capitall enimy to Counsils, and renders them inconstant and involv'd. *Thirdly, the same curiosity doth oftentimes fixe evills, which of themselves would fly away.* For it is a dangerous matter for to provoke mens consciences, who if they think themselves undiscover'd, are easily chang'd to the better; but if once they perceive themselves dismaskt, they drive out one mischiefe with an other. Wherefore it was deservedly judg'd, a point of great wisdome in *Pompeius Magnus*, that he instantly burnt all *Sertorius* papers unperus'd by himselfe; or permitted to be so by others. Plutar. in Pomp.

THE PARABLE.

V. *Thy Poverty shall come as a Travellour, and thy Want as an armed Man.* Prov. VI.

THE EXPLICATION.

IN this Parable, it is elegantly described how the shipwrack of Fortunes falls upon Prodigalls, & on such as are careless of their Estates; for Debt & Diminution of stock, comes upon them at first by insensible degrees, with soft-silent paces, like a Traveller, and is hardly perceived; but soone after *necessity invades him like an armed man*, that is, with so strong and potent an armé, as there is no more resistance to be made; so it was said by the Ancients, *that of all things necessity was the strongest.* Wherefore we must prevent the Travellour, and be well provided against the armed Man.

THE PARABLE.

Prov. IX. VI. *He that inſtructs a ſcorner, procures to himſelfe a reproach; and he that reprehends a wicked man, procures to himſelfe a ſtaine.*

THE EXPLICATION.

Mat. 7. THis Parable agrees with our Saviours precept, *That we caſt not our Pearles before ſwine.* In this Parable the Actions of *Inſtruction*, & of *Reprehenſion* are diſtinguiſht; as alſo the Actions of a *ſcorner*, and of a *wicked perſon*. Laſtly that which is retaliated, is differenced. For in the former part, loſt labour is return'd; in the latter, a ſtaine and diſhonour is repaid. For when a man teacheth and inſtructeth a *ſcorner*, firſt the time thus imployed is caſt away; and then others alſo deride his paines, as a fruitleſſe deſigne, and a labour ill placed; Laſt of all, the ſcorner himſelfe deſpiſeth the knowledge which he hath learned. But the matter is tranſacted with greater danger in the *reprehenſion of the wicked*; becauſe a wicked nature, not only gives no eare to adviſe, but turnes head againſt his *Reprehender*, now made odious unto him; whom he either wounds preſently with contumelies; or traduces afterwards to others.

THE PARABLE.

Prov. X. VII. *A wiſe Sonne is the gladneſſe of his Father; but a fooliſh Sonne is the ſadneſſe of his Mother.*

THE EXPLICATION.

THe *joyes* and *griefes domeſticall* of *Father* and *Mother* touching their Childrē, are here diſtinguiſht: for a wiſe and well-govern'd Sonne, is chiefly a comfort to the Father, who knowes the value of virtue, better than the Mother, and therefore more rejoyceth at the towardlineſſe of his Sonne inclinable to goodneſſe: yea and it may be his education

cation of him, that he hath brought him up ſo well; and implanted in his tender years, the Civility of manners, by precepts and example, is a joy unto him. *On the other ſide*, the Mother is more griev'd, and diſcomforted at the calamity of a Sonne, both becauſe the affection of a Mother is more ſoft and tender; as alſo perchance, being conſcious of hir too much indulgence, ſhe hath tainted and corrupted his tender years.

THE PARABLE.

VIII. *The memory of the Iuſt is bleſt, but the name of the wicked ſhall putrify.* Prov. x.

THE EXPLICATION.

Here is diſtinguiſht the *Fame* of good men and of evill; ſuch as cõmonly falls out after Death: for the *Name* of good men, after envy is extinguiſht, (which cropt the bloſſome of their *Fame*, while they were alive) preſently ſhootes up and flouriſheth; and their *Praiſes* daily encreaſe in ſtrength and vigor: but for wicked men (though their Fame through the partiall favour of Friends, and of men of their own faction laſt for a ſhort time) a deteſtation of their *Name* ſprings up, and at laſt their tranſient glory exhales in infamy, and expires in a filthy and noiſome odor.

THE PARABLE.

IX. *He that troubles his own houſe ſhall inherit the winde.* Prov. xi.

THE EXPLICATION.

A Very profitable admonition touching *Diſcord and Domeſtique Breaches*. Many promiſe to themſelves great matters, *by the diſſentions of Wives*; or the *Diſinheriting of Sonnes*; *or the* often *changing of Servants*; as if the Tranquillity of mind, or the adminiſtration of their Affaires

were by this means advanced, and ſhould become more proſperous unto them. But commonly *their hopes turne to winde*; for thoſe alterations, for moſt part, ſucceed ill, and thoſe *Perturbers of their owne houſe*, often times meet with many vexations, and ingratitudes from *them*, whom (paſsing by others) they adopted and loved: Nay by this means they draw upon their Perſons ill Reports, and doubtfull rumors. For it is well noted of *Cicero*, *Omnem famam a Domeſticis emanare*. Both theſe evills, *Salomon* excellently expreſſes by the *inheritance of winds*: for the *Fruſtrating of Expectation*; and the *raiſing of Rumors*, are rightly compared to *Winds*.

De Pet. Conſul.

THE PARABLE.

Eccleſ. VII

X. Better is the end of a ſpeech, than the Begining thereof.

THE EXPLICATION.

THis Parable taxeth, and reformes a frequent error committed, not only by them which chiefly, *ſtudy words*; but even by the more wiſe and grave. The error is this, *that men are more ſolicitous of the ingreſſe and entrance of their ſpeech; than of the cloſe and iſſue: and more exactly meditate the Exordiums and Prefaces; than the concluſions of ſpeeches*. But they ſhould neither neglect thoſe, and yet have theſe about them, as the more material parts, ready prepar'd and digeſted; conſidering with themſelves, and ſo farre, as may be, fore-caſting in their minds, what may be the iſſue of ſpeech and conference at laſt; and buſineſſes thereby may be promoted and matured. Yet this is not all; for you muſt not only *ſtudy Epilogues, and concluſions of ſpeeches, which may be pertinent to buſineſſe, but alſo regard muſt be taken of ſuch ſpeeches, as may aptly and pleaſantly be caſt in, at the very inſtant of your departure, althoe they have no reference at all to the buſineſſe in hand*. I knew two Counſilors, Perſonages of high ranke, and wiſe men, and on whom the charge

charge of State-affaires did then principally depend; whoſe common, and, to them, peculiar cuſtome it was, that ſo often as they were to negociate with their Princes about their own affaires; never to cloſe their conference with any matter referring to that buſineſſe; but ever ſeek diverſions, either by way of jeſt; or by ſomewhat, that was delightfull to heare; and ſo, as the Adage renders it, *waſh over at the concluſion of all, their Sea-water diſcourſes, with freſh fountaine water.* And this uſage was one of their chiefe Arts.

THE PARABLE.

XI. *As dead Flies cauſe the beſt oyntment, to ſend forth an ill Odor; ſo doth a litle folly him that is in reputation for wiſdome and honour.* Eccleſ. x.

THE EXPLICATION.

THe caſe of Men remarkable *for eminent guifts*, is very unhappy and miſerable (as the *Parable* excellently notes,) becauſe their errors, be they never ſo ſmall find no remiſsion. *But as in a pure Diamond* every leaſt graine, or litle cloud, ſtrikes the eye, and affects it with a kind of trouble; which upon a more groſſe Diamond would hardly be diſcerned: even ſo in men of eminent parts, the leaſt infirmities are preſently ſpied, talked of, and more deeply cenſur'd; which in men of more meane and obſcure guifts, and ranke, would either altogither paſſe without notice, or eaſily procure pardon. *Therefore a litle Folly in a very wiſe man; and a ſmall offence in a very honeſt man; and a ſlight indecency of manners, in a man of Courtly and Elegant behaviour; much derogates from their fame and reputation.* So that it is not the worſt courſe for eminent perſons, *to mingle ſome abſurdities* (ſo it may be done without guilt) *in their Actions;* that they may retaine a kind of liberty to themſelves, and confound the characters of ſmaller defects.

THE PARABLE.

Prov. xxix. XII. *Scornfull men inſnare a Citty, but Wiſe men divert wrath.*

THE EXPLICATION.

IT may ſeem ſtrange, that *Solomon* in the deſcription of men, made, as it were, and by nature fram'd to the ruine and deſtruction of a ſtate, hath choſen the character; *not of* a proud and inſolent man; *not of* a tyrannicall and cruell nature; *not of* a raſh and violent man; *not of* an impious and wicked perſon; *not of* a ſeditious and turbulent ſpirit; *not of* an incontinent and ſenſuall inclination; *not of* a fooliſh and unable Perſon; *but of a Scorner*. But this is a judgement, worthy the wiſdome of that King, who beſt knew the grounds of the conſervation, or everſion of a ſtate. For there is not commonly a like Plague to Kingdomes and Commonwealths, than if Counſilors of Princes, or Senators, and ſuch as ſit at the helme of Goverment, are by nature *Scorners*. For ſuch perſons, that they may win the reputation of undanted ſtates-men, doe ever extenuate the greatneſſe of dangers, and inſult over thoſe that valew dangers, according to the true waight; as timorous and faint-hearted natures. They *ſcoffe* at all mature delayes, and meditated debateings of matters by conſultation, and deliberation; as a thing too much taſting of an oratory-veine; and full of tediouſneſſe; and nothing conduceing to the ſumme and iſſues of Buſineſſe. *As for Fame*, at which the counſils of Princes ſhould eſpecially levell, they contemne it, *as the ſpittle of the vulgar*, and a thing will quickly be blown over. *The powre* and Autority of Lawes, they reſpect no more, than as cobwebbs, which ſhould not inſnare matters of greater conſequence: *Counſils* and Precautions, foreſeeing events a farre off, they reject, as meere dreams and Melancholy apprehenſions: *men ſeriouſly* wiſe, and well ſeen in the world, and of great reſolution and Counſil, they defame with

with gibes and jeasts: *in a word*, they doe at once prejudice, and weaken the whole foundation of Civile government; which is the more to be looked into, becauſe the Action is performed by ſecret fraude, and not open force; and is a practiſe not ſo ſuſpected, as it demerites.

THE PARABLE.

XIII. *A Prince that lends a willing eare to lies, his ſervants are all wicked.* Prov. xxix.

THE EXPLICATION.

WHen a *Prince*, is of ſuch a temper as to *lend an eaſy and credulous eare, without due examination, to Detractors and Sycophants*, there breaths a peſtilentiall ayre from the *Kings* ſide, which *corrupts & infects all his ſervants*. Some feele out the feares and jealouſies of a *Prince*, and aggravate the ſame with fain'd reports. *Others* awake the furies of envy, eſpecially againſt the beſt deſerving in the ſtate. *Others* ſeek to waſh away their own guilt, and the ſtaines of a foule conſcience, by defaming others. *Others* give ſaile to the Honours and wiſhes of their friends, by traduceing, and debaſeing the merit of their competitors. *Others* compoſe Fabulous enterludes againſt their enimies, and concurrents, as if they were upon the ſtage; *and* infinite ſuch like. And theſe are the Arts of ſuch ſervants to Princes, as are of a vile and baſe nature. But they that are of a more honeſt diſpoſition, and better civilz'd, when they perceive their innocence to be no ſafe ſanctuary (in that their Prince knowes not how to diſtinguiſh between truth and falſehood) they put off morall honeſty, and gather in the Court-windes, and are therewith, carried about in a ſervile manner. For as *Tacitus* ſaith of *Claudius*. *There is no ſafety with that Prince, into whoſe head all things are conveyed, as it were, by infuſion and direction from others.* And *Commines* very well, *It is better to be ſervant to a Prince, whoſe jealouſies have no end, then to a Prince, whoſe Credulity hath no meane.* Aliud ſonat Annal. xii. Hiſtoire de Commines.

THE

THE PARABLE.

Prov. XII. XIV. *A Iuſt man is mercifull to the life of his Beaſt; but the mercies of the wicked are cruell.*

THE EXPLICATION.

THere is implanted in man by nature, a noble and excellent Affection of *Piety and compaßion*, which extends it ſelfe even to bruit creatures, that are by divine ordination ſubject to *his* command: and this *Compaßion* hath ſome Analogy with that of a Prince towards his ſubjects. Nay farther, it is moſt certaine, that the more noble the mind is, the more compaſsionate it is; for contracted & degenerate minds, think theſe things nothing to pertaine to them; but the Mind, which is a nobler portion of the world, is affected in the groſſe out of community. Wherefore we ſee that there were under the old Law, many precepts, not ſo meerely *Ceremoniall*, as *Inſtitutions* of *Mercy*; ſuch as was that *of not eating fleſh with the blood thereof*, and the like: even in the ſect of the *Eſſeans* and *Pythagoreans*, they altogither abſtain'd from *eating Fleſh*; which to this day is obſerved by an inviolate ſuperſtition, by many of the Eaſterne people under the Mogol. Nay the Turkes, (both by Deſcent and Diſcipline a cruell and bloudy Nation) yet beſtow almes upon Bruit Creatures; and cannot endure to ſee the vexation and torture of any live thing. But leaſt, what we have ſaid, ſhould perchance ſeem to maintaine all kinds of *Mercy*; *Salomon* upon ſound advice annexeth, *That the Mercies of the wicked are cruell:* Theſe *mercies*, are, when leud and wicked perſons, are ſpar'd from being cut off by the ſword of juſtice; this kind of *Mercy* is more *Cruell*, than *Cruelty* it ſelfe: for *Cruelty* is extended in practiſe on particulars; but this kind of *Mercy*, by a grant of impunity, armes and ſubornes the whole band of impious men againſt the innocent.

THE

THE PARABLE.

XV. *A Foole utters all his minde, but a wise-man reserves somewhat for hereafter.* Prov. xxix.

THE EXPLICATION.

THe Parable (it seemes) especially corrects; *not the Futility* of vaine Persons, which easily utter, as well what may be spoken, as what should be secreted: *not the bold roveing language* of such as without all discretion and judgement flie upon all men and matters: *Not Garrulity*, whereby they fill others even to a surfet: *but another vice*, more close and retired; namely *the Government of speech*, of all adventures the least prudent and politique, which is, *when a man so manages his speech in private conference, as whatsoever it in his mind, which he conceives any way pertinent to the purpose and matter in hand, out it must, at once, as it were, in one breath, and in a set continued discourse*: this is that which doth much prejudice Businesse. *For first, a discontinued speech*, broken off by interlocutions, and instill'd by parts, penetrates deeper, than a *settled continued speech*; because that in a continued Discourse, the weight of Matters is not precisely and distinctly taken, nor by some convenient rests sufferd to fixe; but Reason drives out Reason before it be fully settled in the Comprehension of the Hearers. *Secondly* there is no man of so powerfull and happy a Delivery of himselfe, as at the first onset & encountre of his speech, he is able so to strike him dumbe and speechlesse, with whom he discourseth; but that the other will make some interchangeable reply, and peradventure object something: and then it may fall out, that what should have been reserv'd for refutation & replication, by this unadvised anticipation beeing disclosed and tasted before-hand, looseth its strength and grace. *Thirdly* if a man discharge not all at once what might be said, but deliver himselfe by *Parcells*, now one thing, anon casting in an other, he shall gather from the

lookes and answers of him with whom he discourses, how every particular Passage affectes him, and in what sort they find acceptation; soe as what is yet remaining to be spoken, he may with greater Caution either select, or silence.

THE PARABLE.

Eccles. x. XVI. *If the Displeasure of a Great Man rise up against thee, forsake not thy Place; for pliant demeanure pacifies great Offences.*

THE EXPLICATION.

THe Parable gives in Precept, how a man ought to demeane himselfe, having incurr'd the wrath and displeasure of his Prince. The Precept hath two branches. First *that he relinquish not his place*; Secondly, *that with caution and diligence he attend the Cure, as in case of some dangerous disease.* For men are wont after they perceive their Princes displeasure against them, to retire themselves from the execution of their charge and office, *partly* out of an impatience of disgrace; *partly* lest they should revive the wound by beeing in the Presence; *partly* that Princes may see their sorrow and humility; *nay sometimes* to resigne up the Places and Dignities they held, into the hands of the Prince. But *Solomon* censures this way of *Cure*, as prejudicious and hurtfull; and that upon a very good ground. *For first this course doth too much noise abroad the disgrace it selfe*; so as enimies and enviers become more confident to hurt, and friends more fearfull to help him. *Secondly it comes to passe that the wrath of the Prince*, which perchance if it had not bin publish'd, would have died of it selfe, is now become more fixt, and having once made way to his ruine, is carried on to his utter subversion. *Lastly, this retiring tasts somewhat of a malignant humor, and of one fallen out with the times; which cumulates the evill of Indignation, to the evill of Suspicion:*

ſuſpicion. Now the precepts for cure are theſe. *Firſt, above all things let him take heed that he ſeem not inſenſible, or not ſo affected, as in duty he ought to be, for the Princes diſpleaſure, thorough a ſtupidity or ſtubbornneſſe of mind:* that is, that he compoſe his countenance, not to a ſullen and contumacious ſadneſſe; but to a grave and modeſt penſiveneſſe; and in all matters of imployment, that he ſhew himſelfe leſſe pleaſant, and cheerefull then he was wont to be; and it will promote his caſe to uſe the aſſiſtance and mediation of ſome friend, unto the Prince, which may ſeaſonably inſinuate, with what feeling griefe he is inwardly afflicted. *Secondly let him carefully avoide all, even the leaſt occaſions whereby the matter that gave the firſt cauſe to the indignation, might be reviv'd;* or the Prince take occaſion to be againe diſpleaſed with him, or to rebuke him for any thing, before others. *Thirdly, let him with all diligence ſeeke out all occaſions wherein his ſervice may be acceptable to his Prince;* that he may ſhew both a prompt affection to redime his fore-paſt offence; and *that his Prince may* underſtand what a good ſervant he may chance to be deprived of, if he thus caſt him off. *Fourthly, that by a wiſe art of Policy, he either lay the fault it ſelfe upon others; or inſinuate, that it was committed with no ill intention; or make remonſtrance of their Malice, who accuſed him to the King,* and aggravated the matter above demerit. *Laſt of all, let him be every way circumſpect and intent upon the Cure.*

THE PARABLE.

XVII. *The Firſt in his own cauſe is Juſt, than comes the other Party and inquires into him.* Prov. XVIII.

THE EXPLICATION.

THe firſt information in any cauſe, if it a litle fixe it ſelfe in the mind of the Judge, takes deep root, and wholly ſeaſons and prepoſſeſſeth it; ſo as it can hardly be taken out, unleſſe ſome manifeſt falſhood be found in the matter of Information; or ſome cunning dealing, in exhibiting

and laying open the ſame. For a bare and ſimple defence, thoe it be juſt and more waighty, hardly compenſates the prejudice of the firſt information, or is of force of it ſelfe to reduce the ſcales of Juſtice, once ſwayd downe, to an equall waite. *Wherefore* it is the ſafeſt courſe both for the Judge, that nothing touching the proofes and merit, of the cauſe, be intimated before-hand untill both parties be heard togither; and the beſt for the Defendant, if he perceive the Judge preoccupated, to labour principally in this (ſo farre as the quality of the cauſe will admit) to diſcover ſome cunning ſhift and fraudulent dealing practiſed by the adverſe party to the abuſe of the Iudge.

THE PARABLE.

Prov. xxix. XVIII. *He that delicately brings up his ſervant from a child, ſhall finde him contumacious in the end.*

THE EXPLICATION.

PRinces and Maſters, from the Counſil of *Solomon, muſt keep a mean in the diſpenſation of their Grace and Favour towards Servants.* The meane is threefold; *Firſt, that Servants be promoted by degrees and not by faults.* Secondly, *that they be now and then accuſtomed to repulſes*: Thirdly (which Machiavell well adviſeth) *that they have ever in ſight before them ſomething whether to they may farther aſpire.* For unleſſe theſe courſes be taken in the raiſing of ſervants, Princes ſhall beare away from their ſervants, inſteed of a thankfull acknowledgement and dutifull obſervances, nothing but *diſreſpect and contumacy*: for from ſodaine promotion ariſeth inſolency, from a continued atchievement of their deſires, an impatience of Repulſe: if the accompliſhment of wiſhes be wanting, alacrity and induſtry will likewiſe be wanting.

Machia. Diſcorſo ſopra Liv.

THE

THE PARABLE.

XIX. *Seeſt thou a man of Diſpatch in his Buſineſſe; he ſhall ſtand before Kings, he ſhall not be ranked amongſt mean men.* Prov. xxii.

THE EXPICATION.

AMongſt the qualities which Princes doe chiefly reſpect and require in the choice of their ſervants, *celerity and alacrity in the Diſpatch of Buſineſſe, is above all the reſt, moſt acceptable.* Men of *profound Wiſdome* are ſuſpected by Kings, as men too ſpeculative and penetrating, and ſuch as are able by the ſtrength of wit, as with an engine, to turne and winde their Maſters, beyond their comprehenſion and againſt their inclination. *Popular natures* are ſpighted as thoſe that ſtand in the light of Kings, and draw the eyes of the people upon themſelves. *Men of courage*, are commonly taken for turbulent ſpirits, and dareing more than is meet. *Honeſt men* and of an impartiall upright converſation, are eſtimed too ſtiffe and ſtoicall; nor ſo pliable as they ſhould be to the whole pleaſure of thoſe on whom they depend. *To conclude*, there is not any other good quality, which preſents not ſome ſhadow, wherewith the minds of Kings may not be offended; *only quickneſſe of Diſpatch in the execution of commands, hath nothing in it which may not pleaſe.* Againe, the motions of the minds of Kings are ſwift and impatient of delay; for they think they can doe all things, onely this is wanting, *that it be done out of hand;* wherefore above all other qualities, *celerity is to them moſt acceptable.*

THE PARABLE.

XX. *I ſaw all the living which walke under the ſun, with the ſucceeding young Prince, that ſhall riſe up in his ſtead.* Eccleſ. iv.

THE EXPLICATION.

THe *parable notes the vanitie of men who are wont to preſſe and flock about the deſigned ſucceſſors of Princes*: The root of this vanity is that Frenzie, implanted by nature in the mindes of men, which is, that they too extremely affect their own projected hopes. *For the man is rarely found that is not more delighted with the contemplation of his future Hopes, then with the fruition of what he poſſeſſeth.* So further, *Noveltie is pleaſing to mans nature, and earneſtly deſired.* Now in a ſucceſſour to a Prince theſe two concurre, *Hope and Novitie.* The Parable expreſſeth the ſame which was long agoe uttered, firſt by *Pompeius* to *Sylla*, after by *Tiberius* touching *Macro*; *Plures adorare ſolem Orientem quam Occidentem.* Yet notwithſtanding Princes in preſent poſſeſſion, are not much mov'd with this fond humour; nor make any great matter of it, as neither *Sylla* nor *Tiberius* did; but rather ſmile at the levity of men, & doe not ſtand to fight with *Dreames*; for *Hope* (as he ſaid) *is but the Dreame of a man awake.*

Tacit. Annal. 6. Plutar. in Pomp.

THE PARABLE.

Eccleſ. 9. XXI. *There was a litle Citie, and man'd but by a few; and there was a mighty King that drew his army to it, and erected Bulwarks againſt it, and intrench't it round. Now there was found within the walls a poore wiſe man, and he by his wiſdome rais'd the ſiege, but none remembred that ſame poore-man.*

THE EXPLICATION.

THe *Parable* deſcribeth the depraved and malignant nature of Men. In extremity and ſtraits they commonly flie for ſanctuary to men of wiſdome and power, whom before they diſpis'd; but ſo ſoon as the ſtorme is gone, they become unthankfull creatures to their conſervers. *Machia-*

vell

vell not without reaſon propounds a Queſtion, *whether ſhould be more ingratefull to well deſerving Perſons, the Prince or the People?* But in the meane he taxeth them both of Ingratitude. Notwithſtanding, this vile dealing ariſeth not from the ingratitude of the Prince or People alone; but oft-times there is added to theſe *the envy of the Nobilitie*, who in ſecret repine at the event, though happy and proſperous, becauſe it proceeded not from themſelves: wherefore they extenuate the merit of the Act and depreſſe the Author. Diſcorſo ſopra Liv. Lib. 1.

THE PARABLE.

XXII. *The way of the ſlothfull is a Hedge of Thornes.* Prov. 15.

THE EXPLICATION.

THe Parable expreſſeth moſt elegantly, *that ſloth proves laborious in the end*: For a diligent and ſedulous preparation effects this, that the foot doth not ſtrike it ſelfe againſt any impediment, but that the way is levell'd before it be gone. But he that is ſlothfull and puts off all to the laſt point of Execution, it muſt needs follow, that continually, and at every ſtep he paſſes as it were thorow Briars and Brambles, which ever and anone entangle and detaine him. The ſame obſervation may be made upon the governing of a Family, wherein if there be a care and providence taken, all goes on cheerefully and with a willing alacritie, without noyſe or tumult: but if theſe fore-caſts be wanting when ſome greater occaſions unexpectedly fall out, all matters throng in to be diſpatched at once; the ſervants brawle, the whole houſe rings.

THE PARABLE.

XXIII. *He that reſpects Perſons in judgement doth not well, for that man will forſake the truth even for a peece of Bread.* Prov. 28.

EX-

THE EXPLICATION.

THe Parable most wisely noteth that in a Judge, *Facility of Deportment is more pernicious then the corruption of Bribes*: for all persons doe not give Bribes, but there is hardly any cause wherein somewhat may not be found, that may incline the minde of the Judge, if *Respect of Persons* lead him. For one shall be respected as a Countrey-man, another as an ill-tongu'd man, another as a rich man, another as a Favorite, another as commended by a Friend; and to conclude, all is full of iniquity where *respect of Persons beares rule*; and for a very slight matter, as it were, *for a peece of Bread*, Judgement is perverted.

THE PARABLE.

Prov. XXIV. *A poore man that by extortion oppresseth the poore, is like a land-floud that causes famine.*

THE EXPLICATION.

THis Parable was by the Ancients expresst & shadowed forth, under the Fable of the *two Horse-leeches*, the full and the hungry: for *Oppression comming from the Poore and necessitous persons, is farre more heavy than the oppression caused by the full and Rich: because it is such, as seekes out all Arts of Exaction, and all angles for money.* This kinde of Oppression was wont also to be resembled to *sponges*, which being dry suck in strongly; not so, being moyst. The *Parable* comprehends in it a fruitfull Instruction, both to Princes, that they commit not the government of Provinces, or offices of charge to indigent and indebted persons; as also to the people that they suffer not their Kings to be distressed with too much want.

THE

THE PARABLE.

XXV. *A iuſt man falling before the wicked, is a troubled Fountaine and a corrupted ſpring.* Prov. xxv.

THE EXPLICATION.

THe Parable gives it in Precept, *that States and Republiques muſt above all things beware of an unjuſt and infamous ſentence, in any cauſe of grave importance, and exemplar in the face of the world; ſpecially where the guilty is not quitted, but the Innocent is condemned.* For Injuries ravageing among private perſons doe indeed *trouble*, and *pollute* the *waters of Iuſtice*, yet as in the *ſmaller ſtreames*; but *unjuſt Judgements*, ſuch as we have ſpoken of, from which exemples are derived, infect & diſtaine the very *Fountaines of Iuſtice:* for when the *Courts of Iuſtice* ſide with *Iniuſtice*, the ſtate of things is turned, as into a *publique Robberie*, and it manifeſtly comes to paſſe, *ut Homo Homini ſit Lupus.*

THE PARABLE.

XXVI. *Make no friendſhip with an angry man, nor walke thou with a Furious Man.* Prov. xxii

THE EXPLICATION.

BY how much the more devoutly the Lawes of Friendſhip amongſt good men, are to be kept and obſerved, by ſo much the more it ſtands us upon to uſe all Caution, even at firſt in a prudent election of Friends. *In like manner the diſpoſition and humours of Friends, ſo far as concernes our perſonall intereſt, ſhould by all meanes be diſpenſed withall: but when they impoſe a neceſsity upon us, what quality of Perſons wee muſt put on, and ſuſtaine, it is a very hard caſe and an unreaſonable condition of Friendſhip.* Wherefore according to *Salomons* Precept, it principally conduceth to Peace, and Safety in the courſe of this world, *that we intermingle not our affaires*

with Cholerique natures, and such as easily provoke and undertake Quarrels and Debates; for such kinde of Friends will daily espouse us to Factions and Contentions; that we must of necessity be forced to break off all termes of Friendship; or else be wanting to our own personall safety.

THE PARABLE.

XXVII. *He that conceales a fault seekes Friendship; but he that repeats a matter, separates united Friends.* Prov. xvii

THE EXPLICATION.

THe way to arbitrate differences, and to reconcile affections is of two sorts. *The one begins by an Amnesty & passing over that which is past.* The other, *from a Repetition of wrongs, interlaceing Apologies and Excusations.* For I remember the speech of a very wise Person, & a great States-man which was to this effect. *Hee that deales about a Treaty of Peace, without any recapitulation of the termes of Difference, and falling out; he rather deludes mens mindes with the sweetnesse of an Agreement, than compounds the differences, by equity and moderation of Right.* But *Salomon*, a wiser man than he, is of a contrary opinion, approves *Amnesty*, and prohibites *Repetition:* for in *Repetition*, there are these inconveniences, for that it is, as it were, *unguis in ulcere, the nayle in the ulcer*; as also *there is a danger of breeding a new Quarrell*, for the Parties at difference will never accord upon the termes of their falling out. And lastly, *for that in the issue, it brings the matter to Apologies:* but both the one and the other Partie, would seeme rather to remit an offence, than to admit of an excusation.

THE PARABLE.

XXVIII. *In every good worke there shall be abundance; but where words doe abound, there commonly is want.* Prov. xiv.

THE

THE EXPLICATION.

IN this Parable *Solomon ſeparates the fruit of the Labour of the Toungue, and of the labour of the Hands; as if wealth were the Revenues of the one, want the Revenues of the other.* For it commonly comes to paſſe, that they that talke much, boaſt many things, and promiſe great matters; receive no emolument from the things whereof they diſcourſe: nay rather ſuch natures for moſt part are no way induſtrious, and diligent at work; but only feed and fill themſelves with words, as with winde. Certainly as ſaith the Poet

------ *Qui filet eſt firmus* ------ for he that is conſcious to himſelfe of Proficiency in his indeavours, applaudes himſelfe inwardly, and holds his peace; but on the contrary, he that is guilty to himſelfe of hunting after vaine glory, talkes many things, and reports wonders to others.

THE PARABLE.

XXIX. *Open Repretenſion is better than ſecret Affection.* Prov. xxvii.

THE EXPLICATION.

THe Parable reprehends the ſoft nature of Friends, which will not uſe the Priviledge of friendſhip, in admoniſhing their Friends with freedome and confidence, as well of their errors as of their dangers. *For what ſhall I doe?* (will ſuch a tenderhearted friend ſay) *or which way ſhall I turne my ſelfe? I love him as dearly as any man can doe; and if any misfortune ſhould befall him, I could willingly impawne my owne perſon for his redemption; but I know his diſpoſition, if I deale freely with him, I ſhall offend him, at leaſt make him ſadde, and yet doe no good; and I ſhall ſooner eſtrange him from my friendſhip, than reclaime him, or withdraw him from thoſe courſes, which he hath fixt and reſolved upon in his mind.* Such a friend as this, *Solomon* here reprehends, as weak and worthleſſe; and that a man may reap more profit from a manifeſt Enimy, than

from ſuch an effeminate Friend: for he may perchance heare that by way of reproach from an Enimy, which thorow too much indulgence was but faintly whiſper'd by a friend.

THE PARABLE.

XXX. *A wiſe man is wary of his waies; a cunning Foole ſeekes evaſions.*

THE EXPLICATION.

THere *be two ſorts of* wiſdome; *the one true and ſound, the other counterfeit and falſe, which Solomon doubts not to entitle by the name of* Folly. He that applies himſelfe to the former, *takes heed to his way and footing, foreſeeing dangers, and ſtudying remedies; uſeing the aſſiſtance of Good men, muniteing himſelfe againſt the invaſions of the wicked; wary in his entrance and engagement upon a buſineſſe, not unprepar'd of a retraite and how to come off; attent upon advantages, couragious againſt encounters; with infinite other circumſtances, which reſpect the goverment of his waies and Actions.* But that other kind of wiſdome, *is altogither made up of fallacies and cunning devices, and wholly relies upon circumventing of others, and caſting them according to the forme of their own mould.* This wiſdome the Parable deſervedly rejects, not only as *Wicked, but alſo as Fooliſh. For firſt* it is not in the nũber of thoſe things which are in our own power; nor is it directed by any conſtãt Rule; but new ſtratagems muſt every day be contrived, the old failing and growing out of uſe. *Secondly*, he that is once attainted with the fame and opinion of a *cunning crafty Companion*, hath deprived himſelfe of a principall Inſtrnment for the manage of his affaires, and a practicall life, that is, *Truſt*; and ſo he ſhall finde by experience all things to goe CROSSE to his deſires. *To conclude*, theſe Arts and Shifts, howſoever they promiſe faire, and much pleaſe ſuch as practiſe them; yet are they many times fruſtrated. Which *Tacitus* hath well obſerved, *Conſilia Callida & audacia, expectatione læta; tractatu dura; eventu triſtia.* Taeit.

THE

THE PARABLE.

XXXI. *Be not too preciſely Righteous: nor make thy ſelfe too exceſſively wiſe; why ſhouldſt thou unſeaſonably ſacrifice thy ſafety?* Eccl. VII.

THE EXPLICATION.

THere are Times (ſaith *Tacitus*) *wherein too great virtues are expoſed to certaine ruine.* And this fate befalls men eminent for virtue or Juſtice, ſometime ſuddainly, ſometimes fore-ſeene a farre off: and if theſe excellent parts be ſeconded by the acceſſe of *wiſdome*, that is, that they are wary and watchfull over their own ſafety, than they gaine thus much, that their ruine comes ſodainly, altogither by ſecret and obſcure Counſils, whereby both envy may be avoided, and Deſtruction aſſaile them unprovided. As for that *Nimium*, which is ſet downe in the Parable, (in as much as they are not the words of ſome Periander but of *Solomon*, who now and then notes the evills in mans life, but never commands them) it muſt be underſtood, not of virtue it ſelfe, in which there is no *Nimium* or exceſsive extremity, but of a vaine and invidious Affectation and oſtentation *thereof.* A point ſomewhat reſembling this, *Tacitus* inſinuates in a paſſage touching *Lepidus*, ſetting it downe as a Miracle, that he had never bin the Author of any ſervile ſentence, and yet had ſtood ſafe in ſo cruell, and bloudy times. *This thought* (ſaith he) *many times comes into my mind, whether theſe things are governed by Fate; or it lies alſo in our own Power to ſteere an even courſe void of Danger and Indignity, between ſervile Flattery and ſullen Contumacy.* Tacit. Hiſt. 1. Annal. IV.

THE PARABLE.

XXXII. *Give occaſion to a wiſeman and his wiſdome will be increaſed.* Prov. IX.

THE EXPICATION.

THe Parable distinguishes betweene that wisdome which is growne, and ripened into true Habit; and that which swimmes onely in the Braine and conceit, or is boasted in speech, but hath not taken deep root. For the one upon occasion presented, wherein it may be exercis'd, is instantly quickned, prepared, and dilated, so as it seemes greater than it selfe: but the other which before occasion was quick and active, now occasion is given, becomes amaz'd and confused, that even he who presumed the possession thereof, begins to call into doubt whether the preconceptions of *such wisdome* were not meere Dreames, and empty speculations.

THE PARABLE.

Prov. xxvii. **XXXIII.** *He that praiseth his friend alowd, rising early, it shall be to him no better than a curse.*

THE EXPLICATION.

MOderate and seasonable Praises, and utter'd upon occasion, much conduce both to mens Fame and Fortunes; but immoderate, streporous, and unseasonably powr'd out, profit nothing, nay rather from the sense of this Parable they doe much prejudice. For *first*, they manifestly betray themselves to proceed either from too extreme *Affection*, or from a too studied *Affectation*, to the end that him whom they have thus praised, they may by false acclamations demerit rather to themselves, than by just attributes adorn his person. *Secondly*, sparing and modest *Praises*, commonly invite such as are present to adde something of their own to the commendations; Contrariwise profuse and immodest Praises, invite the hearers to detract and take away something. *Thirdly*, (which is the principall point) *too much magnifying a man* stirres up envy towards him; seeing all *immoderate Praises* seeme to be a Reproach to others, who merit no lesse.

THE

THE PARABLE.

XXXIV. *As Faces ſhine in waters, ſo mens hearts are manifeſt to the wiſe.* Prov. xxvi.

THE EXPLICATION.

THe *Parable diſtinguiſheth between the Hearts of wiſe-men and of other Men; comparing thoſe to waters or Glaſſes, which receive and repreſent the formes and Images of things; whereas the other are like to Earth, or rude ſtone, wherein nothing is reflected.* And the more aptly is the mind of a wiſe-man compar'd to a *Glaſſe* or Mirror; becauſe in a *Glaſſe* his own *Image* may be ſeen togither with the *Images* of others; which the eyes cannot doe of themſelves without a *Glaſſe*. Now if the mind of a wiſe man be ſo capable, as to obſerve and comprehend, ſuch an infinite diverſity of Natures and Cuſtomes, it remaines to be endeavour'd, that it may become no leſſe various in the Application, than it is in the Repreſentation,

Qui ſapit, in numeris Moribus aptus erit. Ovid. de A.A.

THus have we ſtaid perchance ſomewhat longer upon theſe *Parables of Solomon*, thã is agreeable to the proportiõ of an example, being carried away thus farre for the Dignity both of the matter it ſelfe, and of the Auctor. Neither was this in uſe only with the Hebrewes, but it is generally to be found in the wiſe-men of ancient times; that if any mans obſervation light upon any thing that was good and beneficiall to the cõmon practique courſe of life, he would reduce and contract it into ſome *ſhort ſentence* or *Parable*, or elſe *ſome Fable*. But for *Fables* (as we have noted elſewhere) they were in times paſt *Vicegerents*, and *ſupplements of Exemples*; now that the times abound with *Hiſtory*, the aime is more right and Active, when the Marke is alive. But the forme of writing which beſt agrees with ſo variable and univerſall an Argument (as is the handling of *negociations* Lib. 2. cap. 13.

tions and ſcatter'd Occaſions) that would be of all other the fitteſt which *Machiavell* made choice of, for the handling of matters of *Policy and Government*; namely by *Obſervations or Diſcourſes*, as they terme them, upon *Hiſtory* and *Examples*. For knowledge drawn freſhly, and, as it were in our view, out of *Particulars*, knowes the way beſt to *Particulars* againe; and it hath much greater life for Practiſe, when the *Diſcourſe* or *Diſceptation* attends upon the *Example*, than when the *Example* attends upon the *Diſceptation*: for here not only *Order* but *ſubſtance* is reſpected. For when the *Example* is ſet downe as the Ground of the *Diſputation*, it uſeth to be propounded with the preparation of circumſtances, which may ſometimes controule the *diſcourſe* thereupon made; ſometimes ſupply it; ſo it may be in place of a patterne for imitation and practiſe: whereas on the contrary, *examples* alleaged for the *Diſputations* ſake, are cited ſuccinctly and ſimply, and as bond-men waite, in a ſervile aſpect, upon the commands of the *Diſcourſe*. But this difference is not amiſſe to be obſerved, *that as Hiſtories of Times afford the beſt matter for Diſcourſes upon Politiques*, ſuch as are thoſe of Machiavell; *So the Hiſtories of lives, are the beſt Inſtructions for diſcourſe of Buſineſſe*; becauſe they compriſe all variety of *Occaſions* and *Negociations*, as well great as ſmall.

Diſcoſo in Liv.

§ *Nay there is* a ground of Diſcourſe for *Precepts touching Buſineſſe*, more accõmodate than both thoſe *ſorts of Hiſtory*; which is, *when Diſcourſes are made upon Letters, but ſuch as are wiſe and ſerious*, as thoſe of *Cicero ad Atticum*, and others. For letters uſually repreſent Buſineſſe more particularly, & more to the life, than either *Chronicles or Lives*. Thus have we ſpoken both of the Matter and Forme of the firſt portion of the *Knowledge touching Negociation*, which handles *diſperſed Occaſions*, which we deliver up upon the accompts of DEFICIENTS.

* FABER FORTVNÆ, ſive de Ambitu vitæ.

M. There is alſo another portion of the *ſame Knowledge*, which differeth as much from that other, whereof we have ſpoken as *ſapere*, and *ſibi ſapere: for the one ſeems to move as it were from the centre to the circumference; the other as*

it

it were, from the circumference to the centre. For there is a wisdome of giving Counsil unto others; and there is a wisdome of forecasting for his own fortunes; and these doe sometimes meet, but more often sever. For many are exceeding wise in their own waies, which yet are weak for administration of civil affaires, or giving of Counsil; like the *Ant, which is a wise creature for it selfe, but very hurtfull for the Garden. This wisdome* the Romanes, thoe excellent Patriots, did take much knowledge of; whereupon the Comicall Poet saith, *Certainly the Mould of a wise mans Fortune is in his own hands*; yea it grew into an Adage among them ----- *Faber quisq; Fortunæ propriæ* -----; And *Livy* attributes the same virtue to *Cato Major. In this man there were such great abilities of wit and understanding, that into what climate soever his nativity had cast him, he seemd to be able to command a fortune.* This kind of wisdome, if it be profest and openly declar'd, hath ever bin thought not only impolitique, but an unlucky and ominous thing: as it was observed in *Timotheus* the *Athenian*, who after he had done many excellent services to the honour and utility of the state, and was to give an account of his goverment to the people, as the manner was, concluded every particular with this clause, *and in this, Fortune had no part*: but it fell out that he never prosper'd in any thing he took in hand afterwards. *This is in truth* too high and savouring of extreme arrogance, aspiring to the same point of Pride which *Ezechiel* records of *Pharaoh*, *Dicis fluvius est meus, & ego feci meipsum*; or of that which another Prophet speaks, *They exult and offer sacrifices to their net, and burne incense to their snare.* or of that which the Poet expresseth of *Mezentius* a Despiser of the *Gods*.

Plaut. in Trin. Cic. in Par. Sallust. ad Cæs. Lib. 1. Dec. 1v.

Plutar. in Sylla.

Ezech. 29.

Habac. 1.

Dextra mihi Deus, & telum quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint. -----

Virg. Æn. 10.

Finally Iulius Cesar, never, to my remembrance, betraid the impotency of his hidden thoughts, so much as in a speech of like nature; for when the *Augur* gave him information *that the entrailes were not prosperous*, he closely murmur'd to himselfe *Erunt latiora cum volo*, which saying

Suet. in Iulio.

of his preceded not long before the misfortune of his death. *But this extremity of Confidence*, (as we have ſaid) as it is an unhallowed thing, ſo was it ever unbleſt. And therefore they that were great Politiques indeed, and truly wiſe, thought it their ſafeſt courſe, ever to aſcribe their ſucceſſes to their Felicity; and not to their skill and virtue. So *Sylla* ſurnam'd himſelfe *Felix*, not *Magnus*; and Celar (more adviſedly than before) ſaith to the *Pilot*, *Cæſarem vehis, & fortunam ejus*. But yet nevertheleſſe theſe Poſitions; *Faber Quiſque Fortunæ ſuæ. Sapiens dominabitur Aſtris. Invia virtuti nulla eſt via*, and the like; if they be underſtood and applied rather as ſpurres to induſtry, than as ſtirrops to inſolency; and rather to beget in men courage and conſtancy of Reſolutions, than Arrogancy and oſtentation; are deſervedly accounted ſound and healthfull; and (no queſtion) have bin ever imprinted in the greateſt Minds, ſo ſenſibly, as ſometimes they can ſcarce diſſemble ſuch cogitations. *For we ſee Auguſtus Cæſar* (who compared with his uncle, was rather diverſe, than inferior, but certainly a perſon more ſtaid and ſolemne) when he died, deſired of his friends that ſtood about his Bed, *that when he expired they would give him a Plaudite*; as if he were conſcient to himſelfe, that he had plaid his part well upon the ſtage. *This portion* alſo of knowledge is to be ſumm'd up amongſt DEFICIENTS; not but that it hath bin uſurped and frequented in Practiſe, farre more exceſsively than is fitting; but becauſe books concerning *this Argument* are ſilent. *Wherefore* according to our cuſtome, as we did in the former; we will ſet downe ſome heads or paſſages of it; and we will call it *Fabrum Fortunæ*, or as we have ſaid, ----- *Doctrinam de Ambitu vitæ*. -----

Plut. in I. Cæſ.

Suet. in Auguſt.

Wherein, at the firſt view, I may ſeem to handle a new and ſtrange Argument, in teaching men how they may be *raiſers and makers of their own fortune*; a doctrine certainly to which every man will willingly yeeld himſelfe a Diſciple, till he throughly conceives the difficulty thereof. *For* the conditions are neither lighter, or fewer, or leſſe difficult to the Purchaſe of Fortune, than to the purchaſe of virtue; and it is as hard

hard and ſevere a Thing to be a true *Politique*, as to be truly *Morall*. But the handling hereof concernes learning greatly, both in *Honour* and in *Subſtance*. For it is a principall point which neerely concernes the *Honour of Learning*, that Pragmatique men may know, *that Learning is not like ſome ſmall Bird, as the Larke, that can mount and ſing, and pleaſe hir ſelfe, and nothing elſe; but that ſhe holds as well of the Hauke, that can ſoare aloft, and after that when ſhe ſees hir time, can ſtoop and ceyze upon her Prey.* Againe this kind of *wiſdome* much reſpects the *Perfection of Learning*; becauſe it is the right rule of a perfect enquiry, *that nothing be found in the Globe of Matter, that hath not a Parallel in the Chriſtalline Globe, or the Intellect.* That is, that there be not any thing in Being and Action, that ſhould not be drawne and collected into contemplation and Doctrine. Neither doth learning otherwiſe admire or eſtime *this Architecture of Fortune*, than as a worke of an inferior kinde: for no mans proper fortune, can be a retribution any way worthy the donation of his Eſſence and Being granted him from God; nay it often comes to paſſe, that men of excellent guifts abandon their Fortunes willingly, that their minds may be vacant for more ſublime reſpects: yet nevertheleſſe *Fortune*, as an Organ of virtue and merit, deſerves likewiſe hir ſpeculation and Doctrine.

§ *Unto this knowledge* appertaine precepts, ſome *ſummary* and Principall; ſome *ſpars'd* and *various*. Precepts *Summary* are converſant about the true knowledge *both of others, and of himſelfe*. The *firſt Precept*, wherein the principall point of the *knowledge of Others* doth conſiſt, may be determined this; that we procure to our ſelves, ſo farre as may be, *that window* which *Momus* once required. He, when he ſaw in the frame of Mans heart, ſo many Angles and Receſſes, *found fault that there was not a window, through which a man might look into thoſe obſcure and crooked windings.* This *window* we ſhall obtaine, if with all diligent circumſpection we purchaſe and procure unto our ſelves good information touching particular Perſons, with whom we negociate Plato de Rep.

and have to deale; as alſo of their natures, their deſires, their ends, their cuſtomes, their Helps and Advantages, whereby they are chiefly ſupported and are powerfull; and againe, of their weakneſſes and diſadvantages, and where they lye moſt open and are obnoxious; of their Friends, Factions, Patrons and Dependancies; and againe of their Oppoſites, Enviers, Competitors; as alſo their Moodes, Times, and Criticall ſeaſons of eaſy Acceſſe.

Virg. Æn. IV. *Sola viri molles Aditus, & tempora noris.*

Laſtly the Principles and Rules which they have ſet downe to themſelves; and the like. And this information muſt be taken not only of *Perſons*, but of Particular Actions alſo which are on Foote, from time to time, and as it were hott upon the Anvile; how they are conducted and ſucceed; by whoſe futherances they are favour'd, by whom oppos'd, of what weight and moment they are, and what conſequence they inferre; and the like. *For the knowledge of preſent Actions* is not only materiall in it ſelfe, but hath this advantage alſo, as without it the *knowledge of Perſons* will be very deceitfull and erroneous: for *Men* change with the *Actions*; and while they are implicated in Actions, engaged and environed with buſines, they are one; when they returne to their Nature, they are another. Theſe *Informations* touching *Particulars*, reſpecting as well *Perſons* as *Actions* are, as the *Minor Propoſitions* in every *Active Syllogiſme*: for no verity or excellency of *Obſervations* or *Axiomes* (whereof the *Major Propoſitions Politique* are made) can ſuffice to ground a concluſion, if there be error and miſtakeing in the *Minor Propoſition*. And that ſuch knowledge may be compaſſed, *Salomon* is our ſurety, who ſaith ------- *Counſil in the Heart of a Man is like a deepe water, but a wiſe man will draw it out.* ------- And

Prov. XX. although the knowledge it ſelfe fall not under Precept, becauſe it is of Individuals, yet inſtuctions for the deduceing of it may with profit be ſet downe.

§ The *knowledge of Men* ſix wayes may be diſcloſed and drawne out; by their *Faces* and *Countenances*, by *Words*, by *Deeds*, by their *Nature*, by their *Ends*, and by the *Relations* of

of others. As for the *Visage* and *Countenance*, let not the ancient Adage move us ----- *Fronti nulla Fides*; ----- for though this saying may not amisse be meant of the outward and generale composure of the *Countenance* and *Gesture*, yet there are certaine subtile motions and labours of the *Eyes*, *Face*, *Lookes*, and *Gesture*, whereby as *Q. Cicero* elegantly saith, is unlockt and open'd, ------ *Ianua quædam animi* ------ *the gate of the minde*. Who more close then *Tiberius Cæsar*? But *Tacitus*, noteing the Character and different manner of speaking, which *Tiberius* us'd in commending in the Senate the great services done by *Germanicus* and *Drusus*; of the commendations given of *Germanicus* he saith thus ------ *Magis in speciem verbis adornata, quam ut penitùs sentire crederetur*, of the commendations given of *Drusus* thus, ---- *Paucioribus, sed intentior, & fidâ oratione*. Againe *Tacitus* noteing the same *Tiberius* at other times somewhat more cleare and legible Saith ----- *Quin ipse compositus aliàs & velut* [a] *eluctantium verborum; solutius promptiúsq; loquebatur quoties subveniret*. ----- Certainly there can hardly be found any Artificer of *Dissimulation* so cunning and excellent, or a *Countenance* so forced, or as he saith --- *vultus jussus* --- so commanded, that can sever from an artificious and fained speech, these Notes; but that the speech is either more *slight* and *careless*, or more *set* and *Formall*; or more *Tedious* and *Wandring*; or more *Drye* and *Reluctant*, than usuall.

Iuv. Sat. II.

De Pet. Cons.

Annal. I.

Annal. IV.

[a] Orl. & velut elector anxius.

§ As for Mens *words* they are (as Physitians say of *waters*) full of flattery and uncertainty; yet these counterfeit Colours are two wayes excellently discover'd; namely when *words* are uttered either upon the *sodaine*, or else in *Passion*. So *Tiberius* being sodainly moved, and somewhat incens'd upon a stinging speech of *Agrippina*, came a step forth of his imbred dissimulation. --- *These words*, *saith* Tacitus, *heard by* Tiberius *drew from his darke-covert Breast --- such words as he us'd seldome to let fall*; and taking her up sharpely, told her her own in a Greeke verse. *That she was therefore hurt because she did not raigne*. Therefore the Poet doth not improperly call such *Passions* --- *Tortures* --- because they urge

Annal. IV.

men to confeſſe and betray their ſecrets,

Hor. Epiſt. I. *Vino tortus & Ira.* —— Experience indeed ſhewes that there are few men ſo true to themſelves, and ſo ſetled in their Reſolves, but that ſometimes upon heat, ſometimes upon bravery, ſometimes upon intimate good will to a Friend, ſometimes upon weakneſſe and trouble of mind, that can no longer hold out under the weight of griefes; ſome times from ſome other Affection or Paſsion, they reveale and communicate their inward Thoughts: but above all it ſounds the mind to the bottome, and ſearcheth it to the quick, when Simulation is put to it by a counter-Diſsimulation according to the proverb of Spaine *Di Mentira, y ſacaras verdad, Tell a lye and finde a Truth.*

§ Neither are *Deeds* thoe they be the ſureſt pledges of mens minds, altogither to be truſted without a diligent and judicious conſideration of their *Magnitude* and *Nature:* For the ſaying is moſt true, *That fraude erects it ſelfe a countremure of credit in ſmaller matters, that it may cheat with better Advantage afterwards.* The Italian thinks himſelfe *upon the Croſſe with the Crier*, and upon the point to be bought and ſould, when he is better uſed than he was wont to be, without manifeſt cauſe: for ſmall favours, they doe but lull men a ſleepe, both as to *Caution*, and as to Induſtry, and

Demoſt. are rightly called by Demoſthenes *Alimenta ſocordiæ.* Againe we may plainly ſee the falſe and inconſtant propriety and nature of ſome *Deeds*, even of ſuch as are accounted *Benefits*, from that particular which *Mutianus* practis'd upon *Antonius primus, who* upon that hollow and unfaithfull reconcilement made between them, advanced many of the Friends of *Antonius* and beſtowed *upon them Tribuneſhips, and Captaineſhips liberally*: by this ſubtle pretence of Demerit, he

Tacitus Hiſt. IV. did not ſtrengthen, but altogether diſarme and deſolate *Antonius*, and winne from him his Dependances, and made them his own creatures.

§ But the ſureſt kay, to unlock the minds of Men, *conſiſts in ſearching and diſcloſeing either their Natures and diſpoſitions, or their ends and intentions.* And certainly the weakeſt

keſt and ſimpleſt ſort of men are beſt interpreted by their *Natures*; but the wiſeſt and more reſerved are beſt expounded by their *Ends*. For it was wiſely and pleaſantly ſaid (thoe in my judgement very untruly) by a *Nuntio* of the Popes, returning from a certain Nation, where he ſerved as *Leidger*, whoſe opinion being askt, touching the appointment of one to goe in his place, gave Counſil, *that in any caſe his Ho: would not ſend one too wiſe, becauſe, ſaith he, no wiſe man would ever imagine, what they in that countrey were like to doe.* Certainly it is a frequent error, and very familiar with wiſe men, to meaſure other men, by the Module of their own abilities; and therefore often ſhoote over the marke, ſuppoſing men to project and deſigne to themſelves deeper ends, and to practiſe more ſubtile Arts, and compaſſ reahces, than indeed ever came into their heads, which the Italian Proverbe elegantly noteth, ſaying

Dì Denári, dì Sénno, e dì Féde
C'n'è Mánco ché non Créde.

There is commonly leſſe Mony, leſſe Wiſdome, and leſſe good Faith than men doe accompt upon. Wherefore if we be to deale with men of a meane and ſhallow capacity, becauſe they doe many things abſurdly, the conjecture muſt be taken rather from the proclivity of their *Natures*, than the deſignes of their *ends*. Furthermore *Princes* (but upon a farre other reaſon) are beſt interpreted by their *Natures*; and *private perſons by their ends*. For *Princes* being at the toppe of humane Deſires, they have, for the moſt part, no particular ends propounded to themſelves whereto they aſpire, ſpecially with vehemency and perſeverance; *by the ſite and diſtance of which ends*, a man might take meaſure and ſcale of the reſt of their *Actions*, and *Deſires*; which is one of the chiefe cauſes *that their Hearts* (as the Scripture pronounceth) *are inſcrutable.* Prov. 25.

But private perſons are like Travellers which intentively goe on aiming at ſome *end* in their journey, where they may ſtay and reſt; ſo that a man may make a probable conjecture and preſage upon them, what they would, or would not *Doe*: for if any thing conduce unto their

their ends, it is probable they will put the ſame in execution; but if it croſſe their deſignes, they will not. *Neither* is the information touching the diverſity of mens *ends* and *natures*, to be taken only *ſimply*, but *comparatively* alſo; as namely *what affection and humor have the predominancy and command of the reſt?* So we ſee, when *Tigellinus* ſaw himſelfe outſtript by *Petronius Turpilianus* in adminiſtring and ſuggeſting pleaſures to *Neroes* humor, *---Metus ejus rimatur---* Annal. XIV ſaith *Tacitus*, he wrought upon *Neroes Feares*, and by this meanes brake the necke of his Concurrent.

§ *As for the knowing of mens minds at ſecond hand from Reports of other*, it ſhall ſuffice to touch it briefly. *Weakneſſes and faults you ſhall beſt learne from Enimies; Virtues and abilities, from friends; Cuſtomes and times, from ſervants; cogitations and opinions, from intimate confidents, with whom you frequently and familiarly diſcourſe.* Popular fame is light; and the judgement of ſuperiors uncertaine; for before ſuch, men are more maskt; Q. Cic. de Pet. Con. *--- Verior Fama è Domeſticis emanat ----*

But to all this part of enquiry, the moſt compendious way reſteth in three things- *Firſt*, to have generall acquaintance and inwardneſſe with thoſe which have moſt lookt into the world, and are well verſt both in men and matters; but eſpecially to endeavour to have privacy and converſation with ſome particular friends, who according to the diverſity of Buſineſſe and Perſons, are able to give us ſolid information, and good intelligence of all paſſages. *Secondly*, to keep a *diſcreet temper* and *mediocrity*, both in liberty of ſpeech and *Taciturnity*; more frequently uſeing *liberty*, but *ſecrecy* where it imports. *For liberty of ſpeech invites and provokes others to uſe the ſame liberty to us againe; and ſo brings much to a mans knowledge; but ſilence induceth truſt and inwardneſſe, ſo as men love to lay up their ſecrets with us as in a cloſet.* *Thirdly*, We muſt by degrees acquire the *Habit of a watchfull and preſent wit*, ſo as in every conference and Action we may both *promote the maine matter in hand, and yet obſerve other circumſtances that may be incident upon the Bye.* For as *Epictetus* gives it in precept, a Philoſopher in every

every particular Action, ſhould ſay thus to himſelfe, *I will doe this alſo and yet goe on in my courſe.* So a *Politique* in every particular occurrence ſhould make this account, and reſolution with himſelfe; *And I will doe this likewiſe and yet learne ſomething that may be of uſe hereafter.* And therefore they who are of ſuch a heavy wit and narrow comprehenſion, as to overdoe one particular, and are wholly taken up with the buſineſſe in hand, and doe not ſo much as thinke of any matters which intervene (a weakneſſe that *Montaigne* confeſſes in himſelfe) ſuch indeed are the beſt inſtruments of Princes and of ſtate, but faile in point of their own *Fortune.* But in the meane, above all things caution muſt be taken, *that we have a good ſtay and hold of our ſelves, by repreſſing a too active forwardneſſe of diſpoſition*, leaſt that this knowing much, doe not draw us on to much medling; for nothing is more unfortunate, than light and raſh intermedling in many matters. So that this *variety of knowledge of Perſons and Actions*, which we give in precept to be procured, tends in concluſion to this, to make a judicious choice both of thoſe *Actions* we undertake, and of thoſe *Perſons* whoſe advice and aſſiſtance we uſe, that ſo we may know how to conduct our affaires with more dexterity and ſafety.

Epict. Enchir.

Eſſayes.

§ *After the knowledge of others* followes the *knowledge of our ſelves*; for no leſſe diligence, rather more is to be taken in a true and exact underſtanding of *our own Perſons*; *than of the Perſons of others*; for the Oracle, *Noſce Teipſum*, is not only a rule of univerſall Prudence, but hath a ſpeciall place in *Politiques*; for as S^t *Iames* excellently puts us in minde, *that he that viewes his Face in a Glaſſe, yet inſtantly forgets what a one he was*; ſo that there is need of a very frequent inſpection. The ſame holds alſo in Civile Affaires, but there are indeed divers *Glaſſes*; for the *Divine Glaſſe* in which we muſt look our ſelves, is the word of God; but the *Politique Glaſſe* is nothing elſe but the ſtate of the world and times wherein we live. *Wherefore* a man ought to take an exact examination, and an impartiall view (not ſuch as uſeth to be taken by one too much in love with himſelfe) of his own abilities, vir-

Iacob. 1.

tues and supports; as likewise of his own defects, Inhabilities, and Impediments; so making his accounts, that he ever estimate *these* with the most, *those* rather with the least; and from this view and examination, these points following come into consideration.

§ *The first Consideration should be, how a mans individual constitution and moral temper sorts with the general state of the times; which if they be found agreeable, then he may give himself more scope and liberty and use his own nature; but if there be any antipathy and dissonancy then in the whole course of his life hee should carry himselfe more close retired, and reserved.* So did *Tiberius* who being conscient of his own temper not well sorting with his times was never seene at publique Plaies, and came not into the Senate in twelve of his last yeares: whereas on the contrary *Augustus* lived ever in mens eyes, which also *Tacitus* observes: *Alia Tiberio Morum via*; the same reason too was to secure his person from danger. Annal. 1.

§ *The second Consideration should be how a mans nature sorts with the Professions and courses of life which are in use & estime, and whereof he is to make his choice; that so if he have not yet determined what race to run, or what course of life to take, he may chuse that which is most fit and agreeable to his naturall disposition; but if he be engaged already in a condition of life, to which by nature he is not so fitted, let him make a departure at the first opportunity and take another Profession.* This we see was done by *Valentine Borgia* that was design'd by his father to a Sacerdotall profession, which, obeying the bent of his own nature, he quitted soone after, and applied himselfe to a Military course of life; tho as equally unworthy the dignity of a Prince as of a Priest, seeing the pestilent Man hath dishonoured both.

§ *The third Consideration should be how a man may bee valued, and may deport himselfe as he is compar'd with his equals & Rivals, whom it is likely he may have competitors and Concurrents in his Fortune, and that he take that course of life wherein there is the greatest solitude of able men; and himselfe like to be most eminent.* Thus *Iulius Cæsar* did, who at first was an Oratour

ratour or Pleader, and was chiefe conversant in the gowne-Arts of Peace; but when he saw *Cicero*, *Hortensius*, and *Camulus* to excell in the glory of Eloquence, and no man eminent for the warres but *Pompeius*, he forsook his course and bidding a long fare-well to a Civile and Popular Greatnesse, transferd his designes to the warres and to a Martiall Greatnesse; by which mean he ascended to the top of soveraignty.

The fourth Consideration may be, that in the choice of friends and inward dependances, a man consult his own nature and disposition, and proceed according to the composition of his own temper; for different constitutions require different kinds of friends to complie withall; to some men solemne and silent natures, to others bold and boasting humours are acceptable, and many of like sort. Certainly it is worth the observation, to see of what disposition the friends and followers of *Julius Cæsar* were, (as *Antonius*, *Hirtius*, *Pansa*, *Oppius*, *Balbus*, *Dolabella*, *Pollio*, the rest,) these were wont to sweare *ita vivente Cæsare moriar*; bearing an infinite affection to *Cæsar*, but towards all others disdainefull and arrogant, and they were men in publique Businesse active and effectuall; in fame and reputation not so solemne and celebrated.

The fifth Consideration may be that a man take heed how hee guide himselfe by Examples, and that he doe not fondly affect the Imitation of others; as if that which is pervious to others, must needs be as patent to him, never considering with himselfe what difference perhaps there is betwixt his and their natures and carriages, whom he hath chosen for his pattern and example. This was manifestly *Pompeius* error, who, as *Cicero* reports it, was wont often to say *Sylla potuit, Ego non potero?* wherein hee was much abused, the nature and proceedings of himselfe, and *Sylla* being the unlikelieſt in the world; the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemne, reverencing Lawes, directing all to Majestie and Fame; and therefore the lesse effectuall and powerfull to goe thorough with his designes. There are more Precepts of this nature, but these shall suffice for example to the rest.

§ *Nor is the well understanding, and discerning of a mans*

selfe sufficient, but he must consult with himselfe upon a way how handsomly aptly and wisely to open and reveale himselfe; and in summe become flexible and moulded to the severall formes & impressions of occasions. As for the *Revealing of a mans selfe*, we see nothing more usuall than for the lesse able man to make the greater shew. Wherefore it is a great advantage to good parts, if a man can by a kinde of Art and Grace *set forth himselfe to others*, by aptly *revealing* (so it be done without distaste or arrogance) his vertues, Merits, and Fortune; and on the contrary by covering artificially his weaknesses, defects, misfortunes and disgraces; staying upon those, & as it were, turning them to the light, sliding from these, and lessening them by an apt exposition, and the like. *Wherefore Tacitus* saith of *Mucianus*, who was the wisest man and the greatest Politique of his time, *Omnia quæ dixerat fecerat q; Arte quâdã ostentator.* *This setting forth of a mans selfe*, requires indeed some Art, least it turne tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as some kinde of *Ostentation*, tho it be to the first degree of vanity, seems rather a vice in the *Ethiques*, than in the *Politiques*. For as it is usually said of *Slander*, *Audacter calumniare, semper aliquid hæret*. So it may be said of *Ostentation* (unlesse it be in a grosse manner deform'd and ridiculous) *Audacter te vendita, semper aliquid hæret*; it will stick certainly with the more ignorant and inferiour sort of men, tho the more wise and solemne smile at it, and despise it. *Wherefore the Estimation wonne with many, shall counterpaile the Disdaine of a few.* But if this *Ostentation of a mans selfe*, whereof we speak be carried with decency and discretion; for example, if it make shew of a native candor and imbred ingenuity, or if it be assum'd at times, when other Perils approach (as in Military persons in time of warre;) or at times when others are most envied, or if words which respect a mans *own Praise*, seem to fall from him in a careleſse passage, as intending something else, without dwelling too long upon them, or being too serious; or if a man so *grace himselfe*, as with equall freedome, he forbeares not to taxe & jest at himselfe; or in summe, if he doe this not of his own accord, but as urg'd & provokt

Hist. alicubi.

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by the insolencies and contumelies of others; it doth greatly adde to a mans Reputation. *And surely* not a few more solid than windy natures, (and therefore want the Art of bearing up sayle in the heighth of the winds,) suffer for their moderation, not without some prejudice and disadvantage to their reputation and merit. *But for these* Flourishes and enhancements of virtue, howsoever some of weake judgements and perchance too severely Morall, may disallow, no man will deny this, but that we should endeavour at least, that virtue thorow careless negligence be not disvalewed, and imbased under the just price. *This diminution* of the valew, and abating the price in estimating Virtue, is wont to fall out three waies. *First when* a man offers and obtrudes himselfe and service in matters of imployment not called nor sent for; such prompt offices as these are reputed well rewarded, if they be not refused. *Secondly when* a man in the beginning and first on-set of an imployment, too much abuseth his own forces & abilities, when that which should have bin performed by degrees, he lavisheth out all at once, which in matters well managed, winnes early grace and commendation, but in the end induceth satietie. *Thirdly when* a man is too fodainly sensible, and too inconsiderately transported with the fruit of his virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, favour conferr'd upon him; and is too much affected and delighted therewith: of this point there is a wise Avilo; *Beware least you seeme unacquainted with great matters, that are thus pleas'd with small, as if they were great.*

§ *But the covering of Defects is of no lesse importance, than a wise and dexterous ostentation of virtues. Defects are conceal'd and secreted by a threefold industry, and as it were under three coverts, Caution, Colour, and Confidence. Caution* is that, when we doe wisely avoid to be put upon those things for which we are not proper, whereas contrariwise bolde undertaking spirits will easily engage themselves without judgement, in matters wherein they are not seen, and so publish and proclaime all their imperfections. *Colour* is when we doe warily and wisely prepare and make way, to have a favourable

and commodious conſtruction made of our faults and wants; as proceeding from a better cauſe, or intended for ſome other purpoſe than is generally conceiv'd: for of the Coverts of Faults the Poet ſaith well,

Ovid. *Sæpe latet vitium proximitate Boni.*

Wherefore if we perceive a *Defect* in our ſelves, our endeavour muſt be to borrow and put on the *Perſon* and *Colour* of the next bordering Virtue, wherewith it may be ſhadowed and ſecreted. For inſtance, he that is *Dull*, muſt pretend *Gravity*; he that is a *Coward*, *mildneſſe*, and ſo the reſt. And it will advantage, to frame ſome probable cauſe, and to give it out and ſpread it abroad, that induced us to diſſemble our abilities and not doe our beſt; that ſo *making a Virtue of Neceſſitie*, what was not in our *power*, may ſeem not to have bin in our *will* to doe. *As for Confidence*, it is indeed an impudent, but the ſureſt and moſt effectuall remedy; namely that a man profeſſe himſelfe to deſpiſe and ſet at naught, what in truth he cannot attaine; according to the Principle of wiſe Merchants, with whom it is familiar to raiſe the price of their own Commodities, and to beat downe the price of others. *But there* is another kinde of *Confidence* farre more impudent than this, which is to *face out a mans own Defects*, to boaſt them and obtrude them upon Opinion; as if he conceiv'd that he was beſt in thoſe things, wherein hee moſt fayles; and to help that againe, that the Deception put upon others may come off more roundly, he may faine, that he hath leaſt opinion of himſelfe in thoſe things, wherein he is beſt. *Like* as we ſee it commonly in Poets; for a Poet reciting his verſes, if you except againſt any verſe, you ſhall preſently heare him reply, *And for this verſe it coſt me more labour than the reſt*; and than he will bring you ſome other verſe, & ſeem to diſable and ſuſpect that rather, and aske your judgment of it, which yet he knowes to be the beſt in the number, and not liable to exception. *But above* all, in this *Helping a mans ſelfe in his carriage*, namely, that a man may ſet the faireſt gloſſe upon himſelfe before others, and right himſelfe in all points, nothing, in my opinion, availes more, *than that*

a man doe not dismantle himselfe and expose his person to scorne and injurie by his too much Goodnesse and Facility of Nature, but rather in all things shew some sparkles and edge of a free and generous spirit, that carries with it as well a sting, as Hony. Which kinde of fortified carriage together with a prompt and prepared resolution to vindicate a mans selfe from scorne, is imposed upon some by accident and a kinde of an inevitable necessity, for somewhat inherent in their person or fortune; as we see it in Deformed Persons and Bastards, and in Persons any way disgrac'd; so that such natures, if they have any good parts, commonly they succeed with good felicity.

§ *As for the declaring of a Mans selfe*, that is a far different thing from *Ostentation* or the *Revealing of a Mans-selfe*, whereof we spake even now; for it referres not to Mens *abilities* or *weaknesses*, but to the *Particular Actions* of life; in which point, *nothing is more Politique, than to observe a wise and discreet mediocrity in the disclosing or secreting the inward intentions and meanings of the Minde touching particular Actions.* For althoe depth of secrecy and concealing of Counsils, and that manner of managing Businesse when men set things a work by dark, and as the French stiles it, *Sourdes Menées, sourd Arts, & close Carriages*, be a thing both prosperous and admirable; yet many times it comes to passe, as the saying is, *That Dissimulation begets errors, and illaqueates the Dissembler himselfe.* For we see the ablest men, and greatest *Politiques* that ever were have made no scruple of it, openly to professe, freely and without dissimulation, the ends they ayme at: so *L. Sylla* made a kinde of profession, *That he wisht all men happy or unhappy as they stood his friends or enimies*: So *Cæsar* when he went first into *Gaule* confidently profest, *That he had rather be first in an obscure village, than second at Rome*: the same *Cæsar* when the warre was now begun did not play the dissembler, if we observe what *Cicero* reports of him; *the other* (meaning of Cæsar) *refuseth not, nay in a sort desires, that, as matters stand, he may so be called Tyrant.* So wee may see in a letter of *Cicero's* to *Atticus*, how far from a *Dis-*

Plutar. in Sylla.

Plutar. in I. Cæs.

Ad Att. Lib. x. E. 4.

sembler

ſembler Auguſtus Ceſar was, who in his very entrance into Affaires, while he was a darling to the ſenate, yet in his Haranges & ſpeeches to the People was wont to ſweare after this manner, *Ita parentis honores conſequi liceat*, which was no leſſe than the Tyranny; ſave that to help the matter a little, he would withall ſtretch forth his hand to a ſtatua of *Iulius Cæſars*, which was erected in the *Roſtra:* and men laught and applauded, and wondred and diſcourſed thus amongſt themſelves, *what means this? What a young man have we here?* and yet thought he meant no hurt, he did ſo candidely and ingenuouſly ſpeake what he meant. *And all* theſe, we have nam'd, were proſperous: Whereas on the other ſide, *Pompeius* who tended to the ſame ends, but by more umbragious and obſcure waies (as *Tacitus* ſaith of him *Occultor non melior*; a cenſure wherein *Saluſt* concurres, *Ore probo, Animo inverecundo*,) made it his deſigne, and endeavoured by infinite engines, that deeply hideing his boundleſſe deſires and ambition, he might in the meane ſpace caſt the ſtate into an Anarchy and confuſion, whereby the ſtate muſt neceſſarily caſt it ſelfe into his armes for protection, and ſo the ſoveraigne Power be put upon him, and he never ſeen in it: and when he had brought it, (as he thought,) to that point, when he was choſen *Conſul* alone, as never any was; yet he could make no great matter of it; becauſe thoſe, that without queſtion would have cooperated with him underſtood him not; ſo that he was faine in the end, to goe the beaten and common track of getting Armes into his hands, by colour of oppoſing himſelfe againſt Cæſar: ſo tedious, caſuall, and unfortunate are thoſe Counſils which are cover'd with *deepe Diſſimulation*; whereof it ſeems *Tacitus* made the ſame judgement, when he makes the *Arts of Simulation*, a prudence of an inferior forme, in regard of *true Policy*, attributing the one to *Auguſtus*, the other to *Tiberius*; for ſpeaking of *Livia* he ſaith thus, *That ſhe ſorted well with the Arts of her husband, and Diſſimulation of her ſonne.*

Cic. ad Attic.

Hiſt. 2.

Sal. apud Sueton. lib. de cl. Gram

Annal. libris.

§ *As touching the bending and moulding of the Minde; it muſt indeed by all poſſible means be endeavoured, that the mind*

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be made pliant and obedient to occasions and opportunities, and that it be not any way stiffe and renitent to them: for nothing hinders the effecting of Businesse, and the making of mens fortunes so much as this. Idem manebat neq; idem decebat, that is, when men are where they were, and follow their own bent when occasions are turn'd. Therefore *Livy*, when he brings in *Cato Major*, as the experteſt Architect of his fortune, very well annexes this, that he had, *versatile ingenium*, and thereof it comes, that theſe grave ſolemne wits, which muſt be like themſelves, and cannot make departure, have for moſt part more dignity then felicity. But in ſome it is nature to be viſcous and inwrapt and not eaſy to turne: in others it is cuſtome, that is almoſt a nature and a conceit which eaſily ſteals into mens minds, which is, that men can hardly make themſelves believe, that they ought to change ſuch courſes, as they have found good and proſperous by farther experience. For *Machiavell* notes wiſely in *Fabius Maximus*, How *he would have him temporizing ſtill according to his old biaſſe, when the nature of the warre was altered and required bolt purſuit.* Diſcors ſupra Liv. In ſome others the ſame weakneſſe proceeds for want of penetration in their judgement, when men doe not in time diſcerne the Periods of things and Actions, but come in too late after the occaſion is eſcaped. Such an overſight as this, *Demoſthenes* reprehends in the People of Athens, ſaying *they were like countrey fellowes playing in a Fence-ſchoole, that if they have a blow, than they remove their weapons to that ward and not before.* Orat. in Philip. 1. Againe in others this comes to paſſe, becauſe they are loath to looſe the labour, in that way, they have enter'd into, nor doe they know how to make a retrait, but rather intertaine a conceit, that by perſeverance they ſhall bring about occaſions to their owne plie. But from what root or cauſe ſoever this viſcoſity and reſtiveneſſe of mind proceeds, it is a thing moſt prejudicial both to a mans affaires and fortunes; *and nothing is more politique, than to make the wheele of our mind concentrique and voluble with the wheeles of Fortune.* Thus much of the two ſummary precepts touching the *Architecture of Fortune. Precepts*

Scatterd are many, but we will only ſelect a few to ſerve as examples to the reſt.

§ *The firſt Precept* is, that this *Architect of his own fortune rightly uſe his Rule, that is, that he inure his minde to judge of the Proportion and valure of things, as they conduce more or leſſe to his own fortune and ends; and that he intend the ſame ſubſtantially, and not ſuperficially.* For it is ſtrange but moſt true, that there are many, whoſe *Logicall part of Minde* (if I may ſo terme it) is good, but the *Mathematical part* nothing worth; that is, who can well and ſoundly judge of the conſequences, but very unskilfully of the prizes of things. Hence it comes to paſſe, that ſome fall in love and into admiration with the private and ſecret acceſſe to Princes; *others* with popular fame and applauſe, ſuppoſing they are things of great purchaſe, when in many caſes they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment: *others* meaſure things according to the labour and difficulty ſpent about them, thinking that if they be ever moveing, they muſt needs advance and proceed; as *Cæſar* ſaid in a deſpiſeing manner of *Cato Uticenſis*, when he deſcribes how laborious, aſſiduous and indefatigable he was to no great purpoſe, *Omnia* (ſaith he) *magno ſtudio agebat*. Hence likewiſe it comes to paſſe, that men often abuſe themſelves, who if they uſe the favour and furtherance of ſome great and honourable Perſon, they promiſe themſelves all proſperous ſucceſſe; whereas the truth is, that, not the greateſt, but the apteſt inſtruments, ſooneſt, and more happily accompliſh a worke. *And for* the true direction of the *Mathematicall ſquare of the Mind*; it is worth the paines eſpecially to know, and have it ſet downe, what ought *firſt* to be reſolved upon for the *building and advanceing of a mans fortune*? what *next*, and ſo forward?

§ *In the firſt place I ſet downe, the Amendment of the mind*; for by taking away and ſmoothing the impediments, and rubbes of the Minde, you ſhall ſooner open a way to fortune, than by the aſſiſtance of Fortune, take away the impediments of the Mind. *In the ſecond place I ſet downe wealth and*

Meanes,

Means, which perchance moſt men would have placed firſt, becauſe of the generall uſe it bears towards all variety of occaſions; but that opinion I may condemne with like reaſon, as *Machiavell* in another caſe not much unlike; for whereas the old ſaying was, that *Monies were the ſinewes of warre*, he on the contrary affirmed, *that there were no other ſinewes of warres, ſave the ſinewes of valiant mens armes.* In like manner it may be truly affirmed, *that it is not Monies that is the ſinewes of Fortune*, but the ſinewes rather and abilities of the Mind, Wit, Courage, Audacity, Reſolution, Moderation, Induſtry, and the like. *In the third place, I ſet downe Fame and Reputation*, and the rather becauſe they have certaine tides and times, which if you doe not take in their due ſeaſō, are ſeldome recovered, *it being a very hard matter to play an after game of Reputation. In the laſt place I ſet downe Honours*, to which certainly there is a more eaſy acceſſe made by any of the other three, much more by all united; than if you begin with *Honours* and ſo proceed to the reſt. But as it is of ſpeciall conſequence, to obſerve the order and priority of *things*; ſo is it of litle leſſe import, to obſerve the order and priority of *Time*; the prepoſterous placing whereof, is one of the communeſt errors; while men flye unto their ends, when they ſhould intend their beginings; and whilſt we ſodainly ceize upon the higheſt matters, we raſhly paſſe over what lies in the midſt; but it is a good precept, *Quod nunc inſtat agamus.*

Diſcorſi in T. Livio lib. 2.

The ſecond Precept is, that upon a greatneſſe and Confidence of Mind, we doe not engage our forces in too arduous matters, which we cannot ſo well conquer; nor that we rowe againſt the ſtream. For as touching mens Fortune, the counſil is excellent, ——— *Fatis accede Deiſque.*

Let us looke about us on every ſide, and obſerve where things are open, where ſhut and obſtructed, where eaſy, where difficile, to be compaſſed; and that we doe not overſtraine and miſemploy our ſtrength where the way is not paſſable, for this will preſerve us from foile, not occupy us too much about one matter, we ſhall win an opinion of

Moderation; offend few; and lastly, make a shew of a perpetuall felicity in all we undertake; whilest those things which peradventure would of their own accord have come to passe, shall be attributed to their providence & industrie.

The third Precept may seeme to have some repugnancy with that former immediatly going before; though it be well understood, there is none at all. *The Precept is this; that we doe not alwaies expect occasions, but sometimes provoke them, and lead the way unto them*; which is that which *Demosthenes* intimates in high termes. *For as it is a received principle that a Generall should lead the Armie; so wise and understanding men should conduct and command matters, and such things should bee done as they saw fit to be done; and that they should not be forc'd to pursue and build only upon events.* For if we diligently consider it we shall observe two differing kindes of sufficiency in managing affaires and handling businesse; for some can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot and excogitate nothing; some are all for Plots, which they can well urge and pursue, but cannot accommodate & take in. Either of which abilities is maimed, and imperfect without the other.

Orat. in Phil. 1.

A fourth Precept is, not to imbrace any matters which doe occupie too great a quantitie of time; but to have that verse ever sounding in our eares.

Sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile tempus.

And the cause why those who addict themselves to professions of burden and the like, as Lawyers, Orators, painfull Divines, writers of Books, and the like, are not commonly so politique in contriving and promoting their own fortunes, is no other then this; that they want time which is otherwise imployed, to informe themselves of Particulars; and to wait upon occasions, and to devise & project designes which may conduce to the making of their fortune. Nay further, in the Courts of Princes and in states, you shall have those that are exceeding powerfull and expert how to advance their own Fortune, and to invade the Fortune of others, which undergoe no publique charge, but are continually practized in that whereof we speake, *The Advancement of Life.*

A Fifth Precept is, to imitate nature which doth nothing in vaine. Which certainly we may doe, if we discreetly mingle and interlace our businesses of all sorts. For the minde should in every particular action be so disposed and prepared, and our intentions so subdued, and subordinated one under another, as if we cannot have that we seek in the best degree, yet we may have it in a second, or at least in a third: but if we can get no footing nor any consistency at all in any part of a thing we desire, than we may turne the paines we have taken upon some other end, then that whereto it was designed: but if we cannot make any thing of it for the present, at least we may extract something out of it that may stand us instead for the time to come; but if we can derive no solid effect or substance from it, neither for the present nor for the future, let us yet endeavour to winne some good opinion and reputation by it, and the like: ever exacting accoumpts of our selves, whereby it may appeare that we have reapt somewhat more or lesse from every particular Action and Counsil, never suffering our selves to bee cast down and dispirited, like men amaz'd and confused, if perchance we faile in the principal scope of our intentions. For nothing is more prejudicious to a Politique, than to be wholly and solely taken up with one thing, for he that doth so, looseth infinite occasions which doe intervene upon the by, and which perhaps are more proper and propitious for somewhat that may be of use hereafter, than for those things we urge for the present; and therefore we must be perfect in that Rule, *Hæc oportet facere & illa non omittere.* Epict. Ench.

A sixth Precept is, that we engage not our selves too peremptorily in any thing though it seeme not at first sight, liable to accident; but that we ever have either an open window to fly out at, or a secret posterne way to retire by.

A seaventh Precept is, that ancient Rule of Bias, so it be construed not to any point of Perfidiousnesse, but to caution and moderation. *So love a man as yet thou maist become an enimie, so hate a man as yet thou mayst become his Friend,* for it utterly betrayes and frustrates all utility, for a man to em-

barque himſelfe too farre in unfortunate friendſhips; unquiet and troubleſome ſpleenes, or childiſh and humorous Æmulations.

Plura velis? V. Cardani Proxen ſive Arcana Pol: ô quàm Arcana!

Theſe ſhall ſuffice for examples touching the knowledge *of the Advancement of Life*: yet I would have it remembred, that theſe adumbrations which we have drawne and ſet downe as *Deficients*, are farre from compleat Tractates of them, but only that they are as litle peeces and edgings for patternes, whereby a judgement may be made of the whole web. Againe we are not ſo weake and fooliſh as to avouch that *Fortunes* are not to be obtained without all this adoe; for we know well they come tumbling into ſome mens laps, and a numbre obtaine good *fortunes* onely with diligence and aſſiduity (with ſome litle caution intermingled) in a plaine way, without any great or painfull Art. But as *Cicero* when he ſets down the Idea of a perfect Orator, doth not mean that every Pleader ſhould be or can be ſuch: and againe as in the deſcription of a Prince or a Courtier, by ſuch as have handled thoſe ſubjects, the Mould is made according to the perfection of the Art, and not according to common practice: the ſame vve have performed in the inſtruction of a *Politique* man; I mean *Politique for his owne Fortune*. And likewiſe take this advertiſement along vvith you. That the Precepts vvhich vve have choſen & ſet down, are all of that kinde vvhich may be counted and called *Bona Artes*. As for *Evill Arts*, if a man vvould yeeld himſelfe a diſciple to Machiavell vvho gives it in precept, *That a man needs not much care for virtue it ſelfe, but for the appearance only thereof in the eyes of the world, becauſe the fame and credit of virtue is a help, but the uſe of it a cumber*; vvho in another place gives this rule: That a Politique man lay this as a foundatiõ of his Practique wiſdome, *that he preſuppoſe, that men are not rightly & ſafely to be wrought upon & bowed to the bent of our wils, otherwiſe than by feare; & therefore let him endeavour by all meanes poſſible to have every man obnoxious, low & in ſtreights.* So as Machiavells Politician ſeems to be vvhat the Italians call *Jl ſeminatore délle ſpine*; or if any vvould imbrace that Principle

Libro del Pren.

Principle which *Cicero* cites, *Cadant amici, dummodo inimici intercidant*; as the *Trium-viri* sold the lives of their friends, for the deaths of their enimies. Or if a man would be an imitator of *L. Catilina* to become an incendiarie and a perturber of states to the end he may better fish in droumy waters, and unwrap his fortunes; *I* (saith he) *if once a fire ceize upon my Fortune, will extinguish it not with water but with ruine*; Cic. pro L. Marana. or if any one would convert to his use that of *Lysander*, who was wont to say, *That children are to be deceived with Comfits, and men with Othes*. Plutar. in Lysand. With other such corrupt and pernitious Positions of the same impression, whereof (as in all other things, there are more in number, than of the good & sound. If any (I say) be delighted with such contagious and polluted wisdome, I deny not but with these dispensations from all the lawes of charity and integrity, wholly eslaved to the pressing of his own *Fortunes*, he may be more speedy and compendious *in the promoting of his Fortune*: but it is in life, as it is in waies, the shortest way is commonly the fowlest, and surely the fairer way is not much about. *But it is so* far from the minde and purpose of this Discourse that men should apply themselves to these corrupt and crooked Arts, that rather indeed (if they be in their own power and are able to beare and sustaine themselves, and be not carried away with the whirlewinde and tempest of Ambition) they ought in the pursuit of Fortune to set before their eyes, not onely that general Map of the world, *That all things are vanity and vexation of spirit*; but also that more particular card and direction, *That Being, without well-Being, is a curse; & the greater Being, the greater curse*; and that all virtue is most rewarded, and all wickednesse most punisht in it selfe: according as the Poet saith excellently,

Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri, pro talibus ausis
Præmia posse reor solvi? Pulcherrima primùm
Dii Moresq; dabunt vestri. ——— Virg. Æn. 9.

And so on the contrary he speakes as truly of the wicked ---*atq; eum ulciscentur mores sui.*---- Nay further the race of Mortality, whilst their working heads every way tosse and diffuse

diffuſe their thoughts how they may beſt forecaſt and conſult *their advancement in the world*, ought, in the midſt of theſe heats, and eager purſuits, to look up to the divine judgement, and the eternall providence, which oftentimes ſubverts and brings to nothing the plots of the wicked, and their evill counſils, thoe never ſo profound; according to
Pſal. VII. that of ſacred ſcripture, *He conceived wicked thoughts, travel'd great with miſchiefe, and ſhall bring forth deluſive vanity.* Nay though men ſhould refraine themſelves from injuries and evill Arts; *yet this inceſſant and Saboathleſſe aſpiring to the ſteep height of Fortune, paies not the tribute of our time due unto God, who (as we may ſee) demands and ſets apart for himſelfe a Tenth of our ſubſtance and a Seaventh of our time.* For it is to ſmall purpoſe to have an erected face towards heaven, and a groveling ſpirit upon earth; eating duſt as doth the ſerpent; an oppoſition which even Heathens could ſee and
Horat. ſer. 2. cenſure. *Atq; affigit humo divinæ particulam Auræ.* And if any man ſhould herein flatter himſelfe, that he reſolves to imploy his Fortune well though he ſhould obtaine it ill; as was wont to be ſaid of *Auguſtus Cæſar* and *Septimius Severus, That either they ſhould never have bin borne, or elſe they ſhould never have died*, they did ſo much miſchiefe in the purſuit and aſcent of their greatneſſe; and ſo much good when they were eſtabliſht; let him take this with him, that ſuch compenſation of evill by good, may be allowed after the Fact, but is deſervedly condemn'd in the purpoſe. *Laſtly*, it will not be amiſſe for us, in that ſwift and hot race towards our fortune, to coole our ſelves a litle, with that elegant conceit of the Emperour *Charles* the V. in his inſtructions to his ſonne, *That Fortune hath ſomewhat of the nature of a woman, that if ſhe be too much wooed ſhe is the farther off*, but
Script. Germ. A.C. 1519. this laſt remedy is for thoſe whoſe taſt, from ſome diſtemper of the mind, is corrupted: let men rather build upon that foundation, which is as a corner-ſtone of Divinity and Philoſophy, wherein they almoſt joyne cloſe by the ſame aſſertion of *what ſhould be firſt ſought*; for *Divinity* commands,
Mat. VI. *Firſt ſeek the Kingdome of God and all theſe things ſhall be ſuperadded*

peradded unto you; and *Philosophy* commands somewhat like this; *Seek first the goods of the mind, and the rest shall be supplied, or no way prejudiced by their absence.* And although this foundation laid by man is sometimes placed upon the sands, as we may see in *M. Brutus*, who in the last scene of his life, brake forth into that speech,

DION Lib. XLVII. ex Poetâ vet.

Te Colui virtus ut Rem, at Tu Nomen inane es:

Yet the same foundation laid by the hand of heaven, is firmely setled upon a Rock. *And here* we conclude the knowledge of the *Advancement of Life*, and withall the generall knowledge of *Negociations.*

CAP. III.

The Partitions *of the Art of Empire or Goverement* are omitted, only accesse is made to two DEFICIENTS, I. *The knowledge of enlarging the* Bounds of Empire. II. *And the knowledge of* universall Iustice, *or of the Fountaines of Law.*

I. COme now to the *Art of Empire*, or the *knowledge of Civile Goverment*; under which *Household Goverment* is comprehended, as a *Family* is under a *City*. In this part, as I said before, I "
have commanded my selfe silence: yet notwithstanding I "
may not so disable my selfe; but that I could discourse of "
this part also, perchance not impertinently, nor unprofita- "
bly; as one practised by long experience; and by *your Maje-* "
sties most indulgent favours, and no merit of mine owne, "
raised by the degrees of office and honours, to the highest "
Dignity in the state, and have borne that office for foure "
years; and which is more, have bin accustomed to *Your Ma-* "
jesties commands and conferences, for the continued space "
of eighteene years together, (which even of the dullest "
mould might fashion and produce a States-man) who have "
spent much time amongst other knowledges, in Histories "
and lawes. *All which I report to posterity, not out of any arro-* "

gant oſtentation, but becauſe I preſume it makes ſomething to the honour and Dignity of learning, that a man borne for letters more than any thing elſe, and forcibly carried away, I know not by what fate, againſt the bent of his own Genius, to a Civile active courſe of life, ſhould yet be advanc't to ſo high and honourable charges in the ſtate, and that under ſo wiſe a King. But if my times of leaſure ſhall bring forth hereafter any thing touching the *wiſdome of Government*, and ſtate matters, it will be perchance an Abortive, or an after-Birth. In the mean ſpace now that all ſciences are diſtributed and ranged, as it were, into their true Formes; leaſt ſuch an eminent place as this ſhould remaine empty, I have judg'd it fit to note as DEFICIENTS two Portions only of *Civile knowledge*, which pertaine, not to the *Secrets of Empire*, but are of a more open and publique nature; and, according to our cuſtome, to propound examples thereof. *Seeing the Arts of Government*, comprehend three ſorts of *Politique Duties*; *Firſt* that a Kingdome or State be conſerved; *Secondly* that it may become happy and flouriſhing; *Thirdly* that it may be amplified and the bounds thereof propagated and extended. Of theſe duties the *two firſt* are for moſt part by many, excellently well handled; but the *third* is paſt over in ſilence; wherefore we will ſet this downe in the number of *Deficients*, and according to our manner propoſe examples thereof; calling this part of Civile knowledge *Conſulem Paludatum*, or a *knowledge of the enlarging the Bounds of Empire*.

* CONSVL PALVDATVS, ſive de proferendis Imperii finibus.

EXAMPLE
OF A SUMMARY TREATISE
touching the enlarging of the Bounds of EMPIRE.

THe ſpeech of *Themiſtocles*, taken to himſelfe, was indeed ſomewhat uncivile and haughty; but if it had been applied to others and at large, certainly it may ſeem to comprehend in it a wiſe obſervation and a grave cenſure.

censure. Desired at a Feast to touch a lute, he said *He could not Fidle, but yet he could make a small Towne a great City.* Plutar. in Them.
These words drawne to a Politique sense doe excellently expresse and distinguish two differing Abilities, in those that deale in businesse of Estate. *For if a* true survey be taken of all Counsilors and States-men that ever were, and others promoted to publique charge, there will be found (though very rarely) those which can make a *small State great, and yet cannot fidle*, as on the other side there will be found a great many, *that are very cunning upon the Cittern or Lute, (that is in Court-Trifles) but yet are so farre from being able to make a small State, Great; as their guift lies another way, to bring a Great and Flourishing Estate to ruine and decay.* And certainly those degenerate Arts and shifts, whereby many Counsilors and Governors gaine both favour with their Maisters, and estimation with the vulgar, deserve no better name than *Fidling*, being things rather pleasing for the time, and gracefull to the professors themselves, than tending to the *weale and advancement of the State*, which they serve. There are also (no doubt) *Counsilors* and *Governors*, not to be despised, which may be held sufficient men, and equall to their charge, able to manage Affaires, and to *keepe them from precipicies and manifest inconveniences*, which nevertheless are farre from the Ability *to raise and amplify an Estate*. But be the workmen what they may be, let us cast our eyes upon the worke, that is, *what is the true greatnesse of Kingdomes and Estates, and by what meanes it may be obtained?* An argument fit for great Princes to have perpetually in their hand, and diligently to meditate, to the end that neither by overmeasuring their Forces, they loose themselves in vaine and too difficile enterprises, nor on the other side undervaluing them, they descend to fearfull and pusillanimous Counsils. *The Greatnesse of an Estate in Bulke and Territory, doth fall under measure, the Greatnesse of Financies and Revenue doth fall under computation.* The number of Citizens and the Pole may be taken by Musters; and the multitude and greatnesse of Cities and Townes, by Cardes and

Mapps. But yet there is not any thing amongst Civile Affaires, more subject to error, than a true and intrinseque valuation, concerning the Power and Forces of an Estate. *The Kingdome of Heaven is compar'd not to an* Acorne or Nut, *but to a* Grain of Mustard-seed, *which is one of the least Graines, but hath in it a property and spirit hastily to get up and spread.* So are there *Kingdomes and States* in compasse and territory very great, and yet not so apt to *enlarge their Bounds or Command*; and some on the other side that have but a small dimension of stemme, and yet apt to be the Foundations of of great Monarchies.

I. *Walled Townes*, stored Arcenalls and Armories, goodly Rates of Horse, Chariots of warre, Elephants, Ordinance, Artillery, and the like; *all this is but a sheep in a Lions skin, except the Breed and Disposition of the people be stout & warlike.* Nay number it selfe in Armies imports not much, where the people is of a faint & weak courage: for, as *Virgil* saith, *It never troubles a Wolfe, how many the sheep be.* The Army of the Persians in the Plaines of *Arbela*, was such a vast sea of people, as it did somewhat astonish the *Commanders* in *Alexanders Armie*, who came to him therefore, and wisht him to set upon them by *Night*, but he answered, *I will not Pilfer the victory*; and the Defeat by that courageous assurance was the more easie. When *Tigranes* the *Armenian*, being encamped upon a hill with an Armie of 400000 Men, discovered the Army of the *Romans* being not above 14000 marching towards him, he made himselfe merry with it & said; *yonder men are too many for an Ambassage, and too few for a Fight*, but before the sunne set he found them enow to give him the chase with infinite slaughter. Many are the examples of the great odds betweene number & courage. First then a man may rightly make a judgement and set it downe for a sure and certaine truth, that the principall point of all other which respects the *Greatnesse of any Kingdome or State*, is *to have a Race of Military men.* And that is less materiall than trifling, *That Money is the Sinewes of Warre*, where the sinewes of mens armes in base and effeminate people are fay-

B.Ecl 7.

Plutar. in Alex.

Plut. in Lucul.

Macch. Discors. sopra Livio lib.2.

ling:

ling: for *Solon* said well to *Crœsus* (when in ostentation hee shewed him his gold) *Sir, if any other come that hath any better Iron than you, he will be master of all this Gold.* Therefore let any *Prince* or *State* think soberly of their Forces, except their *Militia* of Natives be of Good and Valiant Souldiers: and let Princes on the other side that have Subjects of stout and Martiall disposition know their own strength, unlesse they be otherwise wanting to themselves. As for Mercenary Forces (which is the help in this case where native forces fayle) all times are full of examples whereby it manifestly appeares; that whatsoever State or Prince doth rest upon them, *he may spread his Feathers for a time beyond the compasse of his nest, but he will mew them soone after.* Plut. in Solone.

2 *The blessing of Iudah* and *Issachar* will never meet. *That the same Tribe or Nation should be both the Lions whelp, and the Asse between Burdens*; neither will it be *that a people overlaid with Taxes should ever become Valiant, and Martiall.* It is true that *Taxes* levied by publique consent of the estate doe depresse and abate mens courage lesse, as a man may plainly see in the Tributes of the Low-countries, which they call *Excizes*, and in some degree in those contributions which they call *Subsidies* in England. For you must note that we speak now of the Heart and not of the Purse, so that altho the same Tribute conferr'd by consent or imposed by command, be all one to the purse, yet it works diversly upon the courage: Therefore set down this too as a Principle, *That no People overcharg'd with Tribute is fit for Empire.* Gen. XLIX.

3 *Let States* and kingdomes that ayme at *Greatnesse* by all meanes take heed how the *Nobility*, and *Gentlemen*, and those which we call *Gentle-men*, multiply too fast, for that makes the common subject grow to be a Peasant and Base swaine driven out of heart, and in effect nothing else but the Noblemans Bond-slaves and Labourers. Even as you may see in Coppice wood, *if you leave your staddles too thick, you shall never have cleane underwood, but shrubs and bushes.* So in a country if the *Nobility* be too many the *Commons* will be base and heartlesse, and you will bring it to that, that not

the hundredth Pole will be fit for an Helmet; especially as to the *Infantery*, which is the nerve of an Army; & so there will be great Population and litle strength. This which I speak off hath been in no Nation more cleerely confirm'd than in the examples of *England* and *France*, whereof *England*, thoe farre inferior in Territory & Population, hath bin nevertheless alwaies an over match in Armes; in regard the middle-people of England make good Souldiers, which the Peasants of France doe not. And herein the devise of

Histor. Hen. VII. HENRY THE VII. KING OF ENGLAND (whereof I have spoken largely in the History of his life) was profound and admirable, in making Farmes and Houses of Husbandry of a standard; that is maintain'd with such a Proportion of land unto them, as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty, and to keep the Plough in the hands of the Owners, or at least usu-fructuary, and not hirelings & Mercenaries; and thus a Countrey shall merit that Character whereby *Virgil* expresses ancient *Italy*,

Æn. I. *Terra potens Armis atq; ubere Gleba.*

Neither is that state which is almost peculiar to England, (and for any thing I know, hardly to be found any where else, except it be perhaps in Poland) to be passed over; I meane the state of Free-servants and Attendants upon Noble-men and Gentle-men, of which sort, even they of inferior condition, doe no waies yeeld unto the *Yeomanry*, for *Infantery*. And therefore out of all question the Magnificence and that Hospitable splendor, the Household servants, and great Retinues of Noble-men and Gentle-men receiv'd into custome in England, doth much conduce unto *Martiall Greatnesse*: whereas on the other side, the close, reserved and contracted living of Noble-men, causeth a Penury of *Military Forces*.

4 *By all means it is to be procured, that the Trunck of Nebuchadnezzars Tree of Monarchy, be great enough to beare the Branches and the Boughes*; that is, that the number of *Naturall Subjects* to the Crowne or State, beare a sufficient proportion for the over-topping the *Stronger subjects*. There-

fore

fore all States that are liberal of *Naturalization* towards *ſtrangers*, are fit for the *Greatneſſe of Empire*. For it is a vaine opinion to think that a handfull of people, can with the greateſt courage and Policy in the world, keep and repreſſe under the lawes of Empire, too large and ſpacious extent of *Dominion*; this may hold for a time, but it will faile ſodainly. The Spartans were a ſpareing and nice People in point of *Naturalization*, whereby while they kept their compaſſe, they ſtood firme and aſſured; but when they began to ſpread and to enlarge their Dominion, and that their boughs, multiplied by ſtrangers, were becomen too great for the ſtemme of the Spartans, they became a wind-fall upon the ſodaine. Never any State was in this point ſo open to receive ſtrangers into their Body, as were the Romanes; therefore their Fortune ſeconded their wiſe inſtitution, for they grew to the greateſt Monarchy in the world. Their manner was to grant *Naturalization* (which they called *Ius Civitatis*) and to grant it in the higheſt degree, that is, not only *Ius Commercii*, *Ius Connubii*, *Ius Hæreditatis*, but alſo *Ius Suffragii*, and *Ius Petitionis ſive Honorum*; and this not to ſingular perſons alone, but likewiſe to whole families, yea to Citties, and ſometimes to whole Nations. Adde to this, their cuſtome of *Plantation of Colonies*, whereby the *Romane Plants* were removed into the ſoile of other Nations: and putting both conſtitutions togither, you will ſay, *that it was not the Romans that ſpread upon the world, but it was the world that ſpread upon the Romanes*; which was the ſecureſt way of *Enlarging the Bounds of Empire*. I have marvailed ſometimes at *Spaine*, how they claſpe and governe ſo large Dominions, with ſo few naturall *Spaniards*: but ſurely the whole compaſſe of Spaine, is a very great body of a Tree; being it containes farre more ample Territories, than Rome or Sparta at their firſt riſeings. And beſides, thoe the Spaniards have not had that uſeage to *Naturalize* liberaly; yet they have that which is next to it, that is, *To imploy, almoſt indifferently, all Nations in their Militia of Ordinary ſouldiers*; yea and ſometimes they conferre their higheſt commands of warre, upon Captaines

Exempla apud Cic. pro L. C. Bal.

taines that are no naturall Spaniards: nay it ſeemes, not long agoe, they have begun to grow ſenſible of this want of Natives, and to ſeek a Remedy, as appears by the *Pragmaticall Sanction* publiſht this yeare.

5 *It is moſt Certaine that ſedentary and within-doore Mechanicall Arts; and Delicate Manufactures* (that require rather the Finger, than the Arme,) *have in their nature a contrariety to a Military Diſpoſition.* And generally all warlike People are a litle idle, and love danger better than travaile: neither muſt they be too much broken of it, if we will have their ſpirits preſerv'd in vigor. Therefore it was great advantage in the ancient ſtates of *Sparta*, *Athens*, *Rome*, and others, that they had the uſe, not of *Free-men*, but of *Slaves*, which commonly did rid thoſe *Manufactures*: but the uſe of *Slaves* ſince the receiving of the *Chriſtian Law*, is, in greateſt part aboliſht. That which comes neereſt to this cuſtome, is to leave thoſe Arts chiefly to ſtrangers, which for that purpoſe are to be allured, or at leaſt the more eaſily to be received. The *vulgar Natives* ſhould conſiſt of three ſorts of men; that is, of *Tillers of Ground*; *Free-ſervants*, and *Handy-craftſmen* of ſtrong and *Manly Arts*, as Smithes, Maſons, Carpenters, &c. not reckoning profeſſed Souldiers.

6 *But above all, for the Greatneſſe of Empire*, it imports moſt; *that a Nation doe profeſſe Armes as their glory*, Principall ſtudy, and chiefeſt Honor. For the things which we formerly have ſpoken of, are but *Habilitations* towards Armes; and to what purpoſe is *Habilitation* without endeavour to produce it into *Act*? *Romulus, after his death*, (as they report or faigne) *ſent a preſent to the* Romans, *that above all they ſhould intend* Armes; *and that they ſhould prove the greateſt* Empire *of the World.* The whole Fabrique of the *State of Sparta*, was, induſtriouſly (thoe not ſo wiſely) compos'd and built to that ſcope and end. The *Perſians* and *Macedonians* had the ſame uſeage, but not ſo conſtant and laſting. The *Britans*, *Galls*, *Germans*, *Goths*, *Saxons*, *Normans*, for a flaſh of time gave themſelves chiefly to *Armes*. The *Turkes* not a litle inſtigated thereto by their Law,

Liv. lib. 1. v. c. 37.

Law, retaine the ſame *diſcipline* at this day, (thoe as it is now practiſed) with great declination of their *Militia*. Of Chriſtian Europe they that retaine and profeſſe it, are in effect only the *Spaniards*. But it is ſo liquid and manifeſt, *that every man profiteth moſt, in that he moſt intendeth*, that it needs not to be ſtood upon. It is enough to point at it; *That no Nation which doth not profeſſe Armes, and practiſe Military Arts, making it their principal ſtudy and occupation, may ever hope to have any notable greatneſſe of Empire, fall into their mouthes*: and on the other ſide, it is a moſt certaine Oracle of time, *That thoſe Nations that have continued long in the profeſſion and ſtudy of Armes (as the Romanes & Turkes principally have done, for the propagation of Empire, work wonders*. Nay thoſe that have flouriſht for the glory of Armes, but for the ſpace only of one age; have commonly attain'd *that Greatneſſe of Dominion*, in that one age, which maintained them long after, when their profeſsion and exercile of Armes hath growen to decay.

7 *Incident to this Precept is, for a ſtate to have ſuch lawes and Cuſtomes which may readily reach forth unto them juſt occaſions, or at leaſt pretences of taking Armes*. For there is that apprehenſion of Juſtice imprinted in the nature of men, that they enter not upon *warres* (whereof ſo many calamities doe enſue) but upon ſome, at the leaſt ſpecious grounds and Quarrells. The Turke hath at hand for cauſe of warre the Propagation of his law and ſect; a quarrell that he may alwaies command. The Romans thoe they eſtimed the *extending of the Limits of their Empire*, to be great honour to their Generals, when it was done; yet for that cauſe alone, to *Propagate their bounds*, they never undertook a warre. Therefore let a nation that pretends to *Greatneſſe*, & aſpires to *Empire*, have this condition, that they have a quick and lively ſenſe of any wrongs either upon Borderers, Merchants or publique Miniſters, and that they ſit not too long upon the firſt provocation. *Againe* let them be preſt, and Active to ſend Aides and Succors to their Allies and confederates, as it ever was with the Romans: in ſo much, as if

a hostile invasion were made upon a confederate, which also had leagues Defensive with other states, and the same implored their aides severally; the Romanes would ever be the formost; and leave it to no other to have the Honour of the Assistance. *As for* the warres which were anciently made for a kinde of conformity, or tacite correspondency of Estates, I doe not see upon what law they are grounded. Such were the warres undertaken by the Romanes, for the liberty of Grecia: such were those of the Lacedemonians and Athenians, to set up or pull downe *Democracies* and *Oligarchies*: such are the warres made sometimes by States and Princes, under pretence of protecting Forraine subjects, and freeing them from Tyranny and oppression, and the like. Let it suffice for the present point that it be concluded, *That no Estate expect to be Great, that is not instantly awake, upon any just occasion of Arming.*

8 *No body can be healthfull without exercise, neither Naturall Body nor Politique: and certainly to a Kingdome or Estate a just and honourable warre is in place of a wholsome exercise.* A Civile warre indeed, *is like the heat of a Fever*, but a Forraine *is like the heat of Exercise*, and serves to keep the body in health: for in a slothfull and drowsie Peace, both courages will effeminate, & Manners corrupt. But howsoever it be for the *Happinesse* of any *Estate*, without all question, for *Greatnesse*, it maketh, to be still for the most part in Armes: and a *veterane* Army (thoe it be a chargeable Businesse) alwaies on foot, is that which commonly gives the Law, or at least the Reputation amongst all *neighbour states*. This is notably to be seen in *Spaine*, which had in one part or other a *veterane Army* almost continually, now by the space of sixe score years.

9 *To be Master of the Sea, is an Abridgement of a Monarchy.* *Cicero* writing to *Atticus* of *Pompeius* his preparation against *Cæsar* saith; *Consilium Pompeji, plane Themistocleum est; putat enim, qui Mari potitur, eum Rerum potiri.* And without doubt *Pompey* had tired out and broken *Cæsar*, if upon a vaine confidence he had not left that way. We see

Vide Sis *Cl. Seldeni* Mare claus.

from many examples the great effects of *Battailes by Sea*: The Battaile of *Actium* decided the Empire of the world: the Battaile of *Lepanto* put a ring in the nose of the Turke. *Certainly* it hath often fallen out that *Sea-fights* have bin final to the warre; but this is when Princes or States have set up their Reſt upon thoſe Battails. Thus much is without all doubt, *that he that commands the Sea, is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the warre as he will: whereas on the Contrary, thoſe that be ſtrongeſt by* Land, *are many times neverthelesſe in great ſtraights.* But at this day and with us of *Europe*, the vantage *of ſtrength at Sea (which is indeed one of the principall Dowries of this Kingdome of Great Brittaine)* is in the ſumme of Affaires of great import: both becauſe moſt of the Kingdomes of *Europe*, are not meerely Inland, but girt with the Sea moſt part of their compaſſe, and becauſe the Treaſures and wealth of both Indies, ſeems in great part but an Acceſſarie to the *command of the Seas.*

10. *The warres of latter Ages ſeem to be made in the darke, in reſpect of the Glory and Honor which reflected upon Military men from the warres in ancient times.* We have now perchance, for Martial encouragement ſome degrees and Orders of Chivalry, which neverthelesſe are conferred promiſcuouſly upon Souldiers, and no Souldiers; and ſome Pedegrees of Families perhaps upon Scutchions; and ſome publique Hoſpitals for emerited and maim'd Souldiers, and ſuch like things. But in Ancient times, the *Trophy* erected upon the place of the victory; the Funerall Laudatives and ſtately Monuments for thoſe that died in the warres; Civique Crownes and military Garlands awarded to particular perſons; the ſtile of Emperor, which the Greateſt Kings of the world after, borrowed from commanders in warre; the ſolemne Triumphs of the Generals upon their returne, after the warres were proſperouſly ended; the great Donatives and Largeſſes upon the disbanding of the Armies: theſe I ſay were matters ſo many and great, and of ſuch glorious luſtre and blaze in the eyes of the world, as were able to create a Fire in the moſt frozen breaſts, and to

inflame them to warre. *But above all*, that of the *Triumph* amongst the Romanes, was not a matter of meere Pompe, or some vaine spectacle or pageants; but one of the wisest and noblest institutions that ever was: for it contain'd in it three things, *Honor and Glory to the Generalls; Riches to the Treasury out of the spoiles*, and *Donatives to the Army*. But the *Honors of Triumph* perhaps were not fit for Monarchies, except it be in the person of the King himselfe, or of the Kings sonnes; as it came to passe in the times of the *Roman Emperors*, who did impropriate the *Honor of Triumph* to themselves, and their sonnes; for such warres as they did atchieve in Person, and left only by way of indulgence, *Garments* and *Triumphall* Ensignes to the Generalls.

§ *But* to conclude these discourses, *There is no man* (as sacred Scripture testifies) *that by care taking can adde a cubite to his Stature*, in this lide Modul of a Mans body; but in the great Frame of *Kingdomes* and *Common-wealths*, it is in the Power of Princes and estates, to adde Amplitude and Greatnesse to their *Kingdomes*. For by introducing such ordinances, constitutions and customes, as we have now propounded, and others of like nature with these, they may sow *Greatnesse* to posterity and future Ages. But these Counsils are seldome taken into consideration by Princes; but the Matter is commonly left to fortune to take its chance.

Mat. VI.

§ *And thus much* for the points that for the present, have offered themselves to our consideration touching *the Enlarging of the Limits of a State or Kingdome*. But to what end is this contemplation, seeing of all Imperiall Soveraignties in this world, the Romane Monarchy (as it is believed) was to be the last? but that, being true to our own Designe, nor any where declining out of the way (in as much as, *the Amplification of a Kingdome* was, amongst the three Politique Duties, the third) we could not altogither passe it over untoucht. *There remaines* now another DEFICIENT of the two we have set downe, that is, *of Universall Justice, or the Fountaines of Law*.

11 All they which have written of Lawes have handled that Argument either as Philosophers, or as Lawyers, & none as statesmen. *As for Philosophers* they propound many things goodly for discourse, but remote from use. *For the Lawyers* they are mancipated and wholy devoted every one to the lawes of the state where they live, or to the Placits of the *Emperial or Pontificial Lawes*, and cannot use impartial and sincere judgement, but discourse as out of Gyves & Fetters. *Certainly* this kinde of knowledge pertaines properly to *Statesmen*, who can best discerne what humane society is capeable of, what make for the weale of the publique, what naturall equity is, what the law of Nations, the custome of Countries, the divers and different formes of states and Republiques, and therefore are able to decerne & judge of Lawes, from the Principles, both of natural Equity and Policy. *Wherefore* the businesse in hand is, to have recourse unto, and make enquiry of the *Fountaines* of *Justice*, and of *Publique utility*, and in every part of Law to represent a *kind of character and Idea of that which is just*; by which generall mark and direction he that shall intend his minde & studies that way, may try and examine the *severall lawes of particular kingdomes and estates*; and from thence endeavour an emendation. *Wherefore* after our accustom'd manner we will, in *one Title* propound an example thereof.

EXAMPLE
OF A TREATISE TOVCHING VNIVERSAL *Iustice*, or the *Fountaines of Law*, in one Title, by way of APHORISME.

* IDEA IVSTITIÆ VNIVERSALIS sive de Fontibus Iuris.

THE PROEM.

APHORISME. I.

IN *Civil society either* Law *or* Power *prevailes; for there is a* Power *which pretends* Law, *and some Law taste's rather of* Might, *then* Right. *Wherefore there is a threefold* Fountaine of Injustice; *Meere* Power; *Cunning* Illaqueation *under colour of Law; and the* Harshnesse of Law it selfe.

APHORISME II.

The force and efficacy of Private Right *is this. He that doth a wrong, by the* Fact, *receives* Profit *or* Pleasure, *by the* Example, *incurres* Prejudice *and* Peril: *others are not Partners with him in his* Profit *or* Pleasure; *but they take themselves interressed in the* Example, *and therefore easily combine and accord togither to secure themselves by Lawes, least Injuries by turnes ceize upon every particular. But if thorough the corrupt humour of the times, and the generality of guilt, it fall out, that to the greater number and the more Potent, danger is rather created then avoided, by such a* Law; *Faction disanuls that* Law, *which often comes to passe.*

APHORISME III.

Private Right *is under the Protection of* Publique Law: *for* Lawes are for the People; Magistrates for Laws; *& the authority of Magistrates depends upon the Majesty of Empire, and the forme of Policy, & upon Lawes Fundamental: wherefore if this Part be sound & healthfull, Lawes will be to good purpose; if otherwise, there will be litle security in them.*

APHORISME IV.

Yet notwithstanding, the end of Publique Law *is not only to be a Guardian to* Private Right, *least that should any way be violated, or to represse Injuries: but it is extended also unto Religion, & Armes and Discipline, and Ornaments, & Wealth, & finally to all things which any way conduce unto the prosperous estate of a Common-wealth.*

APHORISME V.

For the End and Ayme at which Lawes *should level, and whereto they should direct their Decrees and Sanctions, is no other then this,* That the People may live happily: *This will be brought*

brought to passe, if they be rightly train'd up in Piety *and* Religion; *if they be* Honest *for Morall conversation*, secur'd by Armes *against forraine enimies*, Munited by Lawes *against seditions, and private wrongs*; Obedient *to Government and Magistrates*; Rich and Florishing *in Forces and wealth: but the Instruments and sinewes of all Blessings are* Lawes.

APHORISME. VI.

And this end the best Lawes *attaine; but many Lawes misse this marke: for there is a great difference, and a wide distance in the comparative value and virtue of* Lawes; *for* some Lawes *are excellent*; some *of a middle temper*; others *altogither corrupt. We will exhibite according to the measure of our judgement, some certaine* Lawes (*as it were*) *of* Lawes, *whereby information may be taken, what in all* Lawes *is well or ill set downe, and Establisht.*

APHORISME. VII.

But before we descend to the Body of Lawes in Particular; *we will briefly touch the merit and Dignities of* Lawes in general. *A* Law *may be held good, that is* Certaine in the intimation; Just in the Precept; Profitable in the Execution; Agreeing with the Forme of Goverment in the present state; *and begetting virtue in those that live under them.*

TITLE. I.

OF THE FIRST DIGNITY OF Lawes, that they be CERTAINE.

APHORISME. VIII.

CERTAINTY *is so essentiall to a* Law, *as without it a* Law *cannot be* Just; Si enim incertam vocem det Tuba, quis se parabit ad Bellum? *So if the Law give an* uncertain sound, *who shall prepare himselfe to obay? A Law than ought to*

give

give warning before it ſtrike: and it is a good Rule, That is the beſt Law which gives leaſt liberty to the Arbitrage of the Iudge; *which is that the* CERTAINTY *thereof effecteth.*

APHORISME. IX.

INCERTAINTY of Lawes *is of two ſorts; one where* no Law is preſcribed; *the other,* when a Law is difficile and darke: *we muſt therefore firſt ſpeak of* Cauſes omitted *in the* Law; *that in theſe likewiſe there may be found ſome Rule of* CERTAINTY.

OF CASES OMITTED *IN LAW.*

APHORISME. X.

THe narrow compaſſe of mans wiſdome, cannot comprehend all caſes which time hath found out; and therefore Caſes omitted, and new *doe often preſent themſelves. In theſe caſes there is applied a threefold remedy, or ſupplement; either by a proceeding upon* like Caſes, *or by the uſe of* Examples *thoe they be not grown up into Law; or by* Iuriſdictions, *which award according to the Arbitrement of ſome Good Man, and according to ſound judgement; whether they be* Courts Prætorian or of Equity, or Courts Cenſorian or of Penalty.

OF PROCEEDING UPON LIKE Preſidents; *and of the* Extenſions of *LAWES.*

APHORISME. XI.

IN Caſes omitted, *the Rule of Law is to be deduced from* Caſes of like nature; *but with Caution and Judgement. Touching which theſe Rules following are to be obſerved.* Let Reaſon be fruitfull, Cuſtome be Barren, and not breed Caſes. *Wherefore whatſoever is accepted againſt the* Sence and Reaſon *of a Law; or elſe where the* Reaſon *thereof is not apparant*

rant, the ſame muſt not be drawne into conſequence.

APHORISME. XII.

A ſingular Publique Good doth neceſſarily introduce Caſes Pretermitted. *Wherefore when a Law doth notably and extraordinarily reſpect and procure the Profit and advantage of a State,* Let the interpretation be ample and extenſive.

APHORISME. XIII.

It is a hard Caſe to torture Lawes, that they may torture Men. *We would not therefore* that Lawes Penal, much leſſe Capital, ſhould be extended to new Offences: *yet if it be an old Crime, and known to the Lawes, but the Proſequution thereof falls upon a new Caſe, not fore-ſeen by the Lawes; we muſt by all means depart from the* Placits of Law, *rather than that offences paſſe unpuniſht.*

APHORISME. XIV.

In thoſe ſtatutes, which the Common Law (*ſpecially concerning caſes frequently incident, and are of long continuance*) *doth abſolutely repeale;* We like not the proceeding by ſimilitude, unto caſes omitted: *for when a* State *hath for a long time wanted a* whole Law, *and that, in* Caſes expreſt; *there is no great danger if the* caſes omitted *expect a remedy by a* new ſtatute.

APHORISME. XV.

Such Conſtitutions as were manifeſtly, the Lawes of Time, *and ſprung up from emergent Occaſion, then prevailing in the* Common-wealth; *the ſtate of times once changed, they are reverenc'd enough if they may conſerve their authority, within the limits of their own proper caſes: and it were prepoſterous any way to extend and apply them to* Caſes omitted.

APHORISME. XVI.

There can be no Sequele of a Sequele, *but the extention muſt be arreſted within the limits of* immediate Caſes: *otherwiſe we fall by degrees upon* unreſembling Caſes; *and the ſubtlety of wit will be of more force, than the Authority of Law.*

APHORISME. XVII.

In Lawes and Statutes of a compendious ſtile, extention *may be made more freely; but in thoſe* Lawes *which are punctuall in the* enumeration of Caſes *Particular, more warily: for as* exception *ſtrengthens the force of a* Law, *in* Caſes not excepted; *ſo* enumeration *weakens it, in Caſes not* enumerated.

APHORISME. XVIII.

An Explanatory ſtatute *dammes up the ſtreames of a* Former ſtatute; *neither is the extention received afterward, in the one or the other: for there is no* ſuper-extenſion *can be made by a* Iudge, *where once an* extention *hath begunne to be made by a* Law.

APHORISME. XIX.

The Forme *of words and Acts of Court, doth not admit an* Extention *upon like Caſes; for that looſeth the nature of* Formality, *which departs from Cuſtome to Arbitrement: and the introduction of* new Caſes *imbaſeth the Majeſty of the* old.

APHORISME. XX.

Extention of Law *is aptly applied unto* Caſes Poſt-nate, *which were not exiſtent in natures when the Law was enacted: for where the caſe could not be expreſt, becauſe there were none ſuch extant; a* Caſe omitted *is accepted for a* Caſe expreſt, *if the reaſon be the ſame.*

So for Extention of Lawes in Caſes omiſt *let theſe Rules ſuffice*

ſuffice. Now we *muſt ſpeak of the uſe of* Examples.

OF PRESIDENTS AND the uſe thereof.

APHORISME. XXI.

NOw *it followes we ſpeak of* Examples, *from which* Right *is inferr'd, where* Law *is deficient: as for* Cuſtome, *which is a kind of* Law; *and for* Preſidents *which by frequent Practiſe are growne into Cuſtome, as into a* Tacite Law; *we will ſpeak in due place. But now we ſpeak of* Examples *or* Preſidents, *which rarely and ſparſedly fall out; and are not yet growne up to the ſtrength of a* Law; *namely when, and with what caution a* Rule *of* Law *is to be derived from them, where* Law is Deficient.

APHORISME. XXII.

Preſidents *muſt be derived from* Good *and* Moderate; *and not from* Bloudy, Factious, *or* Diſſolute Times: *for* Examples *fetcht from ſuch times, are a Baſtard iſſue, and doe rather Corrupt, than Inſtruct.*

APHORISME. XXIII.

In Examples *the more* Moderne, *are to be reputed the* more ſafe: *for that which was but lately done, and no inconvenience enſued thereon, why may it not be done againe? Yet nevertheleſſe* Recent Examples *are of leſſe Authority: and if perchance it ſo fall out, that a Reformation muſt be made,* Moderne Preſidents *taſt more of their own* Times, *than of right* Reaſon.

APHORISME. XXXVI.

But more Ancient Preſidents *muſt be received with caution,*

and choice: for the Revolution of an Age altereth many things; ſo as what might ſeem Ancient *for Time, the ſame through perturbation, and Inconformity to the preſent Age, may be altogither* New. *wherefore the* examples *of a* midle time *are beſt; or of ſuch* an Age, *as beſt ſorts with the* Preſent times; *which now and than* the Time further off *better repreſents, than the* Time cloſe at hand.

APHORISME. XXV.

Keep your ſelfe within, or rather on this ſide the limits of an Example, *and by no means ſurpaſſe thoſe bounds: for where there is no* Rule of Law, *all ought to be intertain'd with jealouſy: wherefore heere, as in obſcure caſes,* follow that which is leaſt doubtfull.

APHORISME. XXVI.

Beware of Fragments *and* Compends *of* Examples; *and view the* Example *entire and every particular paſſage thereof: for if it be unjuſt and unreaſonable* before a perfect comprehenſion of the whole Law, to make a judgement upon a Part, or Paragraph thereof, *much more ſhould this rule hold in* Examples; *which unleſſe they be very ſquare and proper, are of doubtfull uſe and application.*

APHORISME. XXVII.

In Examples *it imports very much thorough what hands they have paſt, and have bin tranſacted; for if they have gone currant with* Clerks *only and* Miniſters, *of* Iuſtice *from the* courſe of ſome Courts, *without any notice taken thereof by* ſuperior Counſilors; *or with the* Maſter of Errors, the People, *they are to be rejected and litle eſtimed of: but if they have bin ſuch preciſe* Preſidents *to Counſilors of Eſtate, Judges or Principall Courts, as that it muſt needs be, that they have bin ſtrengthened by the tacite approbation, at leaſt, of Iudges; they carry the more Reverence with them.*

APHORISME XXVIII.

Preſidents *that have bin publiſht, however leſſe practiſed, which being debated and ventilated by mens diſcourſes and diſceptations have yet ſtood out unargued, are of greater Authority: but ſuch as have remaind, buried, as it were, in Cloſets and Archives, are of leſſe: for* Examples like waters are moſt wholeſome in the running ſtreame.

APHORISME. XXIX.

Examples *that referre to* Lawes, *we would not have them drawn from writers of* Hiſtory, *but from* publique Acts, *and more* diligent Traditions: *for it is an infelicity familiar even with the beſt Hiſtorians, that they paſſe over* Lawes and Iudicial proceedings *too ſlightly: and if perhaps they have uſed ſome diligence therein, yet they vary much from* Authentique Conſtitutions.

APHORISME XXX.

An Example, *which a contemporary Age, or a time neereſt unto it hath repeal'd, ſhould not eaſily be taken up againe, thoe the like caſe ſhould afterwards enſue: nor makes it ſo much for an* Example, *that men have ſometimes uſed it; as it makes againſt an* example, *that upon experience, they have now relinquiſht* it.

APHORISME. XXXI.

Examples *are admitted into Counſils; but doe in like manner preſcribe or command; therefore let* them *be ſo moderated, that the Authority of the time paſt, may be bowed and plied to the practiſe of the Time preſent. And thus much concerning information from* Preſidents *where* Law *is Deficient. Now followes that we ſpeak of* Courts Prætorian *and* Cenſorian; *Courts of Equity, and of Penalty.*

OF COURTS PRÆTORIAN AND CENSORIAN.

APHORISME. XXXII.

LEt *there be* Courts *and* Iuriſdictions, *which may define according to the Arbitrement of ſome Good man, and according to ſound judgement: for the* Law (*as is obſerv'd before*) *cannot provide for* all Caſes; *but is fitted to ſuch occurrences as commonly fall out; and Time* (*as was ſaid by the Ancients*) is a moſt wiſe Thing, and daily the Auctor and Inventor of new Caſes.

APHORISME. XXXIII.

New caſes *fall out both in* Matters Criminal, *which have need of Penalty, and in* Matters Civile, *which have need of Reliefe: the* Courts *which reſpect the Former, we call* Cenſorian; *which reſpect the latter,* Prætorian.

APHORISME. XXXIV.

Let the Cenſorian Courts of Juſtice, *have juriſdiction and Power not only of* puniſhing new offences; *but alſo of* increaſing Penalties *aſſigned by the Lawes for* old crimes, *if the caſes be heynous, and enormous, ſo, they be not* Capitall: for a Notorious guilt, as it were, a New Caſe.

APHORISME. XXXV.

In like manner, let Prætorian Courts of Equity, *have power to* qualify the Rigor of Law; *as alſo of* ſupplying the Defects of Law: *for if a Remedy ought to be extended to him whom* the Law hath paſt by; *much more to him whom* it hath wounded.

APHORISME. XXXVI.

Let theſe Cenſorian *and* Prætorian Courts *be by all means limited*

limited within Cases Heinous *and extraordinary; & not invade ordinary Jurisdictions; least peradventure the matter extend to the* supplantation, *rather than the* supplement *of Law.*

APHORISME. XXXVII.

Let these Iurisdictions *reside only in the* Highest Courts of Iudicature, *and not be communicated to* Courts inferior. *For the Power of* extending, *or* supplying, *or* Moderating Lawes, *litle differs from the Power of* Makeing *them.*

APHORISME. XXXVIII.

But let not these Courts *be assigned over to* one man, *but consist of* Many: *Nor let the Decrees thereof issue forth with silence, but let the Iudges alleage Reasons of their sentence, and that openly in the Audience of the Court; that what is free in the Power, may yet in the fame and reputation be confined.*

APHORISME XXXIX.

Let there be no Rubriques of blood, *neither Define of* Capitall crimes *in what Court soever, but from a known and certaine Law; for God himselfe first denounced Death, afterwards inflicted it. Nor is any man to be put to death, but he that knew before hand,* that he sinned against his own life.

APHORISME XXXX.

In Courts of Censure, *give way to a third Triall, that a necessity be not imposed upon Iudges of absolveing or of condemneing, but that they may pronounce a* Non liquet, *so in like manner, let* Lawes Censorian, *not only be a* Penalty, *but an* Infamy, *that is, which may not inflict a punishment, but either end in admonition; or else chastise the delinquent with some light touch of Ignominy, and as it were, a blushing shame.*

Apho-

APHORISME. XLI.

In Cenſorian Courts *let the* firſt aggreſsions, *and the midle Acts of Great offences, and wicked attempts be puniſht; yea although they were never perfectly accompliſht: and let that be the chiefeſt uſe of* thoſe Courts; *ſeeing it appertaines to* ſeverity, *to puniſh the firſt approaches of wicked enterprizes, and to* Mercy *to intercept the perpetration of them by correcting midle Acts.*

APHORISME. XLII.

Speciall regard muſt be taken, that in Pretorian Courts, *ſuch Caſes be not countenanc'd, which the Law hath not ſo much pretermitted, as ſlighted as Frivolous; or, as odious, judg'd unworthy redreſſe.*

APHORISME XLIII.

Above all it moſt imports the Certainty of Lawes, *that* Courts of Equity *doe not ſo ſwell and overflow their banks, as under pretenſe of* mitigating the Rigor of Lawes, *they doe diſſect or relaxe the ſtrength and ſinewes thereof, by drawing all to* Arbitrement.

APHORISME. XLIV.

Let not Pretorian Courts *have Power to Decree againſt* expreſſe ſtatute, *under any pretence of equity: for if this ſhould be permitted, a* Law-interpreter *would become a* Law-maker; *and all matters ſhould depend upon* Arbitrement.

APHORISME. XLV.

Some are of opinion, that the Iuriſdiction of Defining according to Equity and Conſcience; *and that other, which proceeds according to* ſtrickt Law; *ſhould be deputed to the* ſame Courts; *but others ſay to* ſeveral: *by all means let there be* a ſeparation of Courts; *for there will be no* Diſtinction of Caſes, where there

there is commixtion or jurisdictions; *but you shall have* Arbitrement *incroach upon, and at last, swallow up* Law.

APHORISME. XLVI.

The Tables of the Pretors *amongst the Romans came in use upon good ground: in these the* Pretor *set downe and publisht afore hand, by what forme of Law he would execute Judicature. After the same example, Iudges in* Pretorian Courts, *should propound* certaine Rules *to themselves (so farre as may be) and openly publish them:* for that is the best Law, which gives least liberty to the Judge; he the best Judge that takes least liberty to himselfe. *But of these* Courts *we shall speak more at large, when we come to the Title* De Judiciis, *we now speak of them in passage only, so farre as they cleere and supply that which is* omitted by the Law.

OF THE REFLECTIVE ASPECT OR REFERENCE of Lawes one to another.

APHORISME. XLVII.

THere is likewise another kinde of Supplement of Cases omitted; *when one Law falleth upon another, and withall drawes with it* Cases pretermitted. *This comes to passe in* Lawes or Statutes, *which (as the usuall expression is) looke back or* reflect *one upon another.* Lawes *of this nature, are rarely and with great Caution to be alleag'd: for we like it not, to see a* too Fac'd Ianus in Lawes.

APHORISME. XLVIII.

He that goes about to elude and circumvent the words and sentence of Law by Fraude *and* captious fallacies, *deserves in like manner to be himselfe insnar'd by a succeeding Law: wherefore in case of* subtile shifts *and* sinister devises, *it is very meet that lawes should* looke back *upon and* mutually support *one another, that he who studies evasions, and eversion of* Lawes

Preſent, *may yet ſtand in awe of* future Lawes.

APHORISME. XLIX.

Lawes *which ſtrengthen and eſtabliſh the true* intentions of Records and Inſtruments, *againſt the* Defects of Formes and Solennities, *doe rightly comprehend matters Paſt: for the greateſt inconvenience in a law that* referres back, *is, that it diſturbeth: But theſe* confirmatory Lawes, *reſpect the peace and ſetling of thoſe caſes, which are tranſacted and determin'd; yet we muſt take heed that* caſes already adjudg'd, *be not* reverſt or violated.

APHORISME. L.

We muſt be very carefull that, not thoſe Lawes *alone, be thought to* reſpect things paſt, *which invalide* caſes already decided; *but thoſe alſo which* prohibite *and* reſtraine future caſes *neceſſarily connext with* matters paſt. *As for example, if a Law ſhould interdict ſome kind of Trades-men the vent of their commodities for* hereafter: *the letter of this Law is for the* future; *but the ſenſe and meaning takes hold of the* time paſt; *for now it is not warrantable for ſuch perſons to get their liveing* this *way.*

APHORISME. LI.

Every Declaratory Law *althoe there be no mention of* time paſt, *yet by the force of the Declaration, it is by all means to be extended to* matters paſt: *for the* Interpretation *doth not then begin to be in force, when it is* declared; *but is made* contemporary *with the* Law it ſelfe. *Wherefore never enact* declaratory Lawes, *but in caſe where Lawes may in equity referre and* looke back *one upon another.* And here we have done with that part which handles the INCERTITUDE OF LAWES, where no Law is found. It remaines, we now ſpeake of that other part, namely where there is a Law extant, but ſuch a one as is PERPLEXT and OBSCURE.

OF

OF THE OBSCURITY OF LAWES.

APHORISME. LII.

OBscurity of Lawes *ſprings from foure cauſes: either from the exceſsive* accumulation of Lawes, *ſpecially where there is a mixture of Obſolete Lawes: Or from an* ambiguous, *or not ſo perſpicuous and* dilucide deſcription of Lawes: *or from the* manner of expounding Law, *either altogither neglected, or not rightly purſued: or laſtly from* contradiction *and* incertainty of judgements.

OF THE EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATION OF LAWES.

APHORISME. LIII.

THe *Prophet ſaith,* Pluet ſuper eos Laqueos, *now there are no worſe ſnares than the ſnares of Lawes, ſpecially Penall, if they be* immenſe for number; *and through the alterations of times* unprofitable; *they doe not* preſent a torch, but ſpread a net to our Feet.

APHORISME. LIV.

There are two wayes in uſe of making a new ſtatute; the one *eſtabliſheth and ſtrengthens the* Former ſtatute *about the ſame ject; and then addes and changes ſome things:* the other *abrogates and cancels what was Decreed before, and ſubſtitutes* de integro, a new and uniforme Law. *The* latter way *we approve: for by the* former way *Decrees become complicate and perplext; yet what is undertaken is indeed purſued, but the Body of Law is in the meane time corrupted. But certainly the more diligence is required in the* latter, *where the Deliberation is of the* Law it ſelfe; *that is, the Decrees heretofore made, are to be*

ſearched into and duely waighed and examin'd, before the Law be publiſht: but the chiefe point is, that by this means the Harmony of Lawes *is notably advanced for the future.*

APHORISME. LV.

It was a cuſtome in the ſtate of Athens, *to delegate ſixe perſons, for to reviſe and examine every yeare the* Contrary-Titles of Law, *which they called* Anti-nomies, *and ſuch as could not be reconciled, were propounded to the People, that ſome* certainty *might be defined touching them. After this example, let ſuch in every ſtate, as have the Power of making Lawes, review* Anti-nomies *every third or fifth yeare, or as they ſee cauſe. And theſe may be firſt ſearcht into, and prepar'd by committees aſſigned thereto, and after that exhibited to Aſſemblies; that ſo what ſhall be approv'd, may by ſuffrages be eſtabliſht and ſetled.*

APHORISME. LVI.

And let there not be too ſcrupulous and anxious paines taken in reconcileing Contrary-Titles of Law, *and of Salving (as they terme it) all points by ſubtle and ſtudied Diſtinctions. For this is the webbe of wit; and however it may carry a ſhew of Modeſty and Reverence, yet it is to be reckoned in the number of things Prejudicial; as being that which makes the whole body of Law ill-ſorted and incoherent. It were farre better that the worſt* Titles *were cancel'd, and the reſt ſtand in force.*

APHORISME. LVII.

Obſolete Lawes *and ſuch as are growne out of uſe, as well as* Anti-nomies, *ſhould be propounded by delegates, as a part of their charge to be repeal'd: for ſeeing expreſſe ſtatute cannot regularly be voided by* Diſuſe; *it falls out that through a Diſeſtimation of* Obſolete Lawes, *the autority of the reſt is ſomewhat embaſed, and* Mezentius *Torture enſues*; that Lawes alive are killed with the embracements of Lawes dead: but above all beware of a *Gangrene in Lawes.*

APHOR.

APHORISME LVIII.

So likewiſe for Obſolete Lawes *and ſtatutes, and ſuch as are not lately publiſht; let the* Pretorian Courts *have power, in the mean ſpace, to define contrary to them: for although it hath been ſaid not impertinently,* no man ought to make himſelfe wiſer than the Lawes; *yet this may be underſtood of Lawes, when they are awake, not when they are aſleepe. On the other ſide, let not the more* recent ſtatutes, *which are found prejudiciall to the* Law-Publique, *be in the Power of the Iudges; but in the Power of Kings and Counſilors of Eſtate, and ſupreme autorities for Redreſſe, by ſuſpending their execution through edicts and Acts; untill Parliamentary Courts, and ſuch High Aſſemblies meet againe, which have Power to abrogate them; Leſt the ſafety of the Common-wealth ſhould in the meanwhile, be endangerd.*

OF NEW DIGESTS OF LAWES.

APHORISME. LIX.

BVt if Lawes accumulated upon Lawes *ſwell into ſuch vaſt volumes, or be obnoxious to ſuch confuſion, that it is expedient to reviſe them a new, and to reduce them into a ſound and ſolide body; intend it by all means; and let ſuch a work be reputed an Heroicall noble work; and let the Auctors of ſuch a work, be rightly and deſervedly ranckt, in the number of the* Founders *and* Reſtorers of Law.

APHORISME. LX.

This Purging of Lawes, *and the contriveing of a new Digeſt is five waies accompliſht.* Firſt *let* Obſolete Lawes, *which* Iuſtinian *termes,* old Fables *be left out.* Secondly *let the moſt approved of* Anti-nomies *be received, the contrary aboliſht.* Thirdly, *let all* Coincident Lawes, *or* Lawes *which import the ſame, and are nothing elſe but repetitions of the ſame thing, be expung'd, and ſome one, the moſt perfect among them, retain'd*

in ſtead of all the reſt: Fourthly *if there be any* Lawes which determine nothing, *but only propound Queſtions, and ſo leave them undecided, let theſe likewiſe be caſſeer'd.* Laſtly *let* Lawes too wordy *and too prolixe be abridged into a more narrow Compaſſe.*

APHORISME. LXI.

And it will import very much for uſe, to compoſe and ſort apart in a new Digeſt of Lawes, *Law recepted for* Common Law, *which in regard of their beginning are time out of mind; and on the other ſide* ſtatutes *ſuperadded from time to time: ſeeing in the delivery of a Juridicall ſentence, the interpretation of* Common Law, *and* Statute-Lawes *in many points is not the ſame. This* Trebonianus *did in the Digeſts and Code.*

APHORISME LXII.

But in this Regeneration *and* new ſtructure of Lawes, retaine preciſely the words and the Text of the Ancient Lawes *and of the Books of Law; thoe it muſt needs fall out that ſuch a collection muſt be made by centoes & ſmaller Portions: then ſort them in order. For althoe this might have bin performed more aptly, and (if you reſpect right reaſon) more truly, by a* New Text, *than by ſuch a conſarcination; yet in Lawes, not ſo much the* ſtile *and* deſcription; *as* Autority, *and the Patron thereof,* Antiquity, *are to be regarded: otherwiſe* ſuch a work, *might ſeem a* ſcholaſtique buſineſſe, and method, *rather than* a body of commanding Lawes.

APHORISME. LXIII.

In this New Digeſt of Lawes, *upon good adviſement a caveat hath bin put in, that the* Ancient volumes of Law *ſhould not be utterly extinguiſht, and periſh in oblivion; but ſhould at leaſt remaine in Libraries; thoe the common and promiſcuous uſe thereof might be retain'd. For in Caſes of waighty conſequence, it will not be amiſſe to conſult and look into the mutations and continuations of* Lawes paſt: *and indeed it is uſuall to ſprinkle Moderne*

derne matters with Antiquity. And this new corps of Law, *muſt be confirmed only by ſuch, who in every ſtate have the power of making Lawes; leſt perchance under colour of* Digeſting Ancient Lawes, new Lawes, *under hand be conrayed in.*

APHORISME. LXIV.

It could be wiſht that this Inſtauration of Lawes, *might fall out, and be undertaken in* ſuch times, *as, for learning and experience, excell* thoſe more Ancient times, *whoſe Acts and Deeds they recognize: which fell out otherwiſe in the works of* Iuſtinian. *For it is a great unhappineſſe, when the works of the Ancient, are maimed, and recompiled by the judgement and choice of a leſſe wiſe and Learned Age: but oft times that is neceſſary which is not the beſt.*

They much be ſpoken of the OBSCVRITY of LAWES, ariſing from the exceſſive and confuſed accumulation thereof. Now let us ſpeak of the dark & DOVBTFVLL DESCRIPTION of them.

OF THE PERPLEXT AND OBSCURE *DESCRIPTION OF LAWES.*

APHORISME LXV.

OBſcure Deſcription of Lawes *ariſes either from the* Loquacity or Verboſity *of them, or againe from* extreme Brevity; *or from the* Preamble of a Law *repugnant with the* Body of a Law.

APHORISME. LXVI.

It followes that we now ſpeak of the Obſcurity of Law, *ariſeing from a corrupt and crooked* deſcription thereof. *The* Loquacity *and* Prolixity, *which hath bin uſed in ſetting downe Lawes* we diſlike: *neither doth ſuch a writer any way compaſſe what he deſires, and labours for; but rather the quite contrary. For while a man endeavours to purſue and expreſſe* every Particular

cular caſe in apt and proper termes, *hopeing to gaine more Certitude thereby; contrariwiſe it falls out that through* many words, multitude of Queſtions *are ingendred; ſo as a more ſound and ſolid interpretation of Law, according to the genuine ſenſe and mind thereof, is much intercepted through the noiſe of words.*

APHORISME. LXVII.

And yet notwithwanding a too Conciſe and affected Brevity *for Majeſties ſake, or as more Imperiall, is not therefore to be approved, ſpecially in theſe times; leaſt Law become perchance, a* Lesbian Rule. *Wherefore a* midle temperd ſtile *is to be embraced; and a generality of words well ſtated to be ſought out; which though it doe not ſo throughly purſue caſes comprehended, yet it excludes caſes not comprehended cleerely enough.*

APHORISME. LXVIII.

Yet in ordinary and Politique Lawes and Edicts, wherein for moſt part no man adviſeth with his Counſil, but truſteth to his owne judgement, all ſhould be more amply explicated and pointed out, as it were, with the finger, *even to the meaneſt capacity.*

APHORISME. LXIX.

So neither ſhould we allow of Preambles *to Lawes, which amongſt the ancients were held impertinencies, and which introduce* Diſputeing *and not* commanding Lawes, *if we could well away with ancient cuſtomes. But theſe* Prefaces *commonly (as the times are now) are neceſsarily prefixt, not ſo much for explication of Law, as for perſwaſion that ſuch a Law may paſſe in the ſolemne meeting of a State; and againe to give ſatisfaction to the communalty. Yet ſo farre as poſſible may be,* let Prologues be avoided and the Law begin with a command.

APHORISME. LXX.

The Mind and Meaning of a Law, though ſometimes it may be drawn not improperly from Prefaces *and* Preambles *(as they*

termethem;) yet the latitude and extention thereof, muſt not be fetcht from thence. For a Preamble *by way of example, ſometimes fetcheth in laies hold upon ſome of the moſt plauſible & moſt ſpecious paſſages; when yet the Law compriſeth many moe: or on the contrary, the Law* reſtraines *and* limits *many Caſes, the reaſon of which* limitations *to inſert in the* Preface *were ſuperfluous. Wherefore the* dimenſion *and* latitude *of a Law muſt be taken from the Body of a Law:* for a Preamble often falls either ſhort, or over.

APHORISME. LXXI.

And there is a very vitious manner of Recording of Lawes, *that is, when the caſe at which the* Law *aimeth, is* expreſt at large in the preamble, *afterward from the force of the word* (The like) *or ſome ſuch* terme of relation, *the* Body of a Law *is reverſt into the* Preamble; *ſo as the* Preamble *is inſerted and incorporated into the Law it ſelfe; which is an obſcure and not ſo ſafe a courſe; becauſe the ſame diligence uſeth not to be taken in Pondering and examining the words of a* Preamble, *as there uſeth to be done in the* Body of a Law *it ſelfe. This part touching the* Incertainty of Lawes *proceeding from an* ill Deſcription of them *we ſhall handle more at large hereafter, when we come to treat of the* Interpretation of Lawes. *Thus much* of the obſcure Deſcription of Lawes. *Now let us ſpeake of the waies of expounding Lawes.*

OF THE DIVERS WAIES OF expounding Law and ſolveing Doubts.

APHORISME. LXXII.

The waies of Expounding Law *and* ſolveing Doubts, *are five. For this is done either by* Court Rolls *and* Records; *or by* Authentique writs; *or by* ſubſidiary books; *or by* Prelections; *or by* Reſponſes *and* Reſolutions of wiſe men. *All theſe if they be well inſtituted and ſet downe, will be ſingular helps at hand againſt the* obſcurity *of Lawes.*

OF THE REPORTING OF *IVDGEMENTS.*

APHORISME. LXXIII.

ABove all, let the Iudgements *delivered in higher, and* Principall Courts *of Iudicature, and in matters of* grave importance; *ſpecially* Dubious, *and which have ſome Difficulty and* Newneſſe *in them, be taken with faith and diligence. For* Decrees are the Anchors of Law, as Lawes are of the Republique.

APHORISME. LXXIV.

The manner of collecting ſuch Judgements *and* Reporting *them, let be this.* Regiſter the caſe preciſely; *the* Iudgements exactly; annexe the Reaſons of the Judgements *alleadged by the Judges; mingle not Authorities of* Caſes brought for example *with* Caſes Principal. *As for* Perorations of Pleaders, *unleſſe there be ſomething in them very remarkable, paſſe them over with ſilence.*

APHORISME. LXXV.

The Perſons which ſhould Collect theſe Iudgements, *Let them be of the order and ranke of the* Learnedſt Advocates, *and let them receive a liberall Remuneration from the State. Let not the* Iudges *themſelves medle, at all, with theſe* Reports; *leaſt perchance, devoted to their owne opinions, and ſupported by their owne Authority, they* tranſcend the limits of a Reporter.

APHORISME. LXXVI.

Digeſt theſe Iudgements *according* to the order *and* continuation of time, *not according to* Method *and* Titles: *for* writings of this nature *are, as it were, the* Hiſtories *and* Reports

ports of Lawes; *nor doe the* Decrees *alone, but their* times *alſo, give light to a wiſe Iudge.*

OF AUTHENTIQUE WRITERS.

APHORISME. LXXVII.

LEt the Body of Law *be built only upon the Lawes themſelves, which conſtitute the* common Law; *next of* Decrees *or* Statutes; *in the third place of* Iudgements enrolled; *beſides theſe, either let there be no other* Authentiques *at all, or ſpareingly entertain'd.*

APHORISME. LXXVIII.

Nothing ſo much imports Certainty of Lawes (*of which we now diſcourſe*) *as that* Authentique writings, *be confined within moderate bounds; and that the* exceſsive multitude of Authors *and Doctors of the Lawes; whereby the mind and ſentence of Lawes are diſtracted; the Iudge confounded; proceedings are made immortall; and the Advocate himſelfe, deſpairing to read over and conquer ſo many Books, betakes himſelfe to Abridgements; be diſcarded. It may be ſome good gloſſe, and ſome few of Claſſique writers, or rather ſome ſmall parcell of few writers, may be received for* Authentiques. *Yet of the* reſt, *ſome uſe may be made in Libraries, where Iudges or Advocates, may as occaſion is offered read their Diſcourſes: but in cauſes to be pleaded, let them not be permitted to be brought, and alleaged in the Court, nor grow up into autority.*

OF AUXILIARY BOOKS.

APHORISME. LXXIX.

LEt not the knowledge and practiſe of Law *be deſtituted, but rather well provided of* Auxiliary Books. *They*

are in generall fixe ſorts, Inſtitutes; of the ſignification of words; of the Rules of Law; Ancient Records; Abridgements; Formes of Pleading.

APHORISME LXXX

Young Students, and Novices are to be enterd by Inſtitutes; *that they may the more profoundly and orderly draw and take in the knowledge and Difficulties of the* Lawes. *Compoſe theſe* Inſtitutes *after a cleere and perſpicuous manner. In theſe* elementary books *runne over the whole Private Law; not paſſing by ſome Titles, and dwelling too long upon others; but briefly touching ſomething in all; that ſo coming to read through the* whole body of Lawes, *nothing may be preſented altogither ſtrange; but what hath bin taſted, and preconceiv'd by ſome ſlight notion. Touch not the* Publique Law in Inſtitutes, *but let that be deduced from the* Fountaines of themſelves.

APHORISME. LXXXI.

Compile a Commentary upon the Termes of Law: *Be not too curious and tedious in the explication thereof; and of rendring their ſenſe; for the ſcope here, is not exactly to ſeeke out the* Definition of words; *but ſuch* explications *only, as may cleere the paſſage to the reading of the* Books of Law. *Digeſt not this Treatiſe by the* letters of the Alphabet: *leave that to ſome Index; but let ſuch words as import the ſame thing be ſorted togither; that in the comprehenſion of the ſenſe, one may adminiſter help unto the other.*

APHORISME. LXXXII.

A ſound and well-labour'd Treatiſe of the Diverſe Rules of Law, *conduceth (if any thing doth) to the* Certainty of Lawes. *A worke worthy the Penne of the greateſt wits, and wiſeſt Juriſts. Nor doe we approve what is extant in this kind. And not only noted and common* Rules, *are to be collected, but alſo others more ſubtile, and abſtruſe, which may be abſtracted out of the* Harmony

ny of Lawes, *and* Iudged Cases, *such as are sometimes found in the* best Rubriques; *and these are the generall* Dictates of Reason, *and the* Ballast, *as it were* of Law.

APHORISME. LXXXIII.

But all Decrees and Placits of Law, *must not be taken for* Rules, *as is wont to be, absurdly enough: for if this should be admitted, then so* many Lawes, *so* many Rules; *for a* Law *is nothing else, then a* commanding Rule. *But accept those for* Rules *which cleave to the very* Forme of Iustice, *from whence for most part the same* Rules *are commonly found through the* Civile Lawes *of Different* States, *unlesse perhaps they vary for the reference to the* Formes of Publique Goverments.

APHORISME. LXXXIV.

After the Rule *is delivered in a briefe and substantiall comprehension of words; let there be,* for explication, *annext* examples, *and most cleere and luculent* Decisions of Cases; Distinctions *and* exceptions *for* limitations; Points concurrent in sense, *for* Amplification, *of the* same Rule.

APHORISME. LXXXV.

It is well given in Precept, that a Law should not be drawne from Rules; but the Rule from the Law in force. *Neither is a* Proofe *to be taken from the words of a* Rule; *as if it were a* Text of Law: *for a* Rule (*as the sea-mans needle doth the Poles*) indicates *only, not* Determines Law.

APHORISME. LXXXVI.

Besides the Body of Law, *it will availe also, to survay the* Antiquities or ancient Records of Lawes, *whose Autority thoe it be vanisht, yet their Reverence remaines, still. And let the* writings *and* Iudgements *concerning* Lawes, *be received for the* Antiquities of Laws, *which in time preceded the* Body of Lawes; *whether they were publisht or not: for these must not be Lost. Therefore out of these* Records *select what ever is most use-*

full (for there will be found much vaine and frivolous matter in them) and digeſt them into one volume; Leſt old fables (*as* Trebonianus *calls them*) *be mixt with the* Lawes themſelves.

APHORISME. LXXXVII.

And it much imports the Practique part of Lawes, that the whole Law be Digeſted into Places and Titles; *whereto a man may have (as occaſion ſhall be given) a ſodaine recourſe, as to a furniſht Promptuary for preſent practiſe. Theſe* Books of Abridgements, *both reduce into* Order *what was diſperſed, and* abreviate *what was diffuſed and* Prolixe *in Law. But caution muſt be taken that theſe* Breviaries, *make not men prompt for the* Practique part; *and ſlothfull for the* knowledge it ſelfe: *for their proper uſe and office is this, that by them the* Law *may bee tilled over againe, and not throughly learned. And theſe* Summaries *muſt by all meanes be collected with great diligence, faith, and judgement, leſt they* commit Fellony againſt the Law.

APHORISME. LXXXVIII.

Make a Collection of the diverſe Formes of Pleading *in everykinde: for this conduceth much to the Practique Part: and Certainly theſe* Formes *doe diſcover the Oracles, and ſecret Myſteries of Lawes: for there are many things which lye hidden in Lawes; But in* Formes *of Pleading, they are better and more largely diſplayed;* -- like the Fiſt to the Palme.

OF RESPONSES AND RESOLVTIONS OF DOVBTS.

APHORISME. LXXXIX.

SOme Courſe muſt be taken for the Cutting off *and ſatisfying* Particular Doubts *which emerge from time to time: for it is a hard caſe that they which deſire to ſecure themſelves from error, ſhould finde no guide to the way: but that preſent Buſineſſes ſhould be hazarded; and there ſhould bee no meanes to know the Law before*

before the matter be diſpatcht.

APHORISME. XC.

That the Reſolutions of the Wiſe, given to Clients touching point of Law, *whether by* Advocates *or* Profeſſors *ſhould be of ſuch authority, that it may not be lawfull for the Judge to depart from their opinion, we cannot approve.* Let Law be derived from ſworne Iudges.

APHORISME. XCI.

To Feele and ſound Iudgements by fained Cauſes and Perſons, that by this meanes, men might find out what the Courſe and proceeding of Law will be, we approve not: for it diſhonoureth the Majeſty of Lawes, *and is to be accounted a kind* of prevarication *or double dealing*; and it is a foule ſight to ſee places of Iudicature to borrow any thing from the ſtage.

APHORISME. XCII.

Wherefore let, as well the Decrees, *as the* anſwers and Counſils *proceed from the Judges alone: thoſe of ſuits depending; theſe of difficult points of Law, in the general. Require not theſe* Deciſions, *whether in cauſes private or publique, from the Iudges themſelves, (for this were to make the Iudge an Advocate) but of the* Prince, *or of the* State. From theſe *let the order be directed unto the* Iudges: *and let the* Iudges *thus authorized, heare the* reaſons on both ſides; both of the Advocates or of the Committees, *deputed by the parties to whom the matter appertaineth; or of them aſsigned by the Judges themſelves; if neceſsity ſo require: and waighing the Cauſe, let them deliver the Law upon the caſe and declare it.* Let *theſe* verdicts *and* counſils, *be recorded and notified amongſt* Caſes adjudged, *and be of equall authority.*

OF

OF PRELECTIONS.

APHORISME. XCIII.

LEt the Lectures of Law, *and the exerciſes of thoſe that addreſſe themſelves to the ſtudies of Law, be ſo inſtituted and ordered, that all may tend rather to the laying aſleepe, than the awakeing of Queſtions and Controverſies in Law. For (as the matter is now carried) a Schoole is ſet up, and open amongſt all, to the multiplying of* Altercations and Queſtions in Law; *as if their aime was only to make oſtentation of wit. And this is an old diſeaſe, for even amongſt the Ancients, it was, as it were, a glory, by Sects and Factions, to* cheriſh rather than extinguiſh many queſtions *concerning Law. Provide againſt this inconvenience.*

OF THE INSTABILITY OF *IVDGEMENTS.*

APHORISME. XCIV.

IVdgements *become* incertaine, *either through* immature and too precipitate proceeding to ſentence; *or through* Emulation of Courts; *or through ill and* unſckilfull regiſtring of Iudgements; *or becauſe there is a too* eaſy and expedite way open of Reverſing and Reſcinding them. *Wherefore it muſt be provided, that* Iudgements *iſſue forth not without a* ſtaid deliberation had aforehand; *and that Courts beare a* Reverent reſpect to one another; *and that Decrees* be drawne up faithfully *and wiſely; and that the* way to repeale Iudgements be narrow, *rockie and ſtrewed, as it were, with ſharpe ſtones.*

APHORISME. XCV.

If a Iudgement *have been awarded upon a* Caſe *in any Principall Court; and the* like caſe, *intervene in another Court; proceed not to* ſentence *before the matter be adviſed upon in ſome* ſolemne

lemne Assemble of Iudges: *for if* Iudgements awarded must needs be repeal'd, yet let them be interred with Honor.

APHORISME. XCVI.

For Courts to be at debate and variance about Iurisdictions *is a humane frailty; and the more because this intemperance, through a misprision and vaine conceit* (that it is the part of a stout resolute Iudge to enlarge the priviledges of the Court) *is openly countenanced and spurr'd on, whereas it hath need of the Bridle. But that out of this heat of stomach, Courts should so easily* reverse *on both sides* Judgements awarded, *which nothing pertaine to* Iurisdiction, *is an insufferable evill, which by all means should be repres'd and punisht; by Kings or Counsils of State, or the forme of Government. For it is a President of the worst example,* That Courts, that should distribute Peace, should themselves practise Duells.

APHORISME. XCVII.

Let there not be a too easy and free passage made to the Repealing of Iudgements *by* Appellations, *and* writs of Error, *or* Reexamination, *and the like. It is maintained by some, that a Suit may be brought into a Higher Court, as entire and untried, the Iudgement past upon it,* let aside *and* absolutely Iuspended: *others are of opinion that the* Iudgement it selfe may stand in force, but the execution thereof may be staid: *neither of these is to be allowed, unlesse the Courts wherein the Iudgement was awarded, were of a base and inferior order: but rather that both the* Iudgement stand, *and that the execution thereof goe on; so a Caveat be put in by the Defendant for Damages and charges if the* Iudgement *should be* reverst.

BUt this *Title* touching the *Certainty of Lawes* shall suffice for a president to the rest of a * Digest, which we with care & diligence endeavour to contrive. And now have we concluded *Civile Knowledge* (so farre as we thought fit to entreat thereof) and togither with it *Humane*

* Digestum *juris Anglicani*; Sacrvm Institvtæ Templum; *Opus sane Regium; sed nondum conditum; quod Tuo seculo,* Excellentissime Principum, Instavrandum: Tvi Nominis Æternitati, *consecrandum reservatur.*

Philoſophy, as alſo with *Humane Philoſophy*; *Philoſophy in Generall*. Wherefore being now at length at ſome pauſe, and lookeing back into that we have paſt through; this our writeing ſeems to us not much unlike thoſe ſounds and Preludes, which *Muſitians* make while they are tuneing their *Inſtruments*; which is harſh and unpleaſing to heare, but yet is a cauſe why the *Muſique* is ſweeter afterwards. So have we bin content to imploy our paines in tuneing the *Inſtrument of the Muſes*, and to ſet it unto a true Harmony, that afterwards they may play who have better hands. *Surely*, when I ſet before me the condition of theſe times, in which *Learning* ſeems to have made hir *third Circuit* to Men; and withall diligently behold, with what various ſupplies and ſupports being furniſht, ſhe hath made her viſitation; as are, the *height* and *vivacity* of *many wits* in this our Age; *the excellent monuments of Ancient writers*, which as ſo many great lights ſhine before us; *the Art of Printing*, which communicates Books with a liberall hand to men of all fortunes; *the travel'd boſome of the Ocean* and of the world, opened on all parts, whereby multitudes of experiments unknown to the Ancients have bin diſcloſed; and *Naturall Hiſtory*, by the acceſſe of an infinite Maſſe advanced: *the leaſure* wherewith the Kingdomes and States of Europe every where abound, not imploying men ſo generally in *Civile Buſineſſes*, as the States of *Græcia* did in reſpect of their *Popularity*; or as the ſtate of the Romans did in reſpect of their *Monarchy*: *the Peace* which at this preſent Brittanny, Spaine, Italy, as alſo at this inſtant France and many other Countries enjoy: *The Conſumption & Exinanition* of all that can be imagined or ſaid *in controverſies of Religion*, which now ſo long time have taken up ſo many wits, and diverted them from the ſtudies of *other Sciences*: *the Elevation and Perfection of Your Majeſties Learning*; about whom (as the Birds about the Phœnix) whole vollies of wits flock and aſſemble: *Laſtly the inſeparable property which attends time it ſelfe*, which is, *ever more and more to diſcloſe Truth*: when we think I ſay, on theſe advantages; we cannot but be raiſed to this

this Perſwaſion, that this *third period of Learning*, will farre ſurpaſſe thoſe two former of the *Græcian and Roman Learning*. Onely if men will but well and wiſely know their owne ſtrength and their own weakneſſe both; and take, one from the other, *light of Inventions*, and not *Fire-brands of contradiction*; and eſtime of the Inquiſition of Truth, as a noble entrepriſe, and not as a delight or ornament; and imploy wealth and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar & of popular eſtimation.

As for my Labours, if any man ſhall pleaſe himſelfe or others in the reprehenſion of them, certainly they ſhall cauſe me put up that ancient requeſt, but of great patience, *verbera ſed Audi*; *let men reprehend as they pleaſe, ſo they obſerve and waigh what is ſpoken.* Verily the Appeale is lawfull (though, it may be, for this matter, not ſo needfull) if it be made *from the firſt cogitations of men unto the ſecond; and from the neerer times, to the times farther off.*

Now let us come unto the *Learning*, which thoſe two ancient *Periods of time* were not ſo bleſt as to know, I mean SACRED AND DIVINELY INSPIRED THEOLOGY, *the Nobleſt Saboath and Port of all mens Labors and Peregrinations.*

UMI

THE NINTH BOOK OF FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM VICOUNT St ALBAN.

OF THE DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

The Partitions of Inſpired Divinity *are omitted, only acceſſe is made to three* Deficients. I. The Doctrine of the right uſe of Humane Reaſon in matters Divine. II. The Doctrine of the Degrees of Vnity in the Citty of God, III. And the Emanations of SS. Scriptures.

AND now (*moſt excellent King*) we have with a ſmal Barque, ſuch as we were able to ſet out, ſail'd about the univerſal circumference, as well *of the old as the new*, World Of Sciences, with how proſperous windes and courſe, we leave to Poſterity to Judge. What remaines, but that, having accompliſht our Deſignes, we ſhould pay our vowes? But there reſts yet behinde Sacred-Inspired-Divinity; whereof if we ſhould proceed to intreat, we ſhould depart out of the *Pinnace of Humane Reaſon*, and goe into the *ſhip of the Church*, which muſt alone be governed by a *Divine ſea-needle* to direct her courſe aright: for the *ſtarres of Philoſophy* which hetherto ſhined forth unto us, and were our chiefe guide, here faile us: it were then meet, we kept ſi-

lence in this ſacred ſubject. Wherefore we ſhall omit the *juſt Partitions of this knowledge*; yet notwithſtanding ſomewhat we will caſt into this treaſury, by way of good wiſhes according to the proportion of our ſlender hability. This we doe the rather becauſe we finde no coaſt or ſpace of ground in the whole *Body of Divinity* lying vacant and untilled; ſo diligent have men been, either in ſowing of *Good ſeed*, or *ſowing of Tares*.

§ *Wherefore we* will propound *three Appendices of Theology* treating, not of the matter *informed* of by *Divinity*, or to be *informed* off; but only of the *manner of information*: neither will we annexe examples, or ſet downe precepts concerning theſe Tractates, as our manner was to doe in the reſt; that we referre to *Divines*; for theſe are (as hath been ſaid) *like meere vowes only*.

* SOLON ſive de legitimo uſu RATIONIS humanæ in DIVINIS.

I. *The Prerogative of God* Comprehends the whole man; and is extended as well to the *Reaſon*, as to the *will of Man*; that is, that man renounce himſelfe wholly, and draw neere unto God: wherefore as we are to *obay his law*, thoe we finde a reluctation in our *will*; ſo we are to *believe his word* thoe we finde a reluctation in our *Reaſon*: for if we believe only that which is agreeable unto our *Reaſon*, we give aſſent to the *Matter*, not to the *Auctor*; which is no more than we would doe towards a ſuſpected and diſcredited witneſſe: but *that Faith which was accounted unto Abraham for Righteouſneſſe*, was of ſuch a point, as whereat *Sarah laughed*, who therein was an Image of *Naturall Reaſon*. By how much therefore any *Divine Myſtery* is more diſcondant, and incredible, by ſo much the more Honour is given to God in *Believing*, and the victory of our *Faith* is made more noble: Nay even ſinners by how much the more they are ſurcharg'd in conſcience, & yet repoſe a truſt in the mercies of God for their ſalvation, by this doe more honour God; *for all deſperation is a reproach of the Deity*. Nay farther (if we truly conſider the point) it is an Act more great and high to *believe*, than to *know*, as we now *know*: for in *knowledge* mans mind ſuffers from *ſenſe*, which reſults from

Gen. 18.

from things materiate; but in *Beliefe* the ſpirit ſuffers from ſpirit, which is the worthier Agent: the caſe is otherwiſe in the *State of Glory*, for then *Faith ſhall ceaſe, & we ſhall know as we are knowne.* Wherefore we may conclude, that *Sacred Theology* is grounded on, and muſt be deduced from the *Oracles of God*; & not from the *light of Nature*, or the *Dictates of Reaſon*: for it is written, *The Heavens declare the Glory of God*, but we never finde it written *The Heavens declare the will of God*: of the *will of God*, it is ſaid, *Ad legem & Teſtimonia; ſi non fecerint ſecundum illud, &c.* This holds not only in thoſe Great Myſteries concerning the *Deity*, the *Creation*, the *Redemption*, but appertaines alſo to a more perfect interpretation of the *Law Morall*; *Love your Enimies; doe good to them that hate you &c. that you may be the children of your heavenly Father, who commands the raine to fall upon the juſt and unjuſt*, which words certainly deſerve that applauſe, *Nec vox hominem ſonat.* For it is a voice beyond the light of Nature. So likewiſe we ſee the Heathen Poets eſpecially, when they fall upon a paſſion, doe ſtill expoſtulate with *Lawes and Moralities* (which yet are farre more free and indulgent than *divine Lawes*) as if in a kind of malignity, they were repugnant to the liberty of nature;

1. Cor. xiii.

Pſal. xix.

Mat. v.

——— *Et quod natura remittit*
Invida jura negant ———

Plutar. in Alex. M.

So ſaid *Dendamis* the Indian, unto Alexanders Meſſengers, *That he had heard ſomewhat of the name of Pythagoras, and ſome other of the wiſe-men of* Græcia, *and that he held them for excellent men; but they had one fault, which was, that they had in too great Reverence and veneration, an imaginary thing they called* LAW AND MANNERS. So it muſt be confeſt, that a great part of the *Law Morall* is of that perfection, whereunto the light of nature cannot aſpire: yet notwithſtanding, that men are ſaid to have, even from the *Light and Law of Nature*, ſome notions and conceits of *virtue, vice, juſtice, injury, good and evill*, is moſt true and certaine. Yet we muſt underſtand that this *light of Nature* is uſed in two ſeverall ſences; *firſt*, as it ſprings from ſence, Induction, Reaſon, Argu-

Arguments, according to the *Lawes of Heaven and Earth*. *Secondly*, as it is imprinted and ſhines upon the ſpirit of Man by an inward inſtinct according to the *Law of Conſcience*, which is a ſparke, and, as it were, the Remaines of a Priſtine and Primitive Purity: in which latter ſenſe principally, the ſoule is participant of ſome light to behold and diſcerne the perfection of the *Morall Law*; which light is not altogither ſo cleare, but ſuch as in ſome meaſure rather reprehends *vices*, than fully informes us concerning Duties: So then the *Religion* as well *Morall* as *Myſticall* depends upon *Divine Revelation*.

V. Doctis Hookerum de LL. Eccl Politiæ l. 3. §. VIII. IX. l. I. § VIII IX.

Rom. XII.

§ The *uſe, notwithſtanding, of Humane Reaſon in matters ſpirituall*, is, without queſtion, manifold, very ſpacious, and generall; and it is not for nothing that the Apoſtle calls Religion, *our reaſonable ſervice of God*. Let it be remembred that the ſhadowes and Figures of the old Law, were *full* of *Reaſon* and *ſignification*, much differing from the ceremonies of Idolatry and magique, which were ſurde and mute; oftentimes inſtructing nothing, no not ſo much as inſinuating any thing. *The Chriſtian Faith eſpecially, as in all things, ſo in this is eminent, and deſerves highly to be magnified, that it holds a golden Mediocrity touching the uſe of Reaſon and Diſputation, which is the offſpring of Reaſon; between the Law of the Heathen and the Law of Mahomet, which have imbraced the two extremes;* for the Religion of the *Heathen*, had no conſtant beliefe or confeſsion; on the contrary in the Religion of *Mahomet*, all Diſputation was interdicted: ſo as one hath the very face of wandring and multifarious error; the other of cunning and cautelous impoſture; whereas the *Holy Chriſtian Faith* doth both admit and reject *Diſputation*, but according to due bounds.

§ The *uſe of humane Reaſon in matter pertaining to Religion* is of two ſorts; the one in the *explication and conception of the Myſtery*; the other *in Illations and Inferences derived from thence*. As touching the *Explication of Myſteries*, we ſee that God vouchſafeth to deſcend to the weakneſſe of our capacity, ſo expreſsing and unfolding his *Myſteries* as they may

may beſt be comprehended by us; *and inoculating as it were, his Revelations, upon the Conceptions and Notions of our Reaſon; and ſo applying his inſpirations to open our underſtanding, as the forme of the kay is fitted to the ward of the lock.* In which reſpect notwithſtanding, we ought not to be wanting to our ſelves; for ſeeing God himſelfe makes uſe of the faculty and function of *Reaſon* in his *Illuminations*; we ought alſo every way to imploy and improve the ſame, whereby we may become more capeable to receive and draw in ſuch holy *Myſteries:* with this caution, that the mind for its Module be dilated to the amplitude of the Myſteries; and not the myſteries be ſtreightned and girt into the narrow compaſſe of the Mind.

§ *As for Illations* we ought to know that there is allowed us a *uſe of Reaſon* and Argument, in regard of *Myſteries*, ſecondary and Reſpective; not Primitive and Abſolute: for after the *Articles and Principles of Religion*, are placed in their ſeats, ſo as they ſtand altogether exempt from the examination of *Reaſon*, it is then indeed permitted unto us to make derivations & inferences from them, according to the Analogie of them: *In things Natural* this holds not; for both the Principles are liable to examination, by *Induction* I mean, thoe not by *Syllogiſme*; and the ſame Principles have no repugnancy with *Reaſon*, but that the firſt and midle Propoſitions, may be derived from the ſame fountaine. But it is otherwiſe in the *Doctrine* of *Religion*, where the firſt propoſitions are their own ſupporters and ſubſiſtent by themſelves; and again, they are not regulate by that *Reaſon*, which inferreth conſequent propoſitions. Nor holdeth this in *Religion* alone, but alſo in other *Sciences* both of greater and ſmaller nature; namely *Where the Primarie Propoſitions are Placita not Poſita*; becauſe in *theſe* alſo the *uſe of Reaſon* cannot be abſolute. *For inſtance we ſee in Games, as Cheſſe, or the like, that the firſt Draughts and Lawes of the Play are meerely poſitive & ad placitum, which muſt abſolutely be accepted and not diſputed; but that thereupon you may win the Game, and with the beſt advan-*

tage manage your play, is a thing artificial and Rational. So it is likewiſe in Humane Lawes, wherein there be many *Maximes* (as they ſtile them) that is, meere *Placita Juris*, grounded more *upon Authority than Reaſon*; neither come they into diſceptation: but what is *moſt juſt*, not abſolutely but relatively, (that is from the Analogie of *theſe maximes*) that indeed is *Rational*, and affords a large field of Diſputation. Such therefore is that *ſecondary Reaſon*, which hath place in *ſacred Theologie* that is, which is grounded upon the *Placits of God*.

§ And as there is a double *uſe of humane Reaſon in matters Divine*; ſo in the ſame uſe there is a double exceſſe; the one *where there is made a more curious enquiry into the manner of the Myſtery, than is beſeeming*; the other *when equall Authority is attributed to Derivations, which is to Principles*. For both he, may ſeem to be *Nicodemus Diſciple*, who pertinaciouſly enquires *How can a man be borne when he is old?* and he in no wiſe can be accounted *Pauls Diſciple*, which may not ſometimes interlace his inſtructions with *Ego non Dominus*, or that, *According to my Iudgement*; for to many *Illations* that ſtile is well applied: wherefore to my underſtanding it would be a wholſome and very profitable courſe, if there were a ſober and diligent Tractate compiled, which as a kind of *Divine Dialectique* might give directions, *concerning the true limits and uſe of Reaſon in matters Divine*; which would be a kind of *Opiate Medicine, not only to quiet and lay aſleepe the vanity of Aery ſpeculations, wherewith the Schooles ſometime labour; but likewiſe not a litle calme and mitigate the furies and rage of Controverſies, which raiſe ſideings and factions in the Church*. A Treatiſe of this nature we ſet downe as *Deficient*, and terme it SOPHRON or *the right uſe of Humane Reaſon in matters Divine*.

Ioan. III.

1. Cor. VII.

* IRENÆVS, ſive de Gradibus unitatis in Civitate Dei. Luc. c. IX.

II It imports exceedingly the *Peace of the Church*, that the *League of Chriſtians*, preſcribed by our Saviour in thoſe two clauſes which ſeem to croſſe one the other, were well and clearely expounded; whereof the one defines thus, *He that is not with us is againſt us*, the other thus,

He

He that is not againſt us is with us. From thoſe two ſeverall Luc. xi.
aſſertions it plainly appears, *that there are ſome Articles wherein whoſoever diſſenteth, is to be held as not comprehended in the league: and there are other Articles, wherein a man may diſſent, and yet the league be kept entire.* For the bounds of Chriſtian community are ſet downe, *One Faith, one Baptiſme*; and not, *one Rite, one Opinion.* We ſee likewiſe the Coat of our Saviour *was entire without ſeame*; but the garment of the Church *was of divers Colours.* The *Chaffe* muſt be ſever'd from the corne in the eare; but the *Tares* may not preſently be pull'd up from the Corne in the Field. When Moſes ſaw an Egyptian fighting with an Iſraelite, he did not ſay, why ſtrive you? but drew his ſword and ſlew the Egyptian; but when he ſaw two Iſraelites fight, though it could not poſsible be that both parties had a juſt cauſe, yet he thus beſpeaks them both, *You are Brethren, why ſtrive you?* Wherefore if theſe things be well obſerved, it will be found a matter of great moment and uſe to define what, and of what latitude thoſe points are, which diſcorporate men from the body of the Church, and caſt them out and quite caſſeere them from the communion and fellowſhip of the faithfull. And if any think that this hath bin done now long agoe, let him ſeriouſly conſider with what ſyncerity, and moderation the ſame hath bin perform'd. In the mean ſpace it is very likely, that he that makes mention of *Peace*, ſhall bear away that anſwer *Jehu* gave to the Meſſengers, *Is it* PEACE *Iehu?* 1 Reg. ix.
What haſt thou to doe with PEACE? *turne and follow me. Peace* is not the matter that many ſeek after, but Parties and ſideing: Notwithſtanding we thought good to ſet downe amongſt DEFICIENTS, as a wholſome and profitable work a Treatiſe touching THE DEGREES OF UNITY IN THE CITTY OF GOD.

III. Seeing the Parts of ſacred Scripture touching the *Information of Theology*, are ſuch and ſo great; let us ſpecially conſider the Interpretation thereof; nor doe we here ſpeak of the *Authority* of *interpretateing them*, which is eſtabliſh'd

* VTRES COELESTES, ſive Emanationes Scripturarum.

eſtabliſht by the conſent of the Church, but of the *manner of Interpreting*. This is of two ſorts, *Methodicall*; and *Solute*, or at large: for this divine water, which infinitely excells that of *Iacobs well*, is drawn forth and deliver'd much after the ſame manner as *Naturall waters* uſe to be out of *wells*; for theſe at the firſt draught are either receiv'd into *Ciſternes*, and ſo may be convayed and diriv'd by many Pipes for publique and private uſe, or is powred forth immediatly in Buckets and veſſells, to be us'd out of hand, as occaſion requires.

§ Now this former *Methodicall manner* hath at length brought forth unto us *Scholaſticall Theologie*, whereby *Divinity* hath bin collected into an *Art*, as into a *Ciſterne*, and the ſtreames of *Axioms* and *Poſitions*, diſtributed from thence into all parts.

§ But in *ſolute Manner of Interpreting, two extreams* intervene; the one *preſuppoſeth ſuch a perfection in Scriptures, as that all Philoſophie ought to be fetcht and diriv'd from thoſe ſacred fountains, as if all other Philoſophy were an unhallowed and Heathenish thing*. This diſtemperature hath prevaild eſpecially in the Schoole of *Paracelſus*, and ſome others; the ſource and ſpring whereof flowed from the Rabbins and Cabaliſts. But theſe men have not attain'd their purpoſe; nor doe they give honour (as they pretend) to *Scriptures*, but rather embaſe and diſtaine them. For to ſeeke a *materiate Heaven*, and Earth in the word of God, where-
Mat. xxiv. of it is ſaid *Heaven and Earth ſhall paſſe, but my word ſhall not paſſe*, is indeed to purſue Temporarie things amongſt eternall. *for as to ſeek Divinity in Philoſophy, is as if you would ſeek the living amongſt the Dead*; ſo on the other ſide *to ſeek Philoſophy in Divinity, is all one as to ſeek the Dead amongſt the living*.

§ The other *manner* of *Interpreting*, which we ſet downe as an exceſſe, ſeems at firſt ſight ſober and chaſt; yet notwithſtanding it both diſhonoureth *Scriptures*, and is a great prejudice and detriment to the Church; and it is, to ſpeak in a word, when *Divinely inſpir'd Scriptures are*

expounded

expounded after the ſame manner that humane writings are. For it muſt be remembred, that there are two points known to God the Author of Scripture, which mans nature cannot comprehend; that is, *The ſecrets of the Heart; and the ſucceſſion of times.* Wherefore ſeeing the Precepts and Dictates of Scriptures were written and *directed to the Heart and Thoughts of men*, and comprehend the viciſſitudes of all Ages, with an eternall and certain fore-ſight of all Hereſies, *Contradictions*; differing and mutable eſtates of the Church, as well in generall, as of the Elect in ſpeciall; they are to be interpreted according to the Latitude and the proper ſenſe of the place, and reſpectively toward that preſent occaſion whereupon the words were utter'd; or in preciſe congruity from the Context of the precedent and ſubſequent words; or in contemplation of the principall ſcope of the place; but ſo as we conceive them to comprehend, not only totally or collectively, but diſtributively, even in clauſes and in every word, infinite ſprings and ſtreams of Doctrine to water every part of the Church and the ſpirits of the Faithfull. For it hath bin excellently obſerved that the Anſwers of *our Saviour*, to many of the queſtions which were propounded to him, ſeem not to the purpoſe, but as it were, impertinent to the ſtate of the queſtion demanded. The Reaſons hereof are two: the one, that being he knew the *thoughts* of thoſe that propounded the Queſtions, not from their words, as we men uſe to doe, but immediatly and of himſelfe, he made anſwer to their *thoughts* not to their *words*. The other Reaſon is, that he ſpak not only to them that were then preſent, but to us alſo who now live, and to men of every Age and place to whom the Goſpell ſhould be preacht: which ſenſe in many places of Scripture muſt take place.

§ Theſe thus briefely touch't and fore-taſted, come we now to that Treatiſe which we report as *Deficient*. There are found indeed amongſt *Theologicall writings* too many *books of Controverſies*, an infinite maſſe of that *Divinity* which we call *Poſitive*, as *Common-places*, *Particular*

Treatiſes; Caſes of Conſcience; Sermons; Homilies, and many *Prolix Commentaries* upon the *Books of Scripture:* but the Forme of writing *Deficient* is this, namely *a ſuccinct and ſound Collection, and that with judgement, of Annotations and obſervations upon particular Texts of Scripture; not dilateing into common-places, or chaſeing after Controverſies, or reduceing them into method of Art: but which be altogither ſcatterd and Naturall*; a thing indeed now and then expreſt in more learned Sermons, which for moſt part vaniſh; but which as yet, is not collected into Books that ſhould be tranſmitted to Poſterity. *Certainly* as wines which at firſt preſsing run gently, yeeld a more pleaſant taſt, than thoſe where the wine-preſſe is hard wrought; becauſe thoſe ſomewhat reliſh of the ſtone and skinne of the Grape; ſo thoſe obſervations are moſt wholſome and ſweet, which flow from Scriptures gently expreſt, and naturally expounded, and are not wreſted or drawn aſide to common-places or Controverſies; ſuch a Treatiſe we will name *The Emanations of Scripture.*

" § Thus have we made as it were, a *ſmall Globe of the*
" *Intellectuall world*, as faithfully as we could, togither with
" a deſignation and deſcription of thoſe parts which I find
" not conſtantly occupate, or not well converted by the In-
" duſtry and labours of men. In which work if I have any
" where receded from the opinion of the Ancients, I deſire
" that Poſterity would ſo judge of my intentions, as that
" this was done with a mind of further *Progreſſion*, and *Pro-*
" *ficience in melius*; and not out of a humour of *Innovation*, or
" Tranſmigration *in aliud*: for I could not be true and
" conſtant to my ſelfe, or the Argument which I have in
" hand, if I had not reſolvedly determin'd, *To adde to the in-*
" *ventions of others*, ſo farre as I was able. And I am as willing,
" and as ſyncerely wiſh that later ages may goe beyond me
" hereafter, as I have endeavourd to goe beyond others now.
" And how faithfully I have dealt in this Buſineſſe may ap-
" peare eve by this, that I have propounded my opinions eve-
" ry where naked & unarm'd, not ſeeking to prejudicare the
liberty

Liberty of others by the pugnacity of confutations. For in any thing which I have well ſet downe, I am in good hope that it will come ſo to paſſe, that if in the firſt reading a ſcruple or objection be mov'd, in the ſecond reading an anſwer will be ready made; and in thoſe things wherein I have chanc't to erre, I am ſure I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments, which commonly are of this nature, *that they procure Authority to error, and derogate from Good inventions; for from Dubitation Error acquires Honour, Truth ſuffers repulſe.* And now I call to mind an Anſwer *Themiſtocles* made, who, when an Ambaſſador in a ſet ſpeech had boaſted great matters of a ſmall Village, takes him up thus, *Friend your words would require a Citty.* Surely I ſuppoſe it may be juſtly objected to me, that *my words require an Age*, a whole Age perchance to prove them, and many Ages to perfect them. Notwithſtanding ſeeing the greateſt matters are owing unto their Principles, it is enough to me that I have *Sowen unto Poſterity and the immortall God*, whoſe divine Majeſty I humbly implore through his ſonne and our Saviour, that he would vouchſafe gratiouſly to accept theſe and ſuch *like ſacrifices of Humane underſtanding ſeaſond with Religion as with ſalt, and incenſed to his Glory.*

Plut. in vita.

THE END.

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ERRATA.

THe correction of *Textual Errors* (Courteous Reader) is a work of time, and that hath taken wing. The more faults thou findeſt, the larger field is preſented to thy humanity to practiſe in. Be indulgent in thy cenſure, and remember that *Error*, whether *Manual* or *Mental*, is an inheritance, deſcending upon us, from the *firſt of our Race*. What he ſaid of men, may be ſaid of Books,

----Vitiis nullus ſine naſcitur, optimus ille eſt
Qui minimis urgetur, ----.

MARGINAL CORRECTIONS.

PAg. 18. *for* Del. Hiſt. Fior. *read*. Diſcors ſopra Liv. *pag.* 40. *for* Pſal. 141. *read* Prov. 27. p. 81. * Errores Naturæ, &c. p. 82. * Vinculla Naturæ, &c. p. 85. * Hiſtoria Induct. p. 87. Oculus Polyph. p. 109. * Sapientia veterum. p. 132. * Philoſophia prima. p. 150. * Aſtrologia viva. * Aſtrologia ſana. p. 185. * Problemata Naturalia. p. 159. * Placita Philoſ. The ſtarre in the margent points to the laps and to the recovery. Where thou meeteſt with Vid. Digreſſ. pag. 146. 241, &c. *deleatur*, for the Interpreters Digreſſions are not publiſht. p. 470. *read* Alcoran Azoara. 5.

LECTORI ACADEMICO S.

CErte Philoſophia Naturalis *omnium Scientiarum nobiliſſima eſt, Certiſſima ac ampliſſima; utpote ſuo ambitu Complectens volumen illud magnum & admirandum* Operum Dei ac Creaturarum; *eorumq; varietatem, Conſtantiam ac ornatum.* CATALOGUS vero iſte, *qui Capita & ſumma Rerum Continet, omnium qui unquam prodiere, perfectiſſimus eſt, maxime ordinatus ac definitus : ad* imaginem mundi *compoſitus ac* Rerum; *non* intellectûs *&* ſpeculationum, *quarum non eſt ordo, numerus, neq; finis.* CATALOGUS *revera ad menſuram univerſi & experimentorum ita accommodatus,* ut naturam in natura quærat, *eamq; in omnes ejus formas mutatam conſtringat, omneſq; ejus ſtatus comprehendat;* libertatem, errores, vincula; in ſpeciebus ſuis, in monſtris, in mechanicis. *Deniq;* INDEX *eſt incompabilis, ac ſummo judicio elaboratus. Ad ſylvam & ſuppellectilem Hiſtoriarum Naturalium Colligendam, nullus uberior; ad, ſic collectam, in locos Com. & proprias claſſes digerendam, nullus Concinnior; ad, ſic digeſtam, memoriter retinendam, nullus efficacior unquam extitit; vel humano ingenio ac induſtria excogitari poteſt.* Interpres *ſic cogitavit? quod* Juventuti Academicæ ac veritatis amantibus *notum fieri, ipſorum intereſſe putavit. Erunt fortaſsis Pedarii Senatores, qui, modernis methodis adſueti, aliam ſententiam ferent; atque ferant aliam;* Sed juſtificata eſt ſapientia à filiis ſuis.

CAT.

CATALOGVS
HISTORIARUM
PARTICVLARVM.

Secundùm Capita.

1. Historia Cœlestium; sive Astronomica.
2. Historia configurationis Cœli & partium ejus, versùs Terram & partes ejus; sive Cosmographica.
3. Historia Cometarum.
4. Historia Meteororum ignitorum.
5. Historia Fulgurum, Fluminum, Tonitruum, & Coruscationum.
6. Historia Ventorum, & Flatuum repentinorum, & Vndulationum Aeris.
7. Historia Iridum.
8. Historia Nubium, prout supernè conspiciuntur.
9. Historia Expansionis Cœruleæ, Crepusculi, plurium Solium, plurium Lunarum, Halonum, Colorum variorum Solis & Lunæ; atq; omnis varietatis Cœlestium ad aspectum, quæ fit ratione Medii.
10. Historia Pluviarum Ordinariarum, Procellosarum, & Prodigiosarum; etiam Cataractarum (quas vocant) Cœli, & similium.
11. Historia Grandinis, Nivis, Gelu, Pruinæ, Nebulæ, Roris, & similium.
12. Historia omnium aliorum Cadentium sive Descendentium ex alto, & supernè generatorum.
13. Historia Sonituum in alto (si modò sint aliqui) præter Tonitrua.
14. Historia Aeris, in Toto, sive in Configuratione Mundi
15. Historia Tempestatum, sive Temperamentorum Anni, tam secundùm variationes Regionum, quàm secundùm accidentia Temporum, & periodos Annorum; Diluviorum, Fervorum, Siccitatum, & similium.
16. Historia Terræ & Maris; Figuræ & Ambitûs ipsorum, & Configurationis ipsorum inter se, atq; Exporrectionis ipsorum in latum aut angustum; Insularum Terræ in Mari, Sinuum Maris, & Lacuum salsorum in Terrâ, Isthmorum, Promontoriorum.
17. Historia Motuum (si qui sint) globi Terræ & Maris; & ex quibus Experimentis illi colligi possint.
18. Historia Motuum majorum & Perturbationum in Terrâ & Mari; nempè Terræ Motuum & Tremorum & Hiatuum, Insularum de novo enascentium, Insularum fluctuantium, Abruptionum Terrarum per ingressum Maris, Invasionum & Illuvionum, & contrà Desertionum Maris; Eruptionum ignium è terrâ, Eruptionum subitanearum Aquarum è Terrâ, & similium.
19. Historia Geographica Naturalis, Montium, Vallium, Sylvarum, Planitierum, Arenarum, Paludum, Lacuum, Fluviorum, Torrentium, Fontium, & omnis diversitatis scaturiginis ipsorum, & similium: missis Gentibus, Provinciis, Vrbibus, & hujusmodi Civilibus.
20. Historia Fluxuum & Refluxuum Maris, Euriporum, Vndulationum & Motuum Maris aliorum.

21. Hiſtoria cæterorum Accidentium Maris; Salſuginis ejus, Colorum diverſorum, Profunditatis: & Rupium, Montium, & Vallium ſubmarinarum, & ſimillùm.

Sequuntur Hiſtoriæ Maſſarum majorum.

22. Hiſtoria Flammæ, & Ignitorum.
23. Hiſtoria Aeris, in ſubſtantiâ, non in configuratione.
24. Hiſtoria Aquæ, in Subſtantiâ, non in Configuratione.
25. Hiſtoria Terræ & diverſitatis ejus, in Subſtantiâ, non in Configuratione.

Sequuntur Hiſtoriæ Specierum.

26. Hiſtoria Metallorum perfectorum, Auri, Argenti; & Minerarum, Venarum, Marcaſitarũ eorundem: Operaria quoque in Mineris ipſorum.
27. Hiſtoria Argenti Vivi.
28. Hiſtoria Foſſilium; veluti Vitrioli, & Sulphuris, &c.
29. Hiſtoria Gemmarum; veluti Adamantis, Rubini, &c.
30. Hiſtoria Lapidum; ut Marmoris, Lapidis Lydii, Silicis, &c.
31. Hiſtoria Magnetis.
32. Hiſtoria Corporum Miſcellaneorum, quæ nec ſunt Foſſilia prorsùs, nec Vegetabilia; ut Salium, Succini, Ambræ-griſeæ, &c.
33. Hiſtoria Chymica circà Metalla & Mineralia.
34. Hiſtoria Plantarum, Arborum, Fruticum, Herbarum: & Partium eorum, Radicum, Caulium, Ligni, Foliorum, Florum, Fructuum, Seminum, Lachrymarum, &c.
35. Hiſtoria Chymica circa Vegetabilia.
36. Hiſtoria Piſcium, & partium ac Generationis ipſorum.
37. Hiſtoria Volatilium, & Partium ac Generationis ipſorum.
38. Hiſtoria Quadrupedum, & Partium ac Generationis ipſorum.
39. Hiſtoria Serpentum, Vermium, Muſcarum, & cæterorum Inſectorum; & partium ac generationis ipſorum.
40. Hiſtoria Chymica circa ea quæ ſumuntur ab Animalibus.

Sequuntur Hiſtoriæ Hominis.

41. Hiſtoria Figuræ, & Membrorum externorum Hominis, Staturæ, Compagis, Vultûs, & Lineamentorum, eorumq; varietatis ſecundùm Gentes & Climata, aut alias minores Differentias.
42. Hiſtoria Phyſiognomica ſuper ipſa.
43. Hiſtoria Anatomica, ſive Membrorum internorum Hominis; & varietatis ipſorum, quatenùs invenitur in ipsâ naturali Compage & Structurâ, & non tantùm quoad Morbos & Accidentia præternaturalia.
44. Hiſtoria partium ſimilarium Hominis; ut Carnis, Oſſium, Membranarum, &c.
45. Hiſtoria Humorum in Homine; Sanguinis, Bilis, Spermatis, &c.
46. Hiſtoria Excrementorum; Sputi, Vrinarum, Sudorum, Sedimentorum, Capillorum, Pilorum, Rediviarum, Vnguium, & ſimilium.
47. Hiſtoria Facultatum; Attractionis, Digeſtionis, Retentionis, Expulſionis, Sanguificationis, Aſſimilationis alimentorum in membra, Verſionis Sanguinis & Floris ejus in Spiritum, &c.
48. Hiſtoria Motuum Naturalium & Involuntariorum; ut Motûs Cordis, Motûs

tûs Pulſuum, Sternutationis, Motûs Pulmonum, Motûs Erectionis Virgæ, &c.

49. Hiſtoria Motuum mixtorum ex Naturalibus & voluntariis; veluti Reſpirationis, Tuſſis, Vrinationis, Sedis, &c.

50. Hiſtoria Motuum Voluntariorum; ut Inſtrumentorum ad voces articulatas; ut Motuum Oculorum, Linguæ, Faucium, Manuum, Digitorum; Deglutitionis, &c.

51. Hiſtoria Somni & Inſomniorum.

52. Hiſtoria diverſorum Habituum Corporis; Pinguis, Macilenti; Complexionum, (quas vocant,) &c.

53. Hiſtoria Generationis Hominum.

54. Hiſtoria Conceptionis, Vivificationis, Geſtationis in utero, Partûs, &c.

55. Hiſtoria Alimentationis Hominis, atq; omnis Edulii & Potabilis, atq; omnis Diætæ; & Varietatis ipſorum ſecundùm Gentes aut minores differentias.

56. Hiſtoria Augmentationis & Incrementi Corporis in Toto & Partibus ipſius.

57. Hiſtoria Decurſûs Ætatis; Infantiæ, Pueritiæ, Iuventutis, Senectutis, Longævitatis, Brevitatis Vitæ, & ſimilium, ſecundùm Gentes & minores differentias.

58. Hiſtoria Vitæ & Mortis.

59. Hiſtoria Medicinalis Morborum, & Symptomatum & Signorum eorundem.

60. Hiſtoria Medicinalis, Curæ, & Remediorum, & Liberationum à Morbis.

61. Hiſtoria Medicinalis eorum quæ conſervant Corpus & Sanitatem.

62. Hiſtoria Medicinalis eorum quæ pertinent ad Formam & Decus Corporis, &c.

63. Hiſtoria Medicinalis eorum quæ corpus alterant, & pertinent ad Regimen Alterativum.

64. Hiſtoria Pharmaco-polaris.

65. Hiſtoria Chirurgica.

66. Hiſtoria Chymica circa Medicinas.

67. Hiſtoria Viſûs & viſibilium, ſive Optica.

68. Hiſtoria Picturæ, Sculptoria, Plaſtica, &c.

69. Hiſtoria Auditûs & Sonorum.

70. Hiſtoria Muſica.

71. Hiſtoria Olfactûs, & Odorum.

72. Hiſtoria Guſtûs & Saporum.

73. Hiſtoria Tactûs, & ejus Objectorum.

74. Hiſtoria Veneris, ut ſpeciei Tactûs.

75. Hiſtoria Dolorum corporeorum, ut ſpeciei Tactûs.

76. Hiſtoria Voluptatis & Doloris in genere.

77. Hiſtoria Affectuum; ut Iræ, Amoris, Verecundiæ, &c.

78. Hiſtoria Facultatum Intellectualium; Cogitativæ, Phantaſiæ, Diſcurſûs, Memoriæ &c.

79. Hiſtoria Divinationum Naturalium.

80. Hiſtoria Dignotionum, ſive Diacriſium occultarum Naturalium.

81. Hiſtoria Coquinaria; & Artium ſubſervientium, veluti Macellaria, Aviaria &c.

82. Hiſtoria Piſtoria, & Panificiorum; & Artium ſubſervientium, ut Molendinaria, &c.

83. Hiſtoria Vinaria.

84. Hiſtoria Cellaria, & diverſorum generum Potûs.

85. Hiſtoria Bellariorum & Confecturarum.
86. Hiſtoria Mellis.
87. Hiſtoria Sacchari.
88. Hiſtoria Lacticiniorum.
89. Hiſtoria Balneatoria, & Vnguentaria.
90. Hiſtoria Miſcellanea circa curam corporis; Tonſorum, Odorariorum, &c.
91. Hiſtoria Auri-fabrilis, & Artium ſubſervientium.
92. Hiſtoria Lanificiorum, & Artium ſubſervientium.
93. Hiſtoria Opificiorum è Serico & Bombyce, & Artium ſubſervientium.
94. Hiſtoria Opificiorum ex Lino, Cannabio, Goſſipio, Setis, & aliis Filaceis; & Artium ſubſervientium.
95 Hiſtoria Plumificiorum.
96. Hiſtoria Textoria, & Artium ſubſervientium.
97. Hiſtoria Tinctoria.
98. Hiſtoria Coriaria, Alutaria; & Artium ſubſervientium.
99. Hiſtoria Culcitraria & Plumaria.
100. Hiſtoria Ferri-Fabrilis.
101. Hiſtoria Latomiæ ſive Lapicidarum.
102. Hiſtoria Lateraria, & Tegularia.
103. Hiſtoria Figularis.
104. Hiſtoria Cæmentaria, & Cruſtaria.
105. Hiſtoria Ligni-fabrilis.
106. Hiſtoria Plumbaria.
107. Hiſtoria Vitri & omnium Vitreorum, & Vitriaria.
108. Hiſtoria Architecturæ in genere.
109. Hiſtoria Plauſtraria, Rhedaria, Lecticaria, &c.
110. Hiſtoria Typographica, Libraria, Scriptoria, Sigillatoria; Atramenti, Calami, Papyri, Membranæ, &c.
111. Hiſtoria Ceræ.
112. Hiſtoria Viminaria.
113. Hiſtoria Storearia, & Opificiorum ex Stramine, Scirpis, & ſimilibus.
114. Hiſtoria Lotricaria, Scoparia, &c.
115. Hiſtoria Agriculturæ, Paſcuariæ, Cultûs Sylvarum, &c.
116. Hiſtoria Hortulana.
117. Hiſtoria Piſcatoria.
118. Hiſtoria Venationis & Aucupii.
119. Hiſtoria Rei Bellicæ, & Artium ſubſervientium; ut Armamentaria, Arcuaria, Sagittaria, Sclopetaria, Tormentaria, Baliſtaria, Machinaria, &c.
120. Hiſtoria Rei Nauticæ, & Practicarum, & Artium ſubſervientium.
121. Hiſtoria Athletica, & omnis generis Exercitationum Hominis.
122. Hiſtoria Rei Equeſtris.
123. Hiſtoria Ludorum omnis generis.
124. Hiſtoria Præſtigiatorum & Circulatorum.
125. Hiſtoria Miſcellanea diverſarum Materiarum Artificialium; ut Eſmaltæ, Porcellanæ, complurium Cæmentorum, &c.
126. Hiſtoria Salium.
127. Hiſtoria Miſcellanea diverſarum Machinarum, & Motuum.
128. Hiſtoria Miſcellanea Experimentorum Vulgarium, quæ non coaluerunt in Artem.

Etiam Mathematicarum purarum Hiſtoriæ conſcribendæ ſunt, licèt ſint potiùs Obſervationes quàm Experimenta.

129. Hiſtoria naturarum & poteſtatum Numerorum.

130.

130. Hiſtoria naturarum & poteſtatum Figurarum.

NOn abs re fuerit admonere, quòd, cum neceſſe ſit multa ex Experimentis ſub duobus Titulis vel pluribus cadere, (*veluti* Hiſtoria Plantarum, & Hiſtoria Artis Hortulanæ *multa habebunt ferè communia*) *commodior ſit inquiſitio per Artes, Diſpoſitio verò per Corpora. Parùm enim nobis cura eſt de Artibus ipſis Mechanicis, ſed tantùm de iis quæ afferunt ad inſtruendam Philoſophiam. Verùm hæc è re natâ meliùs regentur.*

FINIS.

Typographus Lectori.

VNA aut alterâ Paginâ vacante in damnum Bibliopolæ, ad implendam areolam inanem, Nobiliſſ. Authoris Litteras, ſuo Collegio miſſas ac propriâ manu munitas, ſubjungere viſum eſt. Quòd vivit Chartula hæc peritura, id noſtrum munus eſt; Tuum Lector, ſi vigeat. Succincta pagina eſt, ſed ſolida: & excellentium virorum, etiam Reliquiæ conſervandæ. *Vale.*

FRA. DE VERVLAMIO

Vice-Comes SANCTI ALBANI.

PERCELEBRI COLLEGIO SANCTÆ *ET INDIVIDVÆ TRINITATIS* *IN* CANTABRIGIA S.

RES omnes earumq́ progressus initiis suis debentur: Itaq́ cum initia Scientiarum è Fontibus vestris hauserim, incrementa ipsarum vobis rependenda existimavi. Spero itidem fore, ut hæc nostra apud vos tanquam in Solo nativo Feliciùs succrescant. Quamobrem & vos hortor, ut salvâ animi modestia, & erga veteres reverentiâ, ipsi quoq́; Scientiarum Augmentis *non desitis: verum ut post volumina sacra verbi Dei & Scripturarum, secundo loco volumen illud magnum operum Dei & Creaturarum, strenuè, & præ omnibus libris, qui pro Commentariis tantùm haberi debent, evolvatis.* Valete.

¶ Excudebat Oxonii
LEONARDVS LICHFIELD
Primarius Academiæ
Typographus.

Impensis ROBERTI YOVNG,
& EDVARDI FORREST.

Anno Salutis,

M. DC. XXXX.